BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN 


THE 


BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN 


TENNESSEE 


NOVEMBER  30,  1864 


JHonograpf) 


BY  JACOB   D,  COX 

\  * 

LATE  MAJOR-GENERAL  COMMANDING  TWENTY-THIRD  ARMY  CORPS 


WITH    MAPS 


NEW   YORK 
CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S   SONS 

1897 


t\  / 


Copyright,  1897, 
BY  CHARLES  SCRIBNEK'S  SONS. 


ress: 

JOHN  WILSON  AND  SON,  CAMBRIDGE,  U.S.A. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   I 

PAGE 

INTRODUCTORY     

Results  of  the  Atlanta  Campaign  —  Hood's  Movement  on  SJieman's 
Communications  —  Jefferson  Davis's  Relations  to  it — Beauregard's 

—  Hood's  March  across  Alabama  —  Delay  at  Tuscumbia— Sher 
man's  Decision  to  Marcli  to  the  Sea  —  Thomas  left  in  Tennessee  — 
Schofield  joins  him  —  Strength  of  contending  Forces  —  Problem  of 
Concentration  —  Schofield  at   I'ulaski  —  Hood's  Advance  —  Scho- 
field's  Retreat  to  Franklin—  Offer  of  Battle  — Confederate  Disaster 

—  Tactical    Problems  —  Comparisons  —  Erroneous    Accounts  — 
Official  Records  of  the  War  —  Schotield  as  Commander. 

CHAPTER  II 
FROM  COLUMBIA  TO  FRANKLIN    . 

The  Line  of  Duck  River  —  Thomas  urgent  that  Hood  should  be  held 
back  —  Positions  of  the  Armies  —  Hood  begins  the  Flank  Movement 

—  Telegraphic  Correspondence  —  How  not  to  do  it  —  Division  of 
Confederate  Forces — Schofield's  Cavalry  lose  Communication  with 
him  —  Combat  at  Spring  Hill  —  Midnight  March  to  Franklin. 

CHAPTER   III 
TAKING  POSITION  AT  FRANKLIN 37 

Arrival  at  Franklin  — No  Bridge  or  Pontoons — _Hood  to  be  held  back 

—  Schofield's  Oral  Directions  —  His  Correspondence  with  Thomas 

—  Delay  in  Arrival  of  Reinforcements  at  Nashville  —  Can  you  hold 
Hood  back  three  Days  ?  —  Orders  to  continue  Retreat  —  The  Posi 
tion  at  Franklin  —  The  Carter  House  —  The  Town  and  the  River 

—  The  Field  in  Front  —  The  Defensive  Line  —  Repairing  Bridges 
/    — Twenty-third    Corps  Positions  —  Reilly's   Division  —  Ruger's 

Division  —  The    Works   on    Carter   Hill  —  Retrenchment  across 
Turnpike — Kimball's  Division. 


886731 


vi  Contents 

CHAPTER  IV 

PAGE 

THE  REAR  GUARD  —  WAGNER'S  DIVISION     .....     64 

Guarding  the  Trains  —  Collecting  the  Stragglers  —  Halt  on  Winstead 
Hill  —  Conditional  Orders — Skirmishing  with  Forrest  —  Hood's 
Infantry  press  close  —  Will  he  turn  the  Position  or  attack?  — 
Wagner  withdraws  Lane's  Brigade  to  Trivet  Knob —  Conrad's  far 
ther  in  Rear  —  OpdyckeV.  \vitliiu  our  Works  — -  Wagner's  Message 
to  Stanley  —  His  Colloquy  with  Opdycke  —  His  Orders  to  Lane  and 
Conrad  to  Fight  —  The  Sergeants  to  fix  Bayonets  —  Ruger's  Prep 
arations  —  Confederates  forming  for  the  Attack. 

CHAPTER  V 
THE  CONFEDERATE  ARRAY 83 

Hood  at  Spring  Hill  —  Discovers  Schofield's  Escape  —  Cavalry  in 
Pursuit  —  Infantry  hastening  after  —  He  decides  to  Assault  —  His 
Cavalry  Positions  —  The  Infantry  —  Deployment  and  Formation  — 
Stewart's  Corps  on  Hood's  Right  —  Cheatham's  in  Centre  and  Left 

—  Part  of  Lee's  in  Reserve  —  Artillery  in  Intervals  —  Chalmers's 
Cavalry  on  extreme  Left  —  Hood's  Headquarters. 

CHAPTER  VI 
THE  ASSAULT  ox  WAGNER'S  OUTPOST 91 

View  from  the  Knoll  on  our  Left  —  Skirmishing  in  Front  —  The  Out 
post  trying  to  intrench  —  Confederate  Advance  —  Colonel  Capers's 
Description  — Artillery  opens  on  both  Sides  —  Surgeon  Hill's  View 
from  Fort  Granger  —  Orders  sent  along  our  Line  —  To  Opdycke 
in  Reserve  —  Retreat  of  the  Outpost — My  Ride  to  the  Centre  — 
Momentary  Break  there  —  Reilly's  Rally — Opdycke's  Rush  for 
ward  —  Strickland's  Rally  —  Meeting  Stanley  —  The  Din  of  Battle 

—  Stanley  wounded. 

CHAPTER  VII 
THE  FIRST  FIGHT  AT  THE  CENTRE 102 

Hood's  Advance  retarded  by  the  Outpost  — His  Right  Wing  farthest 
forward  —  My  Staff  at  the  Carter  House  —  Wagner  also  there  — 


Contents  vii 

Messages  from  the  Outpost  —  Wagner's  Replies  —  Marshall's  Guns 
eomo  in  —  Disorganized  Retreat  of  the  Outpost  —  Wagner's  Efforts 
to  rally  —  Swept  along  to  the  Town  —  Cannon  in  the  Enemy's 
Hands  —  But  soon  retaken  —  Eight  over  the  Batteries  —  Reilly's 
Second  Line  charges  —  Fight  at  the  Cotton-Gin  —  Destruction  of 
Confederates  —  Heroism  of  their  Officers  —  Reilly's  Report  — 
Opdycke's  Formation  for  the  Charge —  Position  of  his  Regiments 
—  Of  Strickland's  —  Focus  of  the  Fight— Two  Lines  on  Carter 
Hill— Turn  of  the  Tide. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

PAGE 

THE  FIGHT  OF  OUR  LEFT  WING  ........     121 

Advance  of  Stewart's  Corps  —  The  narrowing  Field  —  Thorny  Hedges 
—  Changes  in  the  Array  —  Walthall's  Report  —  Loring's  Division 
strikes  Stiles  —  Fighting  in  the  Railway  Cut  —  Batteries  at  Close 
Range  —  Loring  Repulsed  —  The  Attack  on  Casement  —  General 
Adams's  Death  —  Our  Line  successfully  held. 


CHAPTER  IX 
THE  FIGHT  OF  OUR  RIGHT  WING 130 

Cheatham's  Corps  —  Convergent  Attack  of  Cleburne  and  Brown  — 
Line  of  Lane's  Retreat  —  Moore's  Brigade  Front  unmasked  —  Our 
Artillery  Cross-fire  —  Advance  of  Bate's  Division  —  Battery  at  the 
Bostick  Place  — Close  Quarters  at  Moore's  Centre  —  Help  from 
Kimball  —  Chalmers's  Cavalry  attack  Kimball  —  Infantry  attack 
his  Left  — Cavalry  his  Centre  and  Right  — Confederates  Repulsed. 


CHAPTER   X 

THE  SITUATION  AT  SUNSET  .... 

Determined  Fighting  at  the  Centre  —  Examination  of  Strickland's 
Line  —  Fnemy  holding  outside  of  his  Works  —  The  Second  Line 
—  Relative  Position  of  Opdycke  and  Strickland  —  Orders  to  the 
latter  —  Visit  to  Ruger  —  Wagner  reorganizing —  Visit  to  extreme 
Left  —  Reinforcements  for  the  Centre. 


viii  Contents 

CHAPTER  XI 

PAGE 

FROM  THE  CONFEDERATE  STANDPOINT 118 

Multiplication  of  Lines  of  Attack  —  How  caused  —  Walthall's  Descrip 
tion  of  the  Assault  —  In  the  Abattis  —  Repulsed  in  Confusion  —  The 
Ditch  at  the  Cotton-gin  —  Brown's  Attack  on  Right  Centre—  Bate 
overlaps  him  —  Johnson's  Attack  after  Dark  —  Hood's  Description 

—  S.   D.    Lee's  —  Colonel    Capers's  —  Capture    of   Gordon  —  His 
Account  of  the  Charge  —  Clebume  falls. 

CHAPTER   XTT 
THE  BATTLE  AFTER  DARK 160 

In  the  Locust  Grove  —  The  Two  Lines  —  The  1 12th  Illinois  —  Reilly's 
Detachment  —  Sweeping  the  Ditches  —  Captain  Cunningham's 
Story  —  The  Sergeant  Major's  —  General  Strahl's  Death —  Hood's 
Reserves  —  Rallying  on  them  —  Later  Alarms  —  Orders  to  Wood's 
Division  —  Preparations  for  Withdrawal. 

CHAPTER  XIII 
WILSON'S  CAVALRY  ENGAGEMENT 172 

Morning  Positions — Covering  both  Flanks  of  the  Army — Forrest's 
Advance  —  The  Fords  of  the  Harpeth  —  Confederates  cross  at 
Hughes's  Ford  —  Wilson  attacks  —  Sharp  Combat  —  Enemy  re 
treat  across  the  River  —  Covering  the  March  to  Nashville. 

CHAPTER  XIV 
OUR  WITHDRAWAL ISO 

The  Medical  Department  —  Field  Hospitals  —  Ambulance  Train  — 
Sick  and  Wounded  sent  to  Nashville  —  Work  of  Surgical  Corps 
during  the  Battle  —  Artillery  gradually  withdrawn  —  Arrangement 
of  Skirmish  Lines  —  Movement  of  the  Infantry  —  Orders  as  to  Kim- 
ball's  and  Wagner's  March  —  Misunderstanding  —  March  of  Ruger, 
Opdycke,  and  Reilly  —  A  burning  Building  — The  Field  in  Front 

—  The  March  to  Nashville. 


Contents  ix 

CHAPTER  XV 

PAGE 

FRANKLIN  AFTER  THE  BATTLE 194 

Hood's  Midnight  Order  —  Condition  of  his  Army  —  Discussion  of 
Probabilities  ; —  Confederates  move  by  the  Flank —  Experiences  of 
the  Carter  Family  —  Colonel  Carter's  Story  —  Defensive  Armor  — 
Refuge  in  the  Cellar  — The  terrible  Night—  Captain  Carter's  Fate 

—  Private  Gist's  Adventures  —  General  Cooper's  Retreat. 

CHAPTER   XVI 
RESULTS  AND  LESSONS 207 

Sources  of  Statistical  Knowledge  —  Hood's  Forces  before  the  Battle  — 
Schofield's —  Numbers  actually  engaged  —  Hood's  Casualties  — 
Loss  of  Officers  —  Schofield's  Losses — Analysis  of  them  —  The 
Problem  of  Attack  and  Defence  -  Fire  Discipline. 

CHAPTER   XVII 
DISCUSSION  OF  WAGNER'S  CONDUCT 220 

Natural  Rise  of  Controversies  —  Corps  Feeling  —  Good  Comradeship 

—  Wagner's  Personal    Situation  —  Disposition  to  befriend  him  — 
Criticisms  by  his   Subordinates  —  Efforts   to   allay  the  Irritation 

—  Correspondence  —  Preliminary    Reports  —  Conrad's   Report  — 
Wagner  retired  from  the  Division  —  Leaves  the  Army. 

CHAPTER  XVIII 
DOUBLE  BREASTWORKS  ON  CARTER  HILI 233 

The  Two  Lines  at  our  Right  Centre  —  Conflicting  Memory  of  Eye 
witnesses  —  Confederate  Testimony  —  Solution  of  the  Matter  — 
Bullet  Marks  on  Brick  Smoke-house  —  Summary  of  the  Evidence. 

CHAPTER  XIX 
THE  RALLYING  OF  THE  OUTPOST  BRIGADES    ....     243 

Value  of  Detailed  Reports  — Landmarks  —  Lines  of  Retreat  from  the 
Outpost —  Crowding  toward  the  Centre — Significant  Omissions  — 
Lists  of  Missing  —  What  they  Teach  —  Reports  Compared  —  Inci 
dents  relating  to  Captured  Flags  —  Statements  of  various  Officers 

—  Conclusions  from  the  Facts. 


x  Contents 

CHAPTER  XX 

PAGE 

AN  UNEXPECTED  CONTROVERSY 258 

Colonel  Stone's  Paper  in  Century  War  Book  —  General  Stanley's 
Criticism  —  A  Violent  Attack  —  Earlier  Correspondence  —  Nine 
Points  —  Two  Corrections  —  Basis  of  a  Historical  Narrative. 

CHAPTER   XXI 
CONTROVERTED  POINTS  206 

Work  assigned  the  Twenty-third  Corps  —  Detachment  of  Fourth 
Corps  Batteries  —  Orders  to  Ruger  and  Kimball —  Detachments 
often  Necessary — Articles  of  War  and  Regulations —  Questions 
of  Command —  Stanley  on  North  Side  of  River —  Jlis  Ride  to  the 
Front  —  Soon  Wounded  —  lie  Retires — Statements  of  Officers  — 
At  the.  Field  Hospital  —  At  Scliofield's  Headquarters  —  Summary 
—  Official  Reports  —  Analysis  of  Stanley's  —  Contemporaneous 
Records  —  Conclusion. 


APPENDICES 

A.  GENERAL  SCHOFIELD'S  REPORT     .  .  305 

B.  GENERAL  Cox's  REPORT      .     .  ,311 

C.  GENERAL  WOOD'S  REPORT   .     .  ......  323 

D.  GENERAL  STANLEY'S  REPORT  .     .          327 

E.  COLONEL  Dow's  STATEMENT 332 

F.  COLONEL  Cox's   STATEMENTS  .  336 


INDEX  341 


BOOKS  OF  FREQUENT  REFERENCE 

THE i u  FULL  TITLES 

Official  Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Annies.  Series 
I.  Referred  to  by  the  initials  O.  11.,  with  the  numbers  of 
the  original  volumes  in  parts. 

Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War.  4  vols.  The  Century 
Co.  1884-88.  Referred  to  as  Century  War  Book. 

Sketches  of  War  History.  Papers  published  by  the  Ohio  Com- 
mandery  of  the  Loyal  Legion.  Referred  to  as  Ohio  L.  L. 
Papers. 

History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  By  Thomas  B.  Van 
Home,  Chaplain  U,  S.  A.  2  vols.  8vo,  and  Atlas.  Cincin 
nati:  Robert  Clarke  &  Co.  1875.  Referred  to  as  Van 
Home's  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

The  Life  of  Major  General  George  H.  Thomas.  By  Thomas  B. 
Van  Home,  U.  S.  A.  Xew  York  :  Charles  Scribner's  Sons. 
1882.  Referred  to  as  Van  Home's  Life  of  Thomas. 

Narrative  of  Military  Operations  directed,  during  the  late  War 
between  the  States,  by  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  General  C.  S.  A. 
New  York  :  Apple  ton  &  Co.  1874.  Referred  to  as  Johnston's 
Narrative. 

Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government.  By  Jefferson 
Davis.  New  York  :  Appleton  &  Co.  1881.  Referred  to  as 
Davis's  Rise  and  Fall,  etc. 

Advance  and  Retreat :  Personal  Experiences  in  the  United 
States  and  Confederate  States  Armies.  By  J.  B.  Hood, 
Lieut.  General  Confederate  Army.  New  Orleans.  1880. 
Referred  to  as  Hood's  Advance  and  Retreat. 

Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War :  Atlanta.  By  Jacob  D.  Cox,  late 
Major  General  Commanding  Twenty-third  Army  Corps. 
New  York:  Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  1881.  Referred  to 
as  Atlanta. 

Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War  :  The  March  to  the  Sea,  Franklin 
and  Nashville.  By  Jacob  D.  Cox,  etc.  New  York  :  Charles 
Scribner's  Sons.  1882.  Referred  to  as  Franklin  and  Nash 
ville. 

Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War :  Statistical  Record  of  the  Armies 
of  the  United  States.  By  Frederick  Phisterer,  late  Captain 
U.  S.  A.  New  York:  Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  1883.  Re 
ferred  to  as  Phisterer's  Statistical  Record. 


LIST   OF  MAPS 

1.  Map  of  Middle  Tennessee  and  Northern  Alabama. 

To  face  Chapter  I. 

2.  Sketch  Map  of  Carter  Hill,  from  Survey  by  Colonel  M.  B. 

Carter. 

To  face  Page  43. 

3.  Map  of  the  Battle-field  of  Franklin.     By  Major  W.  J.  Twi 

ning,  U.  S.  A.,  Chief  Engineer  Army  of  the  Ohio.  The 
original  of  this  Map  is  in  the  Atlas  accompanying  the 
Official  Records,  Plate  CXXXV.,  C,  No.  5. 

To  face  Page  45. 

4.  Map  of  the  Battle-field  of  Franklin.    By  Major  W.  F.  Foster, 

Engineer  of  Stewart's  Corps,  Confederate  Army.  The 
original  of  this  Map  is  in  the  Atlas  accompanying  the 
Official  Records,  Plate  LXXIIL,  No.  3. 

To  face  Page  83. 


THE   BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN 


CHAPTER    I 


INTRODUCTORY 


Results  of  the  Atlanta  Campaign  —  Hood's  Movement  on  Sherman's 
Communications  —  Jefferson  Davis's  Relations  to  it  —  Beauregard's 

—  Hood's  March  across  Alabama  —  Delay  at  Tuscumbia — Sher 
man's  Decision  to  March  to  the  Sea  —  Thomas  left  in  Tennessee 

—  Schofield  joins  him  —  Strength  of   contending  Forces  —  Prob 
lem  of  Concentration  —  Schofield  at  Pulaski  —  Hood's  Advance  — 
Schofield's  Retreat  to  Franklin—  Offer  of  Battle — Confederate  Dis 
aster  —  Tactical  Problems  —  Comparisons  —  Erroneous  Accounts 

—  Official  Records  of  the  War  —  Schofield  as  Commander. 

THAT  the  battle  of  Franklin  was  a  hard  fought  and 
bloody  combat  is  now  generally  known ;  but  this  of 
itself  would  not  warrant  a  monograph  giving  with 
some  fulness  of  detail  the  progress  and  the  incidents 
of  the  fight.  There  must  be  a  limit  to  the  minuteness 
of  history  even  in  the  most  important  events,  and  in 
military  history  no  less  than  in  the  narration  of  civil 
affairs.  When,  however,  a  battle  proves  to  be  a  turn 
ing  point  in  a  decisive  campaign,  —  when  it  marks 
the  "  beginning  of  the  end  "  in  such  a  contest  as  our 
civil  war,  —  when  it  justifies  the  strategy  of  such  a 
leader  as  Sherman  in  his  division  of  his  forces  in 
Georgia  and  making  the  March  to  the  Sea,  —  when  in 
addition  to  this  the  combat  may  be  fairly  said  to  be  a 
crucial  experiment  in  the  problem  of  attack  and  de 
fence  of  fieldworks  in  an  open  country,  —  we  can 


2  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

hardly  place  a  limit  to  the  desirability  of  detailed 
knowledge.  Everything  which  helps  to  a  complete 
understanding  is  then  made  welcome.  Even  those 
things  which  at  first  blush  may  seem  trivial  are  not 
so  if  they  aid  us  in  comprehending  how  men  live,  and 
act,  and  think,  and  fight,  and  die,  on  such  a  stub 
bornly  contested  field. 

In  all  uhesc  respects  the  battle  of  Franklin  was  an 
^^  jjnportant  one;1  but  besides  these  claims  upon  histori- 
•-'  [-  [  vitL  *afttent£tfn^  i&  was  for  a  long  time  greatly  mis 
understood,  and  controversies  of  all  sorts  grew  out  of 
it  and  the  campaign  of  which  it  was  a  part.  For 
thirty  years  the  author  has  been  frequently  urged  by 
his  comrades  to  accept  the  task  of  writing  the  story 
of  the  battle,  and  when  he  had  prepared  a  brief  his 
tory  of  the  campaign,1  the  desire  for  a  much  fuller 
account  of  the  battle  itself  did  not  appear  to  be 
satisfied.  He  made  conditional  promises  that,  if  he 
should  live  to  see  the  completion  of  the  great  work 
undertaken  by  the  government  in  printing  the  "  Offi 
cial  Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Armies," 
he  would  accept  the  duty.  The  last  volumes  of  the 
principal  series  of  those  records  are  .passing  through 
the  press,  and  the  following  pages  are  written  in  the 
effort  to  redeem  his  promise. 

Soon  after  the  fall  of  Atlanta,  Mr.  Davis,  the  Con 
federate  President,  visited  General  Hood  in  his 
Georgia  camp  for  a  conference  upon  the  further 
prosecution  of  the  campaign.  Hood's  energy  was 
indomitable,  and  he  still  believed  in  aggressive  strat 
egy.  In  this  he  had  the  sympathy  of  Davis,  who  had 
constantly  shown  his  dissatisfaction  with  Johnston's 
defensive  policy,  and  who  was  ready  to  believe  Hood's 

1  The  March  to  the  Sea :  Franklin  and  Nashville,  Charles  Scrib- 
uer's  Sons,  1882. 


Introductory  3 

over-sanguine  assertions  that  his  army  had  not  suf 
fered  in  its  morale  by  the  bloody  and  unsuccessful 
engagements  around  Atlanta  or  by  the  loss  of  that 
important  strategic  point.  Hood's  proposal  to  turn 
Sherman's  position  by  a  somewhat  wide  detour  to  the 
west  of  Atlanta,  and  to  carry  the  war  again  into 
Northern  Georgia,  or  even  into  Tennessee,  met  with 
Mr.  Davis's  complete  approval,  and  in  a  speech  to 
the  troops  he  was  so  far  carried  away  by  the  desire 
to  stimulate  their  confidence  and  their  courage  that 
he  imprudently  announced  the  general  plan  of  cam- 
paign. 

The  speech  got  into  the  newspapers,  and  came  to 
Sherman's  ears.  It  need  hardly  be  said  that,  with 
his  characteristic  alertness  of  mind  and  quickness  of 
decision,  he  set  himself  the  task  of  defeating  his 
enemies'  expectation.  He  would  not  give  them  the 
appearance  even  of  success,  and  at  the  last  moment, 
before  breaking  his  communications  with  the  North, 
and  starting  on  his  March  to  the  Sea,  he  used  Davis's 
defiantly  proclaimed  purpose  to  overcome  the  last  of 
Grant's  doubts.  "The  whole  burden  of  his  song," 
he  wrote  to  the  General  in  Chief,  "consisted  in  the 
statement  that  Sherman's  communications  must  be 
broken,  and  his  army  destroyed.  Now  it  is  a  well 
settled  principle  that,  if  we  can  prevent  his  succeed 
ing  in  his  threat,  we  defeat  him,  and  derive  all  the 
moral  advantages  of  a  victory. " *  Sherman  gave 
Hood  full  credit  "  for  his  skilful  and  rapid  lodgment 
made  on  the  railroad,"2  but  pointed  out  that  he  had 
preserved  his  own  communications  by  his  rapid  chase 
of  the  enemy,  and  had  taken  from  Hood  the  advan- 

1  Sherman  to  Grant,   November  6,   1864,  O.  R.,  xxxix.  part  iii. 
p.  659. 

2  Ibid. 


4  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

tage  of  the  movement,  by  forcing  him  into  the  long 
march  in  retreat  across  northern  Alabama  into 
Mississippi.  "To  have  dogged  him  far  over  into 
Mississippi,  trusting  to  some  happy  accident  to  bring 
him  to  bay  and  to  battle,"  though  much  might  be 
said  in  favor  of  it,  "would  be,"  he  concluded,  to 
"  play  into  his  hands  by  being  drawn  or  decoyed  too 
far  away  from  our  original  line  of  advance."1  So 
he  cut  the  knot,  and  gave  orders  for  the  concentra 
tion  of  his  own  column  at  Atlanta,  and  for  the  march 
through  Georgia. 

The  game,  at  this  stage,  was  a  magnificent  one. 
Hood's  plan  proved  a  military  character  and  mind 
of  no  ordinary  powers,  and  he  had  carried  it  out 
with  a  celerity  and  vigor  that  were  in  complete  keep 
ing  with  it.  The  probabilities  were  all  in  favor  of 
his  success.  The  odds  were  a  hundred  to  one  that 
his  march  to  Tuscumbia,  in  the  northwest  corner 
of  Alabama,  would  be  met  by  Sherman's  transfer 
by  railroad  to  meet  him  at  Columbia  or  Pulaski,  in 
southern  Tennessee.  Grant's  dispatches  show  that 
he  would  have  continued  the  pursuit,  and  this  alone 
is  a  sufficient  tribute  to  Hood's  ability.2  Sherman 
met  him  with  a  still  greater  audacity  than  his 
own,  and  with  a  success  followed  by  far  reaching 
consequences,  which  precipitated  the  fate  of  the 
Confederacy. 

-/  Under  pressure  from  influential  men  in  the  Con 
federate  Congress,  Mr.  Davis  had  assigned  General 
Beauregard  to  the  command  of  the  two  departments 
which  had  been  under  Generals  Hood  and  Taylor, 
but  with  limitations  which  implied  that  he  should 

1  Sherman   to  Grant,  November  6,  1864,  0.  R.,  xxxix.   part   iii. 
p.  659. 

2  rd.,  p.  576. 


Introductory  5 

not  assume  active  command  of  either  army  in  the 
field  unless  an  exigency  made  it  necessary.  Hood 
was  disposed  to  make  the  most  of  his  independence, 
and  Beauregard  limited  himself  generally  to  advice 
and  suggestions,  the  larger  plan  being  supposed  to 
have  been  settled  between  Davis  and  Hood  at  the 
beginning  of  the  new  campaign.1  Beauregard's  rela 
tions  to  the  active  army  remained  merely  nominal, 
though  he  gradually  became  more  pressing  in  his 
urgency  that  Hood  should  resume  vigorous  offensive 
activity.  The  latter  found  the  railways  near  Tus- 
cumbia  badly  out  of  order,  and  thought  it  necessary 
to  accumulate  twenty  days'  supplies  before  crossing 
the  Tennessee  River.2  General  Wheeler,  the  cavalry 
commander,  who  had  been  left  near  Georgia,  had 
sent  him  accurate  information  of  the  movements  of 
Sherman's  different  corps,  and  of  the  statements  of 
prisoners  that  Sherman  was  expecting  to  march  to 
Savannah;  but  he  preferred  to  interpret  the  news 
in  accordance  with  his  wishes,  and  on  the  4th  of  No 
vember  reported  to  Richmond  that  Sherman  seemed 
to  be  concentrating  his  army  at  Huntsville  and 
Decatur  in  Alabama.3  When  he  finally  became  con 
vinced  that  Sherman  in  person,  with  a  veteran  army, 
was  marching  toward  the  Atlantic  coast,  he  was  torn 
by  conflicting  motives  as  to  his  own  course,  and  it 
required  the  peremptory  orders  of  Beauregard  to  put 
an  end  to  his  delay.  But  it  was  now  the  last  week 
in  November;  nearly  a  month  had  been  given 
Sherman  and  Thomas  to  complete  the  arrangements 

1  See  dispatches  between  Davis   and  Beauregard,  0.  R.,  xxxix. 
part  iii.  pp.  782,  785,  870,  874,  879. 

2  Hood  to  Taylor,  Id.,  p.  868  ;  to  Seddon,  Secretary  of  War,  p.  870; 
to  "Railway  Officials  and  Quartermaster,  p.  871  ;  to  Beauregard,  p.  888. 

3  Wheeler  to  Hood,  O.  R.,  xxxix.  part  iii.  pp.  859,  878.     Hood  to 
War  Department,  Id.,  p.  888. 


6  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

for  a  double  campaign,  and  Sherman's  start  was  too 
long  a  one,  both  in  time  and  in  distance,  to  give  the 
Confederates  any  hope  of  overtaking  him.  To  force 
the  fighting  with  Thomas  was  the  only  course  left, 
and  this  was  what  Beauregard  ordered.1 

The  contrast  between  the  boldness  and  vigor  of 
Hood's  October  campaign  and  his  delay  after  reach 
ing  Tuscumbia  points  to  a  consciousness  on  his  part 
that  he  had  been  outgeneralled,  though  he  kept  up  a 
show  of  satisfaction  at  Sherman's  division  of  his 
army,  followed  by  the  wide  separation  of  its  parts. 
He  even  wrote  to  Davis,  that,  should  Sherman  "  move 
two  or  three  corps  south  from  Atlanta,"  he  thought 
it  would  be  "  the  best  thing  that  could  happen  for 
the  general  good"  of  the  Confederacy.2  But  Davis 
reminded  him  that  this  implied  that  prompt  advan 
tage  should  be  taken  of  the  dispersion  to  beat  his 
adversary  in  detail.3  The  troops  left  under  General 
Thomas  were  necessarily  scattered,  and  for  Hood  to 
give  him  time  to  concentrate  was  to  imperil  the  cam 
paign.  His  true  policy  was,  plainly,  to  risk  every 
thing  on  the  quickest  and  strongest  advance  against 
Thomas,  living  upon  the  country,  or  trusting  to  suc 
cess  to  give  him  possession  of  some  of  the  national 
depots  of  supply.  He  was  at  Tuscumbia  on  the  30th 
of  October,  and  next  day  reported  that  he  was  in 
possession  of  Florence  (on  the  north  bank  of  the 
Tennessee),  and  was  laying  a  pontoon  bridge.4  He 
did  not  begin  his  advance  northward  till  the  21st  of 
November.5  Knowing,  as  we  do,  the  energy  of  his 


1  Beauregard  to  Hood,  November  17,  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1215. 
Hood  reported  that  he  had  only  seven  of  the  twenty  days'  needed  sup 
plies  on  hand.     Ibid. 

2  0.  R.,  xxxix.  part  iii.  p.  891.          3  Id.,  p.  896. 

4  Id.,  p.  870.  5  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1236. 


Introductory  7 

character,  it  is  incredible  that  he  should  have  waited 
so  long  unless  he  were  hoping  that  something  would 
happen  to  make  it  feasible  to  follow  Sherman,  by 
showing  that  the  latter  was  moving  upon  Selma  or 
Mobile  instead  of  Savannah. 

In  arranging  his  plans  for  the  March  to  the  Sea, 
Sherman  had  from  the  first  determined  to  put 
Thomas  in  general  command  of  all  that  was  left 
behind,  and  which  lay  east  of  the  Mississippi  River. 
For  himself,  he  did  not  mean  to  make  a  subordinate 
operation  with  a  detachment,  but  to  move  an  army 
which  would  be  (it  to  make  the  campaign  of  the 
Carolinas  after  lie  should  reach  Savannah,  and 
which  could  cope  even  with  Lee's  army  if  it  should 
break  away  from  Richmond.  Definite  plans  beyond 
Savannah  were  postponed  till  he  should  be  successful 
in  reaching  the  coast,  but  the  contingenc}r  of  a  march 
northward  was  prominent  in  his  mind  from  the 
beginning.  As  he  must  move  from  Atlanta  with 
out  lines  of  supply  or  communication,  he  must  strip 
his  army  of  every  unnecessary  weight  or  encum 
brance,  and  must  look  for  no  help  or  reinforcement 
on  the  way.  His  column  must  necessarily  diminish 
by  the  attrition  of  the  campaign,  and  would  be 
strongest  at  the  start.  Thomas's,  on  the  other  hand, 
would  be  weakest  at  the  start,  but  would  be  rapidly 
increased  by  new  troops  which  were  moving  to  the 
front,  by  return  of  the  convalescents  of  the  whole 
army,  and  by  detachments  from  the  departments 
west  of  the  Mississippi.  The  principal  of  these  last 
was  a  portion  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps,  supposed  to 
be  ten  thousand  strong,  under  General  A.  J.  Smith, 
who  was  already  under  orders  to  proceed  from 
Missouri  to  Tennessee.1 

1  0.  K.,  xxxix.  part  iii.  pp.  477,  494,  595. 


8  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Sherman  had  at  first  planned  to  send  back  the 
Fourth  Corps,  and  to  take  the  Twenty-third  Corps 
with  him,  leaving  General  Schofield  to  support 
General  Thomas  with  the  troops  of  the  Department 
of  the  Ohio  which  were  in  Kentucky  and  East 
Tennessee.  But  when  Schofield  returned  from  ab 
sence  at  the  North,  and  rejoined  the  army  at  Gayles- 
ville,  Alabama,  on  October  22d,  he  was  very  unwilling, 
to  part  with  the  corps.  It  was,  besides,  much  re 
duced  by  the  casualties  of  the  year's  campaigns,  and 
greatly  needed  to  be  recruited.  When,  then,  we 
got  news  that  Hood  had  appeared  at  Decatur,  and, 
being  repulsed  there,  had  marched  to  Tuscumbia, 
Schofield  suggested  that,  if  the  corps  were  sent  into 
Tennessee,  it  could  be  recruited,  a  division  of  new 
troops  could  be  added  to  it,  and  he  himself  could 
take  active  field  service  under  Thomas.  Before  that 
time  it  had  seemed  probable  that  Hood  would  follow 
Sherman  southward  with  at  least  the  greater  part 
of  his  army;  but  his  committal  to  a  movement  in 
force  into  middle  Tennessee  made  it  apparent  that 
Thomas  might  need  reinforcement  before  troops  from 
distant  positions  could  come  to  him.  Thomas  was 
fearful  that  troops  from  Missouri  could  not  reach 
him  soon  enough,  but  said  that  if  he  had  Schofield 
he  should  feel  perfectly  safe.  On  the  28th  of  October, 
therefore,  Sherman  announced  his  intention  of  send 
ing  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  as  well  as  the  Fourth, 
to  General  Thomas,  and  to  take  with  him  the  re 
mainder  of  his  army,  thus  reduced  to  about  fifty 
thousand  men.  It  turned  out  that  the  hurry  of  ab 
sentees  to  rejoin  their  commands  increased  his  num 
bers  somewhat,  before  communications  were  broken.1 

1  O.  E.,  xxxix.  part  iii.     Sherman  to  TTalleck,  October  27,  p.  461  ; 
Schofield  to  Sherman,  p.  468  ;  Sherman  to  Halleck,  October  28,  p.  476 ; 


Introductory  9 

The  effective  force  under  General  Thomas,  in 
middle  and  southern  Tennessee,  was  sixty-five  thou 
sand  five  hundred,  officers  and  men  "present  for 
duty  equipped,"  which  was  the  official  phrase  indi 
cating  complete  readiness  for  active  service.  The 
aggregate  present  was  some  twenty  thousand  more.1 
These  figures  do  not  include  the  troops  in  Schofield's 
Department  of  the  Ohio  in  East  Tennessee  and 
Kentucky,  nor  those  of  the  Military  Division  between 
the  Tennessee  and  Mississippi  Rivers,  all  of  which 
were  subject  to  Thomas's  orders.  Hood's  army  in 
the  field  numbered  forty-two  or  forty -three  thousand 
men  of  all  arms,  and  had  been  very  closely  estimated 
by  General  Sherman.2  Thomas's  problem,  therefore, 
was  chiefly  one  of  concentration  in  time  to  meet 
Hood's  advance,  and  the  delay  of  the  latter,  whether 
necessary  or  not,  was  more  than  could  have  been 
hoped  for.  As  early  as  October  29th,  Sherman,  in 
promising  to  send  Schofield  back,  had  urged  Thomas 
to  "  break  up  all  minor  posts,  and  get  about  Columbia 
as  big  an  army  as  you  can,  and  go  at  him."  3  Again, 
two  days  later,  he  reiterated,  "You  must  unite  all 
your  men  into  one  army,  and  abandon  all  minor 
points,  if  you  expect  to  defeat  Hood."4  In  pursu 
ance  of  this  policy,  Thomas  ordered  Schofield  with 
the  Twenty-third  Corps  to  join  Stanley  and  the 
Fourth  Corps  at  Pulaski,  on  the  railroad  between 

Sherman  to  Beckwith,  p.  477;  Thomas  to  Halleck,  p.  582;  Sherman 
to  Thomas,  pp.  484,  497,  499,  514. 

1  Tri-monthly  Official  Return  of  General  Thomas  for  November  20, 
1864,  Avhich  was  the  first  after  the  severance  from  Sherman.      The 
effectives  were  increased  by  9,700  in  the  next  ten  days.     O.  R.,  xlv. 
part  i.  pp.  52,  53,  54.     As  to  Hood's  forces,  see  chap,  xxi.,  post. 

2  Sherman  to  Grant,  0.  R.,  xxxix.  part  iii.  p.  576 ;  to  Thomas,  Id., 
p.  599. 

8  Id.,  p.  498.  4  Id.,  p.  535. 


10  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Columbia  and  Decatur,  though  it  was  necessary  to 
send  one  brigade  temporarily  to  Johnsonville,  on  the 
Tennessee  River  west  of  Nashville,  to  meet  a  raid 
that  Forrest  was  making  in  West  Tennessee  by  way 
of  diversion  in  favor  of  Hood. 

General  Schoficld  reached  Pulaski  on  November 
13th,1  and  assumed  command  of  the  two  corps  of 
infantry,  and  of  the  cavalry  corps  under  General 
James  H.  Wilson,  as  the  latter  gradually  assembled, 
and  the  army  in  the  field  consisted  of  these  organiza 
tions  until  the  general  concentration  at  Nashville  on 
December  1st,  after  the  battle  of  Franklin.  Each 
of  these  corps  was  reinforced  by  some  new  troops, 
and  some  small  detachments  of  older  ones,  but  their 
general  organization  remained.  A  question  of  rank 
between  General  Schofield  and  General  Stanley  was 
before  the  War  Department,  but  General  Thomas  had 
not  heard  of  its  decision  in  favor  of  Schofield  when 
he  assigned  him  to  command  in  the  field.  He  in 
formed  General  Halleck  of  what  he  had  done,  and 
gave  his  reasons  for  hoping  that  his  action  would  be 
sustained,  as  was  in  fact  done.2  Sherman  advised 
that  the  two  veteran  corps  should  be  filled  up  to 
twenty-five  thousand  each,  and  that  Thomas  should 
take  the  field  in  person  when  the  enemy  should  ad 
vance.  Thomas  replied  that  such  was  his  purpose.8 
Both  the  corps,  however,  had  only  the  force  intended 
for  one,  in  the  period  of  the  campaign  we  are  now 
considering,  and  at  Pulaski  only  one  division  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  was  present. 


1  0.  R.,  xxxix.  part  iii.  p.  768 ;  Id.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  885,  886. 

2  Thomas  to  Halleck,  0.  R.,  xxxix.  part  iii.  p.  666  ;  to  Schofield, 
p.  691.     See  also  Thomas's  order,  Id.,  p.  638;  Grant  to  Halleck,  Id., 
p.  684  ;  Halleck  to  Sherman,  Id.,  p.  64. 

8  Id.,  p.  685. 


Introductory  1 1 

Hood  moved  his  infantry  forward  from  his  bridge 
at  Florence  on  the  21st  and  22d  of  November,1  march 
ing  upon  Columbia  by  way  of  Lawrcnccburg  and 
Mount  Pleasant,  turning  Schoiield's  position  at 
Pulaski  upon  the  Nashville  and  Decatur  Railroad. 
Schoneld  withdrew  his  little  army  in  echelon,  by 
way  of  Lynnville  and  Hurricane,  keeping  just  ahead 
of  Hood  in  the  convergent  movements  upon  Columbia, 
and  reaching  the  latter  place  on  the  24th,  barely  in 
time  to  prevent  Hood  from  anticipating  him.  Our 
army  remained  there  till  the  27th,  when  the  enemy's 
operations  to  turn  the  position  by  the  other  flank 
(our  left)  forced  our  retirement  to  the  north  bank  of 
Duck  River.  There,  the  more  detailed  account  of 
events  preceding  the  battle  of  Franklin  will  begin.2 

At  Franklin,  on  the  30th  of  November,  Hood  was 
pressing  so  close  upon  our  columns  that  it  became 
necessary  to  choose  between  abandoning  our  wagon 
trains  and  resisting  him  on  the  south  side  of  the 
Ilarpeth  River.  Schoneld  resolved  to  take  the  risk 
of  fighting  although  the  stream  was  at  our  backs, 
and  the  result  fully  justified  him.  The  repulse  of 
the  Confederates  was  so  destructive,  that,  though 
Thomas  thought  it  wise  to  withdraw  Schofield  to 
Nashville  and  make  his  concentration  there  where 
A.  J.  Smith's  troops  had  just  arrived,  Hood's  advance 
from  the  Harpeth  was  the  merest  bravado,  and  was 
naturally  followed  by  the  final  ruin  of  his  army.  No 
intelligent  officer  on  either  side  was  ignorant  of  the 
fact  that  the  heart  of  the  Confederate  army 
broken,  and  the  character  of  the  fighting  was,  from 
that  day,  in  marked  contrast  with  what  it  had  been 
before. 

1  0.  R,,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1236. 

2  Chap,  ii.,  post. 


12  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Anticipating  the  judgment  which  history  must 
give,  ranking  the  battle  of  Franklin  as  the  crisis  in 
the  campaign  and  the  veritable  "beginning  of  the 
end,"  Hood,  in  his  report  of  December  llth,  treated 
it  as  a  necessary  result  of  the  failure  of  his  subor 
dinates  on  the  29th  of  November,  at  Spring  Hill,  to 
obey  his  orders  with  energy.  There,  he  said,  "was 
lost  the  opportunity  for  striking  the  enemy  for  which 
we  had  labored  so  long,  the  best  which  this  cam 
paign  has  offered,  and  one  of  the  best  afforded  us 
during  the  war."1  A  critical  examination  does 
not  justify  this  effort  to  shift  the  responsibility,  but 
it  remains  a  very  significant  recognition  of  the  fact 
that  Franklin  sealed  the  fate  of  the  campaign. 
Jefferson  Davis  clearly,  though  in  cautious  phrase, 
bears  witness  to  the  same  truth  when,  in  his  "  Rise 
and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  he  says 
of  the  battle,  that  it  was  "  one  of  the  bloodiest  of  the\ 
war,  whose  results  materially  affected  the  future. "  2 
Davis  sympathized  with  and  defended  the  brilliant 
aggressive  strategy  of  the  campaign,  though  he 
limited  his  own  advice  to  the  operations  within  the 
State  of  Georgia,  and  the  confines  of  northeastern 
Alabama.  He  had  removed  Johnston  from  command 
because  of  his  persistent  Fabian  policy,  but  was  forced 
by  the  results  to  throw  doubts  upon  the  wisdom  of 
the  attack  at  Franklin.  Beauregard,  Hood's  imme 
diate  superior,  in  his  general  report  of  April  15th, 
added  his  testimony  by  saying,  "It  is  clear  to  my 
mind  that,  after  the  great  loss  and  waste  of  life  at 
Franklin,  the  army  was  in  no  condition  to  make  a 
successful  attack  on  Nashville."3  He  would  rather 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  657. 

2  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,  vol.  ii.  p.  575. 

3  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  651. 


Introductory  13 

have  moved  on  Murfreesboro,  and  then  sought  winter 
quarters  behind  the  Duck  or  Tennessee  River,  detach 
ing  a  force  for  the  protection  of  South  Carolina.  His 
tribute  to  the  character  and  courage  of  the  troops,  all 
who  had  personal  knowledge  of  the  campaign  will 
unite  in.  "  Untoward  and  calamitous  as  were  the 
issues  of  this  campaign,"  he  said,  "never  in  the 
course  of  this  war  have  the  best  qualities  of  our 
soldiery  been  more  conspicuously  shown;  never  more 
enthusiasm  evinced  than  when  our  troops  once  more 
crossed  the  Tennessee  River;  never  greater  gallantry 
than  that  which  was  so  general  at  Franklin;  and 
never  higher  fortitude  and  uncomplaining  devotion 
to  duty  than  were  displayed  on  the  retreat  from 
Nashville  to  Tupelo. "  l  General  Johnston  supports, 
in  substance,  both  parts  of  Beatiregard's  statement, 
though  his  words  are  strongly  tinged  with  sarcasm 
at  the  results  which  followed  his  own  removal  from 
command.  Of  the  officers  and  men  of  that  army,  he 
says,  "  Their  courage  and  discipline  were  unsubdued 
by  the  slaughter  to  which  they  were  recklessly  offered 
in  the  four  attacks  on  the  Federal  army  near  Atlanta 
as  they  proved  in  the  useless  butchery  at  Franklin, 
and  survived  the  rout  and  disorganization  at  Nash 
ville  as  they  proved  at  Bentonville. "  2 

I  need  not  go  beyond  these  Confederate  authorities 
of  the  first  rank  for  support  of  my  assertion  that  this 
battle  was  the  turning  point  in  a  great  campaign, 
and  fully  justified  Sherman's  plan.  Its  character  as 
a  crucial  experiment  in  the  problem  of  attack  of  field 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  651. 

2  Narrative  of  Military  Operations,  p.  365.     The  battle  of  Benton 
ville,  North  Carolina,  was  the  last  engagement  between  Sherman  and 
the  Confederates,  and  Johnston  had  been  restored  to  his  command. 
For  the  four  attacks  by  Hood  near  Atlanta,  see  my  volume  "  Atlanta  " 
(Scribner's  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War),  chap.  xii. 


14  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

fortifications  will  appear  in  the  progress  of  my  nar 
rative.  Hood  bore  with  patience  the  penalty  of  fail 
ure,  but  justice  requires  the  clear  acknowledgment 
that  his  faith  in  the  attack  has  been,  and  perhaps 
still  is,  the  prevalent  military  creed  in  Continental 
Europe.  His  tactics  of  assault  in  deployed  line  with 
supports  are  not  far  from  the  approved  methods  sup 
posed  to  be  developed  by  late  wars.  It  would  be 
hard  to  match  in  dash  or  in  perseverance  the  veteran 
Confederate  battalions  of  1864- ;  it  would  be  impos 
sible  to  surpass  the  leadership  of  the  officers  who 
headed  the  charges  upon  the  field.  If  theory  is 
worth  testing  at  all,  no  real  soldier  will  be  hard  on 
Hood  for  testing  it.  It  was,  without  doubt,  our 
^general  conclusion  in  1864-65,  that  the  strategic 
I  initiative  and  tactical  defence  had  the  best  of  it. 
But  the  race  characteristics  and  the  educated  qual 
ities  of  men  make  such  a  difference  that  it  would  be 
rash  to  conclude  that  American  experience  is  con 
clusive  for  Germans  or  Frenchmen.  To  make  a 
rapid  march,  then  halt  and  construct  efficient  cover 
whilst  a  vigorous  enemy  is  approaching,  requires  an 
intelligence,  alert  handiness,  and  coolness  in  the 
rank  and  file  and  in  the  subordinate  officers  which 
cannot  always  and  everywhere  be  expected.  The 
ability  to  await  an  attack  is  also  a  very  variable 
quality.  In  bayonet  charges,  it  is  notorious  that  * 
one  side  or  the  other  usually  breaks  before  bayonets 
are  actually  crossed.  With  material  like  our  fron 
tiersmen,  among  whom  a  half-dozen  cool  and  deter 
mined  soldiers  and  scouts,  burrowing  in  a  "buffalo 
wallow  "  upon  the  plains,  will  "  stand  off "  a  hun 
dred  Indians,  almost  anything  can  be  done.1  The 

1  General  Nelson  A.  Miles's  Personal  Recollections,  p.  173. 


Introductory  15 

reader  must  judge  how  far  the  personal  element 
counted  at  Franklin  on  both  sides. 

The  comparative  smallness  of  the  opposing  armies 
is  likely  to  lead  to  an  under  estimate  of  the  desperate 
character  of  the  fighting.  The  analysis  of  the  forces 
engaged  in  the  actual  attack  and  defence  will  come 
later.1  It  is  enough  now  to  note  the  fact  that  Hood 
had  more  men  killed  at  Franklin  than  died  on  one 
side  in  some  of  the  great  conflicts  of  the  war  where 
three,  four,  or  even  five  times  as  many  men  were 
engaged.  His  killed  were  more  than  Grant's  at 
Shiloh,  McClellan's  in  the  Seven-days'  battle,  Burn- 
side's  at  Fredericksburg,  Rosccrans's  at  Stone's 
River  or  at  Chickamauga,  Hooker's  at  Chancellors- 
ville,  and  almost  as  many  as  Grant's  at  Cold  Harbor. 
The  concentration  in  time,  in  those  few  hours  of  a 
winter  afternoon  and  evening,  makes  the  comparison 
still  more  telling.2  It  may  be  properly  said,  there 
fore,  that  the  intrinsic  importance  of  the  battle,  from 
the  purely  military  point  of  view,  warrants  a  full 
study  of  its  history  in  all  its  features. 

The  early  treatment  of  the  subject  was  peculiarly 
unsatisfactory  to  the  great  majority  of  the  officers 
and  men  who  participated  in  it  on  either  side.  This 
was  in  great  part  due  to  the  fact  that  the  period 
following  the  war  was  one  in  which  military  writ 
ings  took  naturally  the  form  of  personal  memoirs  or 

1  See  chap,  xvi.,  post. 

2  See  tables  in  Phisterer's  Statistical  Record  of  the  Armies  of  the 
United  States  (Scribner's  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War),  pp.  213-218. 
The  comparisons  are  necessarily  made  with  losses  on  the  National  side, 
because  no  analyzed  tables  of  the  Confederate  losses  exist./  The  num 
ber  of  Hood's  killed  at  Franklin  is  that  given  in  General  Thomas's 
official  report,  i.  e.  1,750.     See  chap,  xvi.,  post.     Colonel  Maurice  gives 
the  number  of  those  actually  killed  at  Waterloo,  out  of  the  British 
army  of  43,000,  as  1,759.     Maurice,  War,  p.  83. 


16  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

histories  of  particular  organizations,  such  as  regi 
ments,  brigades,  divisions,  and  corps.  In  the  narra 
tives  of  the  experience  of  a  single  organization,  it 
was  not  to  be  expected  that  a  symmetrical  history 
of  a  campaign  should  be  given,  and  there  would  be 
little  ground  for  complaint  that  other  organizations 
should  receive  scant  attention,  even  when  all  were 
busily  participating  in  the  events  described.  In 
regard  to  the  larger  organizations,  however,  such  as 
corps  and  wings  of  a  larger  army,  it  was  almost 
inevitable  that  such  a  mode  of  writing  should  be 
misleading.  The  whole  history  of  a  campaign  or 
battle  would  seem  to  be  given,  and  the  reader  would 
naturally  assume  that  he  had  the  whole,  unless  he 
were  distinctly  told  that  the  narrative  was  confined 
to  a  part  of  the  army. 

In  the  campaign  of  November,  1864,  against  Hood, 
'<  the  twp  organizations  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  were  each  represented  by 
a  corps.  Only  those  quite  familiar  with  the  army 
know  this,  and  when  Chaplain  Van  Home  wrote  his 
history  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  including 
this  campaign,  it  was  commonly  supposed  to  cover 
the  whole  field  and  the  services  of  both  corps  referred 
to.  The  book  was  an  important  one  among  the  earlier 
historical  publications  concerning  the  Civil  War, 
and  was  largely  quoted  and  followed  by  general  his 
torians  of  the  period.  As  to  the  battle  of  Franklin, 
the  troops  which  occupied  during  the  whole  battle 
five  sixths  of  the  line,  a  mile  long,  on  which  Hood 
made  his  desperate  infantry  attacks,  found  them 
selves  ignored.  They  read  accounts  of  the  battle  in 
which  they  were  not  even  mentioned.  Time,  of 
course,  gradually  corrected  some  of  the  errors  and 
misapprehensions.  In  a  second  book,  the  "Life  of 


Introductory  17 

General  Thomas,"  Van  Home  materially  modified 
his  earlier  treatment  of  the  subject,  and  handled  it 
in  a  more  comprehensive  way.  Other  noteworthy 
papers  appeared,  written  by  participants  in  the  cam 
paign  or  by  eminent  journalists  and  literary  men 
who  personally  visited  the  field.1  A  much  more 
correct  idea  of  the  campaign  and  of  the  battle  was 
the  result  of  this  free  discussion,  although  for  a 
time  each  new  publication  seemed  to  start  new 
questions  for  debate.  It  was  entirely  natural  that 
my  own  statements  of  fact,  in  my  little  volume 
already  mentioned,  should  be  questioned ;  for  the 
brevity  of  treatment  made  it  impossible  to  give  the 
wide  array  of  public  documents  and  private  evidence 
which  supported  my  own  recollection.  As  new  points 
appeared,  I  have  tried  to  obtain  the  well  considered 
remembrance  of  surviving  actors  in  the  campaign, 
but  the  reader  will  notice  IIOAV  largely  this  had  been 
done  prior  to  the  publication  of  my  book  in  1882. 
It  will  thus  be  seen  that  I  did  not  speak  at  random, 
and  that  I  used  reasonable  diligence  in  testing  my 
own  memory  before  making  historical  statements. 
Absolute  freedom  from  error  was,  of  course,  improb 
able  ;  but  more  thorough  investigation  has  fully  sus 
tained  the  general  accuracy  of  my  narrative. 

The  publication  of  the  Official  Records  begins  a 
new  epoch  in  the  study  of  our  Civil  War.  The 

1  Among  these  were  a  narration  by  Gen.  Emerson  Opdycke,  New 
York  Times,  Sept.  10,  1882 ;  F.  II.  Burr,  in  Philadelphia  Press, 
March,  1883;  Rev.  Dr.  H.  M.  Field,  in  New  York  Evangelist,  and 
in  his  book  "  Bright  Skies  and  Dark  Shadows  " ;  Prof.  W.  W.  Gist,  in 
Cedar  Rapids,  Iowa,  Republican,  September,  1 883  ;  Col.  Henry  Stone, 
in  Century  War  Book ;  Capt.  Thomas  Speed  and  Capt.  L.  T.  Scofield, 
in  Loyal  Legion  papers  of  Ohio  Commandery;  Maj.  D.  W.  Sanders 
(Confederate),  in  Southern  Bivouac,  1885;  Gen.  B.  F.  Cheatham, 
in  Louisville  Courier  Journal,  December,  1881  ;  General  Hood's 
"Advance  and  Retreat,"  etc. 

2 


18  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

fortunate  preservation  of  Confederate  records  and 
their  careful  collection  by  the  commissioners  must 
be  a  matter  of  congratulation  amongst  all  lovers  of 
truth,  and  of  pride  in  the  heart  of  every  American. 
The  notion  of  saving  only  the  records  of  our  own 
side  was  promptly  discarded.  The  whole  truth  was 
wanted,  and  as  part  of  the  officially  collected  records 
of  the  Confederate  government  were  lost  in  the  clos 
ing  scenes  of  the  contlict,  neither  labor  nor  cost  was 
spared  to  replace  missing  papers  by  authentic  copies 
which  had  been  privately  preserved.  The  voluminous 
mass  which  fills  the  hundred  bulky  volumes  may 
seem  at  first  like  an  excess  of  material ;  but  there 
can  be  no  excess  in  such  a  matter.  Formal  reports 
may  give  distorted  views  of  past  events,  but  the  cur 
rent  dispatches  and  correspondence  from  day  to  day 
and  hour  to  hour  expose  all  glozing  of  errors  or 
false  claims  of  victory.  We  cannot  have  too  perfect 
a  presentation  of  the  details  which  make  up  the 
actual  life  of  the  scene,  with  the  hopes  and  the  pur 
poses,  the  current  knowledge  and  apprehension,  the 
hesitation  and  the  decisive  act  of  every  responsible 
participant  in  such  great  events.  In  this  library  of 
telltale  evidence  each  officer  of  any  prominence  has 
accumulated  the  proofs  of  character  as  to  accuracy, 
candor,  judgment,  modesty,  and,  when  the  question 
of  the  value  of  his  statement  or  the  weight  of  his 
opinion  is  raised,  the  historian  will  not  have  far  to 
seek  for  the  means  of  determining  it.  In  the  same 
cloud  of  witnesses  will  be  found  the  means  of  set 
tling  the  truth  when  formal  statements  are  conflict 
ing.  Established  facts  will  be  fixed  by  the  general 
current  of  evidence ;  and  accord  with  these,  or  dis 
agreement,  will  test  the  correctness  of  particular 
reports  or  claims.  Bearing  these  things  in  mind,  I 


Introductory  19 

have  not  spared  pains  in  verifying  my  recollection 
by  references  to  the  Oflicial  Records,  so  that  the 
reader  who  chooses  to  do  so  may  test  the  statements 
of  the  text  by  the  original  sources  of  knowledge  in 
this  field. 

A  few  matters  have  been  subjects  of  discussion  or 
of  controversy  to  such  an  extent  that  their  complete 
treatment  would  too  much  impede  the  current  of 
continuous  narrative.  My  method,  therefore,  will 
be  to  tell  the  story  first,  with,  as  nearly  as  may  be, 
an  equal  fulness  of  detail  in  the  parts,  and  then 
devote  a  few  chapters  to  the  more  particular  discus 
sion  of  some  controverted  points,  taking  up  each  in 
turn. 

When  we  fasten  our  attention  upon  the  subordinate 
parts  in  such  a  battle  as  Franklin,  we  seem  to  lose 
sight  of  the  most  important  of  all,  — the  controlling 
will  which  directs  the  whole.  This  is  especially 
true  as  to  the  national  side,  because  the  plan  of 
defence  was  a  simple  one,  and  there  were  few  oppor 
tunities  for  new  orders  after  the  battle  was  opened. 
It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  decision  as  to  each 
step  in  the  movement  from  Pulaski  to  Franklin  had 
rested  with  General  Schofield  as  commandant  in  the 
field.  This  decision  had  to  be  made  in  what  were 
sometimes  very  trying  circumstances,  as  at  Columbia 
and  Spring  Hill.  It  was  his  responsible  duty  to 
decide  at  Franklin  whether  he  would  place  his  forces, 
as  they  arrived,  upon  the  north  bank  of  the  Harpeth 
River,  running  the  great  risk  of  the  loss  of  his  army 
trains,  or  give  battle  on  the  south  side,  in  front  of 
the  town,  with  the  great  disadvantage  of  having  the 
river  at  our  back.  When  he  had  determined  to  fight, 
he  had  to  fix  the  general  plan,  and  give  the  orders 
which  alloted  to  his  subordinates  their  positions  and 


20  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

their  duty.  He  was  always  ready  to  listen  to  sug 
gestions  and  opinions,  and  was  most  considerate  in 
allowing  all  reasonable  discretion  in  the  perform 
ance  of  duty  by  those  under  him ;  but  he  fully  as 
sumed  his  own  burden  of  responsibility,  and  decided 
promptly  what  his  duty  called  upon  him  to  decide. 
He  selected  his  own  position  with  thoughtful  refer 
ence  to  the  efficient  performance  of  his  own  task, 
present  or  future,  according  to  the  actual  situation 
or  the  probable  sequence  of  affairs. 

But  it  is  not  only  in  the  foresight  shown  in  plan 
ning  and  in  issuing  the  larger  orders  that  a  com 
manding  officer  makes  himself  felt  by  his  immediate 
subordinates.  He  can  do  much  by  keeping  up  fre 
quent  communication  with  them,  even  though  no  new 
directions  are  called  for.  His  messages  of  encour 
agement,  of  inquiry,  of  suggestion  in  case  of  contin 
gencies,  in  a  hundred  ways  keep  up  the  contact  of 
mind  with  mind,  and  carry  his  own  spirit  and  will 
to  those  who  are  executing  his  commands.  In  all 
these  respects,  General  Schofield  had  a  high  ideal  of 
duty,  and  fully  performed  it.  If,  then,  the  account 
of  the  battle  of  Franklin  shall  seem  to  the  reader  to 
be  mostly  made  up  of  the  personal  actions  of  those 
who  were  upon  the  fighting  line,  from  private  soldiers 
upward,  he  may  well  be  reminded  that,  from  begin 
ning  to  end,  those  whose  duty  it  was  to  carry  out  the 
purposes  of  the  commander  found  themselves  in  con 
stant  touch  with  him,  and  were  conscious  of  the  dis 
tinct  influence  of  his  courage,  his  confidence,  and  his 
full  comprehension  and  command  of  the  situation. 


CHAPTER  II 

FROM  COLUMBIA  TO  FRANKLIN 

The  Line  of  Duck  River  —  Thomas  urgent  that  Hood  should  he  held 
back — Positions  of  the  Armies  —  Hood  begins  the  Flank  Move 
ment  —  Telegraphic  Correspondence  —  How  not  to  do  it  —  Division 
of  Confederate  Forces  —  Schofield's  Cavalry  lose  Communication 
with  him  —  Combat  at  Spring  Hill  —  Midnight  March  to  Franklin. 

ON  Monday,  the  28th  of  November,  1864,  the  army 
under  General  Schofield  was  holding  the  line  of  the 
Duck  River,  opposite  Columbia.  Hood's  advance  from 
Florence,  on  the  Tennessee,  had  been  by  way  of  Law- 
renceburg  upon  Columbia,  and  had  made  our  position 
at  Pulaski  untenable,  for  the  route  of  the  Confederates 
carried  them  far  beyond  our  right  flank.  To  gain 
time  for  the  expected  arrival  of  reinforcements  from 
Missouri  under  General  A.  J.  Smith  was  the  eager 
wish  of  General  Thomas,  who  was  in  supreme  com 
mand,  and  his  dispatches  to  General  Schofield  from 
Nashville,  where  his  headquarters  were,  had  con 
stantly  suggested  the  most  dilatory  strategy.  Each 
day  was  of  great  value,  and  if  he  could  hold  Hood 
south  of  Columbia  and  the  Duck  River  for  a  week,  he 
believed  that  he  could  bring  enough  reinforcements 
to  that  point  to  make  him  willing  to  seek  a  decisive 
engagement  with  the  Confederate  army  on  the  ground 
which  had  been  pointed  out  to  him  by  General  Sher- 


22  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

man  as  the  proper  place  for  concentration.1  Whilst, 
therefore,  he  acquiesced  in  the  retrograde  steps  which 
Schoficld  was  obliged  to  take,  it  was  with  manifest 
reluctance.  His  assent  was  usually  coupled  with  the 
condition  that  his  subordinate  should  find  the  neces 
sity  still  manifest  after  careful  consideration.  He 
indicated  the  steps  in  the  approach  of  his  reinforce 
ments,  and  the  little  margin  of  time  he  needed  to 
make  him  strong  enough  to  resume  the  aggressive. 
The  effect  of  this  was  that  Schofield  felt  bound  to 
take  considerable  risks,  and  to  delay  each  step  in 
retreat  until  (as  he  said  in  his  dispatch  of  the  day 
of  the  battle  of  Franklin)  the  slightest  mistake  on 
his  part  or  failure  of  a  subordinate  might  have  proved 
disastrous.2  From  Thomas's  point  of  view  his  con 
clusions  were  the  natural  ones,  and  his  strong  desire 
to  hold  back  his  adversary  was  most  proper ;  we  are 
now  considering  only  its  effect  upon  Schofield  in  mak 
ing  him  stick  to  the  positions  he  occupied  more  stoutly 
than  his  own  judgment  would  have  dictated.  When 
he  abandoned  Columbia  in  the  night  of  the  27th,  he 
felt  so  strongly  the  disappointment  it  would  be  to 
Thomas  that  his  dispatcli  announcing  the  fact  was 
apologetic  in  tone.3  He  said  that  he  regretted  ex 
ceedingly  the  necessity,  but  believed  it  to  be  absolute, 
and  would  explain  fully  in  time. 

It  is  necessary  to  keep  this  phase  of  the  situation 
very  clearly  in  mind  ;  for  Schofield's  critics  have  made 
the  deliberateness  of  his  retreat  a  favorite  point  for 
attack ;  overlooking  the  pressure  upon  him  to  make  it 
still  more  so,  and  the  indisputable  fact  that,  had  he 

1  For   Sherman's  directions  on  this  point,  see  0.  R.,  xxxix.  part 
iii.  pp.  498,  535,  ct  seq. ;  for  Thomas's  correspondence  with  Schofield, 
id.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  896-1170. 

2  O.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1170  3  Id.,  p.  1106. 


From  Columbia  to  Franklin  23 

hastened  his  movement  by  a  single  day,  Thomas's  con 
centration  would  have  been  balked  by  Hood's  intercept 
ing  the  railway  trains  that  were  bringing  Steedman's 
two  divisions  from  Chattanooga  to  Nashville. 

The  position  on  the  north  side  of  Duck  River  at 
Columbia  was  a  difficult  one  to  hold  against  a  su 
perior  enemy  determined  to  force  a  crossing.  The 
river  makes  a  large  bend  to  the  southward,  enclosing 
a  tongue  of  land  considerably  lower  than  the  banks 
on  the  other  side.  It  was  just  such  a  place  as  the 
enemy  approaching  from  the  south  would  choose  for 
forcing  the  passage  of  the  stream.  Artillery  could 
be  placed  on  either  side  of  the  bend  so  as  to  cross-fire 
upon  the  bottom  land  and  enfilade  any  intrenchments 
or  lines  of  troops  facing  the  crossing  place  at  the  apex 
of  the  bend.  The  bridges  had  been  destroyed  and  the 
river  was  high,  but  falling.  Behind  the  low  land  in 
the  bottom,  however,  a  ridge  rises  to  a  height  equal  to 
the  south  bank  of  the  river,  and  this  made  a  strong 
position  in  which  to  resist  a  hostile  advance  north 
ward,  even  if  the  crossing  were  accomplished.  Scho- 
field  did  not  feel  much  concern,  therefore,  as  to  his 
ability  to  hold  these  heights  ;  but  the  river  was  fall 
ing  and  fords  might  already  be  available,  above  or 
below,  by  which  Hood  could  turn  the  position.  Then 
the  advance,  when  we  should  be  prepared  to  resume 
the  aggressive,  could  not  be  made  at  this  point,  be 
cause  the  features  of  the  position  gave  the  enemy 
such  a  command  of  the  crossing  as  to  make  it  im 
pregnable  against  a  movement  from  the  north.  It 
seemed  wiser  therefore  to  retire  a  little  farther  and 
find  ground  from  which  we  should  have  a  choice  of 
roads  by  which  we  might  march  against  the  enemy 
when  our  reinforcements  should  come. 

In  the  forenoon  cf   the  28th,   Schofield  sent  dis- 


24  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

patches  to  General  Thomas,1  discussing  the  situa 
tion  and  suggesting  the  concentration  of  his  own 
forces  so  that  he  should  be  ready  for  prompt  move 
ment.  This  had  special  reference  to  the  withdrawal 
of  Brigadier  General  Cooper's  troops  from  Centerville, 
thirty  miles  down  the  river,  where  they  had  been  sta 
tioned  by  Thomas  in  the  belief  that  Hood  was  most 
likely  to  advance  upon  Nashville  by  that  route.2 
Early  in  the  afternoon  news  came  to  Schofield 3  that 
the  enemy's  cavalry  under  Forrest  had  crossed  the 
river  near  the  Lewisburg  Turnpike,  some  twelve  miles 
eastward,  and  had  pushed  back  our  horsemen,  under 
General  Wilson,  beyond  Rally  Hill.  They  had  thus 
put  themselves  on  our  left  flank,  but  it  was  not  cer 
tain  at  nightfall  whether  Hood  was  using  his  infantry 
in  this  turning  movement. 

In  sending  this  information  to  Thomas,4  Schofield 
(at  4  P.  M.)  put  the  direct  question  where  he  proposed 
to  concentrate  and  fight  if  it  should  prove  true  that 
Hood  was  moving  in  force  upon  our  rear  by  the  route 
his  cavalry  had  taken.  He  also  suggested  sending  a 
pontoon  bridge  from  Nashville  to  Franklin  to  make 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  parti,  p.  1106. 

2  General  Joseph  A.  Cooper  (of  East  Tennessee)  had  temporarily 
commanded  a  division  in  the  Twenty-third  Corps.      On  our  reaching 
Nashville,  coming  from  Georgia  in  the  early  days  of  October,  he  had 
been  sent  with  parts  of  two  brigades  and  a  battery  of  artillery  to  John- 
sonville  on  the  Tennessee  River  to  assist  in  repelling  Forrest's  raid  in 
that  valley.     After  our  concentration  at  Pulaski  had  begun,  Cooper 
had  inarched  with  these  troops  to  Centerville  and  Beard's  Ferry  (see 
map),  by  orders  from    General  Thomas  direct.      O.   R.,  xlv.  part   i. 
p.  1007.    Meanwhile  General  Ruger  had  been  transferred  to  the  corps, 
and  at  Columbia  a  division  was  provisionally  organized  for  him,  con 
sisting    of    Colonel    Moore's    brigade   and   a   temporary   one   under 
Colonel   Strickland,  the   latter   made   up   by   adding  to   Strickland's 
50th  Ohio  other  regiments  which  came  up  as  reinforcements.     See 
chap,  iii.,  post. 

3  Id.,  p.  1109,  1110.  *   Id.,  p.  1107. 


From  Columbia  to  Franklin  25 

good  a  crossing  of  the  Harpcth  at  that  place,  the 
wagon  bridge  having  been  burned  in  one  of  the 
skirmishes  of  the  campaign,  and  the  river  being  too 
high  to  be  easily  forded. 

The  dispatches  written  by  Thomas  during  the 
evening  all  attest  his  continued  reluctance  to  con 
sider  the  necessity  of  further  retreat,  and  his  strong 
wish  that  Schofield  should  hold  the  Duck  River  line 
till  Smith's  arrival ;  but  none  of  them  reached  Scho 
field  until  eight  o'clock  next  morning,  and  one  written 
at  half  past  three  in  the  morning  of  the  29th  did  not 
reach  its  destination  at  all,  but  was  captured  by  the 
enemy  on  its  way.1  This  was  the  one  in  which  defi 
nite  instructions  were  given  to  retire  to  the  Harpeth, 
in  answer  to  Schofield's  question  of  4  p.  M.  of  the 
28th.2  Schofield  was  thus  left  without  orders,  but 

1  Hood's  Report,  0.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  653. 

'2  Id.,  p.  1137.  The  importance  of  this  dispatch,  and  the  value  of 
its  information  to  the  enemy,  warrant  me  in  giving  a  full  copy  of  it. 
The  Schofield  dispatch  of  4  p.  M.  seems  to  have  been  telegraphed  from 
Franklin  at  9  p.  M.,  and  is  referred  to  by  General  Thomas  as  of  that 
hour.  See  note  2  on  next  page. 

"  NASHVILLE,  November  29,  1864,  3.30  A.  M. 

"MAJOR  GENERAL  SCHOFIELD,  near  Columbia, — 

"Your  dispatches  of  6  p.  M.  and  9  p.  M.,  yesterday,  are  received.  I 
have  directed  General  Hammond  to  halt  his  command  at  Spring  Hill, 
and  report  to  you  for  orders,  if  he  cannot  communicate  with  General 
Wilson,  and  also  instructing  him  to  keep  you  well  advised  of  the  ene 
my's  movements.  I  desire  you  to  fall  back  from  Columbia  and  take 
up  your  position  at  Franklin,  leaving  a  sufficient  force  at  Spring  Hill 
to  contest  the  enemy's  progress  until  you  are  securely  posted  at 
Franklin.  The  troops  at  the  fords  below  Williamsport,  etc  ,  will  be 
withdrawn,  and  take  up  a  position  behind  Franklin.  General  A.  J. 
Smith's  command  has  not  yet  reached  Nashville ;  as  soon  as  he  arrives 
I  will  make  immediate  dispositions  of  his  troops,  and  notify  you  of  the 
same.  Please  send  me  a  report  as  to  how  matters  stand  upon  your 
receipt  of  this. 

"  GEORGE  II.  THOMAS, 

Major  General  U.  S,  Vol's., 

Commanding. ' 


26  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

under  the  influence  of  a  long  series  of  dispatches, 
every  one  of  which  breathed  the  strong  desire  that 
he  should  stubbornly  resist  the  enemy's  further  ad 
vance.  He  resolved  to  await  positive  knowledge  of 
the  movement  of  Hood's  infantry,  and  to  risk  mak 
ing  successful  manoeuvres  in  retreat  when  his  oppo 
nent  should  be  on  the  north  side  of  the  river.  The 
result  proved  his  capacity  as  well  as  his  courage. 

The  sun  rose  about  seven  o'clock  on  the  morning 
of  the  29th,  and  a  little  earlier  than  that  hour  Scho- 
field  had  received  by  courier  a  dispatch  from  General 
Wilson  that  was  a  duplicate  of  one  written  at  one 
o'clock,  which  seems  to  have  miscarried.  The  dupli 
cate  had  a  postscript  written  at  three  in  the  morning, 
and  was  sent  from  Hurt's  Cross  Roads  on  the  Lewis- 
burg  Turnpike,  by  way  of  Spring  Hill,  a  route  of 
more  than  twenty  miles.  This  dispatch  told  of  in 
formation  procured  from  prisoners,1  showing  that  the 
whole  of  Forrest's  command  was  in  Wilson's  front, 
on  the  north  side  of  the  river,  and  that  pontoons 
were  being  laid  for  the  passage  of  infantry.2  Infor 
mation  from  prisoners  is  apt  to  be  unreliable,  and  is 
sometimes  purposely  deceptive ;  but  Wilson  seemed 
so  confident  of  the  truth  of  this  that  Schofield  deter 
mined  to  act  upon  it,  by  putting  his  trains  and  three 
divisions  of  infantry  at  Spring  Hill,  and  keeping 
Wood's  and  my  own  in  position  during  the  day,  if 
possible,  or  until  he  should  get  answers  from  Thomas 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  parti,  p.  1143. 

2  General  Schofield  has  put  on  file  in  the  War  Department  com 
plete  copies  of  all  dispatches  which  passed  between  General  Thomas 
and  himself  in  November,  1864,  annotated  with  notes  giving  times  of 
sending  and  of  receiving,  as  determined  by  all  available  pnblic  and 
private  memoranda,  as  Avell  as  by  a  careful  comparison  of  the  contents 
of  the  dispatches  themselves.    Nearly  every  question  as  to  their  order, 
the  delays  or  failure  in  transmission,  etc.,  is  thus  conclusively  solved. 


From  Columbia  to  Franklin  27 

to  his  dispatches  of  the  previous  evening.  Whilst 
these  orders  were  preparing,  the  enemy  opened  with 
so  lively  an  artillery  lire  from  the  town,  and  from  the 
high  banks  encircling  the  tongue  of  bottom  land,  as 
to  prove  that  most  of  his  artillery  was  still  in  our 
front,  with  part,  at  least,  of  his  infantry  in  support. 
Messages  to  Wilson  were  too  slow,  and  it  was  evident 
that  Forrest  could  prevent  our  cavalry  from  getting 
more  definite  news,  and  a  strong  infantry  reconnois- 
sance  was  determined  upon  as  a  preliminary  before 
deciding  finally  to  leave  the  line  of  Duck  River. 

About  sunrise,  Schofield  therefore  ordered  Stanley 
to  march  with  all  of  his  command,  except  Wood's 
division  and  two  batteries  of  artillery,  to  Spring  Hill.1 
The  trains  were  ordered  to  the  same  place,  and  Ruger 
was  also  directed  to  call  in  his  smaller  detachments 
down  the  river,  and  to  move  the  parts  of  his  division 
present,  except  one  regiment  at  the  ruins  of  the  rail 
way  crossing  (Ducktown),  which  wras  to  remain  as  an 
outpost  till  night.  My  own  division  held  the  tongue 
of  land  in  the  bend  of  the  river,  covering  the  crossing 
by  the  turnpike,  near  which  was  a  ford  barely  passa 
ble  at  a  little  lower  stage  of  water.  We  were  ordered 
to  hold  on  till  night,  and  then,  leaving  pickets  till 
midnight,  to  follow  the  movement  to  Spring  Hill. 
Wood  was  directed  to  send  a  brigade  on  a  brisk  re- 
connoissance  in  force  up  the  river  till  it  should  develop 
the  truth  in  regard  to  the  actual  crossing  of  the  ene 
my's  infantry.  Captain  Twining,  Chief  Engineer  on 
General  Schofield's  staff,  accompanied  the  reconnois- 

1  Spring  Hill,  eleven  miles  north  of  Columbia  on  the  Franklin 
Turnpike,  was  at  an  important  cross-roads,  directly  connected  also  by 
a  diagonal  road  with  Rally  Hill,  where  our  cavalry  concentrated.  It 
was  therefore  the  first  rallying  place  for  the  army  in  a  retrograde 
movement. 


28  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

sauce,  and  reported  its  progress.1  These  orders  were 
given,  partly  by  notes  sent  through  staff  officers,  and 
in  part  by  conferences  of  General  Schofield  with  his 
principal  subordinates  in  person. 

He  had  hardly  given  them  when  he  received  Gen 
eral  Thomas's  reply  to  his  dispatches  sent  about 
nine  o'clock  of  the  previous  forenoon,  before  he  got 
the  news  from  Wilson  that  Forrest  was  over  Duck 
River.2  This  reply  expressed  the  wish  that  he  should 
retain  his  position  at  Duck  River 3  till  the  arrival  of 
Smith  with  his  reinforcements,  if  he  were  confident 
of  his  ability  to  do  so.  It  gave  permission  to  have 
the  distant  detachments  of  infantry  relieved,  but  di 
rected  that  they  should  obstruct  the  crossings  of  the 
river  by  felling  timber,  and  do  this  thoroughly  as  far 
down  stream,  on  our  right  flank,  as  Centerville.  The 
same  courier  brought  an  answer  to  Scliofield's  dis 
patch  of  3.30  P.  M.,  in  which  he  had  announced  the 
first  news  of  Forrest's  crossing  the  river.4  He  had 
added  the  rumor  that  infantry  was  with  Forrest,  but 
said  that  he  did  not  regard  it  as  very  probable.  The 
report  was,  in  fact,  premature.  Thomas's  answer  is 
couched  in  language  which  so  vividly  shows  his  frame 
of  mind,  and  the  conditions  on  which  alone  he  could 
bring  himself  to  think  of  further  retreat,  that  it  must 
be  given  in  his  own  words  :  — 

"  Your  dispatch  of  3.30  just  received.  If  Wilson  can 
not  succeed  in  driving  back  the  enemy,  should  it  prove 
true  that  he  has  crossed  the  river,  you  will  necessarily 
have  to  make  preparations  to  take  up  a  new  position  at 
Franklin  behind  Harpeth,  immediately,  if  it  becomes 
necessary  to  fall  back."  5 

1  O.  R,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  1139,  1140,  1141,  1142. 

2  Id.,  p.  1106.  4  Id.,  p.  1107. 

3  Id.,  p.  1108.  5  Id.,  p.  1108. 


From  Columbia  to  Franklin  29 

On  the  receipt  of  these  dispatches,  Schoficld  resolved 
to  take  the  risks  of  a  more  deliberate  movement.  He 
countermanded  Roger's  order  to  march,1  and  directed 
him  to  make  thorough  obstruction  of  the  fords  and 
roads  down  the  river,  in  accordance  with  Thomas's 
instructions.  A.  messenger  was  sent  to  Cooper  at 
Beard's  Ferry,  near  Centervillc,  ordering  him  to 
march  to  Franklin.2  Kirnball's  division  was  ordered 
to  halt  at  Rutherford's  Creek,  three  or  four  miles  in 
rear  of  Wood's  position.  The  trains,  however,  were 
pushed  onward  to  Spring  Hill,  where  Stanley  went  in 
person  with  Wagner's  division.  Schoiield  informed 
Thomas  that  he  would  await  the  result  of  the  infantry 
reconnoissance,  and  asked  him  to  send  orders  directly 
to  Cooper,  as  it  was  doubtful  whether  his  messenger 
could  reach  Centerville.3  This  closed  communication 
between  Thomas  and  Schofield  till  the  latter  reached 
Franklin  next  morning ;  but  when  the  former  knew 
all  the  circumstances,  he  expressed  the  warmest  ap 
proval  of  the  conduct  of  his  subordinate. 

During  the  week  preceding  the  29th,  the  greatest 
source  of  embarrassment  had  been  the  organization  of 
the  telegraph  service.  The  Secretary  of  War  had,  a 
year  before,  made  the  telegraph  so  far  independent  of 
commanders  in  the  field  that  not  even  General  Grant 
was  allowed  to  have  the  key  of  the  cipher  used  in  his 
dispatches.  This  naturally  led  to  great  uncertainty 
in  the  service,  the  operators  becoming  lax  in  the  per 
formance  of  the  task  of  ciphering  and  deciphering  the 
dispatches  which  came  into  their  hands.  In  the  crisis 
of  this  campaign  the  telegraph  was  practically  of  no 
use,  for  a  special  messenger  could  have  carried  dis 
patches  more  speedily  than  they  were  transmitted  by 
the  wire.  As  early  as  the  20th  of  November,  Scho- 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1142.          '2  Id.,  p.  371  3  Id.,  p.  1137. 


30  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

field  had  been  obliged  to  ask  why  it  should  take  all 
day  to  communicate  hetween  Pulaski  and  Nashville.1 
Again,  on  the  27th  he  informs  General  Thomas  that 
he  had  just  got  a  translation  of  the  cipher  dispatch 
of  the  25th,  two  days  after  it  was  written.2  A  com 
parison  of  the  times  of  writing  and  receipt  will  show 
that  six  or  eight  hours  was  the  common  interval.  To 
cap  the  climax  of  embarrassments,  the  operator  at 
Sehofield's  headquarters  became  alarmed  for  his  per 
sonal  safety  on  the  27th,  and  deserted  his  post,  going 
to  Franklin  and  refusing  to  return  when  ordered.  He 
seemed  to  think  it  was  a  sufficient  performance  of  his 
duty  to  decipher  dispatches  there  and  send  the  trans 
lation  by  a  courier  twenty  miles.  The  security  of  the 
cipher  was  thus  used  over  the  line  from  Nashville  to 
Franklin,  which  was  perfectly  safe,  and  the  insecurity 
of  sending  the  translation  by  a  courier  was  suffered 
upon  the  route  through  Spring  Hill  in  the  presence  of 
the  enemy,  and  where,  in  fact,  the  most  important 
dispatch  of  the  series  was  captured  by  them.3 

But  this  same  dispatch  had  begun  its  misadventures 
at  General  Thomas's  headquarters.  It  was  written 
at  half  past  three  in  the  morning,  but  had  not  been 
sent  to  Franklin  at  six,  and  the  recorded  explanation 
is  proof  of  the  looseness  of  administration.4  Why  the 
Secretary  of  War  had  insisted  upon  such  a  system,  in 
spite  of  the  protests  of  military  commanders,  is  one  of 
the  mysteries  of  the  history  of  the  war.  In  this  in 
stance  it  operated  for  the  benefit  of  the  Confederate 
general  alone.  The  only  rational  plan  was  to  put  the 
key  of  the  cipher  in  the  hands  of  a  confidential  aid  of 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.   p.  958. 

2  Id.,  p.  1086. 

3  See  the  facts  as  brought  out  in  court  martial  proceedings,  0.  R., 
xlv.  part  ii.  p.  289,  and  Id.,  part  i.  p.  11 72. 

4  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1137. 


From  Columbia  to  Franklin  31 

the  general  to  whom  the  dispatches  were  addressed, 
and  limit  the  operator  of  the  telegraph  to  the  mechan 
ical  work  of  transmission.  If  a  courier  had  to  be  used 
where  the  wire  could  not  reach  the  general's  tent,  the 
dispatch  would  at  least  be  unintelligible  to  the  enemy 
that  might  capture  it. 

But  let  us  return  to  the  progress  of  events  in  Sclio- 
field's  little  army.  At  about  eleven  o'clock  Captain 
Twining  had  reported  a  column  of  the  enemy's  infan 
try  moving  northward,  on  what  proved  to  be  the 
road  from  Davis's  Ford  (five  miles  above  Columbia) 
to  Spring  Hill.1  The  discovery  was  mutual,  for  our 
column  was  seen  by  the  enemy,  and  raised  doubts  in 
Hood's  mind  which  grew  more  serious  as  the  day  wore 
on.  The  Confederate  commander  had  marched  with 
the  greater  part  of  his  army,  leaving  General  S.  D.  Lee 
in  Columbia  with  his  corps,  diminished  by  Johnson's 
division,  with  orders  to  detain  Schofield  by  an  active 
demonstration  until  the  afternoon.  He  was  then  to 
push  seriously  his  effort  to  cross  whilst  Hood  himself 
should  attack  our  left  flank.2  The  trains,  and  all  the 
artillery  except  two  batteries  were  with  Lee,  so  that 
Hood  might  not  be  encumbered  in  his  march  upon  the 
by-roads. 

About  noon  Forrest's  cavalry  reached  Spring  Hill, 
having  driven  Wilson  back  toward  Franklin  on  the 
Lewisburg  Turnpike,  and  separated  him  from  connec 
tion  with  our  infantry.3  Stanley  reached  Spring  Hill 
with  Wagner's  division  and  most  of  the  Fourth  Corps 
artillery  at  about  the  same  time  with  Forrest,  and 
easily  checked  his  advance.  The  trains  which  were 
just  arriving  there  under  the  escort  of  a  regiment 
from  my  division  (103d  Ohio)  were  parked ;  the  artil- 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1139. 

2  Lee's  Report,  Id.,  p.  687.  3  Id.,  p.  763. 


32  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

lery  was  placed  on  commanding  ground  and  positions 
were  taken  to  cover  the  approaches  to  Spring  Hill 
from  the  south  and  east.  Stanley  was  also  ordered 
to  communicate  with  Wilson,  and  tell  the  latter  not  to 
let  Forrest  get  between  him  and  the  infantry.1  It 
was  too  late,  however,  to  accomplish  the  last  direc 
tion,  for  the  whole  of  our  cavalry  was  now  on  the 
Lewisburg  and  Franklin  road  several  miles  to  the 
eastward,  and  our  communication  with  it  was  not  re 
newed  till  we  reached  Franklin  next  morning. 

About  three  o'clock  Schofield  became  satisfied  that 
Hood  was  not  intending  to  make  his  attack  on  Kim- 
ball's  and  Wood's  divisions,  which  were  in  echelon  on 
my  left  and  rear.  He  therefore  led  Ruger's  two  bri 
gades  in  person  by  a  rapid  march  to  Spring  Hill,  leav 
ing  a  regiment  of  that  command  to  guard  the  river  at 
the  broken  railway  bridge,  as  has  already  been  men 
tioned.2  As  he  passed  Rutherford's  Creek  he  ordered 
a  brigade  of  Kimball's  division  also  to  follow  him,  for 
by  that  time  the  noise  of  the  combat  at  Spring  Hill 
told  of  a  vigorous  attack  by  the  enemy.  In  anticipa 
tion  of  the  probable  course  of  events,  written  orders 
had  been  prepared  at  Schofield's  headquarters  direct 
ing  a  continuous  movement  toward  Franklin,  begin 
ning  at  dark,  and  these  had  been  distributed  before 
Schofield  went  himself  to  Spring  Hill.  They  were 
necessarily  modified  in  several  particulars  to  meet  the 
changing  events  of  the  afternoon  and  evening. 3 

The  trains  did  not  leave  Spring  Hill  for  Franklin 
until  my  division  passed  at  midnight  and  took  the  ad- 

1  O.  K,,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1141. 

2  Ante,  p.  27. 

3  0.  K.,  xlv.  pp.  1 139, 1140.    The  order  in  General  Schofield's  order 
book  is  dated  at  Spring  Hill,  but  its  issue  was  from  his  headquarters  at 
Duck  River  early  in  the  afternoon.     He  issued  no  written  orders  at 
Spring  Hill. 


From  Columbia  to  Franklin  33 

vance.  Rugcr's  division  was  moved  under  Schofield's 
oral  orders,  and  was  the  first  to  reach  Stanley.  The 
orders  for  the  cavalry  could  not  take  effect,  for  the 
two  brigades  which  Schoiield  supposed  were  at  Spring 
Hill  had  joined  Wilson,  and  when  he  arrived  at  that 
place  were  out  of  reach  of  orders.  The  organization 
of  the  column  had  to  be  changed  in  all  these  respects, 
therefore,  and  it  was  ordered  by  General  Schofield 
orally  and  in  person. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  give  the  details  of  Stanley's 
sharp  engagement  at  Spring  Hill,  or  of  my  own  bick 
ering  combat  with  Lee's  corps  at  the  river.  I  have 
already  given  these  in  another  place.1  My  present 
aim  is  to  show  what  new  light  we  may  get  from  the 
publication  of  the  official  records  upon  General  Scho 
field's  reasons  for  his  action  in  the  conduct  of  the  re 
treat  upon  Franklin.  These  records  give  us  the  means 
of  accurately  knowing  the  situation  from  hour  to  hour, 
and  the  dispatches  received  by  him,  as  well  as  those 
which  miscarried. 

Hood's  attack  upon  Spring  Hill  failed,  and  Lee  did 
not  succeed  in  crossing  the  river  at  Columbia,  At 
nightfall  my  division  was  withdrawn  from  its  position 
at  the  river,2  leaving  the  pickets  in  position  supported 
by  the  12th  and  16th  Kentucky  Regiments,  the  whole 
under  command  of  Lieut.  Colonel  Laurence  H.  Rous 
seau  of  the  former  regiment,  accompanied  by  Major 
T.  T.  Dow,  Inspector  General  on  my  staff.8 

The  picket  lines  were  maintained  till  past  midnight, 
and  were  then  withdrawn  without  molestation.  The 

1  See  March  to  the  Sea,  Franklin  and  Nashville,  chap.  iv. 

2  O.  R.,  xlv.  parti,  p.  1143. 

3  In  my  history  ahove  referred  to,  I  said  that  Lieut.  Colonel  J.  S. 
White  of  the  16th  Kentucky  was  in  command.    Both  these  gallant 
officers  were  present,  but  I  have  learned  that  Colonel  Rousseau  was  the 
senior. 

3 


34  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

enemy  was  not  aware  of  this  till  about  half  past 
two,  when  Lee's  corps  began  its  preparation  for  fol 
lowing  us.1 

When  Schofield  reached  Spring  Hill  with  Ruger's 
division,  darkness  had  put  an  end  to  the  fighting 
there ;  but  he  learned  that  some  force  of  the  enemy 
was  upon  the  turnpike  at  Thompson's  Station,  three 
miles  north.  Cheatham's  corps  lay  in  front  of  Stan 
ley,  his  camp-fires  within  half  a  mile  of  our  road, 
seeming  much  nearer  in  the  darkness.  Indeed,  Scho- 
field's  own  escort,  moving  in  advance  of  Ruger,  had 
brushed  away  a  hostile  picket  from  the  road  itself  as 
he  drew  near  to  Spring  Hill.2  The  brigade  from 
KimbalPs  division  accompanying  him  (Whitaker's) 
was  ordered  to  extend  Stanley's  line  to  the  right, 
giving  better  cover  to  our  line  of  march.  When 
Schofield  learned  of  the  presence  of  the  enemy  on  his 
line  of  communications,  and  that  our  cavalry  was 
wholly  beyond  reach,  he  marched  with  Ruger  at  once 
for  Thompson's,  leaving  with  Stanley  directions  for 
me  to  halt  at  Spring  Hill  till  I  should  hear  further 
from  him.8  He  found  the  road  clear,  however,  the 
detachment  of  Forrest's  men  who  had  been  there 
having  retreated,  leaving  their  camp-fires  burning. 

Schofield  now  posted  Ruger's  division  there,  and 
rode  back  to  Spring  Hill,  arriving  a  few  minutes  after 
I  myself  had  reached  Stanley's  quarters.  It  was  now 
midnight.  The  troops  were  marching  left  in  front,  so 
as  to  face  the  enemy  on  our  right  with  least  delay, 
and  as  the  movement  was  in  retreat,  I  was  with  the 
rear  of  my  column.  The  division  had  massed  by  the 

1  Lee's  Report,  Id.,  p.  687. 

2  Letter  of  Colonel  Wherry  of  Schofield's  staff.     The  escort  was 
Captain  Ashbury's  company,  7th  O.  V.  Cavalry. 

3  Schofield's  Report,  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  342. 


From  Columbia  to  Franklin  35 

roadside  as  it  came  up,  and  moved  again  as  soon  as 
I  had  my  interview  with  the  commandant  of  the  army. 
Wood's  division  was  already  following  my  march,  and 
KimbalPs  was  preparing  to  follow  Wood.  The  pick 
ets  at  Duck  River  were  gathering  upon  Rousseau's 
support,  and  the  infantry  and  artillery  of  our  little 
army  were  steadily  concentrating  upon  Spring  Hill. 
Schoficld  ordered  me  to  take  the  advance  at  once, 
and  march  to  Franklin,  still  twelve  miles  distant.1 
The  trains  followed,  convoyed  by  Ruger's  and  Wood's 
divisions  marching  by  the  side  of  the  wagons ;  Kim- 
ball's  division  followed,  and  Wagner's  acted  as  rear 
guard. 

The  pickets  with  their  supports,  under  Lieut.  Colonel 
Rousseau,  reached  Spring  Hill  at  about  four  o'clock  in 
the  morning.  Wagner's  division  was  still  there,  and 
Rousseau,  pressing  vigorously  forward,  overtook  Gen 
eral  Wood's  column  near  Thompson's  Station,  as  day 
broke,  and  at  his  request  joined  his  command  in  de 
fending  the  trains  against  some  spirited  attacks  of 
the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  marched  the  rest  of  the  way 
in  company  with  that  division.2  Wagner  did  not  get 
wholly  away  from  Spring  Hill,  till  six  o'clock  but 
was  not  vigorously  pursued.3  His  greatest  embarrass 
ment  was  with  the  stragglers.  Some  two  thousand 
new  recruits  had  joined  the  army  during  the  halt  at 
Duck  River,  and  were  not  yet  inured  to  the  fatigue  of 
marching.  It  was  hard  work  keeping  them  up  with 
the  column,  so  that  they  should  not  be  captured.  Their 


1  The  distance  from  Columbia  to  Franklin    by  the   turnpike    is 
twenty-three  miles.     My  position  at  Duck  River  being  a  mile  from 
Columbia,  my  whole  night  march  was  twenty-two  miles.     See  Report, 
Appendix  B. 

2  Colonel  Dow's  statement,  Appendix  TL 

3  Opdycke's  Report,  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  239. 


36  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

knapsacks  were  carried  for  them  or  thrown  away. 
Ambulances  and  wagons  took  those  who  were  most 
footsore,  and,  though  the  rear  of  the  column  was  de 
layed,  they  were  safely  brought  into  camp  at  Franklin 
before  noon. 


CHAPTER   III 

TAKING  POSITION   AT  FRANKLIN 

Arrival  at  Franklin  — No  Bridge  or  Pontoons  —  Hood  to  be  held  back 

—  Schofield's  Oral  Directions  —  His  Correspondence  with  Thomas 

—  Delay  in  Arrival  of  Reinforcements  at  Nashville  —  Can  you  hold 
Hood  back  three  Days  ?  —  Orders  to  continue  Retreat  —  The  Posi 
tion  at  Franklin  —  The  Carter  House  —  The  Town  and  the  River  — 
The  Field  in  Front  —  The  Defensive  Line  — Repairing  Bridges  — 
Twenty-third  Corps  Positions — Reilly's  Division  —  Ruger's  Divis 
ion —  The  Works  on  Carter  Hill  — Retrenchment  across  Turnpike 

—  Kimball's  Division. 

MY  own  march  from  Spring  Hill  to  Franklin  had 
been  undisturbed.  We  had  taken  an  easy  gait,  so 
as  not  to  outmarch  the  trains  and  their  guards,  and 
it  was  about  half  past  four  o'clock,  or  two  hours  and 
a  half  before  day,  when  we  approached  the  outskirts 
of  the  village.  General  Schofield  had  ridden  for 
ward  and  overtaken  me  after  he  had  issued  his  final 
orders  at  Spring  Hill,  for  it  was  of  the  greatest 
importance  that  he  should  study  the  position  north 
of  the  Harpcth,  and  the  means  of  crossing  that  river. 
It  was  hardly  less  so  that  he  should  get  into  direct 
telegraphic  communication  with  General  Thomas. 
On  reaching  Thompson's  Station  in  the  night,  he 
had  sent  Captain  Twining,  his  engineer,  with  a 
small  escort,  to  Franklin,  to  communicate  with 
Thomas,  and  to  examine  the  means  of  crossing  the 
river.  Twining  was  also  instructed  to  order  forward 
any  troops  of  A.  J.  Smith's  command  that  might 


38  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

have  reached  the  Harpeth.  He  arrived  at  Franklin 
at  one  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  telegraphed  Scho- 
field's  situation  to  General  Thomas,  and  his  ex 
pectation  that  he  might  not  get  beyond  Thompson's 
Station  that  night.  He  added  that  Schofield  thought 
it  likely  that  he  might  be  forced  into  a  general  battle 
on  the  30th,  or  lose  his  wagon  train.1 

When  the  outermost  house  of  the  village  came 
dimly  into  view  as  we  marched  northward,  Schofield 
directed  me  to  mass  my  division  on  both  sides  of  the 
turnpike,  leaving  the  way  clear  for  the  trains,  and 
let  the  men  make  their  coffee,  whilst  he  rode  into 
town  to  find  Captain  Twining,  and  learn  the  con 
dition  of  the  river  crossings.  He  was  especially 
anxious  to  know  whether  the  pontoons  had  arrived 
which  he  had  asked  for  by  a  second  and  urgent 
dispatch.2  To  Schofield's  first  request  (sent  on  the 
28th),  Thomas  had  answered  by  giving  authority  to 
use  some  of  those  which  had  been  at  Columbia;3 
but  the  fact  was  that  those  had  been  very  heavy 
wooden  boats,  for  which  there  were  no  trucks  large 
enough  to  carry  them  up  to  the  railway,  or  proper 
cars  for  their  transportation,  and  they  had  been 
destroyed  when  the  crossing  was  abandoned.  The 
second  despatch  (dated  at  1  P.M.  on  the  29th)  reached 
Spring  Hill  after  the  enemy  had  possession  of  the 
road  northward,  and  could  go  no  farther.  Not  being 
informed  of  this,  Schofield  was  hopeful  that  he  would 
find  a  bridge  train  awaiting  him  at  the  river. 

1  O.  R..,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1138.     Twining's  dispatch  as  printed  in  the 
Records  is  dated  at  10  o'clock  p.  M.  of  the  29th,  but  General  Thomas 
in  replying  (p.  1168)  speaks  of  it  as  "your  dispatch  of  1  A.  M.  to-day," 
i.  e.  the  30th,  and  this  best  accords  with  other  events.     Schofield  was 
at  Thompson's  Station  at  about  eleven,  and  returned  in  haste  to  Spring 
Hill,  where  he  met  me,  whilst  Twining  was  on  his  way  to  Franklin. 

2  Id.,  p.  1138.  3  Id.,  pp.  1107,  1108. 


Taking  Position  at  Franklin  39 

After  giving  orders  for  resting  the  troops,  I  rode 
on  with  my  staff  to  the  house  hefore  me  which  was 
on  our  left  hand  as  we  approached  the  town,  and  was 
partly  hidden  by  a  grove  of  trees  a  little  way  south 
of  it.  Rousing  the  family,  they  were  told  that  we 
should  have  to  make  use  of  part  of  the  house  as  tem 
porary  headquarters.  They  put  their  front  sitting- 
room  at  our  disposal,  and,  loosening  sword  belts  and 
pistol  holsters,  we  threw  ourselves  upon  the  floor  to 
get  a  few  minutes  of  greatly  needed  sleep.  1  had 
fallen  into  a  doze  when  General  Schofield  returned. 

In  all  my  intimate  acquaintance  with  him,  I  never 
saw  him  so  manifestly  disturbed  by  the  situation  as 
he  was  in  the  glimmering  dawn  of  that  morning. 
Pale  and  jaded  from  the  long  strain  of  the  forty- 
eight  hours  just  past,  he  spoke  with  a  deep  earnest 
ness  of  feeling  he  rarely  showed.  "General,"  he 
said,  "the  pontoons  are  not  here,  the  county  bridge 
is  gone,  and  the  ford  is  hardly  passable.  You  must 
take  command  of  the  Twenty -third  Corps,  and  put  it 
in  position  here  to  hold  Hood  back  at  all  hazards 
till  we  can  get  our  trains  over,  and  fight  with  the 
river  in  front  of  us.  With  T wining' s  help,  I  shall 
see  what  can  be  done  to  improve  the  means  of  cross 
ing,  for  everything  depends  upon  it.  Let  your  artil 
lery  and  trains  go  over  at  once.  I  will  give  you 
batteries  from  the  Fourth  Corps,  in  place  of  yours, 
as  they  come  in."  So  vivid  is  this  recollection, 
that,  as  I  recall  it,  I  seem  to  hear  the  very  words. 
The  written  orders  which  were  issued  when  Major 
Campbell,  the  Adjutant  General,  established  his 
office  later  in  the  day,  were  only  the  formal  embod 
iment  of  the  purpose  thus  expressed.  On  this  I 
acted.  It  will  become  necessary,  by  and  by,  to 
examine  the  text  of  the  orders,  and  note  the  points 


40  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

of  discussion  which  have  arisen  concerning  them. 
This  is  the  reason  why  I  state  so  fully  the  manner  in 
which  General  Schofield's  purposes  and  commands 
were  made  known  to  me  by  himself.1 

On  his  first  arrival  at  Franklin,  General  Schofield 
found  Captain  Twining,  and  read  General  Thom 
as's  dispatch  of  four  o'clock,  giving  the  news  that 
A.  J.  Smith's  command  was  upon  boats  at  the  levee.2 
Thomas  thought,  however,  that  it  would  be  imprac 
ticable  for  Smith  to  reach  Fr.anklin  that  day,  and 
indicated  a  wish  that  Schofield  should  get  into  posi 
tion  on  the  north  side  of  the  Harpeth,  and  continue 
the  efforts  to  delay  Hood.  Schofield's  answer  is 
dated  at  five  o'clock,  and  urges  that  Smith  should 
march  at  once,  as  he  could,  at  least,  protect  the 
wagon  trains  if  further  retreat  became  necessary.3 
A  half-hour  later  he  reported  his  hope  to  get  his 
troops  and  trains  over  the  river  during  the  morn 
ing,4  and  that  he  would  try  to  get  Wilson,  with  the 
cavahy,  upon  his  flank  again.  A  little  before  ten, 
he  informed  Thomas  that  half  his  troops  were  in, 
a'nd  the  other  half  about  five  miles  out,  coming  on 
in  good  order;  that  Wilson  had  joined  him,  and  was 
in  position  on  his  flank,  but  could  not  cope  with 
Forrest,  by  whose  help  Hood  could  cross  the  river 

1  Major  C.  S.  Frink,  Brigade  Surgeon  and  Medical  Inspector  on 
my  staff,  in  a  letter  of  June  26,  1881,  relating  to  the  hospital  service 
during  the  battle,  incidentally  said  that  he  judged  a  battle  to  be  immi 
nent  "from  the  conversation  I  overheard  between  you  and  General 
Schofield  when  he  formally  placed  the  command  of  the  whole  line  in 
your  hands."     lie  later  reaffirmed  this,  referring  for  corroboration  of 
his  memory  to  a  letter  he  had  written  home  the  day  after  the  battle, 
and  which  was  before  him.     At  the  time  of  this  correspondence,  in 
1881,   I   was   collecting   material   for   my  historical  volume   already 
mentioned. 

2  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1168. 

3  Ibid.  4  III.,  p.  1169. 


Taking  Position  at  Franklin  41 

whenever  he  should  seriously  attempt  it.  He  there 
fore  asked  whether  he  should  hold  on  till  compelled 
to  fall  back.1 

We  must  not  forget  that  Schofield  had  heard  noth 
ing  of  his  cavalry  since  the  middle  of  the  forenoon 
of  the  29th.  He  was  relieved  of  some  anxiety, 
therefore,  when  he  found  at  Franklin  a  dispatch 
from  the  cavalry  commander,  dated  at  ten  o'clock  in 
the  evening,  from  a  point  two  and  a  half  miles  from 
Franklin,  on  the  road  to  Triune  (east).2  Wilson 
had  ordered  Hammond's  brigade  to  march  to  the 
latter  place  (twelve  miles)  without  halting,  and 
report  all  movements  of  the  enemy  in  that  direc 
tion.  One  of  Schofield's  first  acts  after  sending  his 
earliest  dispatch  to  Thomas  was  to  send  directions 
to  General  Wilson3  to  cover  his  immediate  flank  and 
rear  during  the  clay,  with  at  least  a  portion  of  his 
cavalry.  He  felt  that  the  absence  of  his  mounted 
troops  had  added  greatly  to  the  perils  of  his  situation 
during  the  retrea,t  from  Columbia. 

It  will  tend  to  clearness  to  dispose  at  once  of  the 
subsequent  correspondence  between  Thomas  and 
Schofield  on  this  day.  A  dispatch  from  the  former, 
at  10.25  A.M.  (written  before  the  receipt  of  Scho 
field's  of  9.50),  stated  that  it  would  take  Smith's 
troops  the  whole  day  to  disembark,  but  he  would 
then  send  them  to  Franklin  or  to  Brentwood  (half 
way),  unless  he  found  it  necessary  to  keep  them  at 
Nashville.4  This  proviso  refers  to  his  appehension 

1  O.  TJ.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1169.     In  General  Schofield's  report  this  dis 
patch  is  correctly  dated  at  9.50  A.  M.     General  Thomas's  report  has  it 
12.30  M.     By  the  latter  hour,  Wagner's  division  was  in  position  oil 
Winstead  Hill,  and  the  rest  of  the  army  and  the  trains  had  passed 
the  lines  in  front  of  Franklin. 

2  0.  R.,  xlv.  parti,  p.  1145. 

3  M,  p.  1177.  */</.,  p.  1169. 


42  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

that  Forrest  would  make  a  raid  upon  Nashville. 
Wilson's  dispatches  to  Thomas  had  been  full  of  this 
idea,  which,  though  a  mistaken  one,  was  manifestly 
influencing  Thomas's  action.  Schofield  was  there 
fore  told  that  Franklin  should  he  held  till  the  prob 
lem  might  be  cleared  up  a  little,  unless  this  should 
involve  "  too  much  risk. "  Of  course  the  whole  gist  of 
the  question  was,  What  is  too  much  risk?  Schofield 
answered  at  noon  J  that  he  thought  he  had  already 
been  running  too  much  risk,  using  the  language 
already  quoted;  that  the  slightest  mistake  on  his 
own  part  or  failure  of  a  subordinate  during  the  last 
three  days  would  have  proved  disastrous.2  Yet  he 
promised  the  most  cheerful  obedience  in  carrying 
out  his  superior's  views  when  they  should  be  dis 
tinctly  expressed.  He  urged  concentration,  if  not 
at  the  front,  then  at  some  point  further  in  the  rear. 
His  question  whether  he  was  to  hold  fast  "until  com 
pelled  to  fall  back  "  had  not  been  answered.  A 
little  later  Thomas  learned  that  one  division  of 
Smith's  forces  had  not  arrived.  He  telegraphed 
Schofield  that  they  would  have  to  try  to  hold  Hood 
back  till  these  troops  could  come.3  "After  that," 
he  said,  "we  will  concentrate  here,  reorganize  our 
cavalry,  and  try  Hood  again."  He  therefore  asked 
Schofield  whether  he  thought  he  could  keep  Hood  at 
Franklin  for  three  days  longer.  As  Schofield  had 
already  expressed  the  opinion  that  Hood  could  cross 
the  Harpeth  whenever  he  attempted  it,  the  question 
seems  unnecessary;  but  Schofield  replied,  at  3  P.M., 
that  he  did  not  think  he  could  insure  three  days.4 
One  day  he  might  answer  for,  because  the  manoeuvres 
of  the  enemy  would  require  about  so  much  time  when 

1  0.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1169.  3  Id.,  p.  1170. 

2  Ante,  p.  22.  4  Ibid. 


Taking  Position  at  Franklin  43 

a  new  flanking  movement  should  begin.  In  fact, 
preparations  to  cross  above  and  below  were  at  that 
time  making,  and  skirmishing  between  Forrest's  and 
Wilson's  forces,  three  miles  above,  had  just  been 
reported.  Schoficld's  opinion,  which  Thomas  had 
asked  for,  was  that  he  should,  in  view  of  Thomas's 
decision  that  Smith's  forces  could  not  leave  Nash 
ville  that  day,  take  position  at  Brentwood,  and  that 
Smith's  division,  which  had  arrived  in  the  night, 
together  with  the  Murfreesboro  garrison,  should  join 
him  there.1  In  this,  so  far  as  Schofield's  own 
movement  was  concerned,  Thomas  acquiesced,  and 
directed  the  wagon  trains  to  be  put  on  the  road  at 
once.  Hood's  attack  came  to  cut  the  knot,  probably 
before  Schofield  received  the  last  despatch,  and  the 
battle  materially  changed  the  situation.  This  corre 
spondence  exhibits  the  frame  of  mind  in  which  the 
two  generals  were,  and  emphasizes  the  purpose  which 
Schofield  expressed  to  me  at  the  Carter  house  before 
the  break  of  day,  that  my  duty  was  to  use  the  forces 
put  under  my  command  to  hold  Hood  back,  at  all 
hazards,  until  the  trains  and  the  rest  of  the  army 
should  be  safely  across  the  Harpeth. 

The  house  at  which  I  had  stopped  belonged  to  Mr. 
F1.  B.  Carter,  an  aged  man,  who  occupied  it  with 
several  grown  children  and  near  relatives.  A  son 
was  a  Confederate  officer,  who  had  been  taken  pris 
oner,  and  was  now  at  home  on  parol.2  The  house 

1  O.  R.,xlv.  part  i.  p.  1170. 

2  The  younger  man,  Mr.  M.  B.  Carter,  is  now  the  owner  of  the 
farm,  and  still  resides  there,  and  has  been  most  courteous  and  helpful 
in  fixing  the  important  points  of  location  and  topography  connected 
with  the  battle-field.     He  himself  levelled  the  breastworks,  and  as  he 
has  continuously  lived  upon  the  spot  he  is  a  conclusive  authority  on  some 
interesting  questions  in  regard  to  which  accounts  have  differed.     See 
the  account  of  a  visit  to  the  field  in  1 888  by  Captain  Thomas  Speed, 


44  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

was  of  brick,  of  ample  dimensions  on  the  ground, 
but  not  very  high,  as  it  was  built  of  one  lofty  and 
airy  story,  with  attics  above.  An  ell  extended  the 
suite  of  rooms  on  the  north  side  of  the  hall  some 
thirty  feet  toward  the  rear.  On  the  south  side  of 
the  door-yard,  sixty  feet  south  of  the  house,  and 
opposite  the. ell,  two  smaller  buildings  stood.  The 
one  nearest  the  road  was  of  wood,  and  was  used  as 
an  office ;  the  other  was  a  brick  smoke-house,  and 
the  passage  between  the  two  was  ten  or  a  dozen  feet 
wide.  The  house  itself  stood  forty-five  feet  back 
from  the  road,  which  was  bordered  by  a  line  of 
shade  trees.  A  barn  with  a  log  corn-crib  and  some 
smaller  outbuildings  were  a  little  over  a  hundred 
yards  back  from  the  road,  and  some  thirty  yards 
farther  north  than  the  line  of  the  house.  This  group 
of  buildings  was  to  become  the  focus  of  so  desperate 
a  conflict  that  it  is  well  to  have  their  situation  and 
relative  position  clearly  understood.1 

As  soon  as  it  was  light  enough  to  select  positions 
for  the  troops,  I  carefully  examined  the  ground. 
Looking  northward  toward  the  town,  a  well  marked 
slope  leads  to  a  lower  level  on  which  the  place  is 
built,  the  public  square  in  its  centre  being  forty 
feet  lower  than  the  knoll  or  bench  at  the  Carter 
house.  The  pretty  village  itself  is  a  third  of  a 

"  Sketches  of  War  History,"  vol.  iii.  p.  44 ;  published  by  the  Ohio 
Commamlery  of  the  Loyal  Legion.  In  company  with  Captain  Speed 
and  Major  D.  W.  Sanders  (formerly  of  the  staff  of  General  French, 
who  commanded  a  division  in  Hood's  army),  I  visited  the  field  recently 
and  made  careful  verification  of  the  topography. 

1  For  the  accurate  measurements  about  the  Carter  house  I  am  in 
debted  to  Colonel  M.  B.  Carter,  who  is  a  practical  surveyor.  The  office 
building  has,  since  the  war,  been  moved  from  the  place  it  occupied  in 
the  battle,  and  is  now  an  extension  of  the  ell  of  the  dwelling-house. 
In  moving  it,  it  was  turned  about  so  that  its  south  side,  which  is  rid 
dled  with  bullets,  now  faces  northward,  toward  the  town. 


Taking  Position  at  Franklin  45 

mile  away,  an  open  belt  of  fields  and  gardens  then 
encircling  it  from  river  to  river  as  it  stands  in  the 
deep  re-entrant  angle  of  the  Harpeth.  The  bend  oi 
the  river  is  almost  a  right  angle,  and  the  stream 
washes  the  east  and  north  sides  of  the  town.  As 
one  goes  up  stream,  he  finds,  after  getting  beyond 
the  houses,  that  the  valley  turns  to  the  southeast ; 
but  down  stream  it  trends  to  the  northwest,  which 
is  the  general  course  of  the  river  till  it  falls  into 
the  Cumberland,  some  thirty  miles  away.  In  the 
re-entrant  angle  the  northerly  bank  is  the  command 
ing  one,  being  not  only  of  a  higher  general  level, 
but  having  also  well  marked  hills,  on  one  of  which 
(Figuer's  Hill),  enfilading  the  stream  and  railway  on 
the  eastern  side  of  the  village,  was  Fort  Granger,  a 
dismantled  earthwork,  built  a  year  or  two  before. 
The  railway  bridge  is  perfectly  covered  by  any 
artillery  placed  in  the  fort,  and  a  deep  cut  in  the 
railway  at  the  edge  of  the  town  may  also  be 
thoroughly  swept  from  that  position. 

The  streets  in  the  town  are  not  in  the  same  direc 
tion  as  the  turnpike  at  the  Carter  house.  When  the 
highway  from  Columbia  enters  the  village,  it  turns 
to  the  right  to  reach  a  favorable  place  at  the  river 
for  the  bridge,  and  the  squares  are  symmetrical  with 
this  line.1  The  turnpike  bridge  had  been  destroyed 
early  in  the  war,  and  had  not  been  rebuilt.  It  was 
a  single  span  of  covered  wooden  truss,  resting  on 
high  abutments.  What  was  in  1864  known  as  the 
County  Bridge  was  a  lower  and  cheaper  structure  on 
trestles,  built  near  the  railway  crossing,  where  a 
hollow  on  the  north  side  made  a  practicable  ascent 
for  the  roadway.  This  departure  from  the  straight 
line  of  the  turnpike  added  nearly  half  a  mile  to  the 

1  See  Map. 


46  The  Battle  of  Franklin, 

length  of  the  road,  besides  making  it  more  difficult 
by  reason  of  the  grades.  The  ford  was  between  the 
site  of  the  former  turnpike  bridge  and  the  county 
bridge.  From  the  Carter  house  through  the  village 
to  the  ford  is  about  a  mile. 

Turning  now  to  the  south,  from  the  same  point 
of  view,  it  is  seen  that  the  Columbia  Turnpike  is 
nearly  level,  rising  slightly  till  it  crosses  a  low 
summit  half  a  mile  distant,  and  then  dipping  again 
so  as  to  hide  men  or  teams  in  the  road.  Most  of  the 
space  to  the  Winstead  Hill,  two  miles  away,  is  so 
gently  undulating  as  to  look  like  a  plain  with  a  few 
depressions  in  it  on  right  and  left  of  the  central 
ridge  and  road,  where  small  watercourses  run  either 
way  to  the  Harpeth.  About  half  way  to  Winstead 
Hill,  a  bold,  stony  hill  rises  on  the  west  of  the  turn 
pike,  isolated  in  the  general  level  around  it,  and 
known  in  the  neighborhood  as  Privet  Knob.1  Win- 
stead  Hill  bounds  the  valley  on  the  south,  making 
part  of  a  circle  of  ridges  and  heights,  which  seem  to 
surround  the  basin  in  which  the  town  lies.  The 
Columbia  Turnpike  runs  straight  south,  lost  to  view 
after  it  passes  the  low  summit  above  mentioned,  but 
coming  into  view  again,  climbing  Winstead  Hill  by 
a  white  line  rising  from  left  to  right,  and  passing 
over  the  crest  between  two  of  the  rounded  summits, 
which  give  the  elevation  a  picturesque  outline. 

Two  other  turnpikes  run  fom  the  town  southward. 
That  to  Lewisburg  goes  up  the  Harpeth  valley  in  a 
southeasterly  direction.  The  other  is  at  the  west, 
and  leaves  the  town  by  a  similar  angle.  It  is  called 
the  Carter's  Creek  Turnpike.  The  map  of  Franklin 

1  In  some  of  the  reports  of  the  battle  this  hill  is  called  Stone  Hill ; 
in  others,  Merrill's  Hill.  Privet  Knob  is  the  local  name  given  it  in  a 
former  generation,  from  the  privet  thicket  which  covered  it. 


Tdkiiig  Position  at  Franklin  47 

and  its  surroundings  has  been  aptly  compared  to 
the  left  hand  extended  with  separated  fingers.  The 
little  finger  and  thumb  at  right  angles  represent 
the  Harpeth  River  in  its  course  from  left  to  right, 
whilst  the  three  fingers  spread  in  the  midst  indicate 
the  three  turnpikes  diverging  southward  from  the 
village. 

Half  a  mile  southwest  of  the  Carter  house,  and 
near  the  Carter's  Creek  Turnpike,  is  a  hillock  with  a 
mansion  and  orchard  known  as  the  Bostick  place.1 
Between  the  two  houses  is  a  gentle  hollow,  which  is 
about  thirty  feet  below  the  level  in  the  direct  line 
from  house  to  house.  In  it  heads  a  small  water 
course,  which  meanders  through  it,  and,  crossing 
the  Carter's  Creek  Turnpike,  curves  northwardly  to 
the  Harpeth.  This  hollow,  with  its  marshy  brook, 
bounds  the  village  on  the  west. 

Looking  eastward,  the  Carter  Hill  went  forward  a 
little,  and  one  then  saw,  a  hundred  and  twenty  yards 
in  front  and  eighty  yards  east  of  the  turnpike,  a 
cotton-gin,  a  strong  frame  building  like  a  barn  on 
the  most  advanced  salient  of  the  hill.  To  the  left 
of  this  the  ground  descended  a  little,  but  rose  again 
on  reaching  the  Lewisburg  Turnpike,  half  a  mile 
away,  where,  between  it  and  the  railroad  and  a  little 
in  the  rear,  was  another  well  marked  knoll,  through 
which  the  railway  excavation  cuts,  as  has  been  already 
mentioned.2  In  the  middle  of  this  recurved  line,  on 
the  left,  were  two  large  oak  trees,  still  standing, 
landmarks  which  show  the  curve  of  the  natural  lines 
of  defence.  Beyond  the  knoll  and  the  railroad  was 

1  In  the  Twining  Map  (p.  45)  it  is  marked  as  a  group  of  buildings 
in  a  square  enclosure.     The  name  F.  E.  Carter,  near  it,  is  that  of  the 
owner  of  the  large  surrounding  farm,  but  he  did  not  own  this  mansion. 

2  Ante,  p.  45. 


48  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

the  upper  reach  of  the  river,  widening  the  field  in 
front  as  it  bore  off  to  the  eastward.1 

Such  was  the  field  as  it  lay  before  us  under  the 
level  beams  of  the  rising  sun.  It  was  evident  that 
the  Carter  Hill  was  the  key  to  any  strong  system  of 
defence  in  front  of  the  town,  and  that  the  line  from 
the  cotton-gin  as  a  salient  by  the  oaks  to  the  knoll 
near  the  river  bank  must  form  our  line  of  battle  on 
the  left  flank.  Artillery  in  Fort  Granger,  on  Figuer's 
Hill,  would  be  a  powerful  support  to  it.  As  to  the 
right  flank,  a  gallop  to  the  Carter's  Creek  Turnpike 
showed  that  it  would  not  do  to  throw  that  wing  out 
to  the  Bostick  place,  although  that  position  was  the 
most  commanding  one  in  itself.  Our  flank  resting 
there  would  be  "  in  the  air, "  with  no  security  against 
its  being  readily  turned  by  the  enemy.  Having  but 
two  divisions  of  the  corps  in  hand,  we  must  find  a 
shorter  line,  and  let  the  hollow  with  its  watercourse 
determine  the  outline  of  our  breastworks  in  that 
direction.  Our  position  would,  in  part,  be  lower 
than  the  Bostick  Hill,  and  commanded  by  it,  but  we 
could  assist  our  troops  there  by  an  artillery  cross 
fire  from  the  Carter  Hill.  I  hoped  we  might  have 
reserve  enough  to  make  a  second  line  on  the  extreme 
right.  At  any  rate,  it  was  the  best  we  could  do,  and 
if  we  could  hold  back  the  enemy  during  the  day,  we 
should  be  at  liberty  to  put  the  river  between  us  and 
him  at  nightfall, 

'  The  situation,  as  I  have  described  it,  and  the 
general  topography  of  the  region,  made  it  probable 
that  Hood,  after  passing  Winstead  Hill,  would  push 
his  right  flank  forward  on  the  shortest  line  to  our 

1  The  knoll  on  our  extreme  left  is  now  occupied  by  the  residence 
and  grounds  of  Mr.  Kolffs,  a  merchant  of  Franklin.  There  was  no 
house  on  it  at  the  time  of  the  battle. 


Taking  Position  at  Franklin  49 

communications  with  the  north  bank  of  the  Harpeth, 
for  both  the  bridges,  the  wagon  bridge  and  that  of 
the  railway,  as  well  as  the  ford,  were  in  rear  of  the 
left  of  our  defensive  line.  On  the  upper  reaches  of 
the  river  were  also  the  nearest  and  most  available 
fords  by  which  his  cavalry,  under  Forrest,  could 
cross  and  turn  our  position.  These  considerations 
decided  me  to  put  my  own  division  (the  only  troops 
then  in  hand)  on  the  line  from  the  Carter  house 
toward  the  left,  making  the  knoll  near  the  river 
strong  with  a  recurved  line,  which  should  guard  the 
railway  cut.  The  most  essential  part  of  our  defences 
would  thus  be  first  prepared,  and  Ruger's  division, 
as  it  should  come  in,  could  extend  the  lines  west 
ward  with  a  refused  flank  at  the  Carter's  Creek 
Turnpike. 

Let  us  now  go  back  and  follow  the  actual  course 
of  events  from  the  time  General  Schofield  gave  me 
his  general  directions,  and  left  me  in  command  at 
the  Carter  house,  whilst  he  went,  in  the  morning 
twilight,  to  give  personal  supervision  to  the  all- 
important  work  of  improving  the  means  of  crossing 
the  river.  We  had  in  the  corps  an  efficient  engineer 
battalion,  made  up  of  intelligent  mechanics,  and  it 
was  ordered  at  once  to  report  to  Captain  Twining, 
Chief  Engineer.  The  artillery  of  the  corps  under 
Captain  Cockerill,  Chief  of  Artillery,  was  ordered  to 
cross  at  once  by  the  ford,  and  as  it  reached  the 
north  bank  Cockcrill's  own  battery  of  three-inch 
rifles  was  placed  in  Fort  Granger  by  General  Scho- 
field's  personal  order.  The  rest  of  the  cannon  were 
parked  near  by. a 

The  trains  were  also  ordered  to  proceed  at  once  to 
the  town,  and  prepare  to  follow  the  artillery  across 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  432. 
4 


50  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

as  soon  as  possible.  The  approaches  to  the  ford  had 
to  be  mended  by  scarping  the  bank  on  either  side,  so 
as  to  make  a  practicable  grade  for  our  heavy  laden 
army  wagons.  Most  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  am 
munition  train  also  passed  over  to  the  north  side,  as 
the  uniform  calibre  of  the  infantry  arms  enabled 
us  to  rely  on  the  Fourth  Corps  trains,  which  came 
in  last.1 

The  county  bridge  had  been  burned  in  a  skirmish 
earlier  in  the  season,  but  had  not  been  wholly 
destroyed.  It  was  found  that,  by  sawing  off  the 
posts  quite  close  to  the  water,  and  making  new 
stringers  and  flooring  beams  for  the  intermediate 
spaces,  a  temporary  structure  of  a  useful  character 
could  be  made.  It  was  only  intended  at  first  for 
the  passage  of  the  troops  themelves,  but  it  was  found 
to  be  so  substantial  that  loaded  wagons  could  be 
taken  over  it  with  a  little  care.  Its  floor  was  so 
near  the  water  that  many  who  crossed  it  thought  it 
was  a  pontoon  bridge,  and  it  was  so  spoken  of  by 
several  officers  in  reports  and  printed  statements. 
They  had  heard  that  a  pontoon  bridge  was  expected, 
and  naturally  assumed  that  it  had  been  laid.2  The 
change  of  grade  necessitated  a  good  deal  of  work  at 
the  approaches  of  this  crossing  also,  before  it  could 
be  available  for  teams.  But  we  had  still  a  third 

1  Overlooking  this  fact,  Van  Home  speaks  as  if  the  great  quantity 
of  ammunition  used  from  the  Fourth  Corps  train  were  expended  by 
the  troops  of  that  corps  alone.     Army  of  the  Cumberland,  ii.  p.  202. 
It  probably  represents  what  was  expended  by  all  the  troops  engaged 
except  the  few  companies  having  repeating  rifles. 

2  After  the  publication  of  "  The  March  to  the  Sea,"  etc.,  I  learned 
from  Genei'al  Schofield  that  the   pontoons  he  had   telegraphed   for 
arrived  in  the  course  of  the  forenoon  by  railway  train,  but  the  other 
bridges  had  by  that  time  been  put  in  such  condition  that  he  thought 
it   best  not  to  lay  the  pontoon  bridge,  and  sent  the  train  back  to 
Nashville. 


Taking  Position  at  Franklin  51 

means  of  getting  over  the  river, —  the  railway  bridge. 
By  dismantling  some  stables  and  sheds  in  the  town 
this  was  planked,  and  by  skilful  grading  at  the  ends 
was  brought  into  use  for  wagons  as  well  as  for  the 
marching  troops.1  It  was  late  in  the  forenoon  before 
any  other  crossing  was  practicable  for  wagons,  ex 
cept  the  ford.  The  wagon  trains  as  they  came  in 
were  parked  in  the  cross  streets,  leaving  the  main 
thoroughfare  open,  and  one  by  one  they  slowly,  and 
with  great  difficulty,  made  their  way  through  the 
ford.  As  soon  as  either  of  the  bridges  was  avail 
able,  more  continuous  lines  of  teams  were  set  in 
motion ;  and  when  the  battle  opened,  in  the  after 
noon,  most  of  our  wagons  were  quietly  wending  their 
way  toward  Nashville.  Nothing  but  the  most  intel 
ligent  and  energetic  use  of  the  means  at  hand  had 
made  possible  the  saving  of  our  trains  by  these  im 
provised  bridges,  and  nothing  but  strict  discipline 
and  system  in  the  handling  of  the  wagons  by  the 
quartermaster's  staff  and  employees  prevented  con 
fusion  and  consequent  blocking  of  the  way. 

As  soon  as  the  troops  of  my  own  division  had  eaten 
their  breakfast,  Brigadier  General  James  W.  Reilly 
was  put  in  temporary  command  of  them,  and  was 
directed  to  intrench  them  in  the  position  on  the  left 
of  the  Columbia  Turnpike  which  I  have  already 
described. 

The  three  brigades  were  marched  at  once  upon 
this  line,  making  their  front  conform  to  its  angles, 
as  our  habitual  custom  was.  Their  arms  were  then 
stacked  in  rear,  intrenching  tools  distributed,  and 
each  regiment  ordered  to  cover  its  own  front.  Cal 
culation  was  made  to  leave  room  for  two  batteries  of 
artillery  on  the  left  of  the  turnpike,  and  two  others 

1  Schofield's  Report,  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  342. 


52  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

were  promised   me  for  position  in  the  line  on  the 
centre  and  right.' 

Henderson's  brigade  (Colonel  I.  N.  Stiles  in  tem 
porary  command  on  account  of  Colonel  Henderson's 
illness)  was  placed  on  the  extreme  left,  holding  the 
line  between  the  river  and  the  Lewisburg  Turnpike. 
Casement's  brigade  came  next,  occupying  a  straight 
line  toward  the  cotton-gin,  marked  by  the  two  oak 
trees  which  were  left  standing.  Reilly's  brigade  was 
the  right  of  the  division,  and  had  a  short  front  from 
the  Columbia  Turnpike  eastward,  joining  Casement 
beyond  the  cotton-gin.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
two  of  Reilly's  regiments  (12th  and  16th  Kentucky) 
were  the  support  of  the  picket  line  left  at  Duck  River, 
and  did  not  reach  Franklin  till  noon.  Reilly  there 
fore  made  his  front  of  two  regiments  only,  —  the 
100th  Ohio  next  the  turnpike,  and  the  104th  Ohio 
on  its  left, — the  cotton-gin  being  in  rear  of  this 
regiment.  The  8th  Tennessee  (a  small  regiment  of 
loyal  men  from  East  Tennessee)  was  placed  in  reserve 
at  the  centre  of  the  brigade,  leaving  room  in  second 
line  for  Rousseau's  and  White's  Kentuckians  when 
they  should  arrive.  A  new  regiment  of  Ohio  re 
cruits,  the  175th  Ohio,  which  had  very  recently 
arrived,  had  been  assigned  to  duty  in  guarding  the 
railway  south  of  Franklin.  Its  detachments  were 
collected  as  our  columns  withdrew,  and  when  these 
assembled  at  Franklin,  in  the  course  of  the  morning, 
the  regiment  was  temporarily  assigned  to  Reilly,  and 
placed  in  reserve.  Casement's  brigade  was  formed 
with  the  65th  Indiana  on  the  right,  with  the  65th 
Illinois  and  the  124th  Indiana  completing  his  first 
line.1  His  reserve  was  the  5th  Tennessee,2  and  his 
own  regiment  (103d  Ohio),  which  was  greatly  reduced 

1  0.  R,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  425.  2  Id.,  p.  429. 


Taking  Position  at  Franklin  53 

in  number  by  casualties  of  the  preceding  campaign, 
was  on  detached  duty  as  guard  for  the  Twenty-third 
Corps  headquarters  and  ordnance  trains.  Stiles's 
brigade  completed  the  line,  having  the  128th  Indiana 
next  to  Casement  on  its  right,  the  63d  Indiana  in  the 
centre,  and  the  120th  Indiana  on  the  extreme  left. 
He  had  also  the  112th  Illinois  in  reserve.  Part  of 
Stiles's  front  was  just  in  rear  of  a  hedge  of  Osage 
orange,  which  was  thinned  out  so  as  to  make  an 
admirable  palisade  outside  the  ditch,  and  the  mate 
rial  obtained  from  this,  as  well  as  from  some  other 
hedges  near  by,  was  used  as  an  abattis  on  the  rest 
of  the  line,  nearly  or  quite  to  the  Columbia  Turn 
pike.  It  was  too  small  in  size,  but  it  was  tough 
and  very  thorny,  and  proved  to  be  a  useful  obstruc 
tion,  troublesome  to  meddle  with  under  (ire.  We 
lacked  timber  for  revetment  of  the  earthworks,  and 
consequently  a  ditch  was  made  both  inside  and  out 
side  the  parapet  in  many  places.  We  succeeded  in 
finding  material  to  make  the  ordinary  head-logs, 
and  so  before  noon  this  division  had  a  fair  defensive 
line. 

As  soon  as  my  headquarters  wagon  came  in,  two 
or  three  tents  were  pitched  in  the  door-yard  of  the 
Carter  house,  on  the  slope  toward  the  village. 
Captain  Cox,  my  Adjutant  General,  opened  his  office 
there,  and  the  headquarters  flag  was  unfurled  in  its 
front.  This  was  the  centre  of  the  line  when  Ruger's 
division  came  into  its  position,  and  it  was  during 
the  whole  day  and  night  the  point  to  which  all  com 
munications  came,  both  from  the  line  itself  and  from 
General  Schofield,  when  he  sent  orders  or  inquiries 
relating  to  this  front,  until  the  battle  was  over. 

Ruger's  division  began  to  arrive  about  seven 
o'clock,  and  was  assigned  to  position  between  the 


54  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Columbia  and  the  Carter's  Creek  Turnpikes.1  He 
had  but  two  brigades  present.  Cooper's,  having  been 
at  Centervillc,  was  now  making  its  way  toward  a 
crossing  of  the  Harpeth  River,  several  miles  farther 
-•down  the  stream.  Cooper  had  with  him  also  two 
<  regiments  of  Strickland's  brigade,  and  their  place 
was  temporarily  supplied  to  Strickland  by  the  72d 
Illinois  and  the  44th  Missouri,  which  belonged  to 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  had  been  brought 
from  Memphis  to  Nashville  in  time  to  join  Schofield's 
army  at  Columbia.  The  44th  Missouri  was  a  new 
regiment,  very  recently  organized  from  fresh  re 
cruits.2  Another  new  regiment,  the  183d  Ohio,  had 
also  reached  us  a  day  or  two  before,  and  was,  for 
the  time,  under  Strickland's  orders,  whose  brigade 
therefore  contained  only  one  regiment  of  the  old 
troops  of  the  corps.  The  two  veteran  regiments 
(50th  Ohio  and  72d  Illinois)  were  put  in  front  line 
on  the  right  of  the  Columbia  Turnpike,  in  the  order 
named,  and  they  were  supported  in  second  line  by 
the  44th  Missouri  and  the  183d  Ohio.  Moore's 
brigade  was  on  the  right  of  Strickland,  and  had  to 
be  stretched  out  in  single  line,  without  reserves,  to 
enable  it  to  reach  and  cover  the  Carter's  Creek 

1  0.  R,,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  364. 

2  These  two  regiments  have  sometimes  been  spoken  of  as  if  they 
were  the  advance  of  General  A.  J.  Smith's  column.   They  had  not  been 
with  him  in  Missouri,  but  were  later  assigned  to  his  command.     The 
72d  Illinois  was  part  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  and  had  been  left  in 
garrison  on  the  lower  Mississippi,  and  brought  to  Nashville  by  Gen 
eral  Thomas  under  his  authority  as   Commandant  of  the  Military 
Division  of  the  Mississippi  in  Sherman's  absence.     It  reached  Colum 
bia,  November  22d  (0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  999),  and  was  attached   to 
Strickland's  brigade  (Id.,  p.  1039).     The  other  regiments  which  came 
from  the  Mississippi  prior  to  the  battle  of  Franklin  may  be  traced  in 
the  same  volume  of  the  Records,  pp.  1056,  1057,  and  1084.     The  44th 
and  24th  Missouri  were  assigned  to  the  Twenty-third  Corps. 


Taking  Position  at  Franklin  55 

road.1  Its  order  from  left  to  right  was  as  follows, 
viz.  :  lllth  Ohio,  129th  Indiana,  107th  Illinois,  23d 
Michigan,  118th  Ohio,  and  80th  Indiana.  It  was 
still  too  short,  and  two  companies  were  detached  from 
the  183d  Ohio,  and  sent  to  Moore  to  be  placed  at 
his  centre,  between  the  107th  Illinois  and  the  23d 
Michigan.2 

The  breastworks  built  by  Rnger's  men  were  sim 
ilar  to  Reilly's.  The  right  and  front  of  the  south 
west  slope  of  the  Carter  Hill  (looking  toward  the 
Bostick  place)  was  covered  with  a  grove  of  young 
locust  trees,8  and  these,  with  an  apple  orchard  near 
by,  were  used  to  make  an  abattis,  though,  like  the 
material  used  for  the  same  purpose  on  the  other  side 
of  the  turnpike,  it  was  too  light  to  be  quite  what  was 
needed. 

The  position  of  the  works  from  the  cotton-gin  to 
the  barn  and  corn-crib  in  rear  of  the  Carter  house 
proved  so  important  in  the  engagement,  and  became 
moreover  the  subject  of  so  much  controversy,  that 
a  fuller  description  of  them  should  be  given.  As 
has  already  been  said,  the  cotton-gin  formed  a 
marked  salient  in  the  line,  the  space  between  it  and 
the  parapet  in  front  of  it  being  only  enough  for  the 
passage  of  troops  and  the  working  of  the  cannon 
which  were  in  battery  there,  A  little  to  the  right 
of  it  the  works  made  an  angle  toward  the  rear,  com 
ing  back  to  join  the  epaulement  for  four  guns  on 
the  left  of  the  turnpike,  ninety  yards  south  of  the 
Carter  house.  Where  the  line  crossed  the  road,  a  gap 


1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  351. 

2  The  order  of  Moore's  regiments  is  not  given  in  the  division  or 
brigade  report,  and  is  made  up  from  the  reports  of  the  regiments. 
The  list  in  my  own  official  report  was  incomplete.      See  Appendix  B. 

3  See  Twining  Map,  p.  45. 


56  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

i  was  left  of  the  full  width  of  the  road,  for  the  contin- 
(  uous  lines  of  wagons  and  artillery  crowded  it  all  the 
morning.  On  the  west  of  it,  the  line  continued  at 
right  angles  to  the  road  for  fifty  yards  on  level  ground, 
and  then  bent  to  the  rear,  descending  the  slope  some 
what  as  it  did  so.  This  was  with  the  purpose  of 
placing  a  battery  on  the  summit  at  the  right  of  the 
brick  smoke-house,  which  could  fire  over  the  heads 
of  the  infantry  in  the  front  line,  and  sweep  the 
approaches  in  the  direction  of  the  Bostick  place. 

In  rear  of  the  opening  in  the  front  line,  I  ordered 
a  retrenchment  built  across  the  road,  and  a  turnout, 
so  that  the  army  trains  could  go  around  it  on  the 
left  and  regain  the  road.  This  retrenchment  was  in 
line  with  the  south  side  of  the  office  and  smoke-house 
of  the  Carter  place.1  The  retrenchment  was  con 
tinued  to  the  right  by  Strickland's  men,  till  it 
reached  the  small  buildings.  Space  for  a  battery 
was  left  on  the  right  of  the  smoke-house,  and  the 
men  in  the  reserve  line  extended  the  infantry  trench 
some  distance  farther.  My  personal  knowledge  of 
this  was  not  distinct,  as  no  second  infantry  line  of 
trench  had  been  ordered  by  me ;  for  my  purpose  had 
been  to  keep  the  brigade  reserves  as  a  movable  force 
to  support  the  main  line  in  case  of  need,  and  I  did 
not  wish  the  troops  in  the  first  line  to  be  tempted  to 
think  they  could  leave  it  and  fall  back  to  another. 
But  when  soldiers  at  rest  have  intrenching  tools  they 
are  apt  to  use  them,  and  a  sheltering  ditch  may  be 
dug  without  any  authority  but  that  of  a  regimental 
or  brigade  commander. 

My  own  recollection  is,  that  about  noon  I  had 
stopped  at  the  centre  of  the  183d  Ohio,  the  new 

1  See  Sketch  Map,  p.  43.  This  is  from  a  plat  made  by  Colonel 
Carter,  who  verifies  the  position  of  the  earthworks  and  retrenchment. 


Taking  Position  at  Franklin  57 

regiment  on  the  right  of  Strickland's  second  line,  to 
speak  to  Lieut.  Colonel  Clark,  who  had  served  in 
my  command  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  when  he 
was  a  member  of  the  7th  Ohio,  and  who  was  to  lay 
down  his  life  heroically  in  this  bloody  struggle.  As 
1  recall  the  situation,  the  men  of  the  183d  were  then 
lying  down,  with  no  cover  except  the  natural  curve 
of  the  ground.  The  regiment  next  on  its  left  was 
the  44th  Missouri,  and  its  commanding  officer  (after 
the  fall  of  Colonel  Bradshaw),  Lieut.  Colonel  Barr, 
reported  that  it  built  breastworks  on  its  line.1  This 
was  so  fully  corroborated  by  other  official  reports,  and 
by  my  inspection  of  the  field  on  our  advance  after  the 
battle  of  Nashville,  that  I  had  no  hesitation  in  stat 
ing,  in  my  own  official  report  of  the  battle,  that  here 
during  the  fight  the  troops,  "under  cover  of  the 
smoke,  strengthened  a  barricade  and  breastwork  that 
had  been  there  before. "  2 

Late  in  the  forenoon  the  artillery  of  the  Fourth 
Corps  began  to  arrive,  and,  in  accordance  with  Gen 
eral  Schofield's  promise,  Captain  Bridges,  Chief  of 
Artillery,  reported  to  me  with  four  batteries.3  In 
his  official  report  he  says,  "  By  direction  of  Briga 
dier  General  Cox,  commanding  Twenty-third  Army 
Corps,  at  12  M.,  I  placed  the  1st  Kentucky  Light  Bat- 


1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  395.  2  Id.,  p.  354,  and  Appendix  B. 

3  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1172.  The  following  is  the  text  of  the 
order : — 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO,  FRANKLIN,  TENN., 

November  30,  1864. 
"CAPTAIN  BRIDGES, — 

"  The  Commanding  General  directs  that  you  report  four  batteries 
from  your  command  to  Brig.  Gen.  J.  D.  Cox  for  position  on  the  line 
to-day. 

"  Very  respectfully, 

"J.  A.  CAMPBELL, 
Major  and  Assistant  Adjutant  General." 


58  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

tery,  6th  Ohio  Light  Battery,  20th  Ohio  Light  Battery, 
and  Battery  B,  Pennsylvania  Veteran  Volunteers,  in 
/  position  in  line,  and  had  good  embrasures  made  for 
their  guns."  * 

I  had  marked  places  for  these  batteries,  and  they 
were  placed  thus :  the  Kentucky  Battery,  four  guns, 
on  the  left  of  the  Columbia  road,  in  the  line  of  the 
100th  Ohio  Infantry,  the  6th  Ohio  Battery,  two  guns 
in  the  salient  at  the  cotton-gin  and  t\vo  guns  on  the 
left  of  the  Lewisburg  Turnpike,  the  20th  Ohio  Bat 
tery  on  the  right  of  the  Columbia  road  just  west  of 
the  Carter  house,  and  the  Pennsylvania  Battery  at 
the  Carter's  Creek  Turnpike  on  Rugcr's  right.2  A 
little  later,  when  it  became  evident  that  the  enemy 
was  forming  to  attack  in  force,  General  Schoiield 
sent  Colonel  Schofield,  his  Chief  of  Artillery,  to 
meet  Captain  Bridges  at  my  headquarters,  with 
authority  to  use  all  the  artillery  that  might  be  avail 
able.3  Battery  M,  4th  U.  S.  Artillery,  and  Battery 
G,  1st  Ohio,  were  placed  on  the  extreme  left,  and 
Bridges's  own  Battery,  Illinois  Light  Artillery,  with 
Battery  A,  1st  Ohio,  were  held  in  reserve  near  the 
centre.  The  batteries  were  nominally  six-gun  bat 
teries,  but,  in  consequence  of  the  hard  work  of  the 
last  two  or  three  days,  they  were  nearly  all  reduced 
to  four  guns  each  when  reporting  to  me. 

At  noon  our  line  of  breastworks  was  completed  on 
the  left,  and  nearly  so  on  the  right  of  the  Columbia 
Turnpike.  The  artillerymen  were  making  embras- 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  320. 

2  In  the  Official  Records  as  published  (vol.  xlv.  part  i.  p.  351)  there 
is  an  omission  by  a  clerical  error  in  copying.     The  words  "  on  the 
right   of   the   Columbia,"   etc.,  are  made  to  follow  "  6th  Ohio   Bat 
tery/'  omitting  all  that  is  between.     My  private  copy  is  correct.     See 
Appendix  B. 

3  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  321,  351. 


Taking  Position  at  Franklin  59 

urcs  for  the  guns  of  the  four  batteries  already  placed 
in  the  line,  and  were  heightening  and  strengthening 
the  infantry  parapet  to  adapt  it  to  this  purpose.  The 
guns  of  the  Kentucky  battery,  close  on  the  left  of 
the  turnpike  at  the  centre,  displaced  three  companies 
of  the  100th  Ohio  Infantry,  and  Lieut.  Colonel  Hayes, 
their  commander,  placed  these  men  immediately 
behind  the  battery,  in  close  support.1  Lieut.  Colonel 
Rousseau  also  arrived  at  this  time  with  the  12th  and 
16th  Kentucky,  the  supports  of  the  picket  line  at 
Duck  River,  and  on  reporting  to  General  Reilly,  these 
were  placed  in  second  line,  fifty  paces  in  rear  of  the 
first.  Lieut.  Colonel  White,  with  the  16th  Ken 
tucky,  had  his  right  as  close  to  the  turnpike  as  the 
limbers  and  caissons  of  the  battery  would  permit. 
The  8th  Tennessee  and  12th  Kentucky  extended  this 
line  to  the  left. 

It  will  be  seen  that,  in  anticipation  of  a  severe 
struggle  on  the  line  of  the  Columbia  road,  our  lines 
were  doubled  there,  and  strengthened  by  artillery. 
On  the  extreme  left,  not  only  was  the  knoll  in  Stiles 's 
brigade  a  strong  position,  but  the  artillery  in  Fort 
Granger,  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Harpeth,  flanked 
the  position,  and  Cockerill's  three-inch  rifles  had 
range  enough  to  make  their  shell  fire  as  effective  as 
if  they  were  in  the  line. 

The  only  weak  place  was  our  extreme  right;  for 
though  it  was  improbable  that  Hood's  attack  would 
extend  farther  in  that  direction  than  the  Carter's 
Creek  road,  his  cavalry  might  find  the  end  of  the 
line,  and,  unless  there  were  some  reserve  there,  might 
give  us  trouble.  Indeed,  our  skirmishers,  who  were, 
as  usual,  well  out  on  our  front  and  flanks,  reported 
at  this  time  that  a  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  was 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  419. 


60  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

reconnoitring  on  this  road,  and  I  called  General 
Schofield's  attention  to  the  fact  that  Ruger's  right 
flank  had  no  secure  point  to  rest  upon.1  Kimball's 
division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  was  just  coming  in 
then,  and  Schofield  ordered  it  to  report  to  me  to 
strengthen  this  right  flank.2  I  did  not  think  it 
necessary  or  desirahle  to  extend  our  proper  front 
beyond  the  Carter's  Creek  Turnpike,  and  directed 
General  Kimball  to  put  his  brigades  in  echelon  on 
Ruger's  flank  and  rear,  to  provide  against  a  flank 
attack  from  the  west.  The  low  ground  along  the 
little  brook  made  a  continuous  line  unadvisable, 
and  Kimball  occupied  the  higher  grounds  northward 
toward  the  river,  so  that  his  brigades  could  mutually 
support  one  another  as  well  as  cover  Ruger's  flank. 
His  barricades  were  of  a  slighter  kind  than  our 
intrenchments  on  the  front,  and  were  necessarily 
more  hastily  constructed.  As  they  were  not  contin 
uous,  and  had  no  abattis,  the  Confederates  expressed 
their  regrets  afterward  that  they  had  not  known 
this,  so  as  to  modify  their  attack  accordingly.3  No 
doubt  an  attack  in  force  by  Hood's  left  would  have 
changed  the  character  of  the  battle;  but  it  by  no 
means  follows  that  it  would  have  been  more  success- 


1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  351. 

2  Id.,  p.  1172.    The  order  was  nearly  identical  in  tenor  with  that 
which  had  sent  the  batteries  to  me.     It  was  as  follows,  viz. :  — 

"  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO,  FRANKLIN,  TENN., 

November  30,  1864. 
"GENERAL  KIMBALL, — 

"  The  Commanding  General  directs  that  you  report  with  your  com 
mand  to  Brig.  Gen.  J.  D.  Cox  for  position  on  the  line  to-day. 
"  Very  respectfully, 

"  J.  A.  CAMPBELL, 
Major  and  Assistant  Adjutant  General.'" 

3  See  Hood's  report,  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  653,  and  especially  General 
Bate's  report,  Id.,  p.  743. 


Taking  Position  at  Franklin  61 

ful.  In  fact,  it  is  doubtful  if  he  could  have  changed 
the  position  of  his  army  in  time  to  have  delivered  an 
assault  in  that  form  before  dark,  and,  by  morning, 
we  should  have  evacuated  the  town.  We  had  rightly 
judged  of  his  probable  action  and  of  the  points  of  his 
heaviest  assault,  and  had  nothing  to  correct  in  the 
arrangement  of  our  main  line  and  in  the  distribution 
of  its  forces. 

Kimball's  division  consisted  of  three  brigades,1 
and  he  placed  that  of  Grose  on  his  left,  immediately 
supporting  the  right  of  Ruger  and  the  Pennsylvania 
battery.  Kirby's  brigade  was  in  the  centre,  and 
Whitaker's  on  the  right.  As  already  indicated,  the 
general  line  of  this  division  was  nearly  north  and 
south,  facing  to  the  west.  General  Grose's  brigade 
was  made  up  of  seven  small  regiments,2  and  in  his 
first  line  were  the  84th  Indiana,  30th  Indiana,  75th 
Illinois,  and  9th  Indiana,  numbering  from  left  to 
right.  The  three  first  named  were  in  continuous 
line,  reaching  to  the  bank  of  the  little  watercourse 
which  here  makes  a  large  curve  to  the  east.  The 
9th  Indiana  was  on  the  north  side  of  this  hollow, 
and  drawn  back  about  a  hundred  and  fifty  yards.  In 
Grose's  second  line  were  the  80th  and  84th  Illinois, 
the  latter  being  so  placed  as  to  cover  the  ravine  and 
low  piece  of  ground  between  the  9th  Indiana  and 
the  rest  of  the  first  line.  The  77th  Pennsylvania 
was  put  on  duty  as  skirmishers  covering  the  large 
curve  from  the  Carter's  Creek  Turnpike  northward. 
Kirby's  brigade  had  the  21st  Illinois,  38th  Illinois, 
and  31st  Indiana,  with  two  companies  of  the  101st 
Ohio  in  the  first  line,  supported  by  the  81st  Indiana, 
90th  Ohio,  and  eight  companies  of  the  101st  Ohio.3 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  177.  '2  Id.,  p.  208. 

8  Id.,  pp.  184,  1197. 


62  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

General  Whittaker's  brigade,  which  was  the  right 
of  the  division,  was  stretched  out  northward  toward 
the  river,  having  the  35th  Indiana,  21st  Kentucky, 
40th  Ohio,  and  45th  Ohio  in  line,  the  90th  Illinois, 
28d  Kentucky,  and  the  41st  Ohio  in  reserve.1 

The  placing  of  Kimball's  division  on  our  right 
completed  the  array  in  front  of  the  village  of  Frank 
lin.  The  troops  at  the  breastworks  were  busy  get 
ting  their  noonday  meal.  The  Columbia  road  had 
been  crowded  all  the  morning,  double  lines  of  wagons 
and  of  cannon  hastening  through  the  opening  in  the 
works  at  the  centre.  Wood's  division  of  the  Fourth 
Corps  had  inarched  across  the  new  foot-bridge  as 
soon  as  it  was  completed,  and  was  placed  on  the 
commanding  north  bank  of  the  river  with  the  artil 
lery  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  to  cover  the  final 
crossing  of  the  army.  The  army  wagons  were  labo 
riously  pulling  through  the  ford,  and,  after  some 
careful  experiments,  were  being  cautiously  driven 
over  the  bridges  which  had  been  meant  only  for  the 
inarching  troops.  General  Schofield  had  industri 
ously  supervised  all  that  had  been  done  under  his 
orders,  and  soon  moved  his  own  headquarters  to  the 
north  side  also.  He  reckoned  that  the  wagon  trains 
could  all  pass  the  river  before  sunset,  and  that  the 
troops  could  be  withdrawn  soon  after,  if  the  enemy 
should  make  no  attack. 

There  was  now  a  period  of  rest  and  refreshment 
for  the  officers  and  men  of  the  main  line.  Quiet 
followed  the  rattling  of  wheels  and  the  clatter  of 
arms  that  had  made  a  continuous  din  in  front  of 
the  Carter  house  all  the  morning.  Our  camp  din 
ner  over,  the  tents  at  my  headquarters  were  struck, 
the  baggage  packed,  and  the  wagons  sent  into  the 

1  0.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  195. 


Taking  Position  at  Franklin  03 

town  to  fall  in  at  the  rear  of  the  trains  when  the 
rest  should  be  over  the  river.  Our  horses  were  fed 
and  saddled,  and  the  group  of  orderlies  lounged  on 
the  grass  by  the  roadside  at  the  foot  of  the  hill,  while 
the  officers  were  sitting  in  the  veranda  of  the  house, 
smoking  or  sleeping,  as  the  mood  took  them.  The 
da}7  had  proved  to  be  a  bright  and  warm  one,  a  good 
sample  of  Indian  summer  weather  coming  after  the 
first  sharp  frosts  and  snows  of  opening  winter.  The 
air  was  hazy,  and,  except  an  occasional  straggler 
following  his  command  in,  nothing  was  to  be  seen 
between  us  and  the  Winstead  Hill,  two  miles  away. 
A  distant  cannon  shot  now  and  then  told  us  that 
Wagner's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  the  rear 
guard,  was  checking  the  enemy's  advance  on  the 
other  side  of  the  hill. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   REAR  GUARD  —  WAGNER'S  DIVISION. 

Guarding  the  Trains  —  Collecting  the  Stragglers  —  Halt  ou  Wiustead 
Hill  —  Conditional  Orders — Skirmishing  with  Forrest  —  Hood's 
Infantry  press  close  —  Will  he  turn  the  Position  or  attack  ?  — 
Wagner  withdraws  Lane's  Brigade  to  Privet  Knob — Conrad's 
farther  in  Rear  —  Opdycke's  within  our  Works  —  Wagner's  Mes 
sage  to  Stanley —  His  Colloquy  with  Opdycke  —  His  Orders  to  Lane 
and  Conrad  to  Eight  —  The  Sergeants  to  fix  Bayonets  —  Ruger's 
Preparations  —  Confederates  forming  for  the  Attack. 

WAGNER'S  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  had  well 
performed  a  laborious  and  difficult  task  in  acting  as 
rear  guard.  Two  of  its  brigades,  Bradley 's  (com 
manded  by  Colonel  Conrad  after  General  Bradley 
was  wounded  at  Spring  Hill)  and  Lane's,  were  on 
the  flanks  of  the  wagon  trains,  and  marching  with 
them  as  guard,  in  a  way  similar  to  that  of  the  rest 
of  the  troops  of  the  corps.  Opdycke's  brigade  retired 
in  line,  halting  and  facing  to  the  rear  when  they 
were  too  closely  pressed  by  the  enemy's  cavalry.1 
The  troublesome  duty  of  getting  forward  the  strag 
glers  and  footsore  had  of  course  fallen  upon  them. 
At  eleven  o'clock  the  division  reached  Winstead 
Hill,2  and,  by  direction  of  General  Stanley,  Wagner 
deployed  his  whole  command.  Opdycke's  brigade 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  parti,  p.  231. 

2  In  Wagner's  and  Opdycke's  reports  this  is  called  Stevens  Hill, 
but  I  use   the  name  which  was  then  as  now  in  common  use  in  the 
vicinity. 


The  Rear  Guard  —  Wagners  Division          65 

was  at  the  gap  over  which  the  turnpike  runs,  but  also 
occupied  the  high  point  on  the  cast,  having  there 
a  section  of  Battery  G,  1st  Ohio  Light  Artillery. 
Lane's  and  Conrad's  brigades  extended  the  division 
line  eastward  toward  the  Lewisburg  Turnpike.  The 
division  stacked  arms,  and  the  men  were  allowed 
to  get  their  breakfast.  At  this  time  Whitakcr's 
brigade  of  Ivimball's  division  occupied  the  high 
ground  west  of  the  gap,  with  a  section  of  Battery  M, 
4th  U.  S.  Artillery,  but  was  under  orders  to  follow 
the  rest  of  that  division  into  the  town  when  the  road 
should  be  clear.1 

It  was  not  long  before  the  enemy's  advance  guard 
appeared,  and  Wagner  called  his  men  to  arms.  He 
soon  noticed,  however,  that  Whitaker's  brigade 
was  marching  toward  Franklin,  and  having  then  no 
special  orders  to  separate  himself  from  the  rest  of 
the  column,  he  directed  his  brigades  to  follow. 
Opdycke's  brigade  at  the  gap  was  again  the  rear 
guard,2  and  his  statement  is  that  he  had  been  at  rest 
about  an  hour  and  a  half.  Wa.gner,  at  the  head  of 
his  division,  had  come  within  half  a  mile  of  the 
town,3  as  he  says  (he  probably  means  our  main  line 
of  works),  and  Opdycke's  rear  was  just  leaving  the 
hill  when  the  column  was  halted,  and  Wagner  ordered 
its  return  to  the  heights  they  had  just  left.4 

The  occasion  for  this  "  right  about  face  "  is  thus 
stated  in  his  official  report.5  "I  met  a  staff  officer 
from  General  Stanley,  with  written  orders,  directing 
me  to  reoccupy  the  heights  and  hold  them,  unless 
too  severely  pressed. "  He  is  equally  explicit  as  to 
what  he  did.  "In  obedience  to  this  order,"  he 
says,  "  I  returned  to  the  position  from  which  I  had 

1  0.  E.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  195,  338.  >2  Id.,  p.  240. 

3  Id.,  p.  231.  4  Id.,  p.  240.  &  Id.,  p.  231. 

5 


66  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

just  withdrawn  my  command,  except  that  I  now 
detached  one  regiment  from  Colonel  Lane's  brigade, 
and  directed  it  to  be  placed  on  the  heights  to  the 
right  of  the  pike,  from  which  General  Whitaker 
had  just  withdrawn  his  brigade."1  The  reports  of 
his  brigade  commanders  corroborate  him.  Opdycke 
says,  "When  I  reached  the  top  of  the  hill  I  at  once 
discovered  heavy  and  parallel  columns  of  infantry 
approaching  rapidly.  I  was  ordered  off  again  after 
sending  a  number  of  shell  and  solid  shot  at  the 
advancing  enemy. " 2 

Before  following  this  second  retrograde  movement, 
it  will  be  well  to  analyze  more  fully  the  circum 
stances  under  which  the  written  order  was  sent  to 
Wagner,  which  he  interpreted  as  a  command  to 
return  to  the  crest  of  Winstead  Hill.  We  are  for 
tunate  in  having  the  text  of  the  order  preserved.3 

"  HEADQUARTERS  FOURTH  ARMY  CORPS,  FRANKLIN,  TENN., 
November  30,  1864,  11.30  A.  M. 

"BRIGADIER  GENERAL  WAGNER, 

Commanding  Second  Division, — 

"The  general  commanding  directs  that  you  hold  the 
heights  yon  now  occupy  until  dark,  unless  too  severely 
pressed ;  that  you  relieve  Colonel  Opdycke  with  one  of 
your  brigades,  and  leave  his  and  the  remaining  brigade 
as  a  support ;  and  that  you  cross  the  river  to  the  north 
bank  after  dark,  at  which  time  the  position  you  are  to 
occupy  will  be  pointed  out  to  you. 

"Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  [J.    S.    FULLERTON,] 

Assistant  Adjutant  General" 

The  understanding  at  headquarters  of  the  Fourth 
Corps  is  given  in  a  journal  kept  by  Lieut.  Colonel 

1  O.  R,,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  231.  2  Id.,  p.  240.  3  Id.,  p.  1174. 


The  Rear  Guard — Wagners  Division          67 

Fullerton,  who  apparently  penned  the  order.1  This 
has  the  following  entry,  viz. :  "  12  M.  ,  Colonel  Opdycke 
reaches  the  high  knoll  two  miles  from  Franklin ;  and 
General  Wagner  is  ordered  to  hold  him  in  this  posi 
tion  and  support  him  with  his  other  two  brigades 
until  he  is  seriously  threatened  by  a  superior  force 
of  infantry. "  2  General  Stanley  was  at  this  time  at 
General  Schofield's  headquarters  in  the  village,  at 
the  house  of  Dr.  Clift,  near  the  public  square,  and  it 
was  about  this  hour  of  the  day  that  Schofield  deter 
mined  to  withdraw  everything  to  the  north  bank  of 
the  river  at  dark,  if  the  enemy  should  not  attack. 
Schofield  soon  afterward  moved  his  headquarters 
across  the,  Harpcth,  to  the  house  of  Mr.  Alpheus 
Tructt,  and  Stanley  accompanied  him.3  Schofield 
had  no  wish  to  have  any  part  of  his  army  seriously 
engaged  with  the  river  at  its  back ;  but  the  crossing 
of  the  trains  was  work  for  the  whole  afternoon,  and 
my  task  of  covering  this  crossing  would  not  be  com 
plete  till  all  should  be  over.  If  Hood  did  not  attack 
before  dark,  the  cover  of  night  would  manifestly  be 
a  security  for  the  safe  transfer  of  the  troops  and 
artillery  in  the  line. 

The  hostile  force  with  which  Opdycke  had  been 
skirmishing  seems*  to  have  been  Forrest's  cavalry; 
for  the  first  distinct  mention  of  columns  of  infantry 

1  The  brackets".enclosing  the  name  of  Colonel  Fullerton  in  the  copy 
of  the  order  indicate  that  the  order  is  not  the  original  which  was  handed 
to  General  Wagner,  but  is  the  official  record  of  it  kept  at  corps  head 
quarters,  and  has  no  signature.     I  think  it  more  probable  that  it  was 
signed  by  Major  Sinclair,  also  Assistant  Adjutant  General  on  Stanley's 
staff  ;  for  Colonel  Fullerton  in  making  the  entry  in  his  diary  was  evi 
dently  not  aware  of  the  fact  that  Opdycke's  brigade  was  changed  from 
the  advanced  position  to  that  of  support  by  the  order  itself. 

2  O.  II.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  149. 

3  Mr.  Truett  is  still  living  (189G).     His  house  is  on  the  east  side  of 
the  Nashville  Turnpike,  about  half  a  mile  north  of  the  river. 


68  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

is  when  our  rear  guard  went  back  to  the  top  of 
Winstead  Hill.  It  seemed  most  probable  that  Hood 
would  use  the  same  strategy  as  at  Columbia,  and 
force  us  to  make  a  farther  retreat  by  crossing  the 
Harpeth  either  above  or  below  us.  The  correspond 
ence  between  Thomas  and  Scholield  is  based  on 
this  theory,  and  none  of  us  were  quick  to  believe 
that  a  coup  de  main  would  be  attempted. 

The  order  to  Wagner  which  has  been  quoted  was 
evidently  written  on  the  supposition  that  he  was  still 
in  position  on  Winstead  Hill.  It  was  "the  heights 
you  now  occupy,"  and  the  really  material  part  of 
the  order  was  the  direction  to  retire  at  nightfall, 
and  sooner  if  "too  severely  pressed."  Except  for 
Wagner's  information,  there  was  no  need  to  hurry 
the  issue  of  the  order  for  the  general  movement  to 
the  north  bank,  and  it  was  sent  to  me  at  the  time 
Schofield 's  headquarters  were  taken  across  the  river. 
My  own  report  states  that  I  received  it  at  two 
o'clock.1  The  order,  as  issued  by  General  Schofield, 
does  not  seem  to  have  been  preserved,  and  was  prob 
ably  delivered  orally 'by  a  staff  officer.  That  which 
was  issued  by  General  Stanley  to  Kimball's  and 
Wagner's  divisions  of  the  Fourth  Corps  was  in  writ 
ing.  It  directed  those  officers  to  "commence  with 
drawing  your  command  at  dark.  General  Kimball 
will  take  the  foot-bridge,  and  General  Wagner  the 
railroad  bridge.  General  Kimball  will  not  with 
draw  his  pickets  until  12  o'clock  to-night."2  It  was 
signed  by  Major  Sinclair,  the  assistant  adjutant 
general  before  mentioned,  and  wras,  of  course,  in 
conformity  with  the  order  from  General  Schofield, 
which  went  to  Stanley  and  myself  alike. 

But  when  Opdycke  reached  the  gap  in  Winstead 

1  0.  E.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  352.  '2  Id.,  p.  1174. 


The  Rear  Guard  —  Wagner's  Division         69 

Hill  in  obedience  to  the  order  of  Wagner  to  return 
there,  a  new  condition  of  things  was  revealed.  The 
enemy's  infantry  was  now  plainly  seen  coming  on 
rapidly  in  parallel  columns.  The  section  of  Mar 
shall's  battery  which  was  still  with  the  division 
opened  on  the  columns  with  shot  and  shell.  The 
two  turnpikes  from  Columbia  and  Lewisburg  draw 
near  each  other  as  they  approach  Franklin,  and 
Wagner,  finding  that  the  enemy's  column  on  the 
Lewisburg  road  was  turning  his  left  flank,  promptly 
determined  to  withdraw  again,  and  sent  an  officer 
of  his  staff  to  notify  General  Stanley  of  the  move 
ment.1 

He  now  followed  the  directions  of  the  order  he  had 
received  by  giving  to  Lane's  brigade  the  advanced 
position,  putting  Opdyckc  and  Conrad  in  support. 
The  section  of  artillery  was  with  Lane  on  Privet 
Knob,  which  afterward  became  the  place  of  Cheat- 
ham's  headquarters  in  the  battle.  It  has  already  been 
described  as  a  stony  hill  on  the  west  of  the  Columbia 
Turnpike,  half  way  between  Winstead  Hill  and  the 
Carter  house,  and  the  most  considerable  elevation 
in  the  general  plain  surrounded  by  the  higher  hills 
like  the  Winstead. 

The  officer  sent  by  Wagner  to  notify  General 
Stanley  of  his  retiring  from  Winstead  Hill  is  said  to 
have  been  Captain  Whitesides,  his  acting  adjutant 
general,  and  a  statement  has  been  published  pur 
porting  to  be  his,  in  which  he  speaks  of  carrying  a 
message  to  General  Stanley  at  about  2.80  P.  M.,  re 
porting  the  strong  objections  made  by  Colonel  Lane 
to  keeping  his  brigade  and  Conrad's  out  any  longer. 
The  statement  contains  the  additional  fact  that  he 
found  General  Stanley  at  Schofield's  headquarters  in 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  231. 


70  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Dr.  Cliffs  house  in  the  village,  and  that  no  orders 
were  sent  back  to  Wagner.1  This  helps  to  make  it 
clear  that  the  message  was  the  one  Wagner  says  in 
his  report  was  sent  by  him  immediately  after  retir 
ing  from  Winstead  Hill,  though  the  time  of  day  is 
probably  an  error  of  recollection,  which  is  corrected 
by  Colonel  Fullerton's  note  of  its  reception  in  his 
journal.  No  subsequent  message  is  mentioned  by 
Wagner  as  having  been  sent  by  him  before  the 
battle,  and  any  sent  as  late  as  half  past  two  would 
not  have  found  Generals  Schofield  and  Stanley  at 
Dr.  Cliffs  in  the  village.  Colonel  Fullerton's 
journal  reads  thus : — 

"1  P.M.  General  Wagner  reports  two  large  columns 
of  the  enemy's  infantry  approaching  Colonel  Opdycke's 
position,  moving  on  the  Lewisburg  and  Columbia  pikes, 
and,  as  he  cannot  successfully  resist  the  forces,  he  is 
moving  his  division  within  the  bridge-head  constructed 
by  General  Cox  around  the  town  of  Franklin."  2 

An  approval  of  this  by  his  superiors  was  all  the 
answer  the  message  required,  and  whether  it  were 
given  tacitly  by  the  mere  acknowledgment  of  its 
receipt  or  by  a  more  formally  expressed  assent  is  a 
matter  of  no  moment.  Wagner  was  acting  within 
the  spirit  of  the  instructions  given  him,  and  only 
needed  to  complete  his  movement  as  he  had  begun  it. 
It  is  plain,  however,  that  in  some  manner  instruc 
tions  were  given  to  him  that  upon  coming  within  my 
lines  —  the  "  bridge-head  around  the  town, "  as  Colonel 
Fullerton  calls  the  works  —  he  was  to  place  his  com 
mand  by  my  direction  where  it  would  be  conveniently 
in  reserve,  and  could  be  called  upon  in  case  of  need. 
The  official  evidence  of  this  is  clear. 

1  See  Van  Home's  Life  of  General  Thomas,  pp.  289,  291. 
a  O.K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  149. 


The  Rear  Guard — Wagners  Division          71 

In  his  official  report  (dated  December  3d),1  Gen 
eral  Wagner  states  that,  when  the  command  retired 
from  Stevens  (Winstead)  Hill,  "he  directed  Colonel 
Opdycke  to  form  in  the  rear  of  Carter's  house,  to 
the  right  in  rear  of  the  main  line  of  works,  to  act  as 
a  reserve." 

In  my  own  hrief  preliminary  report  (dated  Decem 
ber  2d),2I  said  that  General  Wagner  reported  to  me, 
giving  the  situation  of  his  brigades,  Opdycke's  being 
already  in  reserve  within  the  lines.  That  he  further 
informed  me  "that  he  was  already  under  orders  to 
keep  out  the  two  other  brigades  till  the  enemy  should 
make  an  advance  in  line  in  force,  when  he  was  to 
retire  skirmishing,  and  become  a  reserve  for  the  line 
established  by  me. "  In  my  full  official  report  (dated 
January  10), 3  the  same  facts  are  narrated  with  more 
detail,  and  accompanied  by  my  own  directions  to 
Wagner  as  to  position  and  duty  when  he  should  come 
within  the  lines. 

General  Schofield's  report  (dated  December  31) 
says  of  the  heavy  loss  in  Wagner's  two  brigades, 
that  it  arose  "from  their  remaining  in  front  of  the 
line  after  their  proper  duty  as  outposts  had  been 
accomplished,  and  after  they  should  have  taken  their 
positions  in  reserve."4 

The  concurrence  of  all  these  leaves  no  room  for 
dispute  that  Wagner  was  to  come  within  the  lines 
and  act  as  reserve,  and  that  he  understood  his  orders 
accordingly.  He  in  fact  came  in  person  within  the 
intrenchments,  at  the  head  of  Opdycke's  brigade, 
and  this  was  placed  in  close  column  of  regiments 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  232. 

2  /</..  p.  348. 

3  Id.,  p.  352.     Sec  Appendix  B. 

4  Id.,  p.  344.     See  Appendix  A. 


72  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

on  the  right  of  the  turnpike,  about  two  hundred 
yards  north  of  the  Carter  house.1 

In  my  account  of  the  battle,  written  in  1882,  and 
published  in  another  form,2  I  have  stated  that  "the 
commandant  upon  the  line  was  notified  by  General 
Schofield  that  Wagner's  orders  directed  him  to 
remain  in  observation  only  till  Hood  should  show  a 
disposition  to  advance  in  force,  and  then  to  retire 
within  the  lines  to  Opdycke's  position,  and  act  as  a 
general  reserve.  Wagner,  on  being  shown  the  note 
conveying  this  notice,  said  that  such  were  his 
orders."  The  note  referred  to  does  not  seem  to 
have  been  preserved,  and  the  statement  has  only  the 
weight  which  would  be  given  it  by  clear  recollection. 
It  was  corroborated  by  much  earlier  statements  to 
the  same  effect  contained  in  my  correspondence,  as 
well  as  by  the  assent  of  Generals  Schofield  and 
Stanley.  Being  clearly  in  accord  with  the  evidence 
already  presented  from  the  Official  Records,  it  adds 
to  the  story  an  additional  authentic  detail  among 
the  circumstances  attending  the  situation  between 
two  and  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 

We  shall  get  some  light  upon  Wagner's  condition 
of  mind  and  purpose,  by  going  back  to  consider  more 
carefully  the  steps  in  the  movement  from  the  Win- 
stead  Hill  about  one  o'clock.  The  written  order 
from  Stanley's  headquarters  directed  that  Opdycke's 
regiment  should  -be  relieved  from  the  duty  of  extreme 
rear  guard,  which  it  had  been  gallantly,  performing 
all  the  morning.  This  was  an  unusual  interfer 
ence  with  the  discretion  of  a  division  commander 
having  his  whole  division  in  hand,  and  indicates 
some  chafing  between  him  and  his  subordinates 

1  O.  E.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  240,  352. 

2  The  March  to  the  Sea,  Franklin  and  Nashville,  p.  86. 


The  Rear  Guard  —  Wagners  Division         73 

which  made  the  action  of  the  corps  commander  ne 
cessary. 

Wagner,  having  put  Lane's  brigade  with  the  sec 
tion  of  artillery  in  position  on  Privet  Knob,1  Opdycke 
and  Conrad  were  marched  to  the  point  about  half  a 
mile  in  front  of  our  main  line.  The  official  reports 
arc  silent  as  to  a  discussion  which  occurred  here, 
but  it  is  narrated  in  a  published  account  of  the  cam 
paign  written  by  Colonel  Opdycke.2 

"On  the  way  in  from  Stevens  (Winstead)  Hill, 
Opdycke  was  ordered  by  Wagner  into  line  with  the 
two  brigades ;  but  having  in  a  former  campaign  be 
come  familiar  with  the  military  features  of  the 
locality,  he  thought  the  position  so  extremely  faulty 
that  he  objected,  and  so  was  allowed  to  go  into 
reserve  on  the  rear  slope  of  Carter's  Hill,  about  two 
hundred  yards  from  the  main  line  of  earthworks. 
Wagner  then  said  to  him,  '  Now,  Opdycke,  fight 
when  and  where  you  think  best:  I  may  not  see 
you  again. '  "  3 

It  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  Privet  Knob,  where 
Lane  was  halted,  was  midway  from  Winstead  Hill 
to  our  lines  near  the  Carter  house,  the  distance 
being  about  a  mile  each  way.  Conrad's  brigade  was 
put  in  position  where  Lane  finally  joined  him,  the 
place  being  variously  stated  as  from  three  hundred 
or  four  hundred  yards  to  half  a  mile  from  the  lines. 
The  larger  distance  is  that  which  I  gave  in  my  official 
report,  and  this  was  written  after  I  re-examined  the 
field  in  our  pursuit  of  Hood  three  weeks  later.4 

1  Ante,  p.  69. 

2  The  New  York  Times,  September  10,  1882. 

3  In  private  correspondence  with  me,  in  February,  1876,  General 
Opdycke  used  still  more  vigorous  terms  to  express  his  unwillingness 
to  halt  in  the  advanced  position. 

4  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  352.     This  is  conclusively  corroborated  by 


74  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

As  Wagner's  purpose  seems  to  have  been  to  with 
draw  by  alternately  passing  his  brigades,  it  was 
probable  that  he  would  put  Conrad's  in  support  of 
Lane's  at  about  half  the  distance  from  Lane's  to  the 

'  lines  within  which  Opdycke's  was  marching  to  take 
position.  This  arrangement  in  echelon  was  not  a 
bad  one  if  the  brigades  were  not  allowed  to  become 
involved  in  a  serious  fight  with  superior  forces. 
Lane  should  have  left  his  hill  in  time  to  pass  Conrad 
and  join  Opdycke  in  reserve,  and  Conrad  should  have 
followed,  so  as  also  to  be  wholly  out  of  the  way  when 
the  advancing  enemy  should  be  within  range  of  lire 
from  my  lines.  Wagner's  preliminary  arrangements 
all  indicated  this  purpose.  ;  It  was  one  which  any 
competent  division  commander  handling  a  rear  guard 
is  presumed  to  be  familiar  with,  and  for  which  he 
should  need  neither  instruction  nor  suggestion  from 
his  corps  commander.  The  preliminary  steps  had 
been  well  taken  under  his  actual  orders,  which  have 
been  fully  detailed.  There  was  no  change  in  his 
orders.  At  headquarters  of  the  Fourth  Corps  and  of 

/-the  army,  we  have  seen  that  he  was  supposed  to  be 
in  the  act  of  thus  deliberately  and  progressively  retir- 

;  ing.1  We  have  to  inquire  how  this  intelligent  plan 
was  interrupted  in  execution,  and  became,  instead, 
a  nearly  irretrievable  blunder.2 

Colonel  Carter,  the  owner  of  the  farm,  who  says  the  surveyed  distance 
from  his  house  to  the  fir.st  ri.se  of  ground  on  the  turnpike  southward, 
is  1 60  rods.  This  first  rise  of  ground  was  the  position  of  Conrad  and 
Lane.  See  p.  46,  ante. 

1  See  the  quotation  from  Colonel  Fullerton's  journal,  ante,  p.  70. 

2  In  the  newspaper  discussion  in  which,  at  one  time,  survivors  of 
this  campaign  largely  indulged,  it  was  sometimes  argued  that  General 
Schofield  must  have  given  personal  orders  that  Wagner's  two  brigades 
should  fight  in  front  of  the  line  which  he  had  so  carefully  planned  as 
the  only  one  on  which  to  resist  Hood.     It  is  suggested  also  in  Van 
Home's  Life  of  Thomas,  pp.  289-291.   Such  a  contention  is  sufficiently 


The  Rear  Guard  —  Wagners  Division         75 

Colonel  Lane  tells  us  in  his  official  report  that  at 
two  o'clock  he  sent  word  to  General  Wagner  that 
the  enemy  was  advancing  in  force  and  was  ahout  to 
envelop  his  flanks.1  "With  my  skirmish  line,  and 
a  section  of  artillery  posted  on  Stone  Hill"  (Privet 
Knob),  he  adds,  "I  retarded  the  advancing  column 
until  I  received  orders,  and  withdrew  my  command 
to  a  position  one  third  of  a  mile  in  advance  of  the 
main  line  of  works,  on  the  right  of  the  Third  Brigade 
(Conrad's)."  The  report  of  Captain  Marshall  of 
Battery  G,  1st  Ohio  Artillery,  fully  corroborates 
Colonel  Lane.  He  tells  us  that  at  1  P.M.  he  moved 
Lieutenant  Mitchell's  centre  section  of  the  battery 
out  on  the  Columbia  Turnpike,  and  upon  a  hill  near 
the  skirmish  line  (Lane's  on  Privet  Knob).2  Here 
he  opened  on  the  enemy,  who  was  found  advancing 
in  strong  force.  At  2.30  P.M.  he  withdrew  the  sec 
tion,  in  compliance  with  orders,  "into  the  turnpike 
within  our  first  line  of  works,  and  continued  firing." 
He  thus  accompanied  Lane's  brigade  in  its  retreat 
to  Conrad's  line,  which  he  calls  the  "first  line  of 
works  "  as  distinguished  from  "  our  main  line,"  which 
he  mentions  in  the  next  sentence.3 

Wagner,  in  his  official  report,  agrees  with  the 
account  given  by  Lane.  The  latter  was  halted  on 
Conrad's  right,  instead  of  marching  past  and  enter 
ing  the  intrenched  position  occupied  by  the  Twenty- 
answered  when  it  is  plainly  stated.  It  will  he  seen  that  the  result  of 
my  compilation  of  official  evidence  is  to  relieve  the  Fourth  Corps  head 
quarters  also  of  any  imputation  of  error  in  the  matter. 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  256. 

2  Id.,  p.  331. 

3  The  Confederate  accounts  "also  speak  of  the   line   occupied   by 
Conrad  and  Lane  when  they  were  struck  by  the  enemy  as  our  first 
line.     This  is  apt  to  lead  to  confusion,  for  in  the  fight  ahout  the  Carter 
house  it  will  by  and  by  appear  that  there  were  two  lines  there  in  the 
latter  part  of  the  engagement. 


76  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

third  Corps.  Conrad's  arrangement  of  his  troops 
was  not  wholly  on  the  left  of  the  turnpike.1  He 
placed  one  regiment  on  the  right,  leaving  the  road 
wholly  open.  The  other  regiments  were  finally 
placed  in  single  line.  Their  order  from  right  to 
left  was  as  follows,  viz.  :  15th  Missouri,  79th  Illinois, 
51st  Illinois,  42d  Illinois,  64th  Ohio,  and  65th  Ohio. 
When  Lane  came  back  to  this  line,  between  half 
past  two  and  three,2  the  section  of  Marshall's  battery 
occupied  the  open  road  in  the  interval  between 
Conrad's  right  regiments. 

Colonel  Lane  does  not  give,  in  his  report,  the 
order  of  his  regiments  in  line,  and  we  cannot  supply 
the  omission  by  the  separate  regimental  reports,  for 
none  were  made  except  by  the  97th  Ohio,  his  own 
regiment.  The  regiments  in  the  brigade  were,  be 
sides  the  one  named,  the  26th  Ohio,  28th  Kentucky, 
40th  Indiana,  57th  Indiana,  and  100th  Illinois,  and 
it  is  understood  that,  like  Conrad's,  they  were 
deployed  in  single  line.3  Each  brigade  had  its  outer 
flank  well  retired,  so  that  the  whole  formation  was 
almost  wedge-shaped.4  As  to  his  orders  from  Gen 
eral  Wagner,  Lane  is  sufficiently  explicit.  He  says, 
"  I  here  received  orders  to  give  battle  to  the  enemy, 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  270. 

2  Lane  sent  to  Wagner  for  orders,  as  we  have  seen,  at  two  o'clock, 
and  waited  to  receive  an  answer  at  Privet  Knob  before  beginning  his 
movement.     Wagner  was  then  just  bringing  Opdycke's  brigade  within 
my  lines,  and  in  going  and  returning  the  messenger  must  travel  two 
miles.     The  movement  then  began,  and  the  infantry  marched  half  a 
mile  to  Conrad's  position.     All  this  would  take  more  than  half  an 
hour. 

3  0.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  255. 

4  The  section  of  artillery  took  position  in  the  road  far  enough  north 
of  the  low  summit  in  front  of  my  lines  to  make  the  curve  of  the  ground 
partly  cover  the  guns.     Conrad  formed  on  this  position,  a  hundred 
yards  or  more  on  the  hither  side  of  the  crest  at  the  road.     See  map, 
p.  45,  ante. 


The  Rear  Guard —  Wagners  Division          77 

and,  if  able,  drive  him  off;  if  overpowered,  to  check 
him  as  long  as  possible,  and  then  retire  to  the  main 
line  of  works." 

In  his  visit  to  my  headquarters  at  the  Carter  house, 
when  he  came  in  with  Opdycke,  Wagner  had  himself 
seen  the  character  of  the  lines.  The  intrenchments, 
the  artillery  at  the  embrasures,  the  retrenchment 
covering  the  road,  the  abattis  in  front,  were  all 
examined,  and  made  the  subject  of  conversation  by 
him.  His  experience  in  the  construction  of  such 
lines  and  their  purpose  ran  through  the  whole  of 
the  Atlanta  campaign,  and  he  not  only  knew  that 
the  lines  were  planned  to  meet  any  serious  attack  the 
enemy  might  make,  but  he  had  just  reported  to  head 
quarters  of  the  corps  to  which  he  belonged  that  he 
was  moving  his  division  within  these  lines.  As,  in 
addition  to  this,  his  official  report  makes  no  sugges 
tion  of  any  change  in  his  orders  from  any  source,  it 
is  conclusive  that  the  change  in  his  conduct  must 
have  been  spontaneous  with  him. 

Conrad's  arrangement  of  his  troops  so  as  to  leave 
the  road  open,  and  his  placing  a  regiment  on  the  right 
of  it,  plainly  looked  like  a  temporary  halt,  with  the 
expectation  of  covering  the  march  of  Lane's  brigade 
down  the  turnpike.  There  is  an  indication,  too,  that 
he  did  not  at  once  deploy  his  brigade  in  single  line, 
but  placed  one  regiment  on  each  side  of  the  road  and 
the  others  in  support.  The  barricade  which  his  men 
made,  imperfect  as  it  all  was  when  compared  with  our 
more  carefully  constructed  lines,  was  yet  a  stronger 
defence  close  to  the  turnpike  than  it  was  on  the  outer 
flanks,  showing  that  this  outer  part  was  more  hastily 
thrown  up.1 

1  Colonel  Carter  states  that  he  personally  levelled  down  these  bar 
ricades,  and  that  where  Lane's  brigade  stood,  on  the  west  of  the  road, 


78  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

When  the  enemy  began  to  deploy  on  the  hither 
side  of  Winstead  Hill,  Conrad  sent  to  inquire  of 
Wagner  whether  it  was  expected  that  he  should  hold 
this  line;  but,  as  he  reports,  just  as  his  officer  was 
starting,  Wagner  rejoined  him  in  person,  and  not 
only  gave  orders  to  hold  the  line  as  long  as  possible, 
'  but  directed  him  to  have  the  sergeants  fix  their 
bayonets,  and  keep  the  men  to  their  places.1  "I 
accordingly  gave  the  same  instructions  to  my  regi 
mental  commanders,"  Conrad  adds,  "and,  believing 
an  attack  would  soon  be  made  on  my  line,  I  ordered 
them  to  build  a  line  of  works  in  front  of  their  regi 
ments  respectively."  How  much  time  there  was  for 
this  attempt  at  intrenching  we  cannot  accurately  tell, 
but  it  is  doubtful  if  more  than  half  an  hour  elapsed 
when  the  enemy  advanced  to  the  attack.  Conrad 
says  it  was  while  his  men  "were  very  busily  engaged 
in  throwing  up  the  work.  "2  As  to  Lane's  brigade, 
the  only  evidence  is  the  report  of  Lieut.  Colonel 
Barnes,  who  says  they  "had  but  fairly  begun  to 
throw  up  a  temporary  work."3 

All  accounts  show  that  there  was  neither  time  nor 
means  to  make  a  solid  intrenchment  at  this  out 
post.  The  regiments  had  marched  without  intrench 
ing  tools,  and  it  is  said  that,  finding  a  wagon  broken 
down  by  the  roadside,  in  which  were  some  shovels 
and  pickaxes,  they  had  helped  themselves  to  these.4 
The  army  and  corps  commanders  were  ignorant  that 
they  had  any  intrenching  tools  at  all.5 

they  were  not  continuous,  but  Avere  in  the  shape  of  disconnected  "  half 
moons,"  and  that  all  were  of  the  hasty  kind  made  by  throwing  fence 
rails  together  and  piling  a  little  earth  behind  them. 

1  O.  R,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  270. 

2  Ibid.  3  Id.,  p.  265.  *  Id.,  p.  280. 

5  Major  Atwater,  commanding  42d  Illinois,  says,  "  when  the  enemy 
came  upon  us  we  had  a  very  poor  line  of  works."  Id.,  p.  276.  Cap- 


The  Rear  Guard  —  Wagners  Division         70 

It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  General  Wagner, 
chafing  at  the  urgency,  akin  to  insubordination,  with 
which  Opdycke  had  wisely  opposed  any  stop  in  the 
continuous  retirement  of  the  division  after  passing 
Privet  Knob,  and  excited  by  the  rapid  approach  of 
a  crisis  in  the  stirring  events  of  the  day,  gave  way  to 
an  impulse  to  fight  the  whole  army  of  ilood  upon  the 
line  of  mere  outposts.  Such  impulses,  unfortu 
nately,  are  not  uncommon  in  officers  who  arc  brave 
enough,  but  who  lack  the  power  of  calm  self-control 
under  fire.1  He  was  thus  led  to  issue  the  order 
which  involved  the  two  brigades  in  terrible  con 
sequences.2  In  his  own  report,  Wagner  said  that 

tain  Atwater,  commanding  51st  Illinois,  says  his  men  "threw  up  hasty 
works."  /(/.,  p.  278.  Colonel  Buckner,  of  the  79th  Illinois,  says  the 
"  works  were  constructed  in  a  short  time,"  and  "  it  was  not  long  till 
the  skirmishers  were  engaged  in  our  front."  Id.,  p.  280.  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Brown,  commanding  64th  Ohio,  says  that  "  the  men  with  a 
few  spades,  threw  up  a  bank,  which,  in  consequence  of  no  timber, 
was  very  low."  Id.,  p.  284.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Barnes,  commanding 
97th  Ohio  (Lane's  brigade),  says,  "  we  had  but  fairly  begun  to  throw 
up  a  temporary  work,  with  the  very  limited  means  at  our  disposal," 
when  the  enemy  attacked.  Id.,  p.  265.  All  of  these  except  the  last 
are  in  reports  from  Conrad's  brigade,  and  as  we  have  seen  that  their 
barricades  were  much  better  than  Lane's,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  the  lat 
ter,  the  disconnected  "  half-moons,"  were  scarce  worth  mentioning. 

1  A  noteworthy  example  of  this  impulse  to  conduct  a  battle  by 
"feeding  the  pickets,"  is  that  attributed  by  Kinglake  to  General  Penne- 
futhcr  at  the  opening  of  the  battle  of  Inkerman  in  the  Crimean  War. 
Kinglake's  Invasion  of  the  Crimea,  vol.  iii.  pp.   101,  154  (Harpers' 
edition). 

2  Conrad's  report  was  made  on  December  1st.    The  division  reached 
Nashville  about  noon  of  that  day,  and  though  he  had  been  fighting 
and  marching  two  days  and  nights  without  rest,  the  report  was  written 
before  he  slept.     Wagner's  was  made  on  the  2d,  though  his  subordi 
nates,  Opdycke  and  Lane,  did  not  make  theirs  till  the  5th  and  7th 
respectively.     Conrad's  reporting  that  he  was  ordered  to  fight,  even 
by  making  the  file  closers  use  bayonets,  Avas  equivalent  to  "  charges  " 
against  Wagner,  and  the  latter  hastened  his  own  report  to  reply  to  it, 
not  waiting  to  receive  those  of  his  other  brigade  commanders.     I  shall 
have  occasion  to  notice  the  sequel  of  this.     Post,  chap.  xvii. 


80  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Conrad  and  Lane  were  "directed  to  hold  their  posi 
tion  long  enough  to  develop  the  force  of  the  enemy, 
but  not  to  attempt  to  fight  if  threatened  by  the  enemy 
in  too  strong  a  force. " 1  He  thus  puts  himself  in 
accord  with  the  orders  which  he  had  received  from 
his  superiors,  and  makes  by  implication  a  denial  of 
the  truth  of  Conrad's  statement. 

From  the  breastworks  at  the  Carter  house  the 
enemy  could  be  seen  as  a  dark  line  coming  diag 
onally  down  Winstead  Hill,  blotting  out  the  white 
streak  of  the  turnpike.  Two  miles  is  too  long  a  dis 
tance,  however,  to  see  more  than  a  very  general  out 
line  of  a  moving  column,  livened  here  and  there  by 
the  glint  of  light  flashing  from  a  gun  barrel.  At 
the  foot  of  the  hill  the  ground  was  not  only  lower 
than  it  was  at  one  or  two  points  nearer  to  us,  but 
there  was  an  open  wood  or  grove  with  forest  trees 
enough  to  hide  the  deployment  when  they  began  to 
prepare  for  the  attack.  For  an  army  of  thirty  thou 
sand  men  it  takes  two  or  three  hours  at  least  to  pass 
from  column  into  line,  properly  aligned,  with  sup 
ports  also  in  position,  artillery  in  the  proper  inter 
vals,  and  all  properly  "dressed  up"  with  accuracy; 
because  this  accuracy  is  more  necessary  than  on 
parade,  when  the  event  of  a  great  battle  hangs  on  the 
unity  and  vigor  with  which  an  assault  is  delivered. 

After  my  interview  with  Wagner,  when  Opdycke's 
brigade  came  within  the  lines,  I  had  made  a  final 
inspection  of  our  preparation.  I  had  visited  General 
Ruger,  who,  knowing  that  I  expected  to  be  person 
ally  at  my  headquarters  at  the  Carter  house,  had 
rightly  judged  that  the  next  critical  point  would 
probably  be  at  the  Carter's  Creek  road,  where  the 
Bostick  place  might  give  the  enemy  a  commanding 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  231. 


The  Rear  Guard  —  Wagner's  Division         81 

position  for  artillery.  He  therefore  fixed  his  per 
sonal  position  on  the  line  in  rear  of  his  right  brigade. 
The  recurved  part  of  his  line  was  in  danger  of  en 
filading  fire,  and  he  had  constructed  it  as  a  crcmail- 
lere^i\\Q  indentations  in  it  having  much  of  the  effect 
of  traverses  in  protecting  the  men.  In  at  least  one 
of  the  regiments  regular  traverses  were  also  built 
between  the  companies.  The  locust  grove  near  the 
Carter  house,  and  the  orchard  beyond,  had  both  dis 
appeared  under  the  demand  for  material  to  make 
abattis,  and  the  clear  range  for  infantry  fire  was 
unobstructed  for  half  a  mile.  General  Reilly,  in 
command  of  my  own  division,  made  his  headquar 
ters  at  the  cotton-gin,  where  the  salient  occupied  by 
the  battery  was  not  only  a  point  likely  to  be  aimed 
at  in  an  assault,  but  was  also  prominent  enough  to 
give  a  view  along  the  front  if  the  smoke  should 
permit. 

The  troops  in  the  line  were  everywhere  agog  with 
the  news  of  the  imposing  formation  of  the  enemy  in 
full  view  of  Wagner's  advanced  brigades.  From 
officers  coming  to  me  with  reports  from  our  left,  1 
learned  that  the  hostile  array  could  be  well  seen 
from  the  knoll  in  Stiles's  brigade,  and  I  determined 
to  go  there  for  a  brief  visit,  to  judge  for  myself  of 
Hood's  organization  and  the  points  at  which  his 
attack  would  be  aimed.  It  was  now  three  o'clock, 
and  as  we  were  only  three  weeks  from  the  winter 
solstice,  the  sun  would  set  at  five  o'clock.  Hood 
must  attack  soon  or  not  at  all.  Wagner  had  come 

1  In  the  official  map  of  the  field  made  by  Captain  Twining,  the 
Chief  Engineer  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  (see  map,  p.  45),  part  of 
General  Ruger's  line  is  drawn  as  having  traverses  inside  a  straight 
breastwork.  General  Rnger's  official  report,  however,  says  that  it  was  "  a 
broken  line."  Colonel  Spaulding,  23d  Michigan,  says  he  built "  traverses 
on  the  flanks  of  each  company."  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  365,  386. 

6 


82  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

in  from  his  two  brigades,  and,  meeting  him  in  the 
road  in  front  of  the  Carter  house,  he  confirmed  the 
information  that  the  enemy  was  probably  forming 
for  an  assault.  I  reminded  him  of  his  orders  not  to 
leave  his  brigades  out  too  long,  and  warned  him  of 
the  dangers  that  would  come  from  a  hurried  retreat. 
I  then  rode  off  to  the  left. 

General  Schofield's  staff  had  kept  up  frequent 
communication  between  us  during  the  day.  Colonel 
Schofield  had  just  inspected  the  position  of  the  addi 
tional  batteries  which  Captain  Bridges  had  put  in 
position.  Colonel  Wherry,  the  Chief  of  Staff,  had 
just  carried  the  latest  news  from  the  front.  On 
the  report  of  the  deployment  of  the  enemy,  General 
Schofield  had  gone  to  Fort  Granger,  from  the  para 
pet  of  which,  much  higher  than  any  point  in  my  line, 
he  had  a  complete  view  of  the  whole  field. 

At  a  quarter  past  three  General  Wilson  found 
that  the  enemy's  cavalry  were  pushing  back  our  own 
mounted  outposts,  and  were  making  efforts  to  force 
a  crossing  of  the  Harpeth  three  miles  up  stream,  at 
Hughes's  Ford.1  There  had  been  brisk  skirmishing 
for  an  hour  before,  and  Croxton's  cavalry  brigade  had 
retired  to  the  north  bank  of  the  river  at  McGavock's 
Ford,  about  a  mile  below  Hughes's.  The  river,  so 
far  up,  was  reported  by  the  inhabitants  to  be  fordahlc 
in  many  places,  and  as  soon  as  the  advance  of  the 
enemy  was  developed,  Wilson  concentrated  Hatch's 
and  Johnson's  divisions  to  resist  it.  Thus  the  ball 
opened  nearly  simultaneously  on  the  Columbia  Turn 
pike  by  the  infantry  assault  upon  Wagner's  brigades, 
and  at  the  up-river  fords  by  Forrest's  attack  upon 
our  cavalry.  All  this  will  grow  clearer  as  we  now 
trace  the  enemy's  advance  from  Spring  Hill. 

1  0.  K  ,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  559,  560,  1184. 


CHAPTER   V 

THE   CONFEDERATE   ARRAY 

Hood  at  Spring  Hill  —  Discovers  Schofield's  Escape — Cavalry  in 
Pursuit — Infantry  hastening  after  —  He  decides  to  Assault  —  His 
Cavalry  Positions  —  The  Infantry  — Deployment  and  Formation  — 
Stewart's  Corps  on  Hood's  Right  —  Cheatham's  in  Centre  and  Left 
—  Tart  of  Lee's  in  Reserve  —  Artillery  in  Intervals  —  Chalmers's 
Cavalry  on  extreme  Left  —  Hood's  Headquarters. 

IT  was  not  till  daylight  of  the  30th  November  that 
Hood  learned  at  Spring  Hill  that  Schofield's  little 
army  had  evaded  him.  Forrest  was  dispatched  in 
pursuit  with  Buford's  and  Jackson's  divisions  of  cav 
alry  ;  but  Chalmers  was  sent  with  his  division  to 
explore  the  roads  leading  westward  into  the  Carter's 
Creek  Turnpike,  Hood  being  unable  to  persuade  him 
self  that  all  Schofield's  troops  and  trains  could  have 
moved  by  the  direct  road  to  Franklin  in  the  night.1 
He  had  suspended  operations  late  in  the  evening  of 
the  29th,  in  the  belief  that  Forrest  blocked  the  way  to 
Franklin,  and  had  persuaded  himself  that  Schofield 
must  surrender  in  the  morning.2  Chalmers  fully 
expected  to  find  that  part,  at  least,  of  our  column 
had  been  forced  to  leave  the  Columbia  and  Franklin 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  764. 

2  See  an  important  paper  by  General  Cheatham,  and  the  accompa 
nying  documents,  in  Southern  Bivouac  for  April,  1885.     Chalmers's 
report  for  his  cavalry  division  is  not  preserved  in  the  official  archives, 
hut  a  copy  found  among  his  papers  is  published  in  the  Official  Records, 
and  is  no  doubt  authentic.     /(/.,  p.  763. 


84  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Turnpike  by  a  detour  to  the  west,  and  was  amazed  to 
find  that  our  whole  army  had  passed  tip  the  direct 
road  to  Franklin,  within  a  very  short  distance  of  their 
infantry  lines.1  He  continued  his  route,  however,  in 
accordance  with  his  orders,  and  on  reaching  the  Car 
ter's  Creek  Turnpike  he  turned  northward  upon  it 
toward  Franklin,  although  it  was  demonstrated  that 
no  part  of  Schofield's  forces  had  travelled  that  road. 

Hood's  infantry  at  Spring  Hill  consisted  of  Stew 
art's  and  Cheatham's  corps,  with  Johnson's  division 
of  Lee's.  He  had  with  him  also  two  six-gun  bat 
teries,  —  Guibor's  and  Presstman's.  These  were  put 
in  march  for  Franklin  as  soon  as  Forrest  was  fairly 
off.  The  cavalry  had  run  short  of  ammunition  in 
yesterday's  light,  and  as  the  ordnance  trains  were 
with  the  other  wagons  at  Columbia,  Forrest  had 
to  borrow  some  ammunition  of  the  infantry.  His 
men  were  really  a  mounted  infantry,  and  were  armed 
with  guns  of  the  same  calibre  with  some  of  the  line 
troops. 

S.  D.  Lee's  corps  at  Columbia,  reduced  by  the  ab 
sence  of  Johnson's  division,  consisted  of  Clayton's 
and  Stevenson's  divisions  ;  but  he  had  with  him  nearly 
all  the  artillery,  and  all  the  wagon  trains.  He  became 
aware  that  we  had  left  his  front  about  half  past  two 
in  the  morning;  but  he  had  double  the  distance  to 
march  that  the  other  corps  had,  and  although  he 
began  his  movement  before  day,  he  reached  Franklin 
after  the  attack  had  begun,  and  too  late  to  take 
part  in  it.2 

1  0.  II.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  764. 

2  His  report  says  that  he  reached  Franklin  about  four  o'clock,  as 
Hood  was  about  to  attack ;    but  he   apparently   had  ridden  forward 
in  person,  for  Clayton  says  thev  found  the  bloody  engagement  begun. 
O.  R.,xlv.  part  i.  pp.  087,  G97. 


The  Confederate  Array  85 

The  bold  front  shown  by  Wagner's  division  at 
Winstcad  Hill  had  forced  Hood  to  deploy,  for  his 
failure  at  Spring  Hill  had  not  encouraged  him  to 
attack  with  the  head  of  column.  He  tells  us  that, 
having  gathered  from  the  despatches  he  had  captured 
at  Spring  Hill  that  Thomas  was  intending  to  hold 
Franklin  in  force  by  concentrating  there,  he  knew  it 
was  all-important  to  attack  Schofield  before  he  could 
make  himself  strong.1  It  was  undoubtedly  wise  for 
him  to  force  the  fighting  with  Schofield  if  he  could 
catch  him  at  a  disadvantage,  and  crush  him  if  possi 
ble  before  he  could  unite  with  Thomas's  other  troops, 
or  be  greatly  reinforced  at  Franklin.  At  any  rate, 
he  determined,  as  he  says,  not  to  delay  for  flanking 
movements,  but  to  attack  at  once  in  front. 

He  had  followed  up  our  column  so  closely  that  he 
might  well  assume  that  we  had  not  had  time  to  fortify, 
though  his  experience  in  the  Atlanta  campaign  ought 
to  have  taught  him  that  it  did  not  take  us  long  to 
throw  up  a  formidable  line  of  breastworks  when  we 
had  deliberately  chosen  a  position  for  defence.  His 
exasperation  at  what  he  regarded  as  a  hair's  breadth 
escape  on  our  part  from  the  toils  in  which  he  thought 
he  had  encompassed  us  at  Spring  Hill  had  probably 
clouded  his  judgment.  He  blamed  some  of  his  sub 
ordinates  for  the  hesitation  which  he  seems  himself  to 
have  been  responsible  for,  and  now,  in  an  excitement 
which  led  him  astray,  he  determined  to  risk  everything 
upon  a  desperate  assault. 

Forrest's  reputation  as  a  "raider"  was  so  great  that 
it  was  apt  to  be  assumed  on  the  national  side  that  he 
never  confined  himself  to  the  strictly  auxiliary  work 
of  a  cavalry  column  accompanying  an  army.  In  this 
campaign,  both  on  the  advance  and  the  retreat,  he 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  653. 


86  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

proved  that  he  could  cover  the  movements  of  the  in 
fantry  as  brilliantly  as  he  performed  his  independent 
raids.  He  had  admirably  assisted  Hood  as  a  flanking 
force  all  day  on  Tuesday,  and  now,  on  Wednesday  the 
30th,  with  his  two  divisions,  he  opened  the  way  for 
the  infantry,  harassing  our  rear  guard,  and  making 
dashes  at  the  trains,  sticking  closely  to  his  work  of 
helping  Hood  forward,  and  with  no  thought  of  distant 
expeditions. 

When,  about  one  o'clock,  Wagner's  withdrawal  of 
his  division  left  the  way  over  Winstead  Hill  open, 
Hood's  infantry  advanced  at  once  by  the  Columbia 
and  Lewisburg  turnpikes,  whilst  Forrest's  two  cavalry 
divisions  skirted  the  hill  upon  their  right,  leaving  room 
for  the  deployment  of  the  infantry.1  Jackson's  division 
was  on  Forrest's  right,  facing  Hatch's  division  of  our 
cavalry  near  Hughes's  Ford,  and  Buford's  on  his  left, 
near  the  Lewisburg  Turnpike,  was  facing  Croxton's 
brigade  near  McGavock's  Ford.  Both  Confederate 
divisions  were  halted  while  the  deployment  of  the 
infantry  was  going  on,  and  Buford  was  ordered  to 
advance  close  upon  Stewart's  right  when  the  corps  of 
the  latter  should  go  forward. 

Chalmers  had  come  up  with  the  other  cavalry 
division  by  way  of  the  Carter's  Creek  Turnpike,  and 
was  directed  to  cover  and  extend  the  attack  of  Hood's 
left  wing.  By  noon  he  was  already  in  sight  of  Ruger's 
skirmishers,  who  were  well  in  front  of  the  right  flank 
of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  line,  accompanying  the 
movement  of  Wagner's  men  as  they  withdrew  to 
Privet  Knob.  It  was  on  the  report  of  Chalmers's 
appearance  there,  as  we  have  seen,  that  I  requested 
more  troops  to  support  and  guard  Ruger's  flank.2 

1  Forrest's  Report,  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  754. 

2  Ante,  pp.  59,  GO. 


The  Confederate  Array  87 

Hood  saw,  as  we  did,  that  an  attack  by  his  right 
against  our  left  promised  most  decisive  results,  if  suc 
cessful.  If  Forrest  were  able  to  drive  Wilson  back, 
our  line  of  communications  was  most  easily  reached 
by  that  flank  where  the  fords  of  the  upper  river  were 
close  to  the  line  of  the  infantry  advance,  so  that 
Stewart  could  aid  Forrest  as  he  went  forward,  and 
be  aided  in  turn  by  every  mile  of  vantage  that  the 
cavalry  should  gain. 

The  Confederate  commander,  therefore,  not  only 
kept  two  thirds  of  his  cavalry  under  Forrest  upon  his 
right,  but  made  Stewart  take  ground  in  that  direction 
so  far  as  to  make  room  for  Cleburne's  division  of 
Cheatham's  corps  between  the  Columbia  Turnpike  and 
Stewart's  left.  He  thus  deployed  four  divisions  of 
infantry  between  the  road  which  led  to  our  centre  and 
the  Harpeth  River  on  our  left,  whilst  only  two  were 
deployed  upon  the  west  of  the  turnpike  ; l  for  Johnson's 
division  of  Lee's  corps  was  kept  in  reserve  until  after 
the  first  assault,  and  Lee's  other  two  divisions  did  not 
arrive  on  the  field  in  time  to  take  an  active  part  in 
the  engagement. 

The  order  of  battle  on  the  Confederate  side  was  an 
array  of  two  brigades  in  front  line  and  one  in  support 
in  each  division,  with  intervals  for  artillery  between 
the  divisions.  The  field  of  battle  converged  to  a 
narrower  front  as  the  enemy  approached  our  lines ; 
for  Reilly's  single  division  of  three  brigades  in  our 
trenches  was  thus  to  bear  the  assault  of  four  divisions, 
and  Rugcr's  was  to  be  attacked  by  two  divisions,  be 
sides  a  subsequent  onset  by  a  division  of  Lee's  corps. 
It  will  be  seen,  by  and  by,  that  the  attack  upon  Rugcr 
lapped  over  upon  Kimball's  left  brigade,  and  that  the 
advance  against  Kimball's  centre  and  right  was  made 

1  0.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  708. 


88  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

by  Chalmers's  cavalry  ;  but  Hood's  orders  contem 
plated  guiding  his  infantry  on  the  left  by  the  Carter's 
Creek  road,  and  the  extension  west  of  it  was  caused 
by  the  crowding  of  the  lines  as  they  converged  upon 
our  narrow  front. 

In  his  deployment  Stewart  had  Loring's  division  on 
his  right,  consisting  of  Scott's,  Feathcrston's,  and  Ad 
ams's  brigades.  Walthall's  division  was  his  centre, 
consisting  of  Quarles's,  Shelleyjs^and  Reynolds's  brig 
ades.  French's  division  wa*s*~S  tew  art's  l^ff,  having  at 
this  time  but  two  brigades,  Cockreirs,^i-d  Sears's, 
for  Ector's  was  tiway.ajjtLug  as  guard  -and  escort  for 
the  pontoon  train.1** 

Of  Clieatham's  corps,  Cleburne's  division,  as  I  have 
already  said,  was  east  of  the  Columbia  Turnpike,  and 
took  the  road  itself  for  its  left  guide.  Its  brigades 
were  Folk's,  Govan's,  and  Granbury's.  Brown's  divis 
ion  was  on  the  west  of  the  turnpike  guiding  its  right 
by  the  road.-'  It  was  made  up  of  the  brigades  of  Gor 
don,  Strahl,  Carter,  and  Gist.  Bate's  division  was  the 
left  of  the  line,  with  or$$rs  to  take  ground  to  the  west 
till  it  cleared  Brown's  division  and  Frivet  Knob,2  then 
to  advance  guiding  its  left  by  the  Carter's  Creek 
Turnpike,  in  front  of  the  Bostick  house.  His  brig 
ades  were  those  of  Finley,  Jackson,  and  Smith. 

Johnson's  division  of  Lee's  corps  was  held  in  reserve 
at  the  opening  of  the  battle,  until  the  rest  of  that  corps 
arrived  upon  the  field.3  Its  brigades  were  those  of 
Brantly,  Deas,  Manigault,  and  Sharp.  We  shall  have 
occasion  to  notice  the  arrangement  of  these  brigades 
when  we  have  to  tell  of  their  advance  to  the  attack, 
and  of  those  of  all  the  divisions  engaged.  It  is  enough 
for  the  present  to  say  that  a  space  for  artillery  was  left 
between  the  divisions  of  Stewart's  corps,  and  that  a 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  708.          2  Id.,  p.  743.         3  Id.,  p.  681. 


The  Confederate  Array  89 

section  of  Guibor's  battery  was  placed  in  eacli  of  these 
intervals,  and  between  French  and  Cheatham.1  Presst- 
man's  battery  seems  to  have  fought  as  a  unit,  be 
ing  first  placed  on  the  slope  of  Privet  Knob,  where 
Cheatham  had  his  headquarters,  and  later  on  the  knoll 
at  the  Bostick  place  near  the  Carter's  Creek  Turnpike, 
and  in  Bate's  division. 

Chalmers's  division  of  cavalry,  which  was  ordered 
to  advance  beyond  Bate's  left  flank,  after  meeting  our 
skirmishers  soon  after  midday,  moved  still  farther  to 
the  left  and  front,  so  that  when  it  came  forward  later 
to  join  in  the  general  attack  it  came  out  of  a  hollow 
nearly  at  right  angles  to  the  line  of  General  Bate's 
march.  Whilst  in  this  hollow  it  had  been  hidden  from 
Bate's  view  as  he  advanced,  and,  as  he  was  riot  aware 
of  its  exact  position,  he  thought  it  had  not  come  for 
ward  upon  his  flank  in  accordance  with  the  plan  of 
the  engagement.  It  had  really  got  into  its  concealed 
position  before  his  deployment,  and  he  does  not  seem 
to  have  learned  that  it  took  any  part  in  the  fight,  for 
he  reported  that  his  left  suffered  for  lack  of  the  sup 
port  the  cavalry  was  to  have  given  it.2  We  shall  see 
more  of  this  as  the  incidents  of  the  battle  develop. 

Hood  fixed  his  headquarters  on  the  field  at  the  old 
Neely  house,  not  far  from  the  foot  of  Winstead  Hill,  on 
the  Columbia  Turnpike.  The  position  was  not  one 
from  which  he  could  view  the  engagement,  and  he 
had  to  rely  upon  the  reports  of  his  subordinates  for 
his  information  of  the  progress  of  the  battle.  This, 
however,  was  of  little  moment,  for  the  smoke  of  battle 
was  soon  to  obscure  everything  and  make  personal 
observation  of  little  use.  He  was  a  good  deal  ex 
hausted  in  body  by  the  labors  and  fatigues  of  the  past 
two  days,  and  in  his  maimed  and  crippled  condition, 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  708.  2  Id,  p.  743. 


90  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

lacking  a  leg  and  an  arm  lost  in  former  battles,  he  lay 
on  the  ground  upon  some  blankets,  a  saddle  support 
ing  his  shoulders  and  head,  and  so  received  the  reports 
his  corps  commanders  sent  to  him,  and  gave  his  orders 
in  the  desperate  fight.1 

1  These  particulars  were  given  me  by  Major  Sanders,  of  General 
French's  staff,  among  his  personal  recollections  of  the  battle. 


CHAPTER    VI 

THE  ASSAULT   ON  WAGNER'S  OUTPOST 

Viow  from  the  Knoll  on  our  Left  —  Skirmishing  in  Front  —  The  Out 
post  trying  to  intrench  —  Confederate  Advance  —  Colonel  Capers's 
Description — Artillery  opens  on  both  Sides  —  Surgeon  Hill's  View 
from  Fort  Granger  —  Orders  sent  along  our  Line  —  To  Opdyeke 
in  Reserve —  Retreat  of  the  Outpost  —  My  Ride  to  the  Centre  — 
Momentary  Break  there — Reilly's  Rally — Opdycke's  IJush  for 
ward  —  Strickland's  Rally  —  Meeting  Stanley  —  The  Din  of  Buttle 
—  Stanley  wounded. 

SUCH  was  the  situation  when  I  left  my  headquarters 
at  the  Carter  house  and  rode  along  the  lines  of  Reilly's 
division  to  the  knoll  in  Stiles's  brigade  near  our  ex 
treme  left.  It  was  known  among  the  troops  that  the 
enemy  was  deploying,  and  officers  and  men  were  all 
upon  the  alert.  From  the  parapet  at  the  knoll,  look 
ing  southward,  a  slight  hollow  ran  diagonally  up  to  the 
right  toward  the  water-shed  on  which  the  Columbia 
road  was  built.  This  enabled  me  to  look  behind  the 
rise  of  ground  on  which  Wagner's  two  brigades  were 
now  deployed,  and  to  see  the  gradually  extending 
array  of  the  Confederate  army.  It  was  evident  that 
Hood  was  deploying,  but  it  might  be  only  for  the  pur 
pose  of  encamping  in  line  of  battle  just  beyond  the 
range  of  projectiles,  as  he  had  done  at  Columbia  before 
beginning  his  flanking  movement. 

The  day  continued  bright  and  warm ;  but  the  sun 
would  set  before  five  o'clock,1  and  it  was  already  low 

1  See  note  at  end  of  chap,  x.,  post. 


92  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

enough  in  the  west  to  make  the  haze  seem  thicker  under 
its  slanting  rays,  which  flashed  from  the  weapons  and 
the  accoutrements  of  the  enemy  more  than  a  mile 
away.  Their  line  could  be  continuously  traced  from 
the  Harpeth  River  on  our  left  front  till  it  \vas  lost  near 
Privet  Knob,  in  front  of  our  right  centre,  from  which 
Cheatham's  corps  had  driven  Lane's  brigade  half  an 
hour  before,  though  our  skirmishers  were  still  holding 
the  shoulder  of  the  hill  and  making  a  lively  resistance 
to  the  Confederate  advance  on  that  part  of  the  field. 
Our  cavalry  on  the  river  above  us,  at  the  fords,  were 
considerably  in  advance  of  our  left,  and  a  brisk  en 
gagement  between  them  and  Forrest's  men  was  already 
going  on. 

My  attention  was  now  attracted  to  the  centre  by 
the  efforts  of  Lane's  and  Conrad's  men  to  make  some 
cover  for  themselves.  They  seemed  to  be  digging 
hard  to  throw  up  a  breastwork.  I  attributed  it  to  the 
habit  of  our  men  to  make  some  sort  of  shelter  when 
ever  halted,  unless  they  certainly  knew  they  were 
immediately  to  march,  and  1  momently  looked  for 
the  evidence  that  they  were  ordered  to  cease  the  use 
less  labor  and  retire.  From  the  Carter  house  I  had 
not  noticed  any  such  work  going  on.  Conrad's  brig 
ade  seemed  to  stand  by  a  fence,  facing  southward, 
and  anything  they  had  done  to  strengthen  a  barricade 
of  rails  had  not  been  seen  by  me,  though  I  had  not 
had  occasion  to  examine  them  closely,  occupied  as  I 
was  with  my  own  duties. 

Soon  the  long  lines  of  Hood's  army  surged  up  out 
of  the  hollow  in  which  they  had  formed,  and  were 
seen  coming  forward  in  splendid  array.  The  sight 
was  one  to  send  a  thrill  through  the  heart,  and  those 
who  saw  it  have  never  forgotten  its  martial  magnifi 
cence.  In  our  forest-clad  and  sparsely  inhabited 


The  Assault  on  Wagner's  Outpost  93 

Southern  States  it  was  a  rare  thing  to  have  a  battle 
field  on  which  the  contending  armies  could  be  seen. 
We  usually  fought  in  tangled  woods  and  thickets, 
where  we  knew  the  extent  of  the  engagement  only  by 
the  sound  of  the  distant  artillery  and  the  crash  of  the 
musketry.  Here,  however,  we  could  see  the  field  and 
follow  the  movements  of  the  contending  hosts. 

That  it  impressed  our  opponents,  as  it  did  our 
selves,  we  know  from  many  sources  ;  but  a  vivid  de 
scription,  given  in  the  report  of  Colonel  Ellison  Capers 
of  the  24th  South  Carolina,  enables  us  to  see  the  field 
as  it  looked  to  an  officer  in  the  front  line  of  Brown's 
division  as  it  passed  over  the  crest  of  Privet  Knob, 
and  marched  against  our  works  just  in  rear  of  the 
Carter  house.  Colonel  Capers  was  destined  himself 
to  fall  severely  wounded  in  that  desperate  charge, 
and  we  can  well  understand  that  the  beautiful  land 
scape  and  the  stirring  pageant  before  him  should  be 
imprinted  on  his  memory  as  it  looked  before  he  dashed 
into  the  sulphurous  clouds  of  the  battle  storm. 

Brown's  division  had  come  down  from  the  Winstead 
Hill,  where  it  had  been  deployed,1  marching  by  the 
right  flank  of  regiments" until  they  readied  the  hollow 
at  its  foot.  They  then  formed  "  forward  into  line," 
Gordon's  and  Gist's  brigades  in  front  line,  supported 
by  StrahPs  and  Carter's.  "As  we  advanced,"  says 
Colonel  Capers,  "  the  force  in  front  opened  lire  on  us, 
and  our  line  moved  steadily  on,  the  enemy  retreating 
as  we  pressed  forward.2  Just  before  the  charge  was 
ordered,  the  brigade  passed  over  an  elevation  from 
which  we  beheld  the  magnificent  spectacle  the  battlc- 

1  0.  R,,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  736. 

2  This  was  Lane's  line  of  skirmishers  on  Privet  Knob,  before  he 
joined  Conrad  in  their  last  position.     See  Lane's  Report,  0.  R.,  xlv. 
part  i.  p.  256. 


94  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

field  presented.  Bands  were  playing,  general  and 
staff  officers  were  riding  in  front  of  and  between  the 
lines,  a  hundred  battle-flags  were  waving  in  the  smoke 
of  battle,  and  bursting  shells  were  wreathing  the  air 
in  great  circles  of  smoke,  while  twenty  thousand 
brave  men  were  inarching  in  perfect  order  against 
the  foe." 

The  customs  of  military  service  discourage  the  in 
dulgence  in  sentiment  in  military  reports,  but  the 
results  of  this  battle,  and  its  terrible  scenes,  seem 
to  have  impressed  Confederate  soldiers  with  an  un 
usual  power,  so  that  many  of  them  speak  with  un 
wonted  emotion  in  their  reports,  whilst  many  others 
are  wholly  silent,  as  at  a  great  catastrophe  of  their 
cause.  We  are  thus  indebted  to  the  extraordinary 
feelings  the  event  excited  for  the  vivid  picture  of 
the  field  as  seen  from  the  lines  of  the  foe.  I  shall 
have  occasion  to  borrow  again  from  Colonel  Capers's 
report,  but  must  now  return  to  the  view  from  the  left 
of  our  lines. 

Although  Stewart's  corps  had  been  formed  in 
double  lines,  with  two  brigades  in  front  and  one  in 
rear  in  each  division,  the  rapidly  narrowing  field 
made  it  quickly  necessary  to  reduce  the  front,  so 
that  by  the  time  their  lines  could  be  distinguished 
from  each  other  at  our  position,  each  division  was  a 
column  of  brigades,  coming  on  at  a  quickstep  with 
trailed  arms.  In  the  intervals  between  the  divisions 
the  artillery  galloped  forward,  unlimbered,  and  fired 
till  their  lines  passed  to  the  front,  then  rushed  for 
ward  again  to  repeat  the  manoeuvre.  The  section  of 
Marshall's  battery  which  was  with  Wagner's  men 
opened  first  on  our  side,  and  kept  up  a  steady  fire 
on  the  approaching  enemy.  Cockcrill's  battery  in 
Fort  Granger,  north  of  the  river,  opened  next  with 


The  Assault  on  Wagners  Outpost  95 

its  long-range  rifles,  having  a  most  commanding  posi 
tion,  where  they  could  sweep  the  front  of  our  recurved 
left  flank,  or  fire  over  the  heads  of  our  men  in  the 
lines.  The  batteries  on  both  our  Hanks  increased  the 
lire  as  the  Confederate  columns  came  into  range. 
Surgeon  Hill  of  the  45th  Ohio,  the  medical  officer  in 
charge  of  the  field  hospital  of  Kimball's  division,  was 
in  Fort  Granger  when  the  battle  opened.  "  Standing 
on  this  fort,"  he  says,  in  a  private  letter,  "  where  I 
could  have  an  excellent  view  of  the  country,  I  could 
very  well  follow  the  flight  of  the  heavy  shells,  and  see 
their  explosion  among  the  enemy.  The  closing  up  of 
the  broken  ranks  with  such  well  directed  and  deter 
mined  progress  was  most  wonderful  and  commenda 
ble,  even  in  an  enemy.  The  artillery  duel  was  most 
terrifically  beautiful  and  grand,  and  our  guns  must 
have  wrought  immense  damage."  It  was  from  this 
commanding  position,  it  will  be  remembered,  that 
General  Schofield  was  directing  his  little  army. 

Uneasy  that  the  two  brigades  in  front  were  not 
already  retiring,  I  sent  an  aid  (Lieutenant  Coughlan) 
down  the  line  to  warn  the  troops  at  the  centre  to 
withhold  their  fire  till  Wagner's  men  should  get  in, 
and  to  direct  Opdycke  to  be  ready  to  charge  with  his 
brigade  if  any  break  should  occur.  If  Wagner  should 
be  at  the  lines  near  the  Carter  house,  the  order  relat 
ing  to  his  command  would,  of  course,  go  to  him ;  but 
if  he  were  not  found,  the  aid-de-camp  was  to  deliver 
the  order  directly  to  Opdycke,  and  this  was  what  he 
did.1  I  saw  Mitchell  retire  his  section  of  guns  from 
Conrad's  line,  and  come  leisurely  within  the  works  on 
a  slow  trot.  He  had  wound  up  his  firing  with  canis- 

1  In  his  official  report,  dated  December  5,  Colonel  Opdycke  says, 
"  General  Cox  sent  me  a  request  to  have  my  brigade  ready."  0.  R., 
xlv.  part  i.  p.  240. 


96  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

ter  as  the  enemy  drew  near,1  and  had  lost  two  men 
killed  and  five  wounded  in  this  exposed  service  with 
the  outpost.  Now  surely  the  outlying  brigades  must 
hegin  their  retreat !  No,  they  did  not,  but  they 
opened  a  rapid  musketry  fire  in  hopeless  contest 
witli  the  overwhelming  masses  of  the  enemy.  For  a 
little  while  they  checked  Cheatham's  advance,  but  he 
outflanked  them  far  on  left  and  on  right.  Still  they 
fought  till  their  foes  dashed  over  the  frail  barricades 
and  were  amongst  them,  and  then  they  broke  to  the 
rear  in  confusion. 

When  I  saw  that  the  two  brigades  were  committed 
to  a  hand  to  hand  fight,  I  sent  a  second  aid  (Captain 
Tracy),  with  reiterated  orders  for  Opdycke's  brigade. 
The  two  officers  were  the  only  ones  who  had  accom 
panied  me  on  my  ride  to  the  left.  I  waited  alone  a 
few  moments  till  I  saw  the  break  of  the  unfortunate 
outpost,  then,  after  a  final  word  with  Henderson  and 
Stiles,  I  mounted  and  galloped  back  toward  the  centre. 
I  had  meant  to  time  my  ride  so  that  I  should  reach 
the  centre  before  Wagner's  men,  but  was  delayed  a 
little  by  an  incident  not  unlikely  to  occur  upon  a 
battle-field.  The  artillery  fire  on  our  left  and  in  Fort 
Granger  had  opened  rapidly  when  the  enemy's  lines 
rose  into  view,  and,  as  I  passed  behind  the  line  (already 
firing)  near  the  Lewisburg  Turnpike,  one  of  the  en 
emy's  shells,  bursting  close  by,  had  frightened  the 
horses  attached  to  a  gun  limber,  and  the  runaway  team 
of  six  animals  dashed  by  in  the  drifting  smoke.  This 
with  the  din  of  the  discharges  so  scared  my  horse  that 
he  commenced  rearing  and  plunging  violently.  He 
kept  this  up  till,  finding  that  I  was  making  little 

1  See  Captain  Marshall's  Report,  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  331.  Also 
report  of  Captain  Bridges,  Chief  of  Artillery,  Fourth  Corps,  Id., 
p.  321. 


The  Assault  on  Wagner  s  Outpost  97 

headway,  I  dismounted,  and,  holding  him  by  the  head, 
succeeded  in  quieting  him  by  rubbing  his  nose  and 
ears.  Remounting,  I  went  on  my  way  ;  but  a  half- 
minute  perhaps  had  been  lost.  When  I  came  near 
the  cotton-gin  in  Reilly's  line,  his  reserve  was  just 
rising  to  the  charge.1  Seeing  that  these  troops  were 
going  gallantly  forward,  I  continued  on  toward  the 
Columbia  Turnpike.  A  glance  showed  that  a  break  in 
the  line  had  occurred  there,  and  a  crowd  of  men  in  the 
road  was  just  passing  out  of  sight  among  the  nearest 
houses  of  the  village.  Between  me  and  the  Carter 
house  a  good  many  fugitives  were  still  running  to  the 
rear,  and  some  Confederates  were  advancing ;  but 
at  that  moment  Opdycke's  left  regiments  deployed 
from  column  into  line  across  the  road,  between  the 
crowd  hastening  into  the  village  and  the  enemy  who 
were  trying  to  reform  inside  our  works  for  a  new  ad 
vance.  The  Confederates  were  apparently  hesitating 
to. .leave  the  cover  of  the  breastworks  and  retrench 
ment,  for  the  quick  and  stout  rally  on  Reilly's  line 
drove  back  their  men  who  had  got  over  our  works 
west  of  the  cotton-gin.  The  Carter  house  and  out 
houses  prevented  any  charge  by  them  in  continuous 
line,  and  the  splendid  appearance  of  Opdycke's  bri 
gade  deploying  at  double  quick  showed  that  the  way 
was  not  open  to  them,  though  they  had  possession  of 
our  works  to  the  extent  of  a  brigade  front.  I  could 
not  see  what  was  going  on  behind  the  Carter  buildings, 
but  the  roar  of  the  fight  from  that  direction  showed 
that  only  the  left  of  Ruger's  division  had  given  back. 

1  See  Captain  Speed's  description  of  the  situation  at  this  time,  in 
his  paper  before  referred  to.  Ohio  Loyal  Legion  Papers,  vol.  iii.  p.  44. 
Captain  Speed  was  then  adjutant  of  the  12th  Kentucky  Infantry  in 
Reilly's  second  line,  and  speaks  as  an  eyewitness.  He  is  nephew  of 
Mr.  Speed,  Attorney  General  of  the  United  States,  and  is  now  the  clerk 
of  the  United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts  at  Louisville,  Ky. 


98  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Strickland's  men  were  holding  the  buildings  them 
selves,  and  a  fierce  fight  was  going  on  about  them. 

Changing  my  direction  toward  Opdycke's  brigade,  I 
passed  the  flank  of  his  advancing  line,  and  on  the 
turnpike,  urging  his  brave  men  to  redoubled  exertion, 
I  joined  Colonel  Opdycke  himself,  and  with  him  Gen 
eral  Stanley  and  Captain  Tracy.  The  latter  was  the 
aid-de-camp  whom  1  had  sent  witli  the  last  order 
for  Opdycke.  Stanley,1  as  we  learn  from  himself,  had 
come  to  the  front  only  a  moment  before,  and  just  as 
Opdycke's  men  were  rising  to  their  feet  and  preparing 
to  deploy.  There  was  no  time  for  conference  or  ques 
tioning.  Every  officer  was  fully  employed  rallying 
the  disordered  lines  and  cheering  forward  the  advan 
cing  brigade.  The  scene  was  a  startling  one.  The 
enemy  filled  the  spaces  about  the  Carter  house,  and 
were  trying  to  form  upon  the  turnpike  in  front  of  the 
buildings.  They  had  possession  of  the  cannon  on  both 
sides  of  the  road,  and  sought  to  turn  them  upon  us. 
They  held  in  their  hands  a  number  of  our  men  pris 
oners,  but  had  not  time  to  send  them  all  to  the  rear.2 
As  Opdycke's  line  charged  forward,  the  roar  of  mus 
ketry  on  right  and  left  and  front  was  deafening, 
so  deafening  as  to  produce  the  effect  of  dumb  show. 
The  men  looked  as  if  breasting  a  furious  gale  with 
strained  muscles  and  set  teeth.  Hood,  who  had 
ordered  Cheatham  and  Stewart  "  to  drive  the  enemy 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  116.     See  Appendix  D. 

2  Long  afterward,  an  intelligent  soldier  of  the  100th  Ohio  told  me 
in  graphic  language  how  he  was  captured  at  the  breastworks  close  to 
the  cannon  on  the  left  of  the  road.     He  had  stayed  in  his  place  till  he 
was  run  over  by  our  men  retreating  from  the  front,  and  the  enemy  fol 
lowed  so  close  that  he  could  not  get  away.     He  saw  the  efforts  to  turn 
the  guns  so  as  to  rake  Reilly's  line,  but  while  they  were  looking  for 
primers  our  second  line  and  reserve  were  upon  them  and  he  was  again 
free. 


The  Assault  on  Wagners  Outpost  99 

from  his  position  into  the  river  at  all  hazards,"  now 
heard  the  fearful  din  at  his  headquarters  a  mile  and  a 
half  away,  and  his  narrative  shows  how  even  he  was 
impressed  by  it.  "  At  this  moment,"  he  says,  "  re 
sounded  a  concentrated  roar  of  musketry,  which 
recalled  to  me  some  of  the  deadliest  struggles  in 
Virginia,  and  which  now  proclaimed  that  the  posses 
sion  of  Nashville  was  once  more  dependent  upon  the 
fortunes  of  war.  The  conflict  continued  to  rage  with 
intense  fury."  1 

The  distance  from  Rcilly's  reserve  line  to  Op- 
dycke's  had  been  about  a  hundred  and  fifty  yards.2  I 
had  passed  just  in  rear  of  Rousseau's  and  White's  Ken- 
tuckians  and  the  East  Tennesseans  as  they  sprang  for 
ward,  and  now  Opdycke's  brigade  was  coming  forward 
on  their  flank.  The  melee  about  the  Carter  house  was 
desperate  but  short.  Opdycke  was  in  the  thickest  of 
it,  and,  after  he  had  emptied  his  revolver  at  the  enemy, 
he  used  it  clubbed  till  it  was  broken.  Stanley  rode 
close  in  rear  of  the  line,  hat  in  hand,  cheering  them 
on.  The  Confederates  were  driven  back  over  the 
works,  leaving  in  our  hands  their  dead  and  wounded, 
and  a  goodly  number  of  other  prisoners. 

Opdycke's  men  now  held  the  retrenchment  which 
crossed  the  turnpike  just  beyond  the  Carter  house;3 
his  left  regiment  (44th  Illinois)  under  Lieut.  Colonel 
Russell,  was  on  the  left  of  the  road  joining  the  right 
of  Reilly's  command,  and  occupying  the  ground  where 
the  guns  of  the  Kentucky  battery  which  were  retaken 
had  been.4  General  Stanley  now  asked  me  to  look  at 
a  wound  he  had  received,  and  I  saw  that  a  ball  had 

1  Advance  and  Retreat,  pp.  293,  294. 

2  Opdycke's  Report,  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  240. 

3  Ante,  p.  56. 

4  Reilly's  Report,  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  412.      Russell's  Report,  Id., 
p.  24G. 


100  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

raked  across  his  neck,  passing  over  his  shoulder  diago 
nally.  The  holes  in  his  coat  showed  the  place  of  the 
wound,  and  that  it  was  not  very  deep,  but,  as  the  exit 
of  the  ball  was  close  to  the  spine,  I  urged  him  to  have 
surgical  attention  to  it  at  once.  We  noticed  also  that 
his  horse  was  disabled,  and  I  dismounted  my  aid, 
Captain  Tracy,  who  was  riding  one  of  my  horses,  and 
gave  it  to  Stanley,  who  rode  away  toward  the  town. 
When  we  parted  we  were  in  the  middle  of  the  turn 
pike  directly  in  front  of  the  door-yard  of  the  Carter 
house,  where  my  headquarters  had  been  all  day.  This 
position  was  also  in  the  centre  of  my  command.  Ru- 
ger's  division  stretched  near  half  a  mile  to  the  west, 
and  Reilly's  equally  far  to  the  east.  Opdycke's  bri 
gade  was  the  only  organized  body  of  the  Fourth  Corps 
infantry  now  in  this  space,  and  it  was  crowded  to 
gether  so  that  it  and  Strickland's  brigade  only  occu 
pied  the  space  of  one,  except  that  Russell's  regiment, 
as  has  been  stated,  was  on  the  left  of  the  turnpike. 

The  duration  of  time  in  battle  is  judged  so  differ 
ently  by  different  people  that  one  may  well  hesitate  to 
guess  at  it ;  but  it  is  enough  to  say  that  we  were  in 
the  lull  which  followed  the  repulse  of  the  enemy's  first 
assault,  the  first  of  a  considerable  series  of  persistent 
attacks  which  continued  on  into  the  night.  My  own 
opinion  has  been  that  about  fifteen  minutes  had 
elapsed  since  the  beginning  of  Opdycke's  charge. 
Others,  with  equal  opportunity  of  judging,  thought  the 
time  much  shorter  than  this.  Stanley  was  entirely 
alone,  for  he  had  outridden  his  attendants,  or  they  had 
stopped  to  rally  the  crowd  of  fugitives  in  the  streets 
of  the  village.  .Had  any  of  them  been  present,  there 
would  have  been  no  occasion  to  dismount  my  staff 
officer  to  furnish  a  horse  for  the  retiring  general. 
These  things  show  how  brief  must  have  been  the  time 


The  Assault  on  Wagners  Outpost  101 

occupied  in  the  rush  and  the  struggle  to  retake  the 
works.  I  saw  Stanley  ride  away  toward  the  village, 
and  1  saw  him  no  more  till  next  day.  He  returned 
my  horse  to  me  then  at  Nashville.1 

1  The  importance  of  these  details  of  time  and  place  will  appear  later, 
when  I  shall  have  to  discuss  controversies  that  have  arisen  over  them. 
See  chap,  xxi.,  post.  I  also  postpone  the  discussion  of  the  numbers  of 
disorganized  troops  from  Wagner's  division  who  rallied  at  the  works 
and  fought  with  Strickland,  Opdycke,  and  Keilly.  One  of  my  staff 
officers  recollects  seeing  a  mounted  man  meet  General  Stanley  on  his 
way  toward  the  village,  and  go  back  with  him :  whether  such  person 
was  an  officer  or  an  orderly  he  cannot  tell. 


CHAPTER   VII 

THE  FIRST   FIGHT   AT   THE   CENTRE 

Hood's  Advance  retarded  by  the  Outpost  —  His  Right  Wing  farthest 
forward  —  My  Staff  at  the  Carter  House  —  Wagner  also  there  — 
cMecsr.ges,frcm  the  Outpost  —  Wagner's  Replies  —  Marshall's  Guns 
come  in  —  Disorganized  Retreat  of  the  Outpost  —  Wagner's  Efforts 
r"'itof  rally — "Swept  along  to  the  Town — Cannon  in  the  Enemy's 
',*  ilands-^Tjfrt  soon  retaken — Fight  over  the  Batteries — Reilly's 
Second  Line  charges  —  Fight  at  the  Cotton-Gin  —  Destruction 
of  Confederates  —  Heroism  of  their  Officers- --Reilly's  Report  — 
Opdycke's  Formation  for  the  Charge — Position  of  his  Regiments 
—  Of  Strickland's  —  Focus  of  the  Fight  —  Two  Lines  on  Carter 
Hill  — Turn  of  the  Tide. 

I  HAVE  thus  far  followed  the  progress  of  the  battle 
from  my  personal  point  of  view,  telling  what  came 
under  my  own  eye,  and  have  necessarily  omitted 
much  that  had  happened  at  the  centre.  Let  us  go 
back  and  pick  up  the  thread  of  events  that  took  place 
there  whilst  I  was  absent  on  my  ride  to  the  left  of 
the  line. 

The  bold  skirmishing  of  Colonel  Lane's  brigade 
at  Privet  Knob,  assisted  by  the  good  practice  of 
Lieutenant  Mitchell's  section  of  artillery,  had,  from 
the  first  deployment  of  the  enemy,  produced  a  visible 
effect;  and  when  the  two  brigades  of  Conrad  and 
Lane  took  the  position  where  they  made  their  fight, 
the  delay  of  Hood's  advance  in  the  centre  became 
very  noticeable.  The  lines  of  the  two  brigades  mak 
ing  a  wedge  with  the  apex  forward,  the  Confederates 


The  First  Fight  at  the  Centre  103 

showed  a  corresponding  hollow  in  their  formation, 
so  that  when  the  final  break  came  the  enemy  was 
nearer  my  works  than  the  men  of  the  two  brigades.1 
Thus  it  happened  that  Hood's  lines,  especially  on 
our  left,  reached  our  breastworks  almost  as  soon  as 
the  two  brigades  in  front  were  fully  engaged. 

Conrad  says  that  the  enemy  were  actually  repulsed 
for  a  little  while,  and  "fell  back  under  the  crest  of 
a  small  hill  "  in  his  front,  but  quickly  reformed 
and  advanced  again.2  It  was  not  till,  on  this  re 
newed  advance,  Cleburne's  troops  were  actually  over 
the  barricade,  and  fighting  with  clubbed  muskets 
had  occurred,  that  the  rush  to  the  rear  began.3 

Three  or  four  of  my  staff  had  remained  at  the 
Carter  house,  General  Wagner  had  ridden  out  to 
Conrad's  brigade  and  returned,  and  was  now  rest 
ing,  dismounted,  at  the  opening  in  the  works  where 
the  turnpike  passed  through  the  line.  My  division 
engineer  officer,  Captain  Scofield,  was  there,  direct 
ing  some  strengthening  finish  of  the  breastworks, 
and  tells  the  story.4 

"They  remarked  that  the  musketry  firing  was 
becoming  more  rapid,  also  that  from  the  two  guns 

1  Twining  Map,  ante,  p.  45. 

2  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  271.     He  and  Lane  each  report  that  he  fell 
back  only  after  finding  the  other  brigade  was  retreating.      Id.,  pp.  250 
and  271.    Such  conflict  between  reports  is  common  in  similar  circum 
stances.     Their  retreat  needed  no  such  excuse. 

3  Hid.     Conrad  made  a  separate  report  to  the  Adjutant  General  of 
Missouri  for  his  own  regiment,  the  15th  Missouri.     The  two  reports 
supplement  each  other.     See  Report  of  the  Adjutant  General  of  Mis 
souri  for  1864,  p.  92. 

4  Captain  L.  T.  Scofield  of  the  103d  Ohio,  detailed  as  topographer, 
etc.      He  is  a  very  prominent  architect  of  the  city  of  Cleveland,  and  a 
leading  citizen  there.     The  extract  is  from  his  paper  read  before  the 
Ohio  Commandery  of  the  Loyal  Legion,  and  published  in  their  second 
volume  of  "  Sketches  of  War  History,"  pp.  133, 134.    The  paper  is  en 
titled,  "  The  Retreat  from  Pulaski  to  Nashville." 


104  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

in  front.1  By  and  by  a  staff  officer  rode  fast  from 
one  of  the  brigades,  and  reported  to  Wagner,  ex 
citedly,  '  The  enemy  are  forming  in  heavy  columns : 
we  can  see  them  distinctly  in  the  open  timber,  and 
all  along  our  front.'  Wagner  said,  firmly,  '  Stand 
there  and  fight  them,'  and  then,  turning  to  the 
engineer  officer,  said,  4  And  that  stubbed,  curly- 
headed  Dutchman  will  fight  them  too,'  meaning 
one  of  his  brigade  commanders.  '  But,  General,'  the 
officer  (Captain  Scofield)  said,  '  the  orders  are  not  to 
stand,  except  against  cavalry  and  skirmishers,  but 
to  fall  back  behind  the  main  line  if  a  general  engage 
ment  is  threatened. '  In  a  short  time  another  officer 
rode  in  from  the  right  in  great  haste,  and  told 
him  the  rebels  were  advancing  in  heavy  force.  He 
received  the  same  order.  The  officer  added,  '  But 
Hood's  entire  army  is  coming. '  Then  Wagner 
struck  the  ground  with  his  stick,  and  said,  '  Never 
mind,  fight  them. ' ' 

Captain  Scofield  next  describes  vividly  the  appear 
ance  of  the  unfortunate  outpost  and  the  pursuing 
enemy  as  they  surged  into  sight,  with  the  warning 
that  "Hell  had  broke  loose,"  which  was  given  by 
Mitchell's  artillerymen  as  the  section  came  in. 
Then  followed  the  disordered  infantry.  "Through 
the  gap,  at  last,  and  over  the  works  they  came,  with 
Cleburne  and  Brown  hot  after  them.  Wagner  by 
this  time  was  on  his  horse,  riding  backward  and 
facing  the  disorganized  brigades,  trying  as  hard  as 
ever  man  did  to  rally  them.  With  terrible  oaths  he 
called  them  cowards,  and  shook  his  broken  stick  at 
them ;  but  back  they  went  to  the  town,  and  nothing 
could  stop  them. "  2 

1  The  section  of  Marshall's  hattery  that  was  with  Conrad  and  Lane. 

2  In  a  private  letter  (November  30,  IS89),  Captain  Scofield  gave  me 


The  First  Fight  at  the  Centre  105 

Wagner's  objurgations  in  trying  to  rally  his  troops) 
must  not  be  taken  for  his  real  judgment  of  their 
soldierly  character.  They  only  proved  the  heat  of 
his  wrath  over  the  visible  results  of  his  own  mis 
take.  It  is  true  that  the  regiments  had  within  a 
few  days  received  large  numbers  of  fresh  recruits, 
and  this  weakened  their  cohesive  power;  but  they 
had  each  a  large  nucleus  of  veterans,  who  had  proved 
their  admirable  quality  on  every  field  where  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  had  gathered  glory,  from 
Shiloh  to  Atlanta.  Even  in  their  false  position  in 
front  of  our  main  lines,  they  had  stood  their  ground 
till  Cheatham's  corps  had  nearly  enveloped  them. 
If  any  fault  were  to  be  found,  it  would  rather  be  for 
an  excess  of  stubborn  courage  when  they  knew  that 
"  Some  one  had  blundered."  Once  broken,  arid  mili 
tary  organization  lost,  a  brigade  becomes  a  mere 
crowd.  A  rout  is  then  pretty  sure  to  become 
panicky,  and  the  dictate  of  sound  judgment  is  that 
their  officers  should  reform  them  at  some  place  in 
the  rear,  out  of  the  fire,  where  their  organization  can 
be  restored ;  for  until  then  they  cannot  be  handled 
for  any  military  purpose.  The  cover  for  them  in 
reorganizing  must  be  found  in  reserves  that  are  in 
unbroken  array  and  can  be  manoeuvred  by  the  tac 
tical  words  of  command.  This  was  the  task  of 

other  details  of  this  scene,  as  follows  :  "General  Wagner  was  on  his 
horse  directly  in  front  of  the  Carter  house,  and  was  making  super 
human  efforts  to  check  his  men.  His  horse  was  backing-  against  his 
will,  crowded  to  the  rear  by  the  surging  mass  of  his  own  soldiers,  who 
were  pressing  against  him  in  great  numbers.  .  .  .  While  the  great 
mass  of  the  men  took  to  the  pike  after  getting  over  the  earthworks,  a 
great  many  were  crowding  along  in  the  open  ground  east  of  the  pike. 
I  saw  a  chance  there  to  help  a  little  in  checking  the  retreat,  and  left 
Wagner's  side  to  do  so.  I  did  not  see  him  again,  only  as  he  drifted 
out  of  sight  with  his  men  toward  the  town.  ...  I  know  that  General 
Wagner  did  not  return  to  our  lines  during  daylight." 


106  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Opdycke's  brigade,  lying  in  column  on  the  right  of 
the  road,  whilst  the  broken  mass  rushed  by,  and 
then  deploying  and  charging  with  a  front  of  steel. 
It  was  the  task  also  of  Reilly's  and  Strickland's 
reserves,  restoring  the  line  near  the  cotton-gin,  and 
making  the  second  line  behind  the  Carter  house  the 
rallying  place  to  repulse  the  enemy.  Numbers  of 
brave  men  in  the  broken  ranks  would  obey  the 
impulse  to  turn  when  they  reached  the  breastworks, 
and  have  a  hand  in  the  repulse  of  the  enemy,  but  it 
would  be  the  plain  duty  of  their  officers  to  collect 
them  for  reorganization  the  moment  the  lines  were 
held  by  the  organized  reserves.  This  was  practi 
cally  what  occurred  in  the  present  instance.  Wag 
ner,  with  his  principal  subordinates,  stopped  the 
retreating  mass  in  the  town,  and,  establishing  their 
place  of  reorganization,  near  the  river,  where  there 
was  room  for  the  purpose,  gradually  brought  into 
shape  the  disordered  regiments,  sending  officers  to 
collect  and  bring  to  the  colors  their  scattered  men.1 

The  statement  of  Captain  Scofield  in  regard  to 
the  orders  sent  back  by  Wagner  through  the  messen 
gers  that  came  from  his  brigades  is  so  completely 
in  accord  with  the  official  reports  of  Conrad  and 
Lane  that  further  corroborate  on  is  hardly  necessary. 
One  of  these  messages  was  delivered  to  Wagner  in 
the  presence  of  Captain  Theodore  Cox,  my  Adjutant 
General,  and  he,  with  Lieutenant  D.  C.  Bradley,  one 
of  my  aids,  also  remonstrated  with  Wagner  for  send 
ing  back  orders  to  fight  Hood's  army  advancing  in 
force.  Wagner's  excited  persistence  in  his  order 
was  his  only  reply.2  The  messenger  himself  has 

1  The  details  of   the  evidence  establishing  this  will  be  given  in 
chap,  xix.,  post. 

2  Captain  Cox's  statement  was  prepared  when  I  was  collecting  ma- 


The  First  Fight  at  the  Centre  107 

written  his  account  of  what  occurred.  Conrad  and 
his  brigade  had  the  "understanding  that  when  the 
enemy  appeared  in  heavy  force  they  were  to  retire 
inside  of  the  main  line."  When  Hood's  army  ad 
vanced,  Conrad  sent  him  to  report  the  fact.  He 
found  Wagner  at  the  porch  of  the  Carter  house,  and 
made  his  report.  "  General  Wagner  said,  k  Tell 
Colonel  Conrad  that  the  second  division  can  whip 
till  Hell,  and  for  him  to  hold  his  position  ' ;  which 
I  reported  to  Colonel  Conrad,  and  the  Colonel  said, 
'All  right,  he  would  try.'  "  l  It  is  only  fair  toward 
Wagner,  however,  to  note  that  at  the  last  moment 
he  seems  to  have  been  recalled  by  the  remonstrances 
of  my  staff  officers  to  a  consciousness  that  he  was 
committing  an  error,  and  tried  to  modify  his  order. 
Conrad  reports  that,  after  all  the  imperative  direc 
tions  to  hold  his  ground,  "just  as  the  enemy  got 
within  good  musket  range,  a  staff  officer  of  the  gen- 

terial  for  my  volumes  of  campaign  history  in  the  "  Scribner's  Series," 
already  referred  to.  As  it  contains  matter  pertinent  to  several  inci 
dents  of  the  battle,  it  is  given  in  full  in  Appendix  F.  My  brother 
became  the  Adjutant  General  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  with  rank  of 
Lieutenant  Colonel,  and  was  my  Chief  of  Staff.  After  the  close  of  the 
war  he  returned  to  civil  life,  and  when  he  died  was  Secretary  and 
Treasurer  of  the  Little  Miami  Railroad  Company. 

1  The  messenger,  Mr.  T.  C.  Gregg,  who  was  taken  for  a  staff  officer, 
was  in  fact  the  regular  orderly  at  the  brigade  headquarters,  who  had 
served  with  General  Bradley  till  he  was  wounded  at  Spring  Hill,  and 
then  with  Colonel  Conrad.  He  had  been  with  General  Sheridan  at 
Stone's  River,  was  twice  wounded  at  Chickamauga,  and  left  on  the 
field.  Taken  by  the  enemy,  he  was  sent  to  Richmond,  and  after  a  time 
was  exchanged.  He  returned  to  his  regiment  (51st  Illinois)  in  time  to 
take  part  in  the  assault  on  Kennesaw  Mountain  and  in  the  rest  of  the 
Atlanta  campaign.  After  the  war  he  became  a  Justice  of  the  Peace, 
Clerk  of  the  District  Court  of  Calhoun  County,  Iowa,  and  finally 
Mayor  of  Rocklaud  City,  —  a  career  that  shows  the  good  stuff  there 
was  in  the  ranks.  Hearing  of  him  accidentally,  I  asked  Mr.  Gregg 
for  his  knowledge  of  the  facts,  and  he  sent  me  his  pithy  statement  in 
reply. 


108  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

eral  commanding  the  division  rode  up  and  said  that 
the  general  ordered  that,  if  the  enemy  came  on  me 
too  strong  and  in  such  force  as  to  overpower  me,  I 
should  retire  my  line  to  the  rear  of  the  main  line  of 
works ;  .  .  .  but  as  the  enemy  was  so  close  to  me, 
and  as  one  half  of  my  men  were  recruits  and  drafted 
men,  and  knowing  that  if  I  then  retired  my  lines  my 
men  would  become  very  unsteady  and  confused,  and 
perhaps  panic-stricken,  I  concluded  to  fight  on  the 
line  where  I  then  was.  So  I  ordered  the  men  to 
commence  firing. " 1 

Two  batteries  of  artillery  had  been  kept  in  reserve 
near  the  Carter  place,  and,  just  before  the  battle 
opened,  Captain  Bridges  placed  his  own  battery 
(Illinois  Light  Artillery)  on  the  right  of  the  turn 
pike,  near  the  middle  of  Strickland's  brigade  line. 
One  section  of  Battery  A,  1st  Ohio,  was  sent  to  rein 
force  the  20th  Ohio  Battery,  just  west  of  the  Carter 
house,  in  the  e*paulement  there,  and  Lieutenant  Sco- 
vill  of  the  former  was  directed  to  take  command  of 
all  six  guns,  as  the  only  officer  with  the  20th  was  a 
junior  lieutenant,  Mr.  Burdick.2  The  other  section 
of  ScovilPs  battery  was  placed  close  to  the  turnpike 
on  the  left,  to  rake  the  road  if  the  enemy  should 
break  through. 

When  Wagner's  two  brigades  broke  away  from  the 
ridge  in  front  on  which  they  had  been  placed,  the 
1st  Kentucky  Battery,  which  was  at  the  immediate 
left  of  the  opening  in  our  works,  was  of  course 
masked  by  the  crowd  of  fugitives,  and  could  not  be 
put  in  action.  Nothing  is  more  helpless  than  a 
battery  in  such  circumstances.  Ifc  occupies  a  place 
where  infantry  might  possibly  do  something  if  they 

1  O.  E.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  270. 

2  Bridges's  Report,  Id.,  pp.  320,  321. 


The  First  Fight  at  the  Centre  109 

were  there,  but  in  their  absence,  and  unable  itself 
to  fire,  it  only  adds  to  the  width  of  the  open  door 
through  which  our  broken  brigades  and  the  enemy 
with  them  could  rush  pell-mell.  The  limbers  and 
caissons  retreated,  but  the  guns  were,  as  we  have 
seen,  in  the  enemy's  hands,  until  the  counter  charge 
of  Reilly's  and  Opdycke's  men  regained  them.  For 
a  little  while  the  guns  were  worked  by  volunteers 
from  Colonel  Russell's  regiment  (that  on  Opdycke's 
left),1  but  the  gunners  were  soon  collected  again,  the 
caissons  brought  up,  and  the  battery  was  steadily 
worked  till  dark,  Jiring  over  a  hundred  rounds.2 
The  enemy  hung  on  stubbornly  for  a  while  to  the 
outside  of  the  breastwork,  but  then  surrendered  and 
came  over  the  works  as  prisoners. 

Lieut.  Colonel  Hayes,  commanding  the  100th  Ohio, 
which  had  been  next  to  the  guns,  tells  us  in  his 
report,  that  the  enemy  swarmed  in  on  the  road,  and 
where  the  battery  was,  taking  his  line  in  flank,  as 
well  as  following  Wagner's  men,  who  trampled  over 
it.3  He  himself  shouted  to  the  fugitives  to  rally  at 
the  rear,  and  his  own  men,  thinking  the  order  was 
meant  for  them,  broke  away;  but  he  says  that  his 
color  sergeant  (Baldwin)  led  the  rally,  and  placed 
the  colors  on  the  works,  though  he  did  it  at  the  cost 
of  his  life.  The  acting  Major  (Captain  Hunt)  was 
also  killed  fighting  at  the  parapet. 

Lieut.  Colonel  White  of  the  16th  Kentucky  led 
his  men  into  the  space  occupied  by  the  battery,  and, 
Colonel  Russell  following  him  close,  the  line  was 
made  at  least  four  deep,  and  their  fire  destroyed  the 
Confederates  who  did  not  seek  a  momentary  protec- 

1  O.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  246. 

2  Thomasson's  Report,  Id.,  p.  326. 

3  Id.,  p.  41 9. 


110  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

tion  in  the  outside  ditch.  In  like  manner  the  8th 
Tennessee  and  the  12th  Kentucky  under  Lieut. 
Colonel  Rousseau  doubled  on  the  line  of  the  104th 
Ohio,  the  right  wing  of  which  had  also  been  borne 
away,  and  the  line  of  Reilly's  brigade  was  made  too 
solid  to  be  shaken  again,  even  for  a  moment.  Rous 
seau  says  he  saw  the  men  leaving  the  works  at  the 
angle  near  the  cotton-gin  when  he  ordered  his  men 
forward,  and  it  is  impossible  to  tell  exactly  where 
the  line  of  the  break  began.1  The  rally  was  so 
prompt,  and  the  rush  forward  was  so  determined, 
that  it  was  but  a  moment  till  every  Confederate 
inside  the  works  was  dead  or  a  prisoner. 

The  section  of  the  6th  Ohio  Battery,  which  was  in 
the  salient  angle  at  the  cotton-gin,  was  never  for  a 
moment  in  the  enemy's  hands.  Lieutenant  Baldwin, 
who  commanded  it,  gives  a  graphic  picture  in  his 
report  of  the  hand  to  hand  conflict  there.2  The 
enemy  tried  hard,  he  says,  to  force  a  passage  at  the 
right  embrasure  of  the  battery.  They  several  times 
got  into  the  embrasure,  pushing  their  guns  through, 
and  firing  upon  the  cannoneers.  "They  were  so 
unpleasantly  close  that  we  had  to  resort  to  the  use 
of  sponge-staves,  axes,  and  picks,  to  drive  them 
back."3 

The  left  of  the  second  line  of  Rcilly's  brigade  had 
been  advanced  before  there  was  any  break  in  front,  and 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  415,  416. 

'2  Id.,  p.  334. 

3  Ibid.  Mr.  Baldwin  adds  :  "  No  less  than  thirteen  stand  of  colors 
were  captured  on  the  battery  front  by  General  Keilly's  brigade,  one  of 
which  by  right  should,  as  a  trophy  of  that  bloody  engagement,  be  in 
the  possession  of  the  battery."  I  sympathize  witli  the  gallant  artillery 
man,  but  no  commands  kept  the  flags  as  trophies.  They  were  sent 
to  Washington.  The  battery  fired  550  rounds  of  ammunition  in  the 
battle. 


The  First  Fight  at  the  Centre  111 

the  line  of  Rousseau's  12th  Kentucky  was  oblique, 
ready  to  dash  upon  the  flank  of  any  force  coming 
over  the  works.  It  charged  in  this  way,  and  min 
gled  in  the  hand  to  hand  light  at  the  parapet,  and 
around  the  battery.  One  of  its  officers  was  seen 
doing  the  work  of  a  cannoneer  in  his  enthusiasm, 
with  foot  and  hand  on  the  spokes  of  the  gun  carriage, 
helping  the  swift  handling  of  it.1  A  Confederate 
soldier  thought  to  hinder  the  loading  of  the  gun  by 
thrusting  a  fence  rail  into  it,  and  only  added  to  the 
destruction  caused  by  the  discharge.  Two  of  the 
companies  of  the  12th  Kentucky  were  armed  with 
revolving  rifles,  and  this  was  just  the  pinch  when 
this  multiplication  of  efficiency  in  the  weapon  told 
with  decisive  effect.  Human  courage  could  not 
endure  the  fire.  An  officer  looking  out  under  the 
smoke  says  the  Confederates  on  the  brink  of  the 
ditch  were  as  thick  as  sheep  in  a  pen,  tumbling 
about  in  a  confused  mass.  Captain  Brown  of  the 
same  regiment  seized  the  flag  and  leaped  to  the 
top  of  the  works,  waving  it,  and  shouting.  Strange 
to  tell,  he  leaped  down  again  unhurt.  Ammunition 
ran  short.  The  Adjutant  rushed  a  detachment  of 
men  down  a  ravine  to  the  left,  where  ammunition 
wagons  were,  and  in  a  few  minutes  they  came  back, 
each  with  a  box  of  cartridges  on  his  shoulder.  As 
these  were  thrown  down,  the  soldiers  fell  upon  them 
with  axes,  and  split  the  covers  off  to  save  time  in 
their  distribution.  The  same  officer,  with  others, 
carried  hatsful  of  the  cartridges  along  the  line. 
What  was  happening  at  this  point  was  going  on 
everywhere ;  the  enthusiasm  and  desperate  courage 
were  the  same.2 

1  From  a  written  statement  of  Captain  Thomas  Speed,  giving  de 
tails  not  included  in  his  printed  article  before  referred  to. 

2  Ibid. 


112  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Colonel  Sterl  of  the  104th  Ohio  reports  with  clear 
ness  the  condition  of  the  front  line,  of  which  it 
formed  the  centre  and  left  in  Reilly's  brigade.  The 
K  salient  in  the  breastworks  near  the  cotton-gin  gave 
an  oblique  lire  in  both  directions,  and  his  three  com 
panies  on  the  left  opened  first  on  the  enemy  advancing 
against  Casement  and  Stiles,  as  Loring's  division 
was  a  little  ahead  of  WalthalPs,  for  reasons  that  will 
presently  appear.1  Almost  immediately,  however, 
the  retreating  brigades  of  Wagner's  division  poured 
over  the  works  from  the  salient  westward.  These 
"had  scarcely  crossed  our  works  until  the  ditches  in 
front  were  filled  with  rebels  scrambling  to  get  over. 
.  .  .  The  confusion  and  hurry  of  the  crossing  of  this 
advance  line,  their  officers  crying  to  them  to  '  get  to 
the  rear  and  reform, '  came  near  throwing  our  line 
into  confusion,  and  the  three  right  companies,  borne 
back  by  them,  and  in  doubt  as  to  the  commands,  fell 
back  a  few  paces,  but,  in  almost  a  moment  after 
ward,  rushed  back  with  fixed  bayonets  and  regained 
their  works."2  He  tells  us  that  our  second  line 
rushed  up  simultaneously  with  them,  and  all  together 
"  kept  up  a  constant  and  destructive  stream  of  fire, 
cutting  down  by  hundreds  the  rebels  who  had  accu 
mulated  and  massed  in  the  ditches  and  immediately 
in  front. " 

Colonel  Rousseau  adds  another  telling  incident, 
which  shows  the  energy  and  heroism  of  the  Con 
federate  officers.  The  hostile  battle-flags  were  on 
our  works,  and  "a  number  of  their  men  had  gained 
the  top  and  fired  down  into  our  ranks.  Even  bayo 
nets  and  clubbed  muskets  were  used. "  When  these 
were  shot  down  or  hurled  back  into  the  ditch,  their 
officers  were  heard  exhorting  the  men  to  stick  to  the 

1  See  chap,  xi.,  post,.  2  Sterl's  Report,  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  421. 


The  First  Fight  at  the  Centre  113 

outside  of  the  parapet,  shouting  that  "  they  had  them, 
if  they  knew  it. "  1 

The  briefer  description  by  General  Reilly  is  in 
close  accord  with  the  consistent  and  clear  details 
given  by  his  subordinates,  lie  speaks  also  with 
praise  of  the  conduct  of  the  175th  Ohio,  a  new  regi 
ment,  only  for  that  day  attached  to  the  brigade,  and 
from  which  we  have  no  formal  report.  They  came 
up  with  the  rest  in  the  crisis  of  the  light,  and  gal 
lantly  shared  with  the  others  the  glory  of  restoring 
and  holding  the  line.  They  had  been  on  their  way 
across  the  river  in  the  afternoon,  when  Lieut.  Colonel 
McCoy,  their  commander,  went  in  person  to  General 
Scholield,  and  begged  permission  for  his  regiment 
to  stay  and  support  the  line.  Reilly,  with  Colonel 
Hayes  and  Colonel  White,  heartily  recognized  the 
help  given  also  by  Colonel  Russell  with  his  44th 
Illinois  of  Opdycke's  brigade,2  who  came  up  "right 
nobly  "  close  to  the  turnpike,  among  the  guns  of  the 
Kentucky  battery,  which,  as  we  have  seen,3  was 
recaptured  and  turned  on  the  enemy.  Anticipating 
the  questions  which  might  be  mooted,  Reilly  closed 
this  part  of  his  report  with  careful  explicitness  by 
saying,  "  that  with  the  exception  of  the  aid  rendered 
by  the  175th  Ohio  Volunteer  Infantry  and  44th 
Illinois  Volunteer  Infantry,  as  herein  stated,  the 
brigade  received  no  assistance  during  the  fight,  un 
less,  perhaps,  some  of  the  men  coming  in  over  the 
works  may  have  rallied  in  or  behind  the  lines."4 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  416. 

2  Reilly's  Report,  Id.,  p.  412.  3  Ante,  p.  109. 

4  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  412.  General  Reilly  retained  command  of 
his  own  brigade,  whilst  also  in  temporary  command  of  the  division. 
His  brigade  report  is  fuller  than  that  for  the  division,  as,  after  writing 
the  first,  circumstances  combined  to  give  him  no  time  to  do  much 
more  than  transmit  the  other  brigade  reports.  Id.,  p.  410.  No  brigade 

8 


114  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

In  gallantly  leading  the  16th  Kentucky  forward, 
Colonel  White  was  severely  wounded  in  the  face, 
but  he  kept  on  without  halting,  and  remained  in 
command  of  his  regiment  till  the  brunt  of  the  fight 
was  over.  He  made  no  mention  of  his  wound  in  his 
official  report.  The  casualties  in  the  brigade  (not 
including  the  175th  Ohio)  were  two  hundred  and 
thirty-two.  Six  officers  and  twenty-seven  men  were 
killed,  seven  officers  and  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
three  men  wounded,  and  one  officer  and  sixty-nine 
men  were  missing.  An  analysis  of  these  casualties 
affords  instructive  evidence  of  the  extent  of  the  break 
under  the  rush  of  the  retreating  brigades  of  Conrad 
and  Lane.  I  postpone  it,  however,  till  we  shall  have 
traced  the  progress  of  the  fight  along  the  whole 
line.1  The  order  of  movement  on  the  part  of  the 
Confederate  divisions  can  also  be  more  intelligently 
considered  a  little  later. 

Whilst  speaking  of  the  fight  near  the  cotton-gin, 
I  may  be  permitted  to  make  special  mention  of  one 
young  hero  who  fell  there,  a  brilliant  type  of  the 
volunteers  who  shed  their  blood  for  the  national 
cause.  Lieutenant  James  Coughlan  of  the  24th  Ken 
tucky  had  been  one  of  my  aids  through  the  cam 
paigns  of  the  year.  Of  humble  birth,  and  in  the 
main  self-educated,  he  developed  military  talents 
of  a  high  order.  His  eye  was  quick,  his  judgment 
clear,  his  courage  indomitable,  his  soldierly  bearing 

commander  bore  a  better  reputation  than  General  Keilly.  He  was  an 
excellent  disciplinarian,  always  with  his  men,  keeping  his  eye  on  every 
thing,  and  leading  them  admirably  in  battle.  He  had  been  promoted 
from  the  colonelcy  of  the  104th  Ohio  for  distinguished  services  as  bri 
gade  commander  in  the  Atlanta  campaign.  After  the  war  he  resumed 
his  profession  as  a  lawyer  and  afterward  a  banker,  and  is  one  of  the 
best  known  citizens  of  eastern  Ohio. 
1  See  chap,  xvi.,  post. 


The  First  Fight  at  the  Centre  115 

inspiring.  His  reports  were  so  true  and  just  that 
he  gave  his  chief  just  the  help  needed  by  one  who 
cannot  be  everywhere,  yet  must  know  what  is  hap 
pening,  lie  had  carried  my  first  order  to  Opdycke 
to  be  ready  to  charge  to  the  front  in  case  of  trouble, 
and  on  his  return  dashed  into  the  thickest  of  the 
melee  with  his  old  comrades  of  Reilly's  brigade, 
conspicuously  cheering  them  on  to  regain  their 
breastworks.  Tie  fell  near  the  cotton-gin  in  the 
moment  of  victory,  and  there  his  fellow  staff  officers 
and  friends  buried  him  in  the  darkness  of  the  night, 
in  the  intervals  of  the  fierce  fighting. 

The  charge  of  Opdycke 's  brigade  was  not  made  in 
a  single  line,  but  as  the  brigade  had  been  lying  in 
reserve  on  the  right  of  the  turnpike  in  column  of 
regiments,  the  leading  regiment  became  the  centre 
in  the  advance,  the  others  taking  ground  to  right 
and  left  in  echelon  on  its  flanks.  This  leading  regi 
ment  was  the  88th  Illinois  (with  which  the  74th  had 
recently  been  consolidated),  and  was  commanded  by 
Lieut.  Colonel  Smith,1  of  whom  Opdycke  says  in  his 
report  that  he  "  was  conspicuous,  even  among  heroes. " 
In  rear  of  Smith,  on  the  left,  were  the  73d  and  44th 
Illinois  respectively,  and  on  the  right  the  24th  Wis 
consin,  125th  Ohio,  and  36th  Illinois.2 

It  is  impossible  to  tell,  from  the  evidence  which 
has  been  preserved,  what  was  the  line  of  march  of 
the  leading  regiment,  though  the  place  of  each,  when 
the  line  in  front  was  restored,  is  definitely  fixed.3 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  241. 

2  Id.,  p.  251.     Opdycke's  report  places  the  24th  "Wisconsin  on  the 
right  of  the  125th  Ohio,  hut  as  the  official  report  of  the  latter  explicitly 
places  it  hetween  the  24th  Wisconsin  and  the  36th  Illinois,  I  follow  this 
order.     In  such  details  the  knowledge  of  the  regimental  commanders 
is  most  immediate. 

3  Ante,  p.  98. 


116  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

We  have  already  found  Russell,  with  his  44th  Illinois, 
among  the  guns  immediately  on  the  left  of  the  turn 
pike.  The  73d  Illinois  reports  that  it  "reached  the 
works  now  upon  the  right  of  the  pike  l  just  in  time 
to  drive  the  enemy  back  and  save  a  battery  which 
had  been  left  without  any  support."  Next  on  the 
right  was  Smith's  consolidated  regiment,  and  beyond 
him  the  24th  Wisconsin.  The  reports  of  these  regi 
ments  speak  of  charging  up  to  works.  Still  farther 
on  the  right  came  the  125th  Ohio,  whose  command 
ant  (Captain  Bates)  reports  that  "two  guns  at  the 
right  of  the  regiment  that  had  been  deserted  by  all 
but  a  single  corporal  were  quickly  brought  into 
action  again,  new  barricades  constructed,  stragglers 
forced  back  to  them,  and  disaster  averted. "  2  Last 
on  the  right  flank  of  the  brigade  came  the  36th 
Illinois. 

The  position  of  the  guns  recaptured  is  conclusive 
proof  as  to  the  positions  taken  up  by  these  regiments. 
The  guns  nearest  the  turnpike  on  the  right  were  the 
20th  Ohio  Battery,  which  had  been  placed  "  just  west 
of  Carter's  house  "  by  my  own  direction,  and  their 
epaulement  was  close  on  the  right  of  the  brick 
smoke-house.3  The  two  guns  farther  west  were  a 
section  of  Bridges's  battery,  which  he  as  chief  of 
artillery  had,  just  before  the  battle  opened,  "placed 
near  the  centre  of  Strickland's  brigade."4  There 
was  no  artillery  beyond  these  guns  till  we  come  to 
the  Pennsylvania  battery  on  the  Carter's  Creek 
Turnpike,  on  the  extreme  right  of  Ruger's  division, 
and  nearly  half  a  mile  away.5 

1  0.  "R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  248.  3  /^  p.  351 

2  It!.,  p.  251.  4  LI.,  pp.  320,  351. 

5  General  linger,  in  his  report  (Id.,  p.  365)  says,  that  lie  placed  a 
section  of  the  20th  Ohio  near  the  right  of  Strickland's  brigade.  The 


The  First  Fight  at  the  Centre  117 

It  thus  becomes  tolerably  clear  that  Opdycke's 
regiments,  going  forward  in  a  wedge-shaped  forma 
tion  by  echelon,  doubled  their  ranks,  and  occupied  a 
little  more  than  the  left  half  of  Strickland's  brigade 
line,  together  with  the  retrenchment  on  the  Columbia 
Turnpike,  the  ditch  along  the  east  side  of  the  road, 
and  some  space  immediately  on  its  left.  To  reach 
their  positions  by  direct  lines  from  the  place  where 
they  lay  in  reserve,  Colonel  Smith  must  have  led 
forward  just  in  rear  of  the  Carter  house,  through  the 
yard,  and  up  to  the  outbuildings.  The  other  regi 
ments  partly  overlapping  him  and  each  other  came 
in  on  right  and  left.  The  house,  of  course,  pre 
vented  an  advance  in  continuous  line,  but  it  also, 
with  the  outbuildings,  had  made  points  of  rallying 
and  stubborn  defence  for  some  of  Strickland's  men 
and  some  of  those  retreating  from  the  front.  The 
troops  on  the  turnpike  had  no  obstructions  in  their 
way,  and  could  move  most  rapidly.  The  break  in 
Keilly's  line  had  been  first  closed  up,  and  from  the 
salient  at  the  cotton-gin  as  well  as  from  the  breast 
works  near,  an  oblique  fire  swept  across  the  road  and 
down  between  the  first  and  second  lines,  making  it 
easier  to  regain  possession  of  the  interior  line  of 
works  beyond  the  outbuildings,  which  had  been  built 
by  the  44th  Missouri,  and  which  Lieut.  Colonel  Barr 
declares  in  his  report  they  never  left. l 

artillery  reports  show  that  this  was  modified  by  Lieut.  Colonel  Scho- 
field  and  Captain  Bridges,  chiefs  of  artillery.  As  the  20th  Ohio  had 
only  one  officer  with  it,  it  was  kept  together,  and  Lieutenant  Scovill  of 
Battery  A,  1st  Ohio,  was  sent  to  command  it.  A  section  of  Captain 
Bridges's  own  battery  was  placed  near  the  centre  of  Strickland's  brigade 
just  before  the  action  opened,  and  about  the  time  of  Bate's  attack  was 
reinforced  by  the  other  section,  and  with  Ziegler's  Pennsylvania  battery 
crossed  fire  on  the  advancing  enemy.  Bridges's  Report,  Id.,  pp.  320, 
321  ;  Scovill's  Report,  Id.,  p.  330;  Sergeant  Horn's  Report,  Id.,  p.  336. 
1  Colonel  Bradshaw  was  very  severely  wounded  in  the  battle,  and 


118  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

In  Strickland's  brigade,  the  50th  Ohio,  which  was 
the  left  of  his  front  line,  was  driven  back  on  the 
Carter  buildings,  and  rallied  with  Opdycke's  men  as 
these  advanced.  The  72d  Illinois,  which  was  the 
right  of  the  same  line,  held  fast  to  the  breastworks 
on  the  extreme  right;  but  the  left  wing  of  the  regi 
ment  was  swept  back,  and  rallied  upon  the  183d 
Ohio,  the  new  regiment  which  was  its  support,  and 
continued  the  second  line  of  breastworks  built  by 
the  44th  Missouri  (as  part  of  Opdycke's  men  were 
also  doing)  by  throwing  together  fence  rails  and  any 
other  material  out  of  which  a  barricade  could  be 
hastily  made.1  The  right  wing  of  the  regiment  was 
ordered  back  by  the  Colonel  to  join  the  left  in  second 
line,2  and  to  them  also  rallied  larger  numbers  of 
men  from  Wagner's  broken  brigades  than  were  found 
elsewhere  in  the  line.3 

All  the  circumstances  show  that  the  gap  west  of 
the  Carter  house  was  longest  open,  and  that  bodies 
of  the  enemy  got  farthest  within  our  lines  there. 
General  Cheatham  says  that  on  the  next  day  they 
found  some  of  the  Confederate  dead  fifty  yards 
within  the  breastwork  at  this  point.4  As  they  ad 
vanced,  however,  they  had  Opdycke's  charging  regi- 

the  report  was  made  by  Lieut.  Colonel  Barr.  His  fullest  statement 
is  in  his  report  to  the  Adjutant  General  of  Missouri  (1865,  p.  276). 
My  references  will  be  to  that  when  I  speak  of  his  report.  See  also 
sketch  map,  p.  43,  ante. 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  354. 

2  Sexton's  Report,  Id.,  p.  393. 

3  Statement  in  writing  by  Captain  Sexton,  who  commanded  the  regi 
ment  after  Lieut.  Colonel  Stockton  and  Major  James  were  wounded. 
I  shall  have  occasion  to  refer  to  this  again  in  estimating  the  number 
of  Conrad's  and  Lane's  men  who  rallied  at  the  line. 

4  Private  letter  to  Colonel  Opdycke,  of  which  I  have  a  copy.     Also 
statement  by  General  Gordon  in  his  memorial  address,  hereafter  men 
tioned.     Sec  chap,  xi.,  post. 


The  First  Fight  at  the  Centre  119 

ments  on  one  side  with  the  44th  Missouri,  and  on 
the  other  the  72d  Illinois  and  183d  Ohio,  crossing 
their  (ire  upon  them,  and  as  they  hesitated  these 
troops  charged  upon  them  and  they  fell  back  in 
confusion  to  the  outer  side  of  the  main  line  of 
breastworks. 

The  retreat  of  Strickland's  men  from  the  main  line 
had  left  the  flank  of  Moore's  brigade  exposed,  but 
Captain  Dowling,  the  brigade  inspector,  gallantly 
led  two  companies  to  the  flank  of  the  brigade  and 
placed  them  in  position  to  sweep  with  their  fire  the 
open  space  between  the  lines.  The  enemy  was  thus 
driven  from  close  proximity  to  Moore's  left,  and  his 
line  never  budged  from  its  position.1 

That  the  focus  of  the  fight  was  around  the  position 
of  the  44th  Missouri,  just  in  rear  of  the  Carter  house, 
is  shown  by  the  list  of  casualties  in  that  regiment, 
which  had  more  men  killed  than  all  the  other  regi 
ments  of  the  brigade.2  The  distance  between  the 
two  lines  at  the  turnpike  was  some  sixty-five  yards, 
growing  less  toward  the  west,3  and  across  this  space 
the  fire  leaped  from  the  muzzles  of  the  rifles  and  of 
the  cannon,  now  hotly  in  action  again.  The  men  in 
and  about  the  Carter  buildings  were  better  covered 
than  the  rest,  though,  from  the  nature  of  the  case, 
they  were  more  broken  in  their  order.  They  fired 
from  the  windows  .of  the  buildings  and  from  every 
opening  or  interspace  that  could  be  used  as  a  loop 
hole.  They  clustered  at  the  corners  and  between  the 
out-buildings,  and  fired  obliquely  from  this  cover. 


1  See  also  chap,  ix.,  post. 

2  Its  losses  were  30  killed,  35  wounded,  and  86  missing,  total  151. 
The  losses  of  the  whole  hrigade  Avere  47  killed,  150  wounded,  and  281 
missing,  total  478.     0.  11.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  368,  369. 

3  Id.,  p.  354. 


120  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

From  both  Reilly's  line  and  Moore's,  oblique  fire 
also  crossed  the  deadly  field,  and  the  balance  of  for 
tune  turned  heavily  against  the  Confederates.  It 
was  not  now  the  case  that  "  they  had  the  works  if 
they  only  knew  it,"  as  their  officers  had  shouted  in 
front  of  Reilly :  the  truth  rather  was  that  they  had 
lost  the  battle  if  they  only  knew  it,  and  it  would 
have  been  wiser  to  have  drawn  off  the  shattered 
battalions.  But  they  did  not  know  it.  The  smoky 
battle-cloud  so  hid  the  field  that  Hood  and  his  corps 
commanders  long  thought  our  lines  were  irretriev 
ably  broken,  and  pushed  forward  their  troops  to 
slaughter. 

With  the  new  establishment  of  a  defensible  line 
at  the  centre,  the  first  step  toward  complete  success 
had  been  well  taken,  and  though  the  lull  which  fol 
lowed  was  to  be  short,  it  will  give  us  time  to  trace 
the  current  of  the  fight  on  either  flank  of  our  posi 
tion  across  the  whole  front  from  river  to  river. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

THE  FIGHT  OF  OUR  LEFT  WING 

Advance  of  Stewart's  Corps  —  The  narrowing  Field  —  Thorny  Hedges 
—  Changes  in  the  Array  —  Walthall's  Report — Loring's  Division 
strikes  Stiles  —  Fighting  in  the  Railway  Cut  —  Batteries  at  Close 
Range  —  Loring  Repulsed  —  The  Attack  on  Casement  —  General 
Adams's  Death  —  Our  Line  successfully  held. 

I  HAVE  already  described  the  manner  in  which  the 
centre  of  Hood's  line  of  battle  was  momentarily 
checked  by  the  fire  of  Conrad's  and  Lane's  brigades 
at  their  outpost,  and  how  the  enemy's  wings  swung 
forward.1  It  thus  happened  that  the  fierce  attack 
on  our  works  fell  first  on  Stiles's  and  Casement's 
brigades  in  Reilly's  division;  for  Wagner's  two  hap 
less  brigades  were  nearly  half  a  mile  in  front,  and 
their  useless  struggle  gave  time  for  Stewart's  corps 
to  outmarch  Cheatham's.  We  have  followed  also 
the  fate  of  Wagner's  men  as  the  natural  key  to  the 
events  of  the  battle  till  the  imminent  peril  at  our 
centre  was  passed. 

It  would  have  been  more  in  accord  with  the  actual 
order  of  events  if  we  had  begun  our  examination  of 
the  history  of  the  battle  at  our  extreme  left,  in  Stiles's 
brigade;  for  it  was  there  that  Hood's  infantry  first 
struck  our  main  line.  But  the  connection  of  cause 
and  effect  is,  in  this  case,  more  important  than  the 
sequence  of  the  hours.  The  position  assumed  by 

1  Ante,  p.  103. 


122  The  Batik  of  Franklin 

Wagner  as  an  outpost  gave  its  peculiar  character  to 
the  battle,  and  its  detailed  progress  on  other  parts  of 
the  iield  could  only  be  properly  understood  when  we 
had  seen  the  results  of  the  Confederate  attack  upon 
the  two  brigades,  whose  rout  seemed  to  open  the  way 
into  the  heart  of  our  position. 

We  may  now  go  back  and  trace  the  progress  of  the 
attack  upon  our  two  wings  in  succession:  first  upon 
Stiles's  and  Casement's  brigades  in  Reilly's  division, 
and  then  upon  Moore's  brigade  of  Ruger's  division, 
lapping  upon  Kimball's  division  where  Chalmers's 
Confederate  cavalry  extended  the  enemy's  efforts  to 
our  extreme  right  flank.  On  these  parts  of  the  line 
was  fairly  tested  the  ability  of  the  Southern  army 
to  carry  such  fieldworks  as  ours  by  an  assault  over 
open  ground,  without  the  advantage  of  following 
close  behind  a  broken  and  retreating  body  of  our 
own  men.  The  result  was  not  encouraging  to  such 
attacks. 

The  formation  of  the  Confederate  corps  under 
Stewart  was,  as  we  have  seen,1  a  line  of  battle  of 
three  divisions,  each  division  formed  of  two  brigades 
in  front  with  the  third  brigade  marching  in  reserve. 
The  exception  was  his  left  division  under  French, 
which  was  formed  with  one  brigade  in  front  and 
one  in  second  line,  the  third  brigade  (Ector's)  being 
absent,  guarding  the  pontoon  train.2  The  right  of 
the  corps  was  near  the  Harpeth  River,  which  here 
ran  northwestward  till  it  reached  the  flank  of  our 
works.  The  width  of  the  field  of  battle  contracted 
rapidly  as  Stewart  advanced,  and  it  had,  besides, 
several  obstacles  which  were  not  visible  at  a  dis 
tance,  or  did  not  seem  formidable  till  one  was  upon 
them.  Of  these  the  chief  was  a  field  which  had  been 

1  Ante,  p.  87.  2  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  708. 


The  Fight  of  Oar  Left   Wing  123 

surrounded  by  the  quickset  hedge  of  Osagc  orange, 
of  which  mention  lias  already  been  made.1 

Walthall's  division  was  the  central  one,  and  lie 
alone  made  any  full  report  of  the  engagement,  so  far 
as  the  official  records  show.2  lie  describes  with 
clearness  how  the  thicket  and  hedge  on  the  farther 
side  of  the  great  field  through  which  he  advanced 
made  it  necessary  for  his  left  brigade  (Reynolds's) 
to  get  around  it  by  taking  ground  to  the  left,  and 
on  passing  it  Reynolds  was  not  able  to  get  back  to 
his  place  in  line.  Walthall  therefore  brought  up 
Shelley's  brigade,  which  was  in  reserve,  and  put  it 
in  the  gap.  A  short  halt  was  made  to  reform,  and 
then  the  command  to  charge  was  given.  As  the 
Confederates  of  this  wing  were  guiding  by  the  right 
flank  and  along  the  river  bank,  both  Loring  and 
Walthall  had  to  take  ground  to  their  left  as  they 
advanced,  and  this  brought  Walthall  in  front  of 
Cleburne,  delayed  as  the  latter  was  by  the  resistance 
of  Wagner's  men.  Walthall's  left  seems  to  have 
run  over  part  of  the  outpost  line  held  by  Conrad,  or 
to  have  gone  so  near  to  it  that  he  speaks  as  if  he  had 
had  a  part  in  routing  it.3 

It  was  Loring's  division,  therefore,  with  the  right  * 
of  Walt-hall's,  that  fell  upon  Stiles  and  Casement. 
As  soon  as  the  enemy's  line  came  up  into  view  upon 
the.  open  plain  in  front,  it  was  opened  upon  by  the 
two  batteries  on  the  knoll  at  our  left,  as  well  as  by 
one  which  had  been  placed  in  Fort  Granger.4  Stiles's 

1  Ante,  p.  53.  2  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  720.  3  Ibid. 

4  This  was  Battery  D,  1st  Ohio  Light  Artillery,  composed  of  3-inch 
rifled  ordnance  guns.  It  was  admirably  adapted  for  this  long  range 
work,  and  was  under  the  eye  of  Captain  Cockerill,  who  was  also  Chief  of 
Artillery  of  my  division.  It  expended  I  GO  rounds  of  shell  and  three 
rounds  of  case-shot  in  assisting  to  repel  this  attack  of  Loring  upon 
Stiles.  See  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  432. 


124  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

left  regiment  (120th  Indiana)  was  sharply  recurved 
along  the  railway  cut,  which  was  quite  deep,  and  the 
regiment  was  exposed  to  an  enfilading  fire  of  both 
cannon  and  small  arms,  but  held  its  place  firmly. 
The  centre  of  the  brigade  was  covered  by  the  thorny 
hedge  parallel  to  the  front,  and  the  enemy,  charging 
up  to  this,  was  dismayed  and  exasperated  at  finding 
it  impassable,  whilst  the  small  tough  trunks  of  the 
trees,  thinned  out  as  they  had  been,  did  not  protect 
them  from  the  destructive  fire  of  Stiles's  line.1  On 
the  right  of  the  brigade  the  first  assault  of  Loring's 
men  met  a  bloody  repulse.  His  second  line  soon 
came  on  and  reached  the  works  in  front  of  the  128th 
Indiana.  They  planted  their  colors  on  the  parapet, 
and  some  climbed  over  the  works.  The  color  bearer 
was  shot  down,  and  the  men  who  had  got  over  were 
made  prisoners.  The  obstinacy  of  the  Confederates 
was  met  by  an  equal  pertinacity  of  courage,  and  the 
assault  was  repulsed.2  Then  the  rebel  officers  made 
strenuous  efforts  to  press  their  men  to  their  right, 
and  to  get  between  the  river  and  our  left.  "  They 
were  heard  to  exclaim,  '  Soldiers,  as  you  love  your 
country,  press  to  the  right !  press  to  the  right ! '  But 
the  terrific  and  well  directed  fire  of  the  battery  of 
regulars  (M,  4th  U.  S.  A.)  and  the  musketry  fire  of 
the  brigade  kept  them  in  check."3 

1  The  hedges  perpendicular  to  the  front  had  been  cut  away  to  extend 
an  abattis  toward  the  turnpike,  and  the  farther  one,  across  the  great 
field,  was  that  which  had  disarranged  the  advance  of  Walthall. 

2  Stiles's  Keport,  O.  11.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  430. 

3  From  the  statement  of  Colonel  Henderson  Avhich  I  have  more  fully 
mentioned  in  chap,  x.,  post.     To  explain  Colonel  Henderson's  position 
it  should  be  understood  that  he  had  been  seriously  ill,  but  had  remained 
with  the  brigade,  though  Colonel  Stiles  of  the  63d  Indiana  was  tem 
porarily  assigned  to  the  command.    This  condition  of  things  had  lasted 
for  several  days ;  yet  at  Franklin  lie  could  not  stay  away  from  the  front, 
and,  Aveak  as  he  was,  was  on  the   line.     Technically,  Colonel  Stiles 


The  Fight  of  Our  Left  Wing  125 

The  regular  battery  (Lieutenant  Samuel  Canby  in 
command)  swept  the  field  in  front  of  the  brigade  till 
the  enemy  were  close  to  the  works,  and  then  its 
right  section  was  placed  on  the  left  of  the  left  sec 
tion,  where  it  could  enfilade  the  railroad  cut  in  front 
of  Colonel  Prathcr's  regiment  (120th  Indiana)  as 
well  as  the  river  bank.  Colonel  Henderson  says, 
"The  battery  of  regulars  behaved  so  gallantly  that 
my  admiration  was  excited."  It  did  most  effective 
service.1  But  Canby 's  battery  was  not  alone  on  the 
left  flank.  When  Mitchell's  section  of  Battery  G, 
1st  Ohio,  came  within  our  works  at  the  centre,  it 
joined  the  rest  of  the  battery,  and  Captain  Marshall 
was  sent  to  reinforce  the  left,  near  the  railroad,  just 
as  the  attack  on  Stiles 's  brigade  was  fully  developed. 
He  carried  still  further  the  extension  of  artillery  to 
the  left,  which  Canby  had  made  by  the  transfer  of 
his  right  section,  and  opened  with  canister,  enfilad 
ing  the  railroad  in  front  of  the  original  position  of 
the  regular  battery.  He  tells  us  that  the  enemy 
were  there  in  strong  force,  and  coming  up  to  our 
works  on  their  hands  and  knees.2  The  rifled  guns 
in  Fort  Granger,  across  the  river,  were  also  in  rapid 
action,  and  the  sharp,  continuous,  grinding  rattle  of 
the  musketry  combined  with  the  cannon  roar  to  tell 
why  it  was  that  Scott's  and  Featherston's  brigades 
of  Loring's  division  had  so  terrible  a  list  of  casual- 
remained  in  command,  but  Henderson  gave  assistance  in  everything 
as  he  was  able,  and  the  cordial  good  understanding  between  the  two 
officers  gave  the  brigade  the  benefit  of  the  skill  and  courage  of 
both. 

1  I  take  the  more  pleasure  in  quoting  Colonel  Henderson's  praise 
because  Lieutenant  Canby 's  official  report  is  a  very  brief  and  modest 
statement  of  the  battery's  part  in  the  action.     See  O.  K  ,  xlv.  part  i. 
p.  338. 

2  O.  R,,  xlv.  parti,  p.  331. 


126  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

ties.1  The  fight  here  was  bitter  and  stubborn.  It 
is  difficult  to  determine  how  long  it  lasted.  The 
^  enemy's  reserves  renewed  the  action  at  least  twice, 
but  at  last  they  gave  it  up,  and  those  who  could  get 
away  straggled  back  to  the  hollows  in  front  to  re 
form.  Numbers  surrendered  in  the  ditch,  and  came 
over  the  works  as  prisoners.  Others  lay  flat  along 
(:  the  ground  in  front  of  the  hedge,  and  waited  for 
darkness  to  cover  their  retreat.  At  the  end  of  an 
hour  from  the  opening  of  the  fight,  Stilcs's  front 
was  clear  of  aggressive  bodies  of  the  enemy,  arid  in 
the  dusk  of  the  early  evening  a  skirmish  line  was 
advanced,  and  kept  out  till  the  line  was  withdrawn 
at  midnight.  During  the  advance  of  Loring's  divis 
ion,  Guibor's  Confederate  battery  had  hotly  engaged 
our  artillery  at  the  extreme  left,  and  had  made  the 
position  of  the  120th  Indiana,  formed  as  it  was  en 
potence,  facing  the  east,  a  most  trying  one.  When, 
however,  the  contest  of  the  infantry  became  close, 
the  enemy's  guns  were  withdrawn  from  the  range 
of  Fort  Granger. 

The  fighting  on  the  line  of  Casement's  brigade 
was  similar  to  that  upon  Stiles 's  front,  but  as  the 
line  itself  was  straighter,  and  had  no  recurved  flanks, 
the  contest  was  more  even,  one  regiment  being  no 
more  exposed  than  another.  So  also  no  part  of 
Casement's  line  had  any  advantage,  such  as  the 
tough  standing  hedge  gave  to  Stiles's  centre.  The 
whole  brigade  front  was  covered  with  the  light  abattis 
made  from  the  hedge  material,  but  this  was  not 
pinned  down,  and  was  more  a  show  of  obstruction 
to  the  enemy  than  a  reality.  The  flanking  company 
of  the  65th  Indiana  (which  was  the  extreme  right  of 

1  Loring  officially  reported  an  aggregate  of  876  casualties  in  his 
division.  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  715. 


The  Fiyht  of  Our  Left   Winy  12J 

the  brigade)  was  armed  with  repeating  rifles."*  The 
head -logs  on  the  parapet  were  perhaps  more  contin 
uous  than  in  some  other  brigades  in  the  line,  but  the 
chief  advantage  of  Casement's  position  was  that  it 
had  clear  range  in  front,  and  \vas  just  beyond  the 
disturbing  influence  of  the  rush  of  routed  men  from 
the  outpost. 

No  officer  of  the  division  had  a  stronger  personal 
influence  on  his  men  than  Casement.  At  once 
impetuous  and  clear-headed,  he  was  everywhere 
present,  his  ringing  voice  heard  above  the  din.  His 
men  were  well  in  hand,  and  opened  fire  as  soon  as 
the  enemy  came  within  reach  of  their  rifle  balls.  It 
was  probably  the  left  wing  of  Fcatherston's  brigade 
which  first  struck  this  part  of  our  line.  The  struggle 
was  sharp,  but  the  attack  was  repulsed.  The  Con 
federates  reformed  and  tried  it  again,  but  again 
and  still  again  they  were  driven  back,  leaving  the 
ground  covered  with  their  dead  and  wounded.  Case 
ment  reported  that  "the  firing  was  kept  up  with 
great  vigor  until  dark,  during  which  time  the  enemy 
made  several  distinct  charges,  but  were  repulsed 
each  time  with  terrible  slaughter. "  2 

In  one  of  the  lulls  between  these  attacks,  when 
the  smoke  was  so  thick  that  one  could  see  a  very 
little  way  in  front,  the  officers  of  the  line  seized  the 
opportunity  to  look  over  the  parapet,  the  better  to 
learn  the  situation.  The  enemy's  line  was  dimly 
seen,  and  a  mounted  officer  in  front  of  them,  upon 
a  fractious  horse,  either  forming  them  for  a  fresh 

1  It  was  only  toward  the  close  of  the  war  that  repeating  and  breech- 
loading  arms  were  issued,  and  at  first  in  so  small  numbers  that  only  a 
company  here  and  there  was  supplied  with  them.     In  such  cases  the 
company  was  the  ranking  company  of  the  regiment,  which  stood  on  its 
right. 

2  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  425. 


128  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

assault  or  rallying  them  after  the  last  repulse. 
Several  shots  were  fired,  and  horse  and  rider  both 
fell.  Presently  the  horse  struggled  to  his  feet,  and 
dashed  wildly  forward,  straight  for  the  breastwork, 
leaped  upon  it,  and  fell  dead  astride  of  it.  The 
officer,  shot  through  the  thighs,  tried  to  crawl  away. 
Casement,  who  was  at  the  moment  at  the  extreme 
right  of  his  brigade,  shouted  to  him  to  come  in  and 
save  his  life;  but  he  kept  on,  probably  not  hearing 
the  well  meant  advice  in  the  horrid  noise,  and  flying 
shots  pierced  him  again.  He  lay  helpless  till,  the 
repulse  of  his  command  being  complete  and  dark 
ness  coming  on,  Casement  ordered  forward  a  skir 
mish  line  to  cover  his  front.  The  wounded  officer 
was  General  John  Adams,  whose  brigade  was  the 
left  of  Loring's  division.  He  was  brought  in  still 
living,  and  immediate  surgical  care  was  given  him; 
but  his  condition  was  past  help,  and  he  soon  died.1 

The  incident  has  historical  importance,  as  fixing 
Adams's  place  nearly  opposite  the  right  of  Casement's 
brigade,  and  showing  that  he  probably  came  up  as  a 
reserve  behind  WalthalPs  right.  Four  Confederate 
brigades  thus  attacked  two  of  ours,  and  our  line 
was  shortened  by  having  two  regiments  in  reserve. 
Neither  in  Stiles's  brigade  nor  in  Casement's  was 
there  any  need  to  call  upon  the  reserves.  Those  of 
the  Confederates  were  all  brought  into  action,  and 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  353.  In  my  official  report  I  followed  the 
account  first  circulated,  which  was  that  General  Adams  mounted  the 
parapet  in  a  charge,  and  fell  there.  I  was  set  right  in  this  matter  by 
written  statements  of  General  Casement  and  of  Captain  Ilornbrook  of 
the  65th  Indiana,  made  independently  and  in  substantial  accord.  Ad 
ams's  saddle  with  the  bullet  holes  in  the  flaps  was  long  a  relic  in  Gen 
eral  Casement's  possession.  His  watch  and  other  valuables  were  sent 
to  his  family  under  a  flag  of  truce,  in  our  North  Carolina  campaign  in 
the  next  spring. 


The  Fight  of  Our  Left  Wing  129 

the  short  line  which  they  attacked  made  their  flanks 
lap  upon  each  other.  In  this  way  was  produced  the 
effect  of  an  attack  in  columns  several  lines  deep, 
which  was  the  description  of  the  attack  universally 
given  by  our  officers  and  men.  The  front  line,  when 
repulsed,  rallied  on  its  supports,  and  the  efforts  to 
storm  the  intrcnchmcnts  were  thus  renewed  re 
peatedly  as  long  as  daylight  lasted.  Casement's 
losses  were  slight,  and  he  touches  the  true  cause  of 
this  when  he  says  in  his  report,  "  Not  a  man  left  the 
works  unless  ordered  to  do  so,  which  accounts  for 
the  small  loss. "  l  The  experience  of  the  brigade 
goes  far  to  prove  that,  even  with  muzzle-loading  rifles 
such  as  our  troops  were  then  armed  with,  the  pro 
tection  of  fairly  good  earthworks  is  sufficient  to 
enable  the  line  formed  in  two  ranks  to  cripple  so 
seriously  an  enemy  twice  as  strong,  that  his  aggres 
sive  impetus  is  lost,  and  his  attack  fails  when  made 
over  open  ground.  And  this  was  done  with  a  loss 
to  the  defenders  scarcely  worth  mentioning.2 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  425. 

2  The  same  lesson  was  taught  at  Cold  Harbor  in  Virginia,  where 
the  sides  were  reversed.     Casement's  casualties  in  the  brigade  were 
only  nineteen.     O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  411.     Those  of  Loriug's  division 
have  been  mentioned  above,  p.  126. 


CHAPTER    IX 

THE  FIGHT   OF  OUR  RIGHT   WING 

Cheatham's  Corps  —  Convergent  Attack  of  Clelmrno  and  Brown  — 
Line  of  Lane's  Retreat  —  Moore's  Brigade  Front  unmasked  —  Our 
Artillery  Cross-fire  —  Advance  of  Bate's  Division  —  Battery  at  the 
Bostick  Place  —  Close  Quarters  at  Moore's  Centre  —  Help  from 
Kimball  —  Chalmers's  Cavalry  attack  Kimball — Infantry  attack 
his  Left  —  Cavalry  his  Centre  and  Right  —  Confederates  repulsed. 

/THE  right  of  Ruger's  division  (Moore's  brigade)  was 
I  not  engaged  quite  so  early  as  Strickland's  brigade, 
and    the    circumstances   were    somewhat   different. 
fThe  wedge  shape  of  Conrad  and  Lane's  lines  caused 
I  the  attack  of  the  Confederate  divisions  of  Cleburne 
land    Brown  to  become  convergent,  for  their  charge 
came  straight  at  the  front  of  the  two  brigades  resist 
ing   them.      When   these   broke,    the    lines    both  of 
j  retreat  and  pursuit  all  led  toward  the  turnpike  and_^ 
the  opening  in  our  breastworks  there.     In  all  the 
enemy's  regiments  which  attacked  Lane,  therefore, 
the  left  shoulder  was  thrown  forward,  and  that  flank  ' 
was   turned    obliquely   to    Moore's    line.      The   fire 
opened  as  soon  as  the  Confederates  were  unmasked 
by  our  retreating  men,  and  it  told  with  terrible  effect. 
No  part  of  the  fugitives  made  for  the  breastworks 
here,  for,  as  we  have  seen,1  their  path  was  bounded 
by  the  centre  of  the  72d  Illinois  in  Strickland's  right 
wing.     Moore's  men  proved,  as  did  Casement's  and 

1  Ante,  p.  118. 


The  Fight  of  Our  Right  Wing  13f 

Stiles's  on  the  east  of  the  turnpike,  that  there  was 
no  doubt  of  their  ability  to  hold  the  works  where 
there  was  any  scope  for  their  lire,  and  where  the 
direct  impact  of  the  flying  crowd  was  not  added  to 
the  advantage  the  enemy  had  in  coming  to  the  very 
ditch  under  such  a  cover. 

When  the  front  line  in  Strickland's  front  gave 
way,  the  left  of  Moore's  brigade  was  seriously  com 
promised,  but  the  courage  and  determination  of 
officers  and  men  were  equal  to  the  task.  Colonel 
Sherwood,  commanding  the  left  regiment  (lllth 
Ohio),  had  his  men  fix  bayonets  and  prepare  for  a 
hand  to  hand  light  on  the  parapet.1  Captain  Dow- 
ling,  the  Inspector  of  the  brigade,  rallied  some  of 
the  broken  troops  by  heroic  efforts,  and  led  them 
into  position  as  a  flanking  force  to  cover  the  left  of 
Moore's  line.2  A  little  later,  when  the  enemy  was 
making  renewed  efforts  to  break  through,  part  of  the 
101st  Ohio,  from  Kimball's  division,  was  sent  by 
my  order  to  reinforce  Ruger's  line.  With  these, 
Captain  Dowling  established  a  short  line  nearly  at 
right  angles  to  the  main  one,  where  they  swept  with 
their  fire  the  space  in  front  of  the  new  line  of 
Strickland's  men,  and  drove  the  enemy  from  the 
works  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Sherwood's  flank. 
Dowling  was  wounded  in  the  struggle,  but  his  work 
was  well  done,  and  the  line  thus  reinforced  remained 
unshaken. 

Ziegler's  Pennsylvania  battery  on  the  Carter's 
Creek  Turnpike  was  ordered  to  fire  obliquely  to  the 
left,  where  the  enemy  were  seen  to  be  forming  upon 
the  elevation  on  the  farther  side  of  the  hollow 
already  described,  which  meandered  in  front,  and 

1  Sherwood's  "Report,  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  387. 

2  Moore's  Report,  Id.,  p.  380. 


132  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

ran  diagonally  through  our  lines  near  the  extreme 
right.      Bridges's  Illinois  battery,  which  was  on  the 
slope  near  the  centre  of  Strickland's  brigade,  crossed 
fits  lire  with  Ziegler's,  and  the  infantry  also  carefully 
(  directing  their  rifles  against  the  same  height,  the 
(  Confederate   line,    as   General    Ruger   says,    visibly 
wasted  and  disappeared  under  the  concentrated  fire.1 
Thfi_first  attack  upon  the  front  of  Ruger's  division 
had  been  made  by  Brown's  division  of  Cheatham's 
corps,  which  had  marched  forward,  guiding  its  left 
ujDon  the  Columbia  Turnpike.     But  for   the  reason 
already  stated,  the  Confederate  brigades  had  changed 
their  direction  more  toward  our  left.     Gordon  had 
/partly  crossed   the  turnpike,    and   his  brigade  was 
astride  of  it  when  he  struck   our  works.      Gist  had 
/  extended  the  line  so  as  to  involve  Moore's  brigade 
on  our  side  in  the  attack.2     Strahl  and  Carter  re 
spectively  supported  Gordon  and  Gist.     These  seem 
to_be_the  troops  who,  after  their  repulse,  were  reform 
ing   beyond   the   hollow  where  Lane's   brigade  had 
stood,  and  who  were  withered  in  the  fearful  fire.3 

Batals-  division  of  Cheatham's  corps  had  been 
deployed  on  Brown's  right  and  rear.  It  was  formed 
with  two  brigades  in  front  line,  Jackson's  on  the 
right,  and  Smith's  on  the  left,  with  Bullock's  in  sec 
ond  line.4  Presstman's  battery  was  also  with  him. 
Bate,  had  a  longer  road  to  travel  than  Brown,  and 
thisjnadtL his  attack  somewhat  later.5  His  advance 
was  guided  by  the  house  of  Mrs.  Bostick,  near  the 

1  Ruger's  Report,  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  365. 

2  Capers's  Report,  Id.,  p.  736. 

3  The  evidence  for  this  will  be  given  Avhen  I  analyze  more  fully  the 
lines  of  advance  from  the  Confederate  standpoint,  post,  chap.  xi. 

4  The  permanent  commanders  of  the  two  brigades  last  named  were 
Generals  Tyler  and  Finley,  but  they  were  both  absent. 

5  Bate's  Report,  Id.,  p.  743. 


The  Fight  of  Our  Right  Wing  133 

Carter's  Creek  Turnpike,  and  when  he  reached  it  lie 
had  one  brigade  on  each  side  of  it,  his  left  being  close 
to  the  road.  Presstman's  battery  went  into  action  on 
the  knoll  by  the  house,  whilst  Bate,  finding  a  stout 
line  of  skirmishers  on  his  left  flank'  (from  KimbalPs 
division  as  well  as  Ruger's),  moved  his  reserve 
brigade  to  the  left  so  that  it  was  astride  of  the 
Carter's  Creek  road  with  two  regiments  on  the  west 
of  it.  He  had  found  his  left  under  a  furious  fire  from 
Ziegler's  battery  and  the  right  of  Ruger's  line,  and 
this  further  deployment  was  to  give  the  needed  ex 
tension  to  his  own  front.  He  expected  Chalmers's 
cavalry  division  to  have  joined  his  left,  but  Chalmers 
was  much  farther  around,  in  front  of  Kimball,  and 
was  advancing  nearly  at  right  angles  to  Bate's  line 
of  march.  The  latter  therefore  thought  himself  en 
tirely  unsupported.1 

The  tendenc£.to  move  by  convergent  lines  is  seen   ^p> 
in  Bate's  as  well  as  in  the  other  Confederate  divis 
ions.     His  right  swept  over  the  "half-moon"  barri-  ^  : 
cades  that  Lane  had  held,  and  came  up  to  our  works, 
where  Gist's  and  Carter's  brigades  of  Brown's  divis 
ion  had  preceded  him.      His_  centre  came  full  upon 
Moore's  brigade,   and  his  left,  beyond  the  Carter's 
Creek   Turnpike,    lapped    upon    Grose's   brigade    of 
Kimball's  division. 

The  struggle  was  a  severe  one,  and  in  several 
places  along  Moore's  front  the  enemy  came  to  close 
quarters  over  the  breastworks.  The  centre  of  the 
brigade  was  occupied  by  the  small  detachment  of 
two  companies  Ruger  had  taken  from  the  188d  Ohio 
to  fill  a  gap  in  his  attenuated  line.  These  men  were 
raw  recruits,  and  in  the  pressure  gave  way.  Moore 
took  two  companies  from  the  80th  Indiana  (on  his 

1  Bate's  Report,  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  743. 


134  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

extreme  right),  and  hurried  them  to  the  centre,  where 
they  made  good  the  momentary  gap.  At  Ruger's 
request,  I  also  ordered  Kimbull  to  send  a  regiment 
to  reinforce  him,  as  has  been  already  stated.  A  full 
regiment  was  not  at  the  moment  available,  and  Lieut. 
Colonel  McDanald  was  sent  with  part  of  the  101st 
Ohio.1  These  were  put  in  at  the  weak  place  on  the 
left  of  Moore's  brigade,  and  did  brave  and  efficient 
service. 
g  At  Moore's  centre,  where  the  enemy  had  gained 

"  some  brief  advantage,  they  made  desperate  efforts. 
They  made  a  bold  dash  for  the  Hag  of  the  107th 
Indiana,  which  was  on  the  works  a  little  to  the  left 
of  the  centre,  but  those  Avho  grasped  it  were  shot 
down  before  they  could  accomplish  their  purpose. 
Battle-flags  were  planted  on  the  parapet,  but  the 
23d  Michigan  turned  its  fire  obliquely  to  the  left, 
and  shot  down  two  color  bearers  and  cleared  the 
works  of  the  assailants.  The  space  was  immediately 
filled  by  the  two  companies  of  the  80th  Indiana 
hastening  by  orders  from  the  right,  and  the  line  was 
no  more  in  danger.2  The  sharp  fighting  was,  how 
ever,  confined  to  Moore's  centre  and  left.  His  right, 

/xwhich  was  reLamived,  was  not  at  close  quarters' "with 
,    \  the  enemy ;  for  Bate's  left  brigade  kept  its  align- 

<  mcnt  with  the  centre,  and  did  not  reach  our  works 
at  the  Carter's  Creek  Turnpike  by  a  hundred  and 
fifty  yards.  The  casualty  returns  support  this  view. 
The  two  regiments  on  the  right  (80th  Indiana  and 
118th  Ohio)  report  nine  men  wounded  only.  The 
total  loss  of  the  brigade  was  one  hundred  and  ten, 

1  General  Ruger  says  five  companies.     Colonel  Kirby,  commanding 
Kimball's  brigade,  says  eight.     0.  II.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  367  and  184. 

2  Moore's  Report  leaves  it  doubtful  what  troops  supported  the  left  of 
his  line  and  the  centre  respectively,  but  the  reports  of  the  23d  Michi 
gan  and  80th  Indiana  seem  to  make  it  certain.     Id.,  pp.  383,  38G. 


The  Fight  of  Our  Right  Wing  135 

of  which  only  fifteen  were  missing.  The  heaviest 
loss  fell  naturally  upon  the  lllth  Ohio,  which  was 
exposed  by  the  break  in  Strickland's  brigade.  This 
regiment  .reported  forty-four  casualties,  of  which  ' 
nine  were  missing.1  BjikL .reported  a  loss  of  three 
hundred  and  nineteen  in  his  division,  of  which  nine- 
tecn  only  were  missing.2  The  Confederate  reports 
as  to  their  missing,  however,  cannot  be  reconciled 
with  the  number  of  prisoners  turned  over  to  our 
provost  marshal. 

The  time  when  Bate's  attack  was  delivered  was 
necessarily  somewhat  later  than  the  attack  upon  our 
centre  and  left.  He  was  deploying  and  taking  dis 
tance  toward  his  left,  whilst  Brown  was  advancing, 
and,  wi th_jthc  longer  route  necessary  to  reach  our 
refused  flank,  he  had  probably  a  mile  farther  to  go. 
Tills,  with  the  halts  made  to  correct  the  alignment,  \ 
and  to  change  the  place  of  Bullock's  brigade  from 
second  line  to  the  extreme  left,  would  account  for 
the  time  which  intervened  between  the  attack  of 
Stewart's  corps  east  of  the  turnpike,  and  this  which 
Bate  was  making  on  the  west. 

Chalmers's  division  of  cavalry  had  been  watching 
our  right  since  noon,  and  being  hidden  from  Bate's 
view  by  rolling  ground,  with  orchards  and  woods, 
the  latter  thought  that  the  cavalry  had  failed  to 
accompany  his  movement  on  that  flank.  In  fact, 
however,  they  seem  to  have  been  a  little  ahead  of 
him,  and  some  distance  from  his  left.3  The  hol 
low  with  its  brooklet,  which  ran  diagonally  across 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  369.  In  a  private  letter  Colonel  Sherwood 
informs  me  that  his  missing  were  afterward  proven  to  be  dead.  This, 
of  course,  is  more  or  less  true  of  all  reported  missing.  I  follow  the 
figures  of  the  Official  Records. 

*  /</.,  p.  743. 

3  Chalmers's  Report,  Id. ,  p.  7G4. 


136  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

/Ruger's  front,  made  a  turn  and  entered  our  lines  in 
KimbalPs  division,  between  Grose's  brigade  (which 
stood  next  to  Ruger)  and  Kirby's,  which  was  Kim 
balPs  centre.  Whitaker's,  on  the  extreme  right, 
reached  to  the  Harpeth  River.1  The  _whole  of  Kim 
balPs  division  line  faced  to  the  west,  and  beyond  the 
roll  of  ground  in  that  direction,  in  the  next  hollow, 
Chalmers  prepared  for  his  demonstration.  There  his 
horses  were  left  with  the  regular  details  of  horse 
holders,  and  his  line  was  formed  dismounted. 

A  road  running  northwest  left  the  Carter's  Creek 
Turnpike  close  to  Ruger's  right,  and  its  direction 
was  about  the  same  as  that  of  Ruger's  breastworks 
where  they  reached  the  turnpike.  [KimbalPs  brigades 
being  in  echelon]  his  left  was  near  a  hundred  yards 
in  rear  of  the  road,  and  the  distance  increased  as 
one  went  toward  the  right ; 2  so  that  opposite  Kim 
balPs  centre  this  road  was  two  hundred  and  fifty 
yards  distant.  It  was  there  crossed  by  another 
road  running  out  from  the  town  through  KimbalPs 
lines,  and  at  the  intersection  was  the  place  of  the 
reserves  of  the  skirmish  line.  I  have  said  that  the 
whole  of  the  77th  Pennsylvania  was  detailed  as 
skirmishers  for  Grose's  brigade,  and  its  commandant 
(Colonel  Rose)  had  his  reserves  near  the  cross-road, 
whilst  his  line  of  sentinels  was  nearly  half  a  mile 
out  from  our  main  line,  connecting  at  the  Carter's 
Creek  Turnpike  with  those  of  Ruger's  division.3 
On  his  right  he  connected  with  the  skirmishers  of 
KimbalPs  other  brigades. 

Bate's  advance  pushed  back  our  skirmish  lines, 
and  as  Rose's  men  retreated  they  rallied  on  the 

1  See  ante,  p.  62. 

2  See  Major  Twining's  Map,  p.  45,  ante. 

3  Grose's  Report,  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  208  ;  Rose's,  Id.,  p.  226. 


The  Fight  of  Oar  Right  Wing  137 

reserve  farthest  toward  the  right,1  and  took  advan 
tage  of  the  little  ravine  to  check  the  enemy  from  this 
cover.      Here  they  held  on  for  some   time,  till   the] 
advance  of  Chalmers's  dismounted  cavalry  subjected  ] 
them  to  a  sharp  lire  on  their  right  Hank.      They  then    , 
retired  within  the  lines  by  way  of  the  hollow. 

This  movement  of  the  skirmishers  uncovered,  at 
first,  only  the  Pennsylvania  battery  and  the  left  of 
Gro^'SiJbri^adc}     These  were  brought  into  action, 
and  the  check  given  the  enemy  by  the  stout  resist-^ 
mice  of  the  picket  was  turned  into  defeat  by  the  fire  ( 
of  the  line.      Grose  says  that  his  firing  began  when  / 
the_cncmy  was   about  two  hundred   and  fifty  yards  \ 
away,  and  that  few  of  them  got  nearer  than  a  hun 
dred  yards.     It  was  a  short,  sharp  combat,  and  the 
Confederate  infantry  retreated  to  the  cover  of  the 
hill  at  the  Bostick  house.2 

It  must  be  remembered  that  only  two  regiments  of 
Bate's  division  were  deployed  west  of  the  Carter's 
Creek  Turnpike,  and  they  did  not  extend  over  the  ( 
whole  of  Grose's  front.  This  is  explicitly  stated  in 
the  report  of  the  9th  Indiana  (Colonel  Suman),  which 
was  his  right  regiment,  and  was  separated  from  the 
rest  by  the  little  ravine  and  watercourse.  "  Only  a 
skirmish  line,"  Colonel  Suman  says,  "showed  itself 
in  front  of  my  regiment,  though  their  line  of  battle 
was  seen  very  close  in  front  of  the  75th  Illinois.3 
One  volley,  an  oblique  fire,  was  all  the  fighting  my 
regiment  did.  There  were  no  casualties."  The  re 
port  of  the  75th  confirms  this,  telling  us  that  the 
first  volley  checked  the  enemy  as  soon  as  he  was 
within  good  musket  range,  and  a  few  more  sent  him 
back  in  confusion.  This  regiment  also  suffered  no 

1  Grose's  Report,  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  208 ;  Rose's,  Id,  p.  226. 

2  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  208.  3  Suman's  Report,  Id.,  p.  221, 


138  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

casualties.1  Indeed,  the  casualties  in  the  whole 
brigade  may  be  said  to  be  trifling,  for  out  of  an 
aggregate  of  thirty-seven,  full  half  were  in  the  77th 
Pennsylvania,  which  was  the  skirmish  line.2  The 
regimental  reports  show  that  the  firing  lasted  ten  or 
fifteen  minutes,  when  the  enemy  retreated  and  made 
no  further  serious  effort  on  Grose's  front. 

As  we  have  passed  beyond  the  scope  of  Bate's 
attack  in  our  examination  of  events  as  they  occurred 
from  left  to  right,  we  must  conclude  that  whatever 
fighting  there  was  on  the  front  of  Kirby  and  Whit- 
aker  (the  centre  and  right  brigades  of  Kimball's 
division)  was  with  the  Confederate  cavalry  under 
Chalmers.  Though  no  fully  authenticated  report  by 
this  officer  has  been  found  among  the  Confederate 
archives  which  came  into  possession  of  the  govern 
ment  at  the  close  of  the  war,  the  original  draught 
found  among  General  Chalmers's  papers  and  fur 
nished  by  him  has  been  accepted  without  question, 
and  is  printed  in  the  Official  Records.3  That  the 
commanding  officers  on  the  national  side  do  not  seem 
to  have  recognized  them  as  cavalry  does  not  mili 
tate  against  the  facts,  which  prove  beyond  question 
Chalmers's  advance  on  this  part  of  the  field,  and  that 
Bate's  infantry  fell  far  short  of  reaching  it. 

The  gray  uniforms  of  the  enemy,  soiled  and  worn 
with  hard  service,  were  indistinguishable  in  the  dif 
ferent  corps,  and  as  to  arms  or  equipment  the  case 
/was  nearly  the  same.     Forrest  relied  upon  the  car- 
\  bines  or  muskets  of  his  men,  and  despised  the  sabre, 
so  that  his  horsemen  were  more  than  any  others  a 
.  mounted  infantry  at  a  time  when  the  usual  custom 

1  Bennett's  Report,  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  214. 

2  Grose's  Report,  Id.,  p.  209. 

3  Id.,  p.  763,  and  ante,  p.  83,  note. 


The  Fight  of  Our  Right   Wing  139 

on  both  sides  was  for  this  arm  of  the  service  to  fight 
in  line  dismounted. 

The  heavy  firing  had  been  heard  for  some  time  on 
the  left  by  KimbalPs  men,  when  at  last,  about  sun 
set,  a  line  was  seen  on  the  ridge  in  front  of  Kirby 
and  Whitakcr.1  Two  or  three  volleys  drove  the 
enemy  back,  the  skirmishers  were  again  advanced, 
and  though  a  lively  skirmish  fire  was  kept  up  late  in 
the  evening,  they  maintained  their  position  without 
difficulty,  and  the  main  line  in  this  part  of  the  field 
was  not  again  engaged. 

In  Whitakcr 's  brigade  the  efforts  of  the  enemy  to 
test  the  strength  with  which  the  extreme  flank  was 
held  were  possibly  more  persistent  than  in  front  of 
Kirby,  for  Whitaker  speaks  of  the  fight  as  "short 
hut  severe.  The  enemy  persisted  in  the  assault 
about  fifteen  minutes,  when  they  broke  and  fled,  to 
return  no  more. "  2  Whitaker's  casualties  were  only 
one  killed  and  eight  wounded.  Kirby 's  aggregate 
was  fourteen,  but  McDanald's  regiment,  which  was 
sent  to  reinforce  Ruger's  division,  belonged  to  this 
brigade. 

Chalmers  tells  us  that  his  line  advanced  about 
half  past  four,  driving  in  the  skirmishers,  till  he 
was  "within  sixty  yards  of  the  fortifications,"  but 
his  "force  was  too  small  to  justify  an  attempt  to 
storm  them."  He  reports  his  loss  at  one  hundred 
and  sixteen,  killed  and  wounded.3  His  claim  to 
have  "held  his  position "  in  KimbalPs  front  can 
only  mean  the  position  behind  the  rolling  ground,  out 
of  range,  for  certainly  his  men  were  seen  no  more 
from  KimbalPs  line,  nor  did  they  manifest  their 
presence  when  the  troops  were  withdrawn  at  mid- 

1  Kirby's  Report,  O.  R,,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  184. 

2  Id.,  p.  195.  3  Id.,  p.  764. 


140  The  Batik  of  Franklin 

'night.     On  this  part  of  the  line,  therefore,  we  must 
j  conclude  that  a  forced  reconnoissance  was  all  that 
Chalmers  really  attempted,  and  that,  though  boldly 
pushed,   it  was  easily  repulsed. 

The  extent  of  front  covered  by  Kimball  was  so 
great  that  we  had  not  attempted  to  make  a  contin 
uous  line  of  infantry  trench,  but  only  to  hold  the 
salient  points,  putting  in  the  brigades  where  they 
would  mutually  support  one  another,  and  sweep  with 
their  fire  the  spaces  between.  Even  this  had  not 
been  fully  accomplished  when  the  fighting  began, 
and  the  reports  of  brigade  and  regimental  command 
ers  show  that  the  works  were  incomplete,  and  the 
troops  had  to  drop  the  intrenching  tools  to  seize 
their  rifles.1  This  was  what  led  both  Hood  himself 
and  Bate  to  express  their  regret  that  a  more  vigorous 
attack  was  not  made  on  our  right  flank.  1  have 
already  given  reasons  for  my  opinion  that  it  was  not 
practicable,  and  that  we  were  right  in  considering 
the  Carter's  Creek  Turnpike  as  the  limit  of  our  proper 
front  on  that  side,  Kimball's  division  being  more  in 
the  position  of  a  support  for  the  flank  than  as  part 
of  the  line  itself.2 

1  0.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  195,  214.  2  Ante,  p.  60. 


CHAPTER    X 

THE   SITUATION  AT   SUNSET 

Determined  Fighting  at  the  Centre  —  Examination  of  Strickland's 
Line  —  Enemy  holding  outside  of  his  Works  —  The  Second  Line 
—  Relative  Position  of  Opdycke  and  Strickland  — Orders  to  the 
latter  —  Visit  to  Kuger  —  Wagner  reorgunixiug  —  Visit  to  extreme 
Left  —  Reinforcements  for  the  Centre. 

WE  have   now  followed  the  progress  of  the  battle 
during  the  hour  between  four  and  five  o'clock,  and 

*~^  A* 

have  seen.  ..tUal-  the- severe  repulse  of  the  enemy  on 
both  our  flanks  was  complete  and  final.  In  these 
parts  of  the  field  skirmishers  had  been  advanced  as 
the  Confederates  retreated,  and  were  kept  out  till 
our  final  withdrawal  at  midnight.  (.The  skirmishing 
was  active,  and  a  lively,  rattling  fire  continued  along  /-jp 
the  front  on  both  wings,  but  no  serious  efforts  to 
advance  again  in  force  were  made  by  the  enemy  any 
where  but  at  and  near  the  centreJ  Whenever  a  new 
assault  was  made  near  the  Columbia  road,  brisk 
demonstrations  would  be  made  by  Stewart's  corps 
on  our  left,  and  by  Bate's  division  on  our  right;  the 
artillery  in  our  line  would  sweep  the  front  with 
canister,  and  the  sounds  would  indicate  a  battle, 
but  the  only  really  determined  work  by  the  Con 
federates  was  done  upon  the  front  of  the  central 
brigades  of  Reilly  and  Strickland,  between  which 
Opdyclce's  sturdy  regiments  were  now  solidly  placed, 
the  lines  of  all  three  brigades  being  more  or  less 


142  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

thickened  by  disorganized  but  brave  groups  of  Con 
rad's  and  Lane's  men,  who  had  rallied  at  the 
works. 

My  personal  observation  of  these  earlier  scenes  in 
the  fight  has  been  brought  down  to  the  time  when  the 
disorder  at  the  centre  was  corrected  by  the  splendid 
charges  of  our  reserves,  it  may  be  well  to  take  up 
the  story  there,  and  tell  what  passed  under  my  own 
eye,  so  far  as  it  is  material  to  an  accurate  under 
standing  of  the  persistent  struggle. 

I  have  said  that  from  the  turnpike  we  could  not 
see  what  was  occurring  behind  the  Carter  house  and 
its  group  of  farm  buildings.  The  comfortable  farm 
stead  was  surrounded  by  shade  trees,  with  some  fruit 
trees  in  the  enclosure  nearest  the  house.  This  grove- 
was  mostly  on  the  northern  slope  toward  the  town, 
after  the  locust  trees  at  and  in  front  of  the  breast 
works  had  been  felled,  and,  with  the  house  and  farm 
buildings,  quite  shut  off  the  view  looking  westward. 
As  soon  as  the  first  repulse  of  the  enemy  on  Rcilly's 
line  and  on  the  turnpike  left  me  free  to  turn  my 
attention  elsewhere,  I  went  in  person  to  examine 
the  condition  of  affairs  at  the  centre  of  Strickland's 
brigade  line.  I  had  seen  Opdycke's  men  at  the 
retrenchment  crossing  the  road  in  line  with  the 
brick  smoke-house  and  adjacent  building  in  rear  of 
the  opening  in  the  works  left  for  the  incoming  troops 
and  trains,  but  I  could  not  see  how  they  connected 
on  the  right  with  Strickland's  men.1  The  smoke 
obscured  the  view,  but  enough  could  be  seen  to  make 
me  suspect  that  the  enemy  still  held  the  outside  of 
our  main  intrenchments  for  some  distance  west  of  the 
>  turnpike  and  southwest  of  the  Carter  buildings. 

Passing  round  the  grove  and  houses  under  cover  of 

1  Ante,  pp.  97,  98. 


The  Situation  at  Sunset  143 

the  southern  slope,  1  saw,  as  soon  as  I  got  beyond 
the  obstructions  to  the  view,  that  my  suspicion  was 
correctjjand  that  our  men  were  holding  a  new  line, 
apparently  running  from  the  brick  smoke-house  above 
mentioned,  standing  south  of  the  dwelling-house.  I 
The  efforts  of  the  enemy  to  break  through  at  this 
point  were  so  quickly  renewed  that  the  lulls  were 
short  and  there  was  small  chance  for  extended  inves 
tigation.  ( Not  meeting  Colonel  Strickland  in  per 
son,  I  sent  to  him,  by  a  staff  officer,  an  order  to 
make  the  most  strenuous  efforts  to  carry  his  brigade 
forward  to  their  original  place  in  the  front  line  of 
intrenchment. 

We  have  seen  how  embrasures  had  been  made  for 
the  four  guns  of  the  20th  Ohio  Battery  in  the  second 
line  just  west  of  the  smoke-house  and  the  other  small 
building  that  stood  between  it  arid  the  road.  The 
infantry  now  made  a  continuous  line  -from  the  re 
trenchment  in  the  road  to  and  between  these  build 
ings,  and  among  the  guns.  Just  west  of  the  battery 
was  the  breastwork  which  the  44th  Missouri  had 
built.  When  the  break  occurred  at  the  front  line,/ 
the  buildings  and  this  breastwork  made  a  rallying  - 
place,  and  Opdycke's  brigade  on  the  left,  with 
Strickland's  on  the  right,  had  formed  upon  it  as 
the  reserves  rushed  forward.  In  the  first  melde, 
officers  and  men  of  both  brigades  were  intermixed, 
and  scattered  among  them  here  and  there  were  some 
of  those  whose  pell-mell  rush  from  the  front  had 
swept  from  the  intrenchment  part  of  its  defenders. 
The  bulk  of  Opdycke's,  however,  were  nearer  the 
turnpike,  and  most  of  Strickland's  gathered  toward 
the  right,2  so  that,  although  they  lapped  upon  each 
other,  Strickland  occupied  substantially  the  right 

1  See  Sketch  Map,  ante,  p.  43.  2  Ante,  p.  117. 


144  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

half  of  the  line  originally  allotted  to  him.     When 
ever  a  lull  occurred  in  the  fight,  the  men  "-'instinct 
ively  crowded  to  left   and   right  so   as   to  get  the 
^organizations   better   separated,    and    both    brigades 
{strengthened    and   extended    the    barricade   in   the 
(second  line  on  which  they  had  rallied.1 

In  reply  to  the  order  to  Strickland  to  reoccupy-the 
front  line  of  breastworks,  he  soon  sent  word  that  he 
had  done  so;  but  still  noticing  from  the  turnpike 
that,  in  the  repeated  onslaughts  of  the  Confederates 
that  followed  each  other  quickly,  their  fire  came 
from  what  I  recognized  as  the  outside  of  our  original 
intrenchments,  I  went  a  second  time  to  his  position, 
just  before  sunset.  I  found  him  just  west  of  the  ell 
or  wing  of  the  Carter  house,  in  rear  of  what  was  the 
centre  of  his  brigade  line  before  the  battle  opened, 
but  now  was  near  the  point  where  his  left  and 
Opdyckc's  right  appeared  to  join. 

From  this  position  I  pointed  out  to  him,  as  well 
as  the  smoke  would  permit,  the  difference  between 
,  the  present  line  held  by  his  men  and  that  which  they 
had  originally  occupied,  and  from  the  other  side  of 
which  the  enemy  were  firing.  Urging  him  to  watch 
for  an  opportunity  to  get  forward  and  drive  his  oppo 
nents  away  from  the  works,  I  passed  on  to  Moore's 
brigade,  and  visited  General  Ruger,  the  division 
commander.  The  whole  of  Moore's  front  was  firmly 
held,  and  Ruger's  report  indicated  that  the  fighting 
beyond  the  Cartersville  Turnpike  had  not  been  seri 
ous.  I  therefore  felt  free  to  call  upon  Kimball  to 
send  a  regiment  to  Ruger  to  strengthen  the  flank  of 
Moore's  brigade  and  assist  in  Strickland's  movement 
forward,  as  has  been  stated.2 

In  this  personal  visit -to  the  different  brigades  in 

1  0.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  354.  2  Ante,  p.  134. 


. 


The  Situation  at  Sunset  145 

Jjne,  my  object  was  to  verify  the  actual  situation  and 
come  iiitp" "foucli"^vvitlf  subordinate  commanders,  so 
that  the  action  of  all  might  be  co-ordinated  to  secure 
victory.  I  now  knew  that  Kimball  and  his  brigades 
were  firmly  in  place.  So  was  Ruger  with  his,  ex 
cept  the  change  in  Strickland's  line  which  has  been 
described.  Opdycke's  brigade  was  astride  the  Colum 
bia  Turnpike,  crowding  upon  Reilly  on  the  left  and 
upon  STn-ickland  on  the  right.  Had  there  been  any 
other  division  or  brigade  commander  there,  my  quest 
would  have  discovered  him,  for  my  ride  was  an 
inspection  for  the  express  purpose  of  knowing  what 
strength  we  had  in  hand  to  complete  our  task.  I 
did  not  find  Wagner  or  either  of  his  brigade  com 
manders  except  Opdycke.  I  have  never  doubted  that 
the  other  two  were  where  duty  called  them,  busy  in 
the  reorganization  of  the  two  disordered  brigades; 
but  they  were  not  in  the  line  nor  visible  from  it.1 

Returning  to  the  centre,  I  found  that  Strickland 
thought  he  needed  the  help  of  fresher  well  organized 
troops  to  lead  forward  to  the  breastworks  in  front, 
and  I  determined  to  continue  my  ride  to  the  extreme 
left  and  judge,  after  conference  with  Reilly  and  his 
brigade  commanders,  whether  a  reinforcement  for 
Strickland  could  be  spared. 

At  my  headquarters  on  the  turnpike  1  was  met  by 
a  message  from  my  acting  Quartermaster,  Captain 
Hentig,2  complaining  that  the  passage  of  wagons 
and  ambulances  at  the  bridge  was  obstructed  by 
crowds  of  Wagner's  men.  I  sent  my  Adjutant  Gen- 

1  The  reason  for  making  this  statement  so  detailed  and  explicit  will 
appear  when,  in  chapter  xix.,  I  shall  have  to  notice  the  controversies 
in  regard  to  this  part  of  the  battle  history. 

2  Captain  lleutig  was  Commissary  of  Subsistence,  but  in  the  absence 
of  my  Quartermaster  on  leave,  he  was  performing  temporarily  the  duties 
of  both  offices. 

10 


146  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

eral  to  the  place  to  ask  General  Wagner  to  correct 
the  evil.  Captain  Cox  found  Wagner  seeking  to 
reorganize  his  brigades  in  the  open  space  along  the 
river,  and  exhorting  those  whom  he  and  his  officers 
had  there  halted  and  brought  into  some  kind  of 
order.1  He  promised  to  place  a  guard  at  the  bridge 
to  stop  stragglers  and  keep  the  passage  free,  and 
this  he  did. 

After  communicating  thus  with  Wagner,  I  passed 
on  to  the  left  and  saw  Henderson  and  Stiles  in  per 
son,  and,  from  their  reports,  feeling  assured  as  to 
the  safety  of  that  part  of  the  line,  directed  that  their 
reserve  regiment,  the  112th  Illinois,  should  be  sent 
to  the  right  centre  to  assist  Strickland  in  fully  re 
gaining  the  works.  My  Inspector  General,  Major 
Dow,  was  with  me,  and  as  he  was  an  officer  of  this 
regiment,  he  was,  at  his  own  request,  allowed  to 
accompany  it  in  its  new  task.2 

On  my  way  back  I  consulted  with  General  Reilly 
and   Colonel   Casement,  and  informed  them   of  my 
action.     I  also  directed  General  Reilly  to  have  a 
detachment  in  readiness  to  form  on  the  outside  of 
his  breastworks,   and  to  sweep  with  an  enfilading 
fire  the  enemy  who  held  on  in  front  of  the  right 
[    jcentre,    if    the    new   effort    from    Strickland's    line 
v   should  not  succeed.3 

1  Captain  Cox's  statement,  Appendix  F. 

2  Henderson,  the  brigade  commander,  was  colonel  of  the  regiment, 
which  was  therefore  in  command  of  Lieut.  Colonel  Bond.     Colonel 
Henderson  for  many  years  represented  his  district  in  Congress,  and  is 
one  of  the  most  honored  public  men  of  western  Illinois.     His  recol 
lection  of  my  visit  to  the  brigade  for  the  purpose  noted  is  included  in 
an  interesting  written  statement  from  which  I  have  quoted,  and  shall 
have  other  occasions  to  quote. 

3  In  a  letter  from  General  Casement  (in  1881)  replying  to  inquiries 
of  mine  when  I  was  preparing  the  volume  of  history  of  this  campaign, 
he  mentions  the  last  order,  reminding  me  of  an  amusing  personal  occur- 


The  Situation  at  Sunset  147 

The  sun  was  just  setting  behind  the  hills  in  Ihc 
west  as  I  got  back  to  my  station  on  the  Columbia 
Turnpike,  close  to  the  Carter  house.  Twilight  and 
darkness  soon  settled  down  upon  the  field,  for  tjic 
true  sunset  was  at  almost  exactly  five  o'clock.1 
Subordinates  were  notified  where  to  find  me,  and 
to  make  their  reports  during  the  evening,  so  that 
there  might  be  no  miscarriage  of  communications 
in  the  darkness.  The  112th  Illinois  had  more  than 
half  a  mile  to  march,  in  order  to  reach  and  reinforce 
Strickland,  and  it  was  completely  dark  when  the 
regiment  reported  to  him.  Meanwhile  the  fight  at 
the  centre  had  been  bitter  and  unceasing,  for  Hood's 
brave  men  were  still  possessed,  with  the  belief  that 
they  could  turn  their  brief  advantage  there  into  a 
complete  victory,  and  they  fought  with  almost  unex 
ampled  tenacity  to  accomplish  their  desire. 

rence  connected  with  it.  In  a  subsequent  fuller  statement  lie  confirmed 
it,  with  other  matters  to  which  I  shall  refer  later.  General  Casement  , 
was  colonel  of  the  103d  Ohio,  and  was  brevetted  Brigadier  General 
for  services  in  this  campaign,  lie  afterward  won  a  national  reputa 
tion  in  connection  Avith  the  track-laying  of  the  Union  Pacific  Railway, 
and  in  other  great  Avorks  of  railway  construction.  He-Avas  Territorial 
Delegate  in  Congress,  and  filled  other  important  public  positions.  Few 
business  men  have  been  so  prominent  or  so  Avell  knoAvn. 

1  ^Professor  J.  G.  Porter  of  the  Cincinnati  Observatory  has  kindly 
computed  the  actual  sunset  at  Franklin  on  ^pvember  30,  1864,  and 
finds  it  to  have  been  at  4h.  59  m.,  local  time/} Colonel  M.  B.  Carter, 
living  on  the  field,  has  also  been  good  enough  to  note  the  apparent  sun 
set  on  one  of  the  anniversaries  of  the  battle,  and  found  it  to  be  4  h.  51  m. 
The  low  hills  Avestward  account  for  the  difference  betAAreen  the  real  and 
the  apparent  sinking  of  the  sun  beloAv  the  horizon.  lie  also  noted  that 
at  5  1).  2  m.  it  Avas  too  dark  to  read  ordinary  neAvspaper  print,  marking 
the  twilight  Avhich  is  commonly  called  "  early  caudle-lighting." 


CHAPTER   XI 

FROM   THE   CONFEDERATE   STANDPOINT 

Multiplication  of  Lines  of  Attack  — How  caused  —  Walthall's  Descrip 
tion  of  the  Assault  —  In  the  Abattis  —  Repulsed  in  Confusion  —  The 
Ditch  at  the  Cotton-gin  --  Brown's  Attack  on  Right  Centre  — Rate 
overlaps  him  — Johnson's  Attack  after  Dark  — Hood's  Description 
—  S.  D.  Lee's  —  Colonel  Capers's  —  Capture  of  Gordon  —  His 
Account  of  the  Charge  —  Cleburne  falls. 

[IT  was  the  impression  made  on  those  who  fought 
near  our  centre,  that  the  enemy's  original  formation 
was_that  of  deep  columns  of  attack,  charging  one 
after  another  to  the  number  of  a  dozen  or  more,  and 
intended  to  break  through  our  lines  at  the  Carter 
house  by  their  numerous  and  rapidly  repeated  as 
saults.  This  was  a  natural  conclusion  from  the  man 
ner  in  which  the  charges  were  renewed  and  persisted 
in,  long  after  the  flanks  at  right  and  left  werejcalieved 
^from  serious  fighting.  This  was,  however,  the  result 
of  fortuitous  circumstauces~and  not  of  a  plan,  for  the 
official  reports  of  all  the  Confederate  officers  prove 
that  their  first  deployment  was,  like  our  own,  a  line 

I  of  battle  in  which  each  division  was  arrayed  with  two 
deployed  brigades  in  first  line,  supported  by  one  in 

•second  line.  The  exceptions  were  in  French's  divis 
ion,  which  (as  one  of  the  brigades  was  absent)  had 
but  one  in  front  and  one  in  support,  and  in  Brown's 
division,  which  had  four  brigades,  and  therefore  put 
two  in  each  line.  Reasons  have  already  been  given 


From  the  Confederate  Standpoint  149 

for  concluding  that  Hood's  real  design  was  to  turn  or 
break  our  left  flank,  which  was  by  far  closer  to  the 
bridges  and  ford  which  were  our  line  of  retreat  in 
case  of  disaster.1 

AsJIood,  however,  in  his  first  advance,  sent  eigh 
teen  brigades  to  attack  our  main  line  of  five  between 
the  rail ro¥d'Tnd  Carter's  Creek  Turnpike,  it  neces 
sarily;  tiiriietT "out  tjwit  the  Confederate  movement  was 
a  convergent  one.  v  Their  brigades  being  the  tactical 
units  which  actually  controlled,  these  not  only  lapped 
over  each  other,  but  unforeseen  circumstances  made 
the  imi  Id  plication  of  the  brigade  lines  greater  at  the 
centre  by  the  spontaneous  crowding  in  from  the  flanks 
when  the  word  passed  among  them  that  they  had 
possession  of  our  parapet  near  the  Carter  houses 

As  each  division  had  its  own  support,  there  was  a 
double  assault  when  it  struck  our  front,  with  as  many 
successive  rallyings  and  fresh  attacks  as  its  men 
could  be  induced  to  make.  The  divisions  of  Loring, 
Walthall,  French,  and  Clcburne  were  all  east  of  the 
Columbia  Turnpike,  and  Cleburne's  left  guided  upon 
the  road.2  Loring's  right  was  necessarily  guided  by 
the  line  of  the  river  and  railroad,  and  as,  by  reason  of 
the  check  at  the  centre  caused  by  the  brief  resistance 
of  Wagner's  two  brigades,  the  enemy's  right  got  for 
ward  fastest,  Walthall  came  in  echelon  to  Loring,  lap 
ping  over  him  in  rear  to  the  extent  of  a  brigade,  whilst 
French  would  be  similarly  in  rear  of  Walthall. 

By  the  same  crowding  process  Cleburne's  division 
wauld.be_thrown  behind  French,  and  immediately  upon  /  L. 
the  road  and  on  its  east  side  there  would  result  a 
column  of  five  brigades,  for  Walthall  distinctly  declares 
that  his  left  brigade  (Shelley's)  assaulted  our  works 
"  just  to  the  right  of  the  pike,"  which  brings  him  in 

1  Ante,  p.  87.  2  See  Stewart's  Map,  facing  p.  87. 


150  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

front  of  Reilly's  brigade  on  our  side.1  Pie  further 
says  that  General  Shelley  was  among  those  that  got 
over  the  works ;  and  as  we  certainly  know  that  Case 
ment's  brigade  was  nowhere  pierced,  it  seems  clearly 
proved  that  it  was  between  the  cotton-gin  and  the 
turnpike  that  Shelley  was  in  person.  Reynolds' s  bri 
gade  had  apparently  been  thrown  into  the  second  line 
by  obstructions  in  the  advance,  which  have  been  be 
fore  mentioned,  and  it  may  have  been  in  rear  of 
Quarles,  who  attacked  Casement.2  (But  behind  Shel 
ley  must  have  been  Cockrell's  and  Sears's  brigades  of 
French's  division,  and  two  of  Cleburne's  three,  mak 
ing  five  in  column^  But  even  this  does  not  complete 
the  full  tale ;  for  Gordon5?  brigade  of  Brown's  divis 
ion  got  also  astride  of  the  road,  and  Gordon  himself 
was  captured  in  Reilly's  brigade  line,  as  I  shall  show.3 
^  <v  [Thus,  at  brief  intervals,  six  distinct  lines  here  made 
I  furious  attacks,  to  say  nothing  of  repeated  rallyings 
and  new  efforts  of  each. 

Let  us  summarize  these  attacks  upon  our  left  wing. 
Loring's  division  in  two  lines  attacked  Stilcs's  brigade, 
and  made  the  brave  but  fearfully  costly  effort  to  turn 
our  flank  by  way  of  the  railway  cut.  Fcatherston's 
brigade  of  the  same  division  seems  to  have  come  first 
against  Casement's  works,  and  to  have  been  followed 
by  Quarles's  and  Reynolds's  brigades  of  WalthalPs 
division  in  succession.  Tkcjrpnt_pf :  Reillj^s  brigade, 
including  the  Kentucky  battery  at  the  turnpike,  was 
siruck  by  the  six  brigades  in  succession  that  have 
been  enumerated  in  the  last  paragraph. 

Walthall's  own  report  of  the  advance  of  his  division 
is  such  indisputable  evidence  of  the  desperate  nature 
of  the  struggle  that  it  deserves  to  be  quoted  at  some 

1  O.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  720.  2  Ante,  p.  123. 

8  Post,  p.  159. 


From  the  Confederate  Standpoint  151 

length.     "  Both  officers  and  men,"  he  says,  "  seemed 
fully  alive  to  the  importance  of  beating  the  enemy  here 
at  any  cost,  and  the  line  moved  steadily  forward  until 
it  nearcd  his  outer  works,1  and  then  fell  upon  it  so 
impetuously  that  the  opposing  force  gave  way  without 
even  retarding  the  advance,  and  retired  in  disorder  to 
the  strong  intrenchments  in  the  rear.     There  was  an 
extensive  open    and  almost  unbroken  plain  between 
the  outer  and  inner  lines,  across  which  we  must  pass 
to  reach  the  latter.     This  was  done  under  far  the  most 
deadly  fire  of  small  arms  and  artillery  that  I  have  ever 
seen  troops  subjected  to.     Terribly  torn  at  every  step 
byjm  oblique  fire  from  a  battery  advantageously  posted 
at  the  enemy's  left,  no  less  than  by  the  destructive    , 
fire  in  front,  the  line  moved  on  and  did  not  falter  till, 
just  to  the  right  of  the  pike,  it  reached  the  abattia 
fronting  the   works.     Over   this   no  organized  force 
could  go,  and  here  the  main  body  of  my  command, 
both  front  line  and  reserve,  \vas  repulsed   in  confu- 
sionj  but  over  this  obstacle,  impassable  for  a  solid  line, 
many  officers  and  men  (among  the  former  Brigadier 
General  Shelley)  made  their  way,  and  some  crossing 
the  ditch  in  its  rear  were  captured,  and  others  killed 
and  wounded  in  the  effort  to  mount  the  embankment. 
Numbers  of  every  brigade  gained  the  ditch  and  there 
continued  the  struggle,  with  but  the  earthwork  sepa 
rating  them  from  the  enemy,  until  late  in  the  night."  2 
The  gallant  division  commander  does  not  tell  of 
his  own  experience,  but  his  corps  commander,  Gen 
eral  Stewart,  reports  that  "  Major  General  Walthall 
had    two   horses    killed,    and    was    himself    severely 
bruised." 3      General   Quarles  was  severely  wounded 
in  the  advance,  all  his  stafT  officers  with  him  on  the 

1  The  flank  of  Conrad's  brigade  at  its  outpost  position. 

2  O.  11.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  720,  1'2\.  *  1,1.,  p.  70S. 


152  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

field  were  killed,  and  we  arc  told  that  "so  heavy  were 

the  losses  in  his  command  that  when  the  battle  ended 

its  officer  highest  in  rank  was  a  captain."1     It  is 

/'greatly  to  be  regretted  that  so  few  of  the  Confederate 

/  reports   of  the   battle   are   preserved,  if  indeed   they 

/  were  made ;    but  this  of  Walthall  shows  what  must 

have  been  their  character. 

On  the  west  of  the  turnpike  Brown's  division  went 
/forward  in  two  lines.     In  the  first  line  were  Gordon's 
j  brigade  (guiding  on  the  Columbia  Turnpike)  with  Gist's 
]  on  Gordon's  left.     In  the  second  line  Strahl's  was  in 
/  support  of  Gordon's  and  Carter's  in  support  of  Gist's.2 
\  It  also  appears  that  Cockrell's   brigade   of   French's 
division  lapped  over  Gordon  and  Strahl.    Later  in  the 
fight  Bate's  division  lapped  upon  Brown's  to  the  extent 
of  two  brigades,  for  he  attacked  with  the  three  in  sin 
gle  line,  and  his  left  brigade  was  astride  the  Carter's 
Creek  Turnpike.3    Two  and  a  half  of  his  brigades  were 
therefore  in  front  of  our  two  (Strickland's  and  Moore's), 
and  Bate's  right  must  have  reached  nearly  or  quite  to 
the  Columbia  road,  making  the  third  line  which  at 
tacked  our  right  centre.     But  this  was  not  all.     An 
/"hour  after  dark   Johnson's   division  of   Lee's  corps, 
)  which    was    in    reserve,   went    to   the    assistance    of 
(:  Cheatham's  men,  and  this  strong  division  of  four  bri- 
\  gades  made  a  fifth  and  a  sixth  line  of  battle  attacking 
near  the  Carter  house,4  where  Opdycke  was  now  filling 
lialLof  Strickland's  line  and  Moore's  left  was  holding 
grimly  to  its  breastwork,  the  regiment  from  Stiles  on 
our  extreme  left  and  another  from  Kimball  on  our  ex 
treme  right  gallantly  helping  the  defence  at  the  critical 
point. 

For  the  attack  by  Johnson's  division  we  are  depend- 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  721.  3  Bate's  Report,  Id.,  p.  743. 

*  Capers's  Report,  Id.,  p.  73G.  4  Lee's  Report,  Id.,  p.  687. 


From  the  Confederate  Standpoint  153 

cut  upon  the  official  report  of  General  Stephen  D. 
Lee,  the  corps  commander.  "  This  division,"  he  says,  ? 
"  moved  against  the  enemy's  breastworks  under  a 
heavy  fire  of  artillery  and  musketry,  gallantly  driving 
the  enemy  from  portions  of  his  line.  The  brigades  of 
Sharp  and  Brantley  (Mississippians)  and  of  Dcas  (Ala- 
bamians)  particularly  distinguished  themselves.  Their 
dead  were  mostly  in  the  trenches  and  on  the  works  of 
the  enemy,  where  they  nobly  fell  in  a  desperate  hand 
to  hand  conflict.  Sharp  captured  three  stand  of  colors. 
Brantley  was  exposed  to  a  severe  enfilading  fire.  These 
noble  brigades  never  faltered  in  this  terrible  night 
struggle.  Brigadier  General  Manigault,  commanding 
a  brigade  of  Alabamians  and  South  Carolinians,  was 
severely  wounded  in  this  engagement  while  gallantly 
leading  his  troops  to  the  fight,  and  of  his  two  succes 
sors  in  command,  Colonel  Shaw  was  killed  and  Colonel 
Davis  wounded.  I  have  never  seen  greater  evidence 
of  gallantry  than  was  displayed  by  this  division  under 
the  command  of  that  admirable  and  gallant  soldier, 
Major  General  Edward  Johnson."  l 

Here,  as  on  the  other  side  of  the  turnpike,  the  fear-  ! 
ful  destruction  of  Confederate  officers  is  the  reason  i 
for  the  scarcity  of  official  reports  ;  but  all  that  we  J 
have  arc  so  telling  in  their  references  to  the  despera 
tion  of  the  conflict,  that  we  would   perhaps  shrink 
from  further  repetition.     Hood  himself  says  of  it  thatX 
"  the  engagement  was  of  the  fiercest  possible  charac 
ter.     Our  men  possessed  themselves^c-£the  exterior  of 
the  works  while  the  enemy  held  the   interior.     Many 
of  our  men  were  killed  entirely  inside  the  works.    The 
brave  men  captured  were  taken  inside  his  works  in  the 
edge  of  the  town.     The  struggle  lasted  till  near  mid 
night,  when  the   enemy   abandoned   his    works    and 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  687,  688. 


154  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

crossed  the  river,  leaving  his  dead  and  wounded  in  our 
possession.  Never  did  troops  fight  more  gallantly."  1 

There  arc  errors  in  these  statements,  but  they  fairly 
describe  the  general  character  of  the  fight.  Lieut. 
General  S.  D.  Lee  tells  also  how  he  was  ordered  to 
put  Johnson's  division  in,  because  it  was  a  stubborn 
fight  and  Chcatham  hud  informed  him  about  dark 
that  assistance  was  needed  at  once.  "  Owing  to  the 
darkness  and  want  of  information  as  to  the  locality," 
he  says,  "  his  attack  was  not  felt  by  the  enemy  till 
about  one  hour  after  dark."  He  calls  it  a  "  desperate 
hand  to  hand  conflict,"  and  a  "  terrible  night  strug 
gle."  Of  our  side  he  says,  "  The  enemy  fought  gal 
lantly  and  obstinately  at  Franklin,  and  the  position 
he  held  was,  for  infantry  defence,  one  of  the  best  I 
have  ever  seen."2 

Major  General  Clayton,  of  the  same  corps,  says  that 
his  division  reached  Franklin  late  in  the  afternoon. 
"  We  found  that  bloody  and  disastrous  engagement 
begun,  and  were  put  in  position  to  attack,  but  night 
mercifully  interposed  to  save  us  from  the  terrible 
scourge  which  our  brave  companions  had  suffered."3 

In  General  Brown's  division  of  Cheatham's  corps, 
!„  the  report  of  Colonel  Capers  of  the  24th  South  Caro 
lina,  jrom  which  I  have  already  quoted,4  is  the  only 
one  preserved.  He  tells  how  his  brigade  commander, 
General  Gist,  had  first  his  horse  shot  under  him,  and 
then,  leading  his  brigade  on  foot,  fell,  pierced  through 
the  heart.  AJLJlie_5iiiS!3EiSIi3^e  brigade  was 
checked,  and  there  they  captured  and  sent  "to  flieTear 
many  of  Wagner's  men.  "  Fortunately  for  us,"  he  says, 
"the  fire  of  the  enemy  slackened  to  let  their  advance 
troops  come  in,  and  we  took  advantage  of  it  to  work 

1  ().  It.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  653.  3 

2  Id.,  p.  689.  4 


From  the  Confederate  Standpoint  155 

our  way  through,  gist's  and  Gordon's  brigades  charged 
on  and  reached  the  ditch,  mounted  the  work,  and  met 
the  enemy  in  close  combat.1]  The  colors  of  the  24th  were 
planted  and  defended  on  the  parapet,  and  the  enemy 
retired  in  our  front  some  distance,  but  soon  rallied 
and  came  back  in  turn  to  charge  us.  He  never  suc 
ceeded  in  retaking  the  line  we  held.  About  dusk  there 
was  a  lull  in  the  firing  west  of  the  pike.  Brown^s 
division  had  established  itself  in  the  ditch  of  the  work, 
and~spnfaT  as  Gist's  brigade  front,  on  the  crest.  Torn 
and  exhausted,  deprived  of  every  general  officer  and 
nearly  every  field  officer,  the  division  had  only  strength 
enough  left  to  hold  its  position.  Strahl's  and  Carter's 
brigades  came  gallantly  to  the  assistance  of  Gist's 
and  Gordon's,  but  the  enemy's  fire  from  the  houses  in 
rear  of  the  line,  and  from  his  reserves  thrown  rapidly 
forward,  and  from  guns  posted  on  the  far  side  of 
the  river  so  as  to  enfilade  the  field,  tore  their  line  to 
pieces  before  it  reached  the  locust  abattis."  1 

Colonel  Capers  was  wounded  and  fell  in  the  early 
part  of  the  -attack,  and  lie  does  not  claim  to  narrate 
the  whole  engagement  as  an  eyewitness,  but  com 
pleted  his  report  from  statements  of  his  subordinates.2 
It  also  contains  errors,  but  it  is  contemporaneous  and 
important  testimony.  He  informs  us  that,  at  the  close 
of  the  engagement,  Captain  Gillis  of  the  46th  Georgia 
was  the  senior  officer  of  the  brigade,  and  that  the  men 
in  the  ditch  loaded  the  muskets  and  passed  them  up 
to  those  who  could  fire  over  the  parapet,  and  thus  an 
effective  fire  was  maintained  until  nine  o'clock. 

The  meagre  Confederate  official  reports  are  supple 
mented  by  recollections  of  Southern  officers  published 

1  0.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  736. 

2  Colonel   Capers  became  a  minister  of  the  Protestant  Episcopal 
Church  after  the  war,  and  is  now  (1896)  Bishop  of  South  Carolina. 


156  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

since  the  war.  General  George  W.  Gordon,  who  was 
made  prisoner  in  the  engagement,  delivered  in  1891  an 
address  at  the  unveiling  of  a  statue  of  General  Cleburnc, 
full  of  valuable  matter  drawn  from  his  own  experience 
in  the  battle.  He  describes  the  formation  of  Hood's 
army  on  either  side  of  the  Columbia  Turnpike,  Cle- 
/burne's  and  Brown's  divisions  of  Cheat-ham's  corps 
I  advancing,  the  one  on  the  east  and  the  other  on  the 
(  west  of  the  highway,  which  was  the  left  guide  of 
(  Cleburne  and  the  right  guide  of  Brown.  General 
v  Granbury's  brigade  was  Cleburne's  left  wing,  and 
Gordon's  own  brigade  the  right  of  Brown's.  These 
two  brigades  moved  to  the  attack  in  the  front  line 
separated  only  by  the  road.  "  As  the  array/'Jhe  con- 
/tinues,  "  with  a  front  of  two  miles  or  more  in  length, 
moved  steadily  down  the  heights  and  into  the  valley 
below  with  flying  banners,  beating  drums,  and  bris 
tling  guns,  it  presented  a  scene  of  the  most  imposing 
grandeur  and  magnificence.  ^Whcn  we  had  arrived 
within  about  four  hundred  paces  of  the  enemy's 
advanced  line  of  intrenchments,1  our  columns  were 
halted  and  deployed  into  two  lines  of  battle  prepara 
tory  to  the  charge.  This  advanced  position  of  the 
enemy  was  not  a  continuous,  but  a  detached  line, 
manned  by  two  brigades,  and  situated  about  six  hun 
dred  paces  in  front  of  his  main  line  of  formidable  works, 
and  was  immediately  in  front  of  Cleburne's  left  and 
Cheatham's  (Brown's)  right.  When  all  was  ready  the 
charge  was  ordered.  With  a  wild  shout,  we  dashed  for 
ward  upon  this  line.  The  enemy  delivered  one  volley 
at  our  rushing  ranks,  and  precipitately  fled  for  refuge 
to  his  main  and  rear  line.  The  shout  was  raised,  *Go 
into  the  works  with  them.'  This  cry  was  taken  up  and 
vociferated  from  a  thousand  throats  as  we  rushed  on 

1  He  here  refers  to  the  outpost  line  of  Wagner's  two  brigades. 


From  the  Confederate  Standpoint  157 

after  the  flying  forces  we  had  routed, —  killing  some 
in  our  running  fire,  and  capturing  others  who  were 
slow  of  foot,  —  sustaining  but  small  losses  ourselves 
until  we  arrived  within  about  one  hundred  paces  of 
their  main  line  and  stronghold,  when  it  seemed  to 
me  that  Hell  itself  had  exploded  in  our  faces.  The 
enemy  had  thus  long  reserved  thoir  lire  for  the  safety 
of  their  routed  comrades  who  were  flying  to  them  for 
protection,  and  who  were  just  in  front  of  and  mingled 
with  the  pursuing  Confederates.  When  it  became  no 
longer  safe  for  themselves  to  reserve  their  fire,  they 
opened  upon  us  (regardless  of  their  own  men  wha 
were  mingled  with  us)  such  a  hailstorm  of  shot  and! 
shell,  musketry  and  canister,  that  the  very  atmos-/ 
phcre  was  hideous  with  the  shrieks  of  the  messengers; 
of  death.  The  booming  of  cannon,  the  bursting  of 
bombs,  the  rattle  of  musketry,  the  shrieking  of  shells, 
the  whizzing  of  bullets,  the  shouting  of  hosts,  and  the 
falling  of  men  in  their  struggle  for  victory,  all  made 
a  scene  of  surpassing  terror  and  awful  grandeur." 

I  have  not  felt  at  liberty  to  abridge  this  description 
by  General  Gordon,  for  nothing  short  of  the  whole 
would  quite  convey  the  impression  made  on  his  mind 
by  that  jLcrriblc  charge.  It  is  not  the  story  of  an 
imaginative  writer  of  fiction,  but  the  words  of  a 
brave  soldier  at  the  head  of  his  brigade,  giving  the 
best  and  truest  narrative  he  can  of  the  actual  situ 
ation  of  his  command  and  of  himself.  He  had  at 
an  exceptionally  early  age  won  his  rank  by  distin 
guished  services  on  many  a  hard  fought  field,  and  this 
only  makes  more  terribly  significant  the  pre-eminence 
he  gives  to  the  field  of  Franklin  over  all  others  he 
had  seen.  It  was  in  the  centre  of  this  storm  of  war 
that  Cleburne  appears,  whose  memory  his  friend  was 
celebrating. 


158  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

"Amid  this  scene  General  Clcburnc  came  charging 
down  our  line  to  the  left,  and  diagonally  toward  the 
enemy's  works,  his  horse  running  at  full  speed,  and 
if  I  had  not  personally  checked  my  pace  as  I  ran  on 
foot,  he  would  have  plunged  over  and  trampled  me  to 
/  the  earth.  On  he  dashed^but  for  an  instant  longer, 
when  rider  and  horse  both  fell,  pierced  with  mauy 
bullets,  within  a  few  paces  of  the  enemy's  works.  COn 
we  rushed,  his  men  of  Granbury's  brigade  and  mine 
having  mingled  as  we  closed  on  the  line,  until  we 
reached  the  enemy's  works;  but  beiii^jioj^^-O- ex 
hausted  and  so  few  in  numbers,  we  halted  in  the 
ditch  on  the  outside  of  the  breastworks  among  dead 
and  dying  men,  both  Federals  and  Confederates.j  A 
f  few  charged  over,  but  were  clubbed  down  with  mus 
kets  or  pierced  with  bayonets.  [  For  some  time  we 
fought  them  across  the  breastworks,  both  sides  lying 
low  and  putting  their  guns  under  the  head-logs  upon 
the  works,  firing  rapidly  and  at  random  and  not  ex 
posing  ajjy  part  of  the  body  except  the  hand  that  fired 
the  gun."  Suffering  from  fire  in  every  direction,— 
front,  flanks,  and  rear,  —  they  finally  shouted  to  our 
men  within  the  works  that  they  would  surrender. 
u  At  length,"  says  General  Gordon,  "  they  heard  us 
and  understood  us,  ceased  their  fire,  and  we  crossed 
their  works  and  surrendered.  It  was  fatal  to  leave 
the  ditch  and  endeavor  to  escape  to  the  rear.  Every 
man  who  attempted  it  (and  a  number  did)  was  at 
once  exposed  and  was  shot  down  without  exception." 
lie  concludes  his  description  with  an  important  fact 
which  fixes  his  own  location  as  well  as  that  of  the 
rest  of  his  brigade. 

"  The  left  of  my  brigade,"  he  says,  "  under  com 
mand  of  Colonel  Horace  Rice  (I  was  on  the  right) 
successfully  broke  the  line,  and  some  of  my  brave  and 


From  the  Confederate  Standpoint  159 

noble  men  were  killed  fifty  paces  or  more  within  the 
works.  But  just  at  this  critical  juncture  a  reinforce 
ment  of  a  Federal  brigade  confronted  them  with  a 
heavy  lire,  and  being  few  in  numbers  they  were  driven 
back  to  the  opposite  side  of  the  works,  behind  which 
they  took  position  and  bravely  held  the  line  they  had 
previously  taken."  1 

The  particulars  so  vividly  told  by  General  GordonN 
leave  no  doubt  as  to  his  position  on  the  field.  The 
left  of  his  brigade  is  placed  at  the  break  in  Striek- 
hmd'£._line  on  the  west  of  the  turnpike,  whilst  his 
right  (with  which  he  \vas)  extended  across  the  road  to 
the  east,  occupying  part  of  Cleburne's  ground,  and 
mingling  with  Granbury's  brigade.  This  explains 
also  Cleburne's  hasty  ride  towards  them  to  see  the 
cause  of  the  interference  in  the  movement,  and  cor 
roborates  the  general  opinion  that  that  distinguished 
officer  fell  on  the  east  of  the  turnpike,  nearly  in  front 
of  the  Carter  cotton-gin  and  a  very  few  rods-  from 
our  breastworks.2  It  shows  also  that  Gordon  and  his 
surviving  companions  came  over  the  works  as  prison 
ers  in  Reilly's  brigade  line  not  far  from  the  cotton- 
gin  ^'the  fire  from  that  salient  being  mentioned  as  one 
of  the  causes  of  his  surrender,  and  the  head-logs 
spoken  of  being  east  of  the  Kentucky  battery  front, 
which  was  constructed  with  embrasures  for  the  cannon, 
and  not  with  the  head-log  for  infantry  protection. 

1  The  address  from  which  these  extracts  were  taken  was  delivered 
at  Helena,  Arkansas,  and  published  in   the  Memphis  Appeal  of  Mav 
11,  1891. 

2  See  also  a  statement  by  Mr.  John  McQuaide  of  Vicksburg,  one 
of  the  party  which  found  the  body.     Century  War  Book,  iv.  439.     It 
substantially  agrees  also  with  the  position  shown  by  the  Carter  family 
and  other  residents  of  the  neighborhood. 


CHAPTER   XII 

THE   BATTLE   AFTER   DATJK 

In  the  Locust  Grove  —  The  Two  Lines  —  The  1 12th  Illinois—  Ueilly's 
Detachment  —  Sweeping  the  Ditches  —  Captain  Cunningham's 
Story  —  The  Sergeant  Major's  —  General  Strahl's  Death—  Hood's 
Reserves  —  Rallying  on  them  —  Later  Alarms  —  Orders  to  Wood's 
Division  —  Preparations  for  Withdrawal. 

HAVING  seen  from  the  Confederate  standpoint  the 
repeated  heroic  assaults  made  upon  our  lines,  we 
must  again  turn  our  attention  to  the  progress  of  the 
equally  determined  defence,  especially  at  the  criti 
cal  point  at  the  locust  grQXfi,  where  our  men  had 
given  back  from  the  main  line  and  were  holding 
their  second  liiieTb'f  Hastily  constructed  barricade. 
It  will  be  remembered  that,  after  the  main  line  of 
works  crossed  the  Columbia  Turnpike  and  ran  west 
some  fifty  yards,  it  turned  toward  the  northwest, 
following  the  curve  of  |he  hill,  and  descending  a 
little  upon  its  slope.1  'The  body  of  the  enemy  that 
held  on  to  the  outside  of  the  parapet  and  filled  the 
ditch  was  just  west  of  the  angle  in  the  line  where 
the  men  were  sheltered  from  the  fire  of  the  salient 
near  the  cotton-gin  by  both  the  angle  itself  and  the 
depression  of  the  ground  below  the  level  of  the  turn- 
pikeO  The  Confederates  there  were  hardly  an  organ 
ized  body,  but  were  a  mingling  of  men  from  all  the 
different  commands  that  had  followed  Gordon's  and 

1  See  ante,  p.  43,  and  the  sketch  there  given. 


The  Battle  after  Dark  161 

Gist's  brigades  in  the  first  charge.  In  this  respect 
the  confusion  of  commands  on  both  sides  was  not 
dissimilar.  Those  of  the  enemy  who  were  within 
tllcTange  of  our  oblique  fire  from  left  or  right  were 
swept  away,  and  as  to  the  crowd  at  the  ditch  at  the 
place  indicated,  it  may  fairly  be  said  that  it  was  less 
perilous  for  them  to  remain  than  to  retreat  across 
the  storm-swept  tield  behind  them.  There  they  stood 
in  desperation,  the  men  in  the  ditch  passing  up 
loaded  guns  to  those  who  stood  on  the  bermc,  who 
were  thus  able  to  keep  up  a  continuous  lire  over  the 
parapet. 

It_was  desirable  that  the  fire  from  the  salient  at 
the  cotton-gin  should  have  the  most  effective  enfilad 
ing"  sweep  along  the  front,  and  it  was  for  this  reason  ' 
that  the  112th  Illinois,  when  brought  from  our  left, 
was  ordered  to  report  to  Strickland  for  the  purpose! 
of  bringing  our  line  forward  to  the  main  works  by; 
advancing  from  his  right.  Lieut.  Colonel  Bond, 
commanding  the  regiment,  accompanied  by  Major 
Dow  of  my  staff,  led  it  to  the  right  of  Strickland's 
brigade,1  the  position  of  the  72d  Illinois,  which  was, 
by  the  casualties  of  the  battle,  left  in  command  of 
Captain  Sexton.  [This  intrepid  officer  was  consulted 
as  to  the  extent  of  the  enemy's  front  in  contact  with 
th£_e3£tllworksQand  it  was  decided  to  pass  Colonel 
Bond's  regiment  out  near  the  small  log  building  or 
corn -crib  which  was  standing  in  rear  of  Sexton's 
line,2  and  try  to  reach  the  main  works  close  to  the 
flank  of  Moore's  brigade,  supporting  the  movement 
by  the  troops  in  second  line  advancing  on  the  left  of 
Bond  as  he  reached  the  parapet.  Captain  Carter 
of  the  72d  Illinois  acted  as  guide  for  Colonel  Bond 
in  the  advance. 

1  Ante,  p.  146.  2  See  sketch,  ante,  p.  43. 

11 


162  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

As  .it  had  already  become  dark,  in  the  double 
gloom  of  night  and  the  pall  of  smoke  the  position 
and  the  extent  of  the  enemy  could  only  be  known  by 
the  flashing  of  the  musketry.  The  112th  Illinois 
got  over  the  barricade  in  front  of  Sexton's  line  and 
crawled  forward,  led  by  Bond  and  Dow,  and  keeping 
low  so  as  to  be  beneath  the  line  of  fire.  They  had 
no  great  difficulty  in  getting  close  to  the  parapet  in 
( front,  but  when  they  rose  to  occupy  the  work  the 
fire  of  the  enemy  was  so  close  that,  as  Colonel  Bond 
says,  his  face  was  burned  by  the  powder.1  But  the 
fire  in  front  was  not  the  only  peril  in  the  darkness. 
Although  word  had  been  sent  to  the  troops  on  right 
and  left  to  cease  firing,  the  din  of  battle  made  it 
hard  to  get  the  orders  understood  by  the  men  in  line, 
and  they  could  not  be  restrained  from  firing  obliquely 
at  the  flash  of  the  enemy's  guns.  Sexton's  regiment 
had  gone  forward  on  the  left  of  Bond's,  and  both 
dropped  to  the  ground  to  wait  for  a  cessation  of  the 
fire.  Colonel  Bond  was  twice  wounded  slightly,  one 
ball  cutting  the  tendon  of  his  heel.  "As  I  was  very 
close  to  the  first  line,"  he  says,  "the  Confederates 
could  not  have  fired  so  low. "  2 

Finding  that  the  front  line  was  now  made  unten- 
'  able  by  this  fire  from  their  friends,  the  regiments 
:  returned  to  the  second  line,  the  112th  Illinois  pass 
ing  through  the  locust  grove  and  around  the  west 
end  of  the  barricade,  which,  in  Colonel  Bond's  judg 
ment,  extended  some  fifty  feet  west  of  the  log  build 
ing,  arid  there  ended  without  connecting  with  Moore's 
brigade,  whose  left  rested  on  the  northwest  slope  of 

1  Letter  of  Colonel  Emery  S.  Bond,  September  29,  1885.     Colonel 
Bond  was  then  a  commission  merchant  in  Chicago.    See  also  statement 
of  Major  Dow,  in  Appendix  E. 

2  Letter  of  October  22.  1885. 


The  Battle  after  Dark  163 

the_Carter  Hill,  as  Moore's  report  tells  us.1  The 
regiment  remained  during  the  evening  in  support 
of  Strickland's  brigade,  awaiting  a  more  tavorable 
opportunity  for  the  renewal  of  the  effort  to  reoccupy 
the  main  works.  The  two  lines  were  here,  as  the 
officers  stated,  about  three  or  four  rods  apart. 

Tojkecriup  the  active  efforts  to  clear  the  front  of 
Strickland's  brigade,  I  had  directed  General  Reilly 
to  put  a  detachment  from  his  own  brigade  over  the 
works  near  the  cotton-gin,  giving  orders  to  sweep 
down  along  the  front  to  the  turnpike  upon  the  flank 
of  any  of  the  enemy  that  might  be  hanging  on  in 
front  of  Opdycke,  thus  assisting  in  dislodging  those 
also  who  were  farther  down  behind  the  angle  already 
..described.2  This  he  did,  the  result  being  consider 
able  additions  to  the  number  of  prisoners  and  flags 
in  our  hands.  It  was  now  near  nine  o'clock  in  the, 
evening.  The  attack  o£  General  Edward  Johnson's 
division  from  Hood's  reserve  had  been  made  and 
repulsed,  and  as  it  fell  back  from  the  hollow  toward 
the  higher  ground,  where  the  barricades  held  by 
Wagner's  men  at  the  beginning  of  the  fight  still 
were,  the  remnant  of  the  Confederates  in  the  ditch 
who  were  not  too  much  disabled  made  their  way 
also  to  the  rear.  Heavy  volleying  and  continuous 
fire  was  still  for  some  time  kept  up,  but  it  was  now 
across  a  considerable  interval,  and  not  from  the 
outside  of  our  own  parapet  at  any  point. 

1  Captain  Sexton  fully  corroborates  Colonel  Bond's  account  of 
these  details.  In  February,  1894,  without  any  knowledge  of  Colonel 
Bond's  letters  referred  to  above,  he  wrote  me  an  interesting  statement 
accompanied  by  a  sketch  map  from  memory.  At  the  time  of  writing, 
Captain  Sexton  was  just  closing  his  term  as  postmaster  of  the  city  of 
Chicago.  It  would  be  hard  to  find  a  stronger  concurrence  of  indepen 
dent  testimony  than  that  which  establishes  the  situation  on  this  part  of 
the  field.  For  Moore's  Report,  see  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  379. 

-  Ante,  p.  UG. 


164  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Captain  W.  E.  Cunningham,  of  the  41st  Tennessee, 
in  StrahPs  brigade,  who  was  himself  among  the 
severely  wounded,  and  was  among  the  last  to  crawl 
back  from  the  fatal  ditch  in  the  locust  .grove,  has 

(described  the  situation  clearly  and  vividly.1  "The 
•4?  \  remnants  of  Strahl  and  Gordon  held  the  works  in 

(pure  desperation.-  It  was  certain  death  to  retreat 
across  that  plain,  and  equally  as  bad  to  remain.  The 
men  fought  doggedly  across  the  works  without  officers, 
and  with  no  light  save  the  lurid  glare  of  the  enemy's 
artillery,  which  seemed  to  sear  the  eyeballs.  This 
portion  of  the  wrorks  was  held  against  every  attack 

Cf  the  enemy  to  regain  them.  The  thicket  had  been 
lit  down  as  if  by  a  mowing  machine,  and  the  ground 
was  all  in  deep  furrows.  About  nine  o'clock  the 
firing  gradually  dwindled  into  a  slight  skirmish. 
Those  who  were  able  walked  or  crawled  back  from 
under  the  works." 

Sergeant  Major  Cunningham,  of  the  same  regi 
ment  (a  near  kinsman  of  the  captain),  has  also  left 
a  truthful  picture  of  this  doomed  and  dwindling 
remnant,  when,  as  he  says,  there  was  not  an  efficient 
man  left  between  this  group  and  the  turnpike,  and 
among  themselves  hardly  enough  to  hand  up  guns  to 
the  short  and  thin  line  firing  from  the  outside  of  the 
parapet.2  "It  was  evident  that  we  could  not  hold 
out  much  longer,  and  it  was  thought  that  none  of  us 
would  be  left  alive.  It  seemed  expedient  that  we 
should  either  surrender  or  try  and  get  away,  when 
the  General  (Strahl)  was  asked,  and  he  responded, 
4  Keep  firing,'  and  just  as  the  man  to  my  right  was 

1  Communication  to  the  Philadelphia  Times,  May  27,  1882. 

2  I  have  referred  to  the  reliability  and  value  of  Sergeant  Major 
Cunningham's  pamphlet  in  my  volume  on  the  campaign,  "  Franklin  and 
Nashville,"  etc.,  p.  93. 


The  Battle  after  Dark  165 

shot  and  fell  against  me  with  terrible  and  loud 
groans,  General  Strahl  was  shot.  He  threw  up  his 
hands,  falling  on  his  face,  and  we  thought  him  dead ; 
hut  in  asking  the  dying  man,  who  still  rested  against 
my  shoulder,  how  he  was  wounded,  our  General,  not 
dead,  and  thinking  my  question  was  to  him,  raised 
up,  saying  he  was  shot  in  the  head,  and  called  for 
Colonel  Stafford  to  turn  over  his  command.  He 
crawled  over  the  dead,  the  ditch  being  three  deep, 
about  twenty  feet  to  where  Colonel  Stafford  was. 
His  staff  officers  started  to  carry  him  to  the  rear,  but 
he  received  another  shot,  and  directly  a  third,  which 
killed  him  instantly.  .  .  .  Captain  W.  E.  Cunning 
ham  had  lost  an  eye,  and  as  he  sat  in  the  ditch 
waiting  for  the  terrible  night  to  end,  called  to  his 
devoted  comrade  and  told  him  of  his  misfortune. 
An  almost  helpless  handful  of  us  were  left,  and 
the  writer  was  satisfied  that  our  condition  was  not 
known,  so  he  ran  to  the  rear  to  report  to  General 
Brown  commanding  the  division.  He  met  Major 
Hampton  of  the  division  staff,  who  told  him  that 
General  Brown  was  wounded,  and  that  General 
Strahl  was  in  command  of  the  division.  This  con 
firmed  his  prediction,  so  he  wrent  on  the  hunt  of 
General  Cheatham,  and  after  having  failed  to  find 
him  for  some  time,  and  seeing  that  relief  was  being 
sent,  he  lay  down  to  rest  and  sleep.  His  shoulder 
was  black  with  bruises  from  firing,  and  it  seemed 
that  no  moisture  was  left  in  his  system.  These  per 
sonal  mentions  arc  all  he  can  give,  for  it  was  night, 
and  the  writer  never  knew  other  than  what  he  saw. 
It  was  not  long  after  the  recruits  [reserves  ?]  were 
sent  forward  until  the  last  gun  was  silenced." 

Hood's  reserves  consisted  of  Clayton's  and  Steven- 
of  Lee's  corps  after  the   repulse  of 


166  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Johnson's  division  of  the  same  corps.  Reference 
has  already  been  made  to  the  fact  that  they  were 
put  in  position  to  attack.1  General  Stovall,  who 
commanded  the  advanced  brigade  of  Clayton's  divis 
ion,  states  that  he  occupied  "the  enemy's  first  line 
of  works,"  as  the  Confederates  designated  the  out 
post  line  of  Wagner's  two  brigades  as  distinguished 
from  our  " main  line."  Just  in  rear  of  this  posi 
tion,  sheltered  by  the  roll  of  the  ground,  the  rest  of 
(  the  reserve  was  placed,  "preparatory,"  as  General 
/  Stevenson  reports,  "to  an  assault  which  it  was 
•  announced  was  to  be  made  by  the  entire  army  at 
daybreak."3  Upon  this  centre  the  remnants  of  the 
corps  of  Cheatham  and  Stewart  were  rallied  after 
the  repulse  of  Johnson's  division  and  the  return  of 
the  handful  from  Brown's  division  who  escaped 
destruction,  as  has  been  so  graphically  told  by  the 
two  Cunninghams. 

The  front  of  lioth  armies  was  now  covered  by 
skirmishers,  and,  though  the  Confederates  did  not 
venture  any  further  assaults,  "  alarms  occurred  fre 
quently  until  eleven  o'clock,  and  frequently  caused  a 
general  musketry  fire  on  both  sides  from  our  centre 
toward  the  right,  but  I  found  no  evidence  that  any 
real  attack  was  made  at  so  late  an  hour,  the  demon 
strations  being  manifestly  made  by  the  rebels  to  dis 
cover  whether  our  lines  were  being  abandoned  during 
the  evening. " 4 

I  have  followed  the  successive  stages  of  the  fight 
ing  upon  the  line  down  to  the  time  in  the  evening 
when  the  enemy  definitely  accepted  defeat,  and 
sought  only  to  reform  his  lines  and  collect  the  rem 
nants  of  his  broken  divisions  under  the  shelter  of  the 

1  Ante,  p.  154.  2  0.  E,,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  701.  3  Id.,  p.  694. 

4  My  own  report,  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  354,  355,  and  Appendix  B, 


The  Battle  after  Dark  167 

two  divisions  of  Leo's  corps,  which  had  not  been 
engaged.  We  could  not  tell,  in  the  darkness,  much 
beyond  what  was  revealed  by  the  partial  contact  of 
the  skirmish  lines.  From  time  to  time  a  general 
fire  would  roll  along  the  front  of  Hood's  reserve, 
our  skirmishers  would  run  in,  and  the  (ire  would  be 
returned  from  our  line.  After  a  little  it  would  quiet 
down,  skirmish  lines  would  be  sent  forward  again, 
and  the  rattle  of  single  shots  here  and  there  would 
take  the  place  of  the  continuous  roar.  When  this 
had  been  a  few  times  repeated,  we  became  satisfied 
that  no  further  attack  would  be  made,  and  the  enemy 
concluded  in  like  manner  that  we  were  determined 
tojiold  our  position  through  the  night. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  General  Schofield's 
orders  in  the  morning  had  directed  a  withdrawal  to 
the  north  side  of  the  Harpeth  at  dark,  if  Hood  had 
not  before  that  time  engaged  us  on  our  lines.  The 
orders  sent  to  Wagner  on  Winstead  Hill  prolonged 
his  duty  as  rear  guard  in  that  contingency.1  The 
south  bank  of  the  river  would  have  been  cleared  of 
everything  by  six  o'clock,  and  Wagner's  division 
would  have  been  the  last  to  cross  the  Harpeth. 
Hood's  attack  had  changed  all  that.  From  his  posi 
tion  at  the  fort  on  Figucr's  Hill,  General  Schofield 
could  himself  see  the  progress  of  the  battle  better 
than  we  could  who  were  in  its  din  and  smoke,  and 
for  the  details  of  what  was  occurring  upon  the  line 
he  had  the  help  of  his  staff,  who  were  kept  constantly 
going  and  coming  between  his  headquarters  and  my 
own  at  the  Carter  Hill. 

During  the  desperate  melde  he  had  ordered  General 
Wood's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  to  be  held  in 
readiness  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the  river2  in  case 

1  Ante,  p.  GG.  2  O.  "R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1174. 


168  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

the  enemy  should  succeed  in  breaking  our  lines  on 
the  south  side,  and  dispositions  were  carefully  made 
by  General  Wood  for  that  purpose. 

A  little  earlier,  on  General  Wilson's  report  that 
the  enemy's  infantry  was  threatening  to  cross  at 
Hughes's  Ford,  three  miles  above  Franklin,  Schoficld 
had  directed  a  brigade  from  Wood's  division  to  be 
sent  to  support  the  cavalry  there,1  and  to  delay  the 
flank  movement  of  Hood,  which  was  his  most  prob 
able,  as  it  was  certainly  his  wisest  movement.  Gen 
eral  Wood  ordered  Beatty's  brigade  to  that  duty,2  but 
it  was  delayed  a  little  for  the  issue  of  rations,  and 
before  it  actually  marched  the  advance  of  the  Con 
federates  against  us  in  force  solved  the  problem  of 
Hood's  intentions,  and  the  order  was  countermanded. 
General  Wood,  in  accordance  with  the  later  orders, 
now  made  the  disposition  of  his  division  to  cover  the 
withdrawal  of  our  troops  from  the  intrenched  line  if 
it  should  become  necessary.3  Beatty's  brigade  was 
deployed  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river  above  the 
town;  Streight's  brigade  along  the  bank  of  the 
river  immediately  opposite  the  town;  and  Post's 
brigade  on  the  bank  of  the  river  below  the  town. 

o 

The  telegraphic  correspondence  between  General 
Schofield  and  General  Thomas  was  going  on  at  this 
time,  and  on  the  announcement  of  Hood's  preparing 
to  cross  the  Harpeth  on  our  left  flank  above  the 
town,  Thomas  ordered  the  army  trains  sent  back  to 
Brentwood  and  Nashville,  covered  and  followed  by 
the  troops.4  The  stirring  scenes  of  the  battle  quickly 
followed,  necessarily  suspending  the  orders  for  retir 
ing  at  dark.  When  night  shut  down  on  the  field, 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1 1 78.  2  Id.,  p.  1 1 74. 

3  Wood's  Report,  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  125,  126,  and  Appendix  C. 

4  Ante,  p.  43,  and  O.  R,,  xlv.  part  i.  p   1171. 


The  Battle  after  Dark  169 

although  the  conflict  seemed  as  fierce  as  ever,  we 
who  were  upon  the  line  knew  that  the  impetus  of 
Hood's  assault  was  broken,  and  that  we  could  hold 
our  position.  Colonel  Wherry,  the  chief  of  staff, 
had  been  able  to  report  this  confidence  to  General 
Schofield,  who  now  issued  new  orders  for  a  midnight 
withdrawal,  anticipating  the  total  cessation  of  the 
battle  by  that  time.  These  directed  that  the  lines 
should  be  drawn  back  from  the  right  and  left  of  the 
centre  at  the  Carter  Hill  simultaneously,  troops  from 
the  left  passing  by  the  railroad  bridge,  and  those 
from  the  right  by  the  foot-bridge,  all  then  marching 
to  Brentwood  by  the  Nashville  Turnpike.  The  skir 
mishers  of  the  whole  line  were  to  be  kept  out  until 
the  rear  of  the  columns  had  crossed  the  river,  and 
were  then  to  be  withdrawn  together.  General  Wood 
was  to  cover  the  crossing,  as  he  had  earlier  prepared 
to  do,  and  then  to  act  as  rear  guard.1 

This  order  was  issued  between  six  and  seven 
o'clock,  and  received  by  me  about  the  last  named 
hour.2  Fearing  that  General  Schofield  did  not  know 
the  full  confidence  I  had  in  our  ability  to  hold  our 
lines,  I  sent  at  once  my  Adjutant  General,  Ca.ptain 
Theodore  Cox,  to  his  headquarters  to  express 
strongly  my  willingness  to  be  personally  answer 
able  for  holding  the  position,  and  my  opinion  that 
there  was  now  no  need  to  retreat.  The  trains  had, 
however,  been  some  hours  on  the  road  toward  Nash 
ville  under  General  Thomas's  order,  and  with  a 
warmly  congratulatory  message,  General  Schofield 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i   p.  1172. 

2  The  order  from  Fourth  Corps  headquarters  in  obedience  to  Gen 
eral  Schofield's  was  issued  at  7.15  P.M.     Allowing  for  time  to  make 
copies  of  the  original,  this  supports  my  statement  that  General  Scho 
field  issued  his  between  six  and  seven.     No  hour  is  marked  on  the 
original.     Ibid.,  and  p.  1173. 


170  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

sent  word  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  carry  out 
the  orders  already  issued.1 

At  General  Schofield's  headquarters  my  staff  officer 
found  General  Stanley,  who  had  gone  there  after  his 
wound  had  been  dressed  and  the  necessary  changes 
of  clothing  had  been  made.  Somewhat  later,  my 
Inspector  General,  Major  Dow,  went  also  to  the 
army  headquarters  in  obedience  to  a  call  to  meet 
there  Colonel  Hartsuff,  Schofield's  Inspector  Gen 
eral,  and  to  arrange  the  details  of  the  order  for 
covering  our  withdrawal  by  the  skirmish  lines  and 
then  bringing  these  off  together  at  a  later  hour. 
Major  Dow  also  met  General  Stanley  at  the  head 
quarters.2 

Another  incident  of  the  early  evening  was  the  re- 
establishment  of  the  second  line  at  the  centre  as  it 
had  been  organized  before  the  battle.  Colonel  Rous 
seau  of  the  12th  Kentucky  describes  this  in  his 
report.3  The  repulse  of  the  enemy  at  the  first  series 
of  fierce  assaults  made  it,  as  he  says,  comparatively 
easy  to  hold  the  works  afterward,  and,  a  skirmish 
line  in  connection  with  that  of  Casement's  brigade 
having  been  advanced  from  the  left  front  of  Reilly's 
brigade,  Rousseau's  regiment  was  ordered  back  into 
the  reserve  position  he  occupied  at  the  beginning. 
The  right  of  Reilly's  brigade  was  longer  involved  in 
the  struggles  which  continued  on  the  west  of  the 
turnpike. 

But  in  Opdycke's  brigade  also  the  dictate  of  mil 
itary  judgment  was  obeyed,  though  necessarily  later, 

1  For  the  detailed  statement  of  Captain  Cox,  see  Appendix  F.    This 
was  corroborated  by  a  letter  from  General  Schofield  to  Captain  L.  T. 
Scofield,  February  2,  1887,  the  latter  having  published  the  incident 
in  his  paper  on  the  campaign  quoted  ante,  p.  103. 

2  See  also  chap,  xxi.,  post. 
8  0.  B.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  416. 


The  Battle  after  Dark  171 

and  a  brigade  reserve  was  also  drawn  out  of  the 
overcrowded  front  line,  and  placed  in  support  before 
the  movement  in  evacuation  of  the  lines  was  begun.1 
The  men  of  Lane's  and  Conrad's  brigades  who  had 
remained  scattered  among  the  organized  forces  in 
the  line  went  back  to  join  their  standards  near  the 
river,  where  General  Wagner  had  been  all  the  evening 
busy  in  the  reorganization  of  his  command.2 

Before  describing  the  midnight  withdrawal  of  the 
troops,  however,  it  will  be  proper  to  narrate  the  part 
in  the  day's  work  which  was  performed  by  the  cav 
alry  under  General  Wilson.  For  the  sake  of  clear 
ness,  I  have,  as  far  as  possible,  omitted  reference  to 
their  movements,  and  must  go  back  and  give  their 
positions  in  the  early  morning,  as  well  as  their 
spirited  engagement  in  the  afternoon. 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  251,  253. 

2  For  fuller  discussion  of  this  point,  see  chap,  xix.,  post. 


CHAPTER    XIII 

WILSON'S   CAVALRY   ENGAGEMENT 

Morning  Positions  —  Covering  both  Flanks  of  the  Army — Forrest's 
Advance  —  The  Fords  of  the  Harpeth  —  Confederates  cross  at 
Hughes's  Ford  —  Wilson  attacks  —  Sharp  Combat  —  Enemy  re 
treat  across  the  River — Covering  the  March  to  Nashville. 

DURING  the  night  of  the  29th,  the  principal  body  of 
General  Wilson's  cavalry  force  was  concentrated  at 
the  cross-roads  two  miles  and  a  half  east  of  Franklin, 
on  the  Triune  road.1  His  headquarters  were  at  the 
Matthews  house,  and  his  outposts  observed  the  fords 
of  the  Harpeth  River  for  several  miles  above  the 
town.2  The  only  important  detachment  was  Ham 
mond's  brigade,  which  had  been  sent  to  Triune  to 
learn  whether  Forrest  was  making  a  turning  move 
ment  in  force,  as  Wilson  apprehended.3  Hammond's 
brigade  reported  directly  to  the  commander  of  the 
cavalry  corps,  and  the  rest  of  the  force  was  organ 
ized  in  two  divisions,  Johnson's  and  Hatch's.  The 
former  consisted  of  two  brigades,  Croxton's  and 
Capron's,  the  latter  commanded  by  Colonel  Thomas 
J.  Harrison.4  Under  Hatch  were  Coon's  brigade  and 
Stewart's. 

Soon  after  daylight  of  the  30th,  in  obedience  to 
orders  from  General  Schofield,  Wilson  sent  Croxton's 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  550.  3  Id.,  pp.  1145,  1146. 

2  Id.,  p.  598.  4  id.,  pp.  576,  598. 


Wilson1 8  Cavalry  Engagement  173 

brigade  across  the  Harpeth  to  the  south  side,  and 
thence  out  upon  the  Lewisburg  Turnpike  to  the 
Douglass  church.1  Here  Croxton  covered  the  Hank 
of  our  infantry  column  marching  upon  the  Columbia 
Turnpike,  and  when  the  rear  guard  of  the  Fourth 
Corps  passed  this  point  Croxton  also  retired  and 
i'oniicd  upon  General  Wagner's  left  (facing  south), 
Wagner  having  halted  upon  the  Winstead  Hill  and 
checked  the  advance  of  Hood's  army. 

In  pursuance  of  similar  directions  from  head 
quarters  of  the  army,  Wilson  directed  Hammond's 
brigade  not  to  remain  at  Triune  if  no  considerable 
force  of  the  enemy  were  found  there,  but  to  return 
by  way  of  Petersburg  to  Wilson's  mill,  a  position 
on  the  Brentwood  Turnpike,  northeast  of  the  general 
position  of  our  cavalry  at  the  Matthews  corners,  and 
covering  our  communications  with  Nashville  on  the 
cast  and  by  the  rear.2  Hammond  had  found  no 
signs  of  the  enemy  near  Triune,  and  in  the  course 
of  the  forenoon  took  up  the  position  indicated.3 

To  cover  the  right  flank  of  the  army,  well  out 
toward  the  west,  and  to  try  to  open  communication 
with  General  Cooper,  who,  with  parts  of  two  brigades 
was  supposed  to  be  marching  from  Centreville  on 
the  Duck  River  to  join  us  at  Franklin,  the  Fifth 
Iowa  cavalry  was  detached  from  Harrison's  brigade 
and  sent  down  the  river  to  the  turnpike  leading  from 
Hillsboro  to  Nashville.4 

The  array  of  General  Schoficld's  army  was  thus 
completed  and  made  compact  as  possible.  Apart 
from  the  fault  inherent  in  a  position  astride  of  a 
river  which  circumstances  had  forced  upon  us,  the 
preparation  to  meet  the  enemy  was  a  satisfactory 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  559,  572.  3  Id.,  pp.  1182,  1183. 

2  Id.,  p.  559.  4  Id.,  p.  598. 


174  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

one,  especially  in  the  relations  of  the  cavalry  to  the 
rest  of  the  command. 

On  the  part  of  General  Hood,  the  knowledge  that 
Cooper  was  somewhere  to  the  westward  of  our  line 
of  march  and  might  at  any  time  appear  on  his  left 
flank,  had  made  it  necessary  to  divide  Forrest's 
cavalry  corps  more  nearly  in  equal  parts,  sending 
Chalmers  with  a  division  and  a  fraction  of  another  to 
the  Carter's  Creek  Turnpike,  whilst  Forrest  himself 
led  Buford's  and  Jackson's  divisions  in  advance  of 
the  army,  and  endeavored  by  Hank  movements  to  cut 
in  upon  and  destroy  our  trains. 

When  Wagner  had  halted  at  the  Winstead  Hill 
and  checked  there  the  Confederate  advance,  Croxton's 
cavalry  brigade  was,  as  we  have  seen,  upon  his  left.1 
Forrest  awaited  the  arrival  of  Stewart's  corps,  and, 
leaving  to  that  officer  the  direct  movement  by  the 
turnpike,  took  both  his  mounted  divisions  across  to 
and  beyond  the  Lewisburg  road,  turning  the  position 
of  Opdycke's  brigade  on  the  hill,  and  gradually  for 
cing  Croxton  back  toward  Franklin.  Then  followed 
the  retreat  of  Wagner  to  his  unfortunate  position 
between  the  armies ;  but  Forrest  did  not  hasten  the 
advance  of  his  overwhelming  force  against  Croxton's 
brigade.  He  awaited  quietly  the  complete  deploy 
ment  of  Hood's  army,  timing  his  advance  by  it.  He 
ordered  the  whole  of  Buford's  division,  dismounted, 
to  deploy  on  the  right  of  Loring's  division  of  infan 
try,  and  to  go  forward  with  it  when  Stewart  should 
give  the  word  to  attack.2  The  horses  were  left  in 
the  wooded  hollows  where  the  deployment  had  been 
made,  under  cover  from  the  fire  of  our  artillery  in 
the  line  and  in  Fort  Granger  on  the  hill  north  of  the 
river. 

1  Ante,  p.  17-3.  '-  0.  R,,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  754. 


Wilson's  Cavalry  Engagement  175 

Jackson's  division  was  not  dismounted  at  once 
like  Buford's,  but  was  ordered  to  reconnoitre  toward 
Ilughes's  Ford,  which  was  nearly  east  from  the  ex 
treme  right  flank  of  the  Confederates  when  they 
passed  the  Winstcad  Hill.  The  road  from  the  ford 
northward  led  directly  to  General  Wilson's  position 
at  the  Matthews  place.  When  the  general  advance 
should  be  made,  Jackson's  directions  were  to  cross 
the  river  and  dislodge  our  forces  from  the  hill  at 
Fort  Granger,  from  which  CockerilPs  rifled  guns 
had  opened  fire  as  soon  as  Forrest's  men  had  come 
within  range.1 

Croxton  reported  that  about  two  o'clock  the 
enemy's  cavalry  made  a  dash  at  him,  but,  being 
repulsed,  moved  off  to  Hughes 's  Ford,  whilst  infantry 
took  their  place.2  The  Confederate  reports  are  so 
explicit  in  stating  that  Buford's  dismounted  men 
occupied  the  space  between  the  Lewisburg  Turn 
pike  and  the  river  whilst  Jackson's  division  made 
the  movement  toward  the  ford,  that  there  is  little 
room  for  doubt  that  Croxton  mistook  the  dismounted 
men  for  infantry,  as  was  so  frequently  done  when 
the  horses  and  their  holders  were  not  in  sight.3  We 
have  seen  the  mistake  appear  in  the  reports  of 
Kimball's  division  on  the  extreme  right,  and  shall 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  754.     It  was  the  general  belief  among  the 
Confederates  that  we  had  a  battery  upon  a  hill  farther  up  the  north 
bank  of  the  river  than  the  fort.     This  is  indicated  in  the  map  accom 
panying  Stewart's  report  (Official  Atlas,  plate  Ixiii.  fig.  3),  and  is  men 
tioned  in  Major  Sanders's  valuable  paper  (Southern  Bivouac,  July, 
1885,  p.  9).     The  belief  is  nevertheless  a  mistaken  one.     No  artillery 
was  with  Wilson's  cavalry,  all  the  batteries  of  the  Fourth  Corps  were 
in  our  main  lines,  and  the  Twenty-third  Corps  batteries,  except  that  in 
the  fort,  were  parked  with  Wood's  division,  and  so  remained  during 
the  day.     O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  432.     (Report  of  Chief  of  Artillery, 
Twenty-third  Corps.)     For  Stewart's  Map,  see  p.  83,  ante. 

2  Id.,  p.  573.  s  Ante,  p.  138. 


1/6  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

find  it  again  in  Forrest's  report  of  his  advance 
against  Wilson's  position  on  our  extreme  left,  later 
in  the  day. 

Within  the  limits  of  the  field  of  battle  there  were 
two  fords  across  the  Harpeth.  llughes's,  which  has 
been  already  mentioned,  was  some  three  miles  above 
Franklin,  and  about  as  far  from  the  Columbia  Turn 
pike  where  that  road  passes  the  Winstead  Hill. 
McGavock's  Ford  was  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the 
centre  of  the  town,  and  not  far  from  the  Lewisburg 
Turnpike,  which  for  some  distance  follows  the 
general  direction  of  the  river. 

Seeing  the  array  of  Hood's  army  in  line  of  battle, 
Croxton  withdrew  his  brigade,1  and  crossed  the  river 
to  the  right  bank  by  McGavock's  Ford,  having  one 
regiment  (the  2d  Michigan)  on  the  hither  side,  which 
for  some  time  skirmished  with  Buford's  advancing 
men.  About  three  o'clock,  and  nearly  simultane 
ously  with  the  advance  of  Hood's  infantry  against 
our  lines,  Wilson  was  definitely  informed  of  Forrest's 
crossing  at  Hughes's  Ford,  and  prepared  to  meet  the 
enemy's  movement.  The  first  report  from  the  out 
post  up  the  river,  when  Jackson's  division  first 
approached  the  ford,  had  brought  news  that  both 
infantry  and  cavalry  wrere  threatening  to  cross,  and, 
this  being  sent  to  General  Schofield,  he  had  ordered 
General  Wood  to  send  a  brigade  of  infantry  to  sup 
port  our  cavalry,  as  wre  have  seen.2  But  the  desper 
ate  assault  of  Stewart's  and  Cheatham's  corps  coming 
at  that  time  had  made  Schofield  revoke  his  order 
till  it  should  be  seen  whether  Wood's  reserve  might 
not  be  more  needed  at  the  centre.  It  turned  out 
that  Jackson  was  not  supported  by  infantry;  the  one 
division  of  cavalry  was  all  that  crossed  to  the  right 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  573.  2  Ante,  p.  168. 


Wilson's  Cavalry  Engagement  177 

bank  of  the  Harpcth,  and  this  Wilson  was  able  to 
take  care  of.  He  ordered  Hatch's  division  to  ad 
vance  from  the  Matthews  place  to  meet  the  enemy  in 
front,  and  Croxton  to  march  from  McGavock's  Ford 
and  attack  in  flank.1  Harrison's  brigade  was  held 
in  reserve  on  the  left  and  rear. 

The  Confederate  cavalry  advancing  from  Hughes 's 
Ford  had  driven  back  the  picket  with  its  supports, 
Ross's  brigade  having  the  advance.2  A  series  of 
lively  charges  and  countercharges  between  single 
regiments  occurred  before  Hatch  could  move  the 
body  of  his  command  forward.  The  Confederates 
had  gained  the  summits  of  several  steep  hills  look 
ing  down  abruptly  into  a  little  valley  between  them 
and  our  advancing  cavalry.  Their  line  extended 
beyond  Hatch's  left.  The  latter  dismounted  his 
men  and  moved  them  forward  in  line  to  the  foot  of 
the  hills,  when  the  order  was  given  to  charge.  The 
men  now  sprang  forward  with  great  spirit,  carrying 
the  crests.  Giving  his  men  a  moment  to  breathe, 
Hatch  again  ordered  them  forward,  and  the  enemy 
broke.3 

Jackson's  men  now  retired  across  the  river,  the 
pickets  were  established  at  the  fords  as  before,  and 
there  was  no  further  collision  between  the  cavalry 
forces  on  this  wing  of  the  two  armies.  At  the  time 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  5GO,  573. 

2  General  Ross  is  the  onlv  subordinate  of  Forrest  whose  report  of 
this  affair  is  found  in  the  Official  Records.     It  seems  to  claim  that  his 
brigade  was  the  only  force  which  fought  with  Hatch  and  Croxton. 
Id.,  p.  770.     Forrest's  report,  however,  states  that  Jackson's  division 
crossed  and  engaged  both  infantry  and  cavalry.     Id.,  p.   754.     The 
infantry   was  imaginary,  and  some   other  parts  of  the  very  general 
statement  are  inaccurate.     Ross's  report  is  the  safer  one  to  follow  in 
matters  of  detail,  as  he  was  in  personal  contact  with  events  on  the 
field. 

15  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  576. 

12 


178  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Croxton  received  his  orders  to  co-operate  with  Hatch 
in  the  attack  upon  Jackson's  division,  he  withdrew 
his  regiment  from  the  left  bank  at  McGavock's  Ford, 
but  was  delayed  in  his  advance  by  a  report  that  the 
Confederates  were  crossing  still  further  down,  near 
the  town.  He  left  two  of  his  regiments  to  look  after 
this  reported  movement,  and  marched  up  the  stream 
with  the  remaining  two.  The  report  proved  un 
founded,  and  he  recalled  the  regiments.  Marching 
now  with  his  whole  brigade,  he  moved  forward  in 
support  of  Hatch's  left,  and  took  part  in  the  pursuit 
of  Jackson.1  At  five  o'clock  General  Wilson  was 
able  to  report  the  defeat  of  the  enemy  in  his  front, 
and  his  messenger  reached  General  Schoficld  a  half 
hour  later,  when  our  repulse  of  the  first  assaults  of 
the  infantry  along  the  line  gave  him  assured  confi 
dence  that  we  should  be  equally  successful  against 
the  reiterated  efforts  of  the  Confederates,  however 
persistent.2  Wilson  soon  followed  his  messenger  in 
response  to  an  invitation  sent  him  just  before  the 
battle  opened,3  and  early  in  the  evening  had  a  per 
sonal  conference  with  General  Schofield,  in  which 
he  received  full  instructions  as  to  his  part  in  the 
general  withdrawal  toward  Nashville.  The  cavalry 
was  ordered  to  maintain  its  position  till  daylight, 
keeping  its  pickets  at  the  upper  fords,  and  then  to 
withdraw  by  the  Brentwood  or  Wilson  Turnpike, 
being  joined  by  Hammond's  brigade  as  it  went,  and 
seeking  to  keep  abreast  of  General  Wood,  whose 
division  of  infantry  was  to  leave  the  river  by  the 
Nasvhillc  Turnpike  at  the  same  time.4  Brentwood 
was  indicated  as  the  next  place  of  concentration  for 
the  army. 

1  0.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  573.  3  Id.,  p.  1178. 

2  Id.  p.  1179.  4  fci}  pp>  1179>  1185> 


Wilsons  Cavalry  Engagement  179 

On  the  Confederate  side,  Forrest  withdrew  Buford's 
division  to  the  place  where  their  horses  had  been 
left,  and  kept  Jackson's  division  near  Hughes's 
Ford  in  observation  and  covering  the  right  of  the 
army.1  A  few  hours  had  wrought  a  great  change  in 
the  outlook,  as  seen  by  the  leader  of  the  Confederate 
cavalry.  When  the  line  of  battle  was  forming  for 
the  attack,  his  boiling  impatience  led  him  to  ride 
along  the  infantry  lines  of  Stewart's  corps,  urging 
haste  in  formation,  so  that  the  Yankees  could  not 
retreat  before  they  could  be  brought  to  battle.2  At 
midnight  there  was  need  of  all  his  indomitable  spirit 
to  resist  the  conviction  rife  among  the  remnants  of 
the  shattered  Confederate  army,  that,  as  an  army, 
it  was  nearly  destroyed,  and  its  career  practically 
ended. 

1  0.  E.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  754. 

2  This  incident  was  told  me  by  a  staff  officer  in  French's  division  of 
Stewart's  corps. 


CHAPTER    XIV 

O  U  R   W I T  H  I)  II A  W  A  L 

The  Medical  Department  —  Field  Hospitals — Ambulance  Train  — 
Sick  and  Wounded  sent  to  Nashville — Work  of  Surgical  Corps 
during  the  Battle  —  Artillery  gradually  withdrawn  —  Arrangement 
of  Skirmish  Lines  —  Movement  of  the  Infantry  —  Orders  as  to  Kim- 
ball's  and  Wagner's  March  —  Misunderstanding  —  March  of  Ruger, 
Opdycke,  and  Reilly  —  A  burning  Building  —  The  Field  in  Front 
—  The  March  to  Nashville. 

IN  the  preparation  for  evacuating  our  lines  at  mid 
night,  the  removal  of  the  wounded  from  the  field  and 
the  disposal  of  the  field  hospitals  became  an  impor 
tant  part,  and  an  outline  of  the  practical  organization 
of  the  medical  department  in  a  campaign  should  be 
understood. 

Our  surgeons  did  not  enter  upon  their  battle  duties 
at  Franklin  without  some  embarrassment  from  the 
accumulation  of  patients  during  the  preceding  week. 
The  ambulance  train  as  it  came  in  was  pretty  well 
filled  with  the  men  wounded  in  the  affairs  about 
Columbia  and  Spring  Hill,  and  with  the  sick.  The 
first  wintry  weather  had  naturally  been  followed  by 
an  increase  of  hospital  cases  among  the  troops.  All 
these  must  be  disposed  of  so  that  the  ambulances 
could  be  ready  for  new  work. 

As  soon  as  I  assumed  the  temporary  command  of 
the  corps,  Surgeon  C.  S.  Frink,  the  Surgeon  in  Chief 
of  my  division,  took  in  hand  the  task  of  preparation 


Our  Withdrawal  181 

for  active  work.  The  organization  of  the  medical 
department  in  the  field  was  an  excellent  one,  the 
outgrowth  of  the  experience  of  severe  campaigns. 
The  army  and  corps  Medical  Directors  had,  of 
course,  a  general  supervision,  but,  under  them,  the 
division  constituted  the  principal  unit  of  adminis 
tration  in  the  field.  Its  medical  supply  train  was 
independent,  and  contained  the  full  equipment  for 
a  field  hospital  in  tents,  stores,  medicines,  and  sur 
gical  instruments  and  appliances.  A  surgeon  was 
selected  as  the  head  of  the  hospital  by  the  Surgeon 
in  Chief,  and  was  detailed  by  proper  order  from 
headquarters.  The  medical  officer  thus  in  charge  of 
the  field  hospital  was  responsible  for  the  selection 
of  its  site,  for  the  erection  of  the  tents,  the  arrange 
ments  for  operating,  and  the  general  administration 
which  would  make  the  hospital  work  run  smoothly 
and  rapidly.  The  hospital  and  ambulance  train  was 
under  the  charge  of  a  lieutenant  of  the  line,  selected 
for  his  fitness  for  the  work,  and  the  drivers  and 
stretcher  bearers  were  under  his  military  command, 
as  he  was  under  that  of  the  Surgeon  in  Chief  and  the 
surgeon  in  charge  of  the  hospital.  The  stretcher 
bearers  were  permanently  detailed  men,  who  were 
drilled  in  their  duties  and  thoroughly  efficient  in 
them.  The  division  medical  train  consisted  of 
thirty-six  ambulances  and  six  wagons. 

The  Surgeon  in  Chief  was  assisted  by  an  Operating 
Board  of  three  surgeons,  and  as  many  assistant  sur 
geons  as  were  required,  all  these  being  detailed  from 
the  regiments  on  the  selection  of  the  Surgeon  in 
Chief.  Each  operation  of  the  graver  class  was  per 
formed  under  the  immediate  direction  of  one  of  the 
Operating  Board.  Surgeon  Frink  was  ably  seconded 
in  the  Third  Division  by  Surgeons  G.  A.  Collamore, 


182  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

J.  H.  Rodgers,  and  C.  W.  McMillin  of  the  Board, 
and  by  Surgeon  Joseph  S.  Sparks  as  Chief  of  the 
Hospital.  Lieutenant  Alexander  W.  Bciglilc  was 
in  charge  of  the  ambulance  train.  These  officers 
worked  together  during  the  campaigns  of  the  last 
two  years  of  the  war,  and  their  harmony,  discipline, 
system,  and  professional  ability  was  of  wonderful 
benefit  to  the  command. 

To  complete  the  sketch  of  the  practical  organiza 
tion  of  the  surgeon's  department,  it  is  only  neces 
sary  to  add  that  in  battle  brigade  depots  for  the 
wounded  were  placed  as  near  the  fighting  line  as 
practicable,  in  any  spot  sheltered  from  direct  fire. 
Here  the  first  temporary  surgical  assistance  was 
given,  and  from  these  the  ambulances  carried  the 
disabled  to  the  field  hospital  in  the  rear.  These 
depots  were  conducted  by  the  surgeons  and  assistant 
surgeons  of  the  regiments  who  were  not  detailed  for 
the  hospital  work,  as  the  distribution  of  labor  would 
be  made  by  the  Surgeon  in  Chief  in  the  exigencies 
of  varying  circumstances.  The  whole  medical  corps 
worked  together  with  a  zeal  and  self-devotion  as 
worthy  of  remembrance  a,s  that  of  their  comrades  of 
the  line. 

When  the  ambulance  train  came  in  from  Columbia 
in  the  forenoon,  Surgeon  Frink's  first  duty  was  to 
arrange  for  the  proper  disposal  of  the  sick  and 
wounded  who  filled  it,  so  that  it  could  be  ready  for 
further  use.  Fortunately  he  found  a  railway  train 
of  box  cars  on  the  north  side  of  the  river,  loaded 
with  forage,  and  just  ready  to  start  for  Nashville. 
The  surgeon  persuaded  the  conductor  of  the  train  to 
wait  a  few  minutes,  while  he  galloped  to  General 
Schofield's  headquarters,  and  procured  from  the 
general  in  person  an  order  to  unload  cars  enough 


Our  Withdrawal  183 

to  accommodate  the  disabled  men  of  both  army 
corps,  and  to  take  these  to  Nashville.  The  ambu 
lances  with  their  loads  could  not  safely  cross  the 
river  at  the  rough  and  deep  ford,  and  waited  for 
the  repairs  on  the  county  bridge  to  open  this  way  of 
passing  to  the  north  bank.  It  was  thus  made  late 
in  the  day  before  the  transfers  could  be  made,  and 
the  railway  train  started  toward  its  destination. 
Surgeon  Sparks,  meanwhile  (acting  for  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps),  had  selected  a  place  for  the  general 
field  hospital  on  the  Nashville  Turnpike  some  dis 
tance  north  of  the  bridges,  the  tents  were  pitched, 
and  the  hospital  organized  for  work.  The  time  of 
Hood's  delay  in  his  attack  had  barely  sufficed  for 
these  arrangements.1 

In  the  Fourth  Corps  the  medical  organization  was 
similar  to  that  of  the  Twenty-third  which  I  have 
described.  The  field  hospital  was  placed  on  the  west 
of  the  Nashville  Turnpike,  not  far  from  that  of  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio.  It  was  in  charge  of  Surgeon 
R.  J.  Hill  of  Kimball's  division,  under  the  direc 
tion  of  Surgeon  J.  T.  Heard,  Medical  Director.  The 
medical  staff  of  both  corps  co-operated  with  com 
plete  harmony,  and  the  description  of  the  methods 
of  one  will  apply  to  both. 

The  failure  of  the  Confederate  attacks  upon  the 
flanks  of  the  position,  and  the  consequent  early  ces 
sation  of  severe  fighting  there,  had  made  it  easy  to 
carry  out  the  regular  system  at  these  parts  of  the 

1  I  have  been  assisted  in  these  details  by  an  interesting  letter  from 
Surgeon  Frink,  dated  June  26,  1881.  Several  years  later  he  wrote  for 
me  a  still  more  full  account  of  the  work  and  organization  of  the  medi 
cal  corps  from  which  1  have  also  borrowed.  After  the  war  he  returned 
to  his  home  at  Elkhart,  Indiana,  and  until  his  death  was  known  as 
one  of  the  eminent  men  of  his  profession  and  a  devotee  of  scientific 
investigation. 


184  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

line.  The  ambulances  could  reach  the  brigade 
depots  without  difficulty  after  the  first  hour's  light 
ing,1  and  the  disabled  were  promptly  carried  to  the 
field  hospitals  on  the  north  side  of  the  river. 

At  the  centre  the  situation  was  a  much  more 
troublesome  one.  The  turnpike  there  came  from 
the  village  by  so  gentle  a  slope  that  the  road  was 
storm-swept  with  rifle  balls  till  late  in  the  evening, 
and  the  ambulances  could  not  approach  the  lines  by 
that  route.  They  came  up  the  hollows  on  right  and 
left  as  near  as  they  could,  and  the  wounded  were 
carried  by  the  stretcher  bearers  to  meet  them.  Those 
who  had  fallen  in  the  retreat  of  Wagner's  two  brig 
ades  were  out  in  front,  mingled  with  the  Confed 
erate  dead  and  wounded,  and  could  not  be  reached. 
Others  lay  between  the  two  lines  in  Opdycke's  and 
Strickland's  brigades,  and  as  the  battle  waned  in 
the  evening,  were  brought  in  and  sent  to  the  rear. 
But  in  a  night  engagement  the  darkness  prevents 
the  full  scrutiny  of  the  field  by  the  officers,  and  men 
crept  into  buildings  that  were  near,  thinking  only  of 
present  shelter,  and  forgetting  that  they  were  liable 
to  be  overlooked  and  left  to  fall  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy. 

Some  that  were  not  wounded  were  so  overcome  by 
the  fatigue  of  several  days'  marching  and  fighting 
that  they  too  fell  asleep  wherever  they  might  be, 
and  did  not  wake  till  their  companions  had  marched 
away  in  silence,  the  orders  to  "Fall  in  "  being  given 
with  bated  breath.  Stragglers  had  taken  refuge  in 
various  places  in  the  village,  secure  in  the  darkness 
which  prevented  the  provost  guards  from  finding 
them.  It  thus  happened  that  there  were  some  who 
fell  into  the  enemy's  hands  who  would  not  have  done 

1  See  ante,  p.  126. 


Oar  Withdrawal  185 

so  had  the  battle  and  the  withdrawal   occurred  in 
daylight. 

The  same  lateness  of  the  hour  prevented  the  sur 
geons  at  the  division  hospitals  on  the  north  side  of 
the  Harpcth  from  attending  to  more  than  the  pre 
liminary  dressing  of  wounds,  and  all  for  whom  trans 
portation  could  be  provided  were  sent  forward  to  the 
Nashville  hospitals.  The  ambulance  trains,  how 
ever,  were  not  enough  for  all,  and  a  good  many  had 
to  be  left  in  the  field  hospitals.  For  these,  regu 
lar  details  of  surgeons  were  assigned  to  remain  in 
charge,  with  medical  stores  and  supplies.  On  our 
return  after  the  battle  of  Nashville,  a  fortnight  later, 
most  of  our  wounded  thus  left  came  again  into  our 
hands,  together  with  great  numbers  of  the  Confed 
erates  who  were  not  yet  able  to  join  Hood's  army  in 
its  rough  experience  of  a  winter  retreat  beyond  the 
Tennessee  River.1 

1  Paper  of  Surgeon  Frink,  referred  to  on  p.  183,  ante,  and  published 
in  Ohio  Loyal  Legion  Papers,  vol.  iv.  p.  418.  Report  of  Medical  Di 
rector,  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  O.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  108.  Reports  of 
General  Thomas,  Id.,  p.  41,  and  of  Surgeon  Heard  for  P'ourth  Corps, 
Id.,  p.  174.  An  incident  illustrating  the  pathetic  scenes  occurring  in  an 
army  surgeon's  experience  was  told  me  by  my  friend,  Dr.  Stephen  C. 
Avers,  one  of  the  surgical  staff  at  the  Cumberland  Hospital  in  Nash 
ville  ai  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Franklin,  and  now  Professor  of  Dis 
eases  of  the  Eye  in  the  Cincinnati  College  of  Medicine  and  Surgery. 
Among  the  wounded  brought  to  the  hospital  from  Franklin  was  a 
young  soldier,  a  mere  boy,  who  was  unconscious  from  a  gunshot  wound 
in  the  head.  The  long  ride  from  the  battle-field  had  left  him  in  extreme 
exhaustion,  but  Surgeon  Avers,  noticing  that  he  was  still  alive,  at 
tempted  to  give  him  some  relief.  He  had  been  struck  by  a  glancing 
ball  which  tore  the  scalp  and  left  a  well  marked  depression  in  the  skull. 
After  washing  the  parts  and  trimming  away  the  hair,  the  surgeon,  by 
the  careful  use  of  forceps,  was  able  to  lift  the  plate  of  bone  and  relieve 
the  brain  of  pressure.  The  boy  immediately  opened  his  eyes,  looking 
intelligently  into  the  doctor's  face.  The  latter  seized  the  opportunity 
to  ask  his  name  and  his  home,  and  was  answered  clearly.  In  a  moment, 
however,  the  clot  pressed  again  upon  the  brain  and  consciousness  was 


186  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

The  method  of  withdrawing  our  troops  from  the 
intrenched  line  was  such  as  was  usual  with  us. 
Skirmish  and  picket  lines  were  under  the  charge  of 
the  Inspector  Generals  of  corps  and  division,  and  a 
brigade  officer  of  the  day  from  each  brigade  reported 
with  his  detail  for  duty  to  the  staff  officer.  Lieut. 
Colonel  Hartsuff,  General  Schofield's  Inspector  Gen 
eral,  was  assigned  to  the  general  supervision  of 
this  duty,  and  Major  Dow,  my  own  inspector,  met 
him  at  headquarters  for  consultation  which  should 
make  thorough  co-operation  in  the  important  task. 
The  order  of  withdrawal  was  that  which  would  put 
an  end  to  my  general  command  upon  the  line  from 
the  moment  that  the  movement  should  begin;  for  no 
other  order,  written  or  oral,  had  modified  or  recalled 
those  which  had  been  issued  in  the  morning,  and 
which  have  been  already  quoted.1 

Major  Dow  at  once  instructed  the  officers  of  the 
day  on  the  Twenty-third  Corps  front  as  to  their 
duty,  and  the  whole  skirmish  line  was  carefully  pre 
pared  for  cool  and  intelligent  obedience  to  orders. 
The  Major  himself  was  directed  to  collect  and  bring 
off  the  skirmishers  after  the  last  of  the  troops  of  the 
line  had  crossed  the  bridges. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  artillery  was  not  quite  so 
simple  a  matter  as  marching  off  the  infantry,  for  some 
batteries  had  suffered  severely  in  horses,  and  refit 
ting  and  rearrangement  became  necessary.  Colonel 
Schofield,  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio, 

again  lost.  Before  permanent  surgical  relief  could  be  given,  the  young 
soldier  died,  but  the  moment  of  lucidity  had  saved  him  from  a  grave 
among  the  "  unknown  dead,"  and  gave  to  his  family  the  comfort  of 
knowing  the  glorious  end  of  his  patriotic  service  and  the  means  of  iden 
tifying  and  reclaiming  his  body. 

1  Ante,  p.  57,  et  scq.  The  effect  of  General  Stanley's  appearance  at 
the  Carter  hill  is  considered  in  chap,  xxi.fpost. 


Our  Withdrawal  187 

had  been  in  frequent  consultation  with  me  during 
the  day,  and  Captain  Bridges,  the  Fourth  Corps  Chief 
of  Artillery,  had  remained  under  my  orders  and  with 
my  staff  at  my  position  near  the  Carter  house.1 
As  it  was  desirable  to  get  the  batteries  over  the  river 
before  the  infantry  should  leave  the  trenches.  Cap 
tain  Bridges  was  authorized  to  withdraw  them  one 
or  two  at  a  time,  and  as  quietly  as  possible,  begin 
ning  with  those  on  the  extreme  flanks  where  there 
had  been  no  serious  fighting  after  dark. 

Captain  Scovill's  Ohio  battery,  which  was  in 
reserve,  and  the  regular  battery  under  Lieutenant 
Canby,  drew  out  at  about  eight  o'clock.2  Ziegler's 
Pennsylvania  battery,  and  part  of  Baldwin's  Ohio 
battery  soon  followed.  Between  nine  and  ten  o'clock 
the  Twentieth  Ohio  Battery,  which  had  been  in  the 
focus  of  the  fight  back  of  the  Carter  house  and  gar 
den,  was  withdrawn.  Lieutenant  Burdick,  its  com 
mander,  had  been  desperately  wounded  in  the  last 
effort  of  the  enemy  but  a  few  minutes  before,  and 
the  guns  were  under  the  command  of  Sergeant  Horn. 
The  loss  in  men  and  horses  had  been  so  severe  that, 
at  Captain  Bridges's  request,  a  detail  of  infantry 
men  was  furnished  from  Opdycke's  brigade  to  haul 
the  guns  out  to  the  turnpike  by  hand.3 

Captain  Marshall's  Ohio  battery  next  followed, 
but  the  Kentucky  battery  on  the  Columbia  road 
under  Captain  Thomasson,  and  Captain  Bridges's 
own  Illinois  battery  under  Lieutenant  White  (which 
was  in  position  in  Strickland's  brigade),  were  still 
kept  to  strengthen  the  centre,  and  it  was  nearly 
midnight  when  the  last  of  the  artillery  took  its  way 
to  the  bridge.4 

1  O.  II.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  321.  3  Id.,  p.  321. 

2  M,  p.  338.  4  ld.}  p.  327. 


188  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

The  actual  movement  of  the  infantry  from  the 
lines  of  intrenchment  and  over  the  river  was  a  quiet 
one,  and  was  not  disturbed  by  the  enemy.  Some  of 
the  details,  however,  show  how  easy  it  is  for  mis 
takes  to  occur  in  orders  which  are  issued  without 
full  knowledge.  General  Schofield's  order  neces 
sarily  gave  only  the  outline  of  the  movement,  leav 
ing  minor  matters  to  the  judgment  and  discretion 
of  his  subordinates  commanding  the  Fourth  and 
Twenty-third  Corps.  It  indicated  the  centre,  on 
the  Columbia  Turnpike,  as  the  dividing  line,  the 
troops  on  the  right  of  it  to  cross  the  river  by  the 
foot-bridge  and  those  on  the  left  of  it  by  the  rail 
way  bridge.1  No  special  mention  was  made  of  the 
artillery,  but,  in  consultation  with  the  chiefs  of 
artillery,  I  arranged  for  the  gradual  withdrawal  of 
this  in  advance  of  the  infantry,  as  has  been  narrated. 

Let  us  recall  the  actual  position  of  the  troops. 
On  the  right  of  the  Columbia  Turnpike,  in  the  line, 
were  Opdycke's  brigade  of  Wagner's  division,  Ruger's 
division,  and  KimbalPs  division.  On  the  left  was 
my  own  division,  now  commanded  by  General  Reilly. 
The  two  brigades  of  Wagner's  division,  with  which 
he  was  in  person,  were  at  the  river  bank,  and  quite 
to  the  left  of  the  Columbia  road,  and  the  central 
street  of  the  village.  They  were  in  fact  close  to 
the  head  of  the  county  bridge  (the  foot-bridge  spoken 
of  in  the  order),  over  which  Wagner  had  placed  a 
guard  at  my  request.  An  earlier  order,  issued  from 
Fourth  Corps  headquarters  before  the  battle  began, 
and  when  it  was  expected  that  the  withdrawal  would 
be  at  dark,  had  directed  Wagner  to  cross  by  the 
railroad  bridge  and  Kimball  by  the  other.2  The 
order  for  the  midnight  withdrawal  had  been  issued 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1172.  2  id.,  p.  1174. 


Oar  Withdrawal  189 

from  Fourth  Corps  headquarters  in  the  form  of  a 
copy  of  General  Scholield's,  adding  the  further  direc 
tion  that  "General  Kimha.ll  will  withdraw  by  his 
right  Hank,  followed  by  General  Wagner."1  This 
sent  them  both  by  the  county  bridge,  and  assigned 
three  divisions  to  cross  there,  and  only  one  by  the 
railroad. 

Later  in  the  evening  the  position  of  Wagner's  two 
brigades  in  reserve  seems  to  have  been  considered, 
and,  as  we  learn  from  the  diary  of  Colonel  Fullcrton, 
Wagner  was  ordered  to  take  the  advance  in  crossing. 
" December  1,  12.30  A.M.  The  troops  of  this  corps 
commenced  to  withdraw  from  the  line  in  front  of 
Franklin,  Wagner's  division  first,  then  Kimball's 
division,  and  to  cross  the  Harpeth  River."2  Kim- 
ball  does  not  appear  to  have  been  notified  of  this 
change,  and  on  coming  to  the  bridge  he  was  sur 
prised  to  find  it  occupied  by  Wagner's  men.  In  his 
official  report  he  says:  "At  midnight,  in  obedience 
to  orders,  I  withdrew  my  division  from  its  position, 
leaving  my  skirmishers  on  duty  in  front  of  the  line, 
and  moved  to  the  bridge  to  effect  a  crossing,  as  I 
had  been  directed  to  move  at  once  upon  Brentwood 
to  take  up  position  till  the  army  should  arrive ;  but 
to  my  surprise  1  found  the  way  blocked  up  by  other 
troops  who  had  left  their  position  in  advance  of  the 
time,  and  hence  was  unable  to  cross  in  advance,  but 
was  compelled  to  wait  and  take  the  position  which 
others  should  have  taken."3 

From  General  Wagner's  point  of  view,  however, 
it  was  Kimball  who  was  in  the  wrong,  and  in  his 
official  report  he  also  refers  to  the  circumstance, 
saying  "About  midnight,  finding  the  troops  which 
were  to  follow  me  across  the  river  already  crossing, 

1  0.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1173.  '2  Id.,  p.  151.  a  1<L,  p.  178. 


190  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

I  directed  my  brigade  commanders  to  get  ready  and 
cross  the  river  at  once  and  march  out  on  the  Nash 
ville  pike."1  He  here  refers  to  the  two  brigades 
with  him  at  the  river,  for  no  orders  were  sent  to 
Opdycke,  as  we  shall  presently  see. 

KimbalPs  supposition  evidently  was  that  the 
whole  of  Wagner's  division  had  been  in  the  line 
where  Opdycke's  brigade  in  fact  was,  and  had  that 
been  the  case  he  might  well  have  been  startled  at 
finding  the  troops  which  were  supposed  to  crown  the 
arch  which  resisted  the  pressure  of  the  enemy  cross 
ing  the  bridge  before  he  who  had  constituted  the 
most  distant  flank  could  reach  it.  The  reader  who 
has  followed  the  narrative  with  care  will  not  need  to 
be  told  that  no  such  compromising  blunder  had  been 
committed.  Wagner's  two  reorganized  brigades  in 
reserve  were  properly  the  troops  first  to  leave  the 
south  side  of  the  river;  but  Opdycke's  brigade  of 
the  same  division  was  still  in  place  at  the  centre, 
between  the  two  divisions  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps, 
grimly  holding  the  line  it  had  so  glorious  a  part 
in  restoring  in  the  afternoon.  And  there  it  stayed 
till  everything  else  from  the  right  of  the  line  had 
marched,  and  accompanied  Ruger's  division  as  it 
moved  toward  the  bridge.  "My  withdrawal,"  says 
Colonel  Opdycke  in  his  official  report,2  "was  under 
General  Cox's  instructions,  and  was  accomplished  at 
midnight."  My  own  official  report  states  the  same 
fact.  "  The  whole  movement  was  made  without  inter 
ruption  or  molestation  from  the  enemy,  the  third 
division  (Reilly's)  moving  by  the  left  flank  and 
crossing  the  river  upon  the  railroad  bridge,  and  the 
second  division  (Ruger's)  with  Opdycke's  brigade 
of  the  Fourth  Corps,  moving  through  the  town,  and 

1  0.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  232.  2  Id.,  p.  241. 


Our  Withdrawal  191 

crossing  by  a  wagon  bridge  a  little  below  the  railroad 
crossing."  1 

From  my  headquarters  at  the  Carter  Hill,2  I  had 
kept  track  of  the  movement  of  the  Fourth  Corps 
divisions  of  which  I  have  spoken.  There  was  no 
guaranty  that  Hood  might  not  again  press  in  upon 
us  if  he  suspected  we  were  retiring,  and  it  was  a 
plain  duty  not  to  uncover  the  centre  until  Kimball 
should  be  out  of  the  way,  and  the  road  to  both  bridges 
clear.  As  I  have  already  explained,8  the  bridges  and 
the  ford  were  all  near  the  left  flank  of  our  line,  and 
Reilly's  division  alone  could  have  drawn  back  through 
the  town,  covering  all  the  crossings  in  case  of  need.4 
That  division  was  therefore  kept  to  the  last  in  line, 
and  after  Ruger  and  Opdycke  had  marched  into  the 
town,  Reilly's  division  faced  to  the  left  and  moved 
through  the  trenches  to  the  railway  bridge.  Accord 
ing  to  the  rule  in  cases  of  retreat,  I  was  with  my 
staff  at  the  rear  of  the  column,  and,  except  the 
pickets,  we  were  the  last  to  cross  the  river. 

An  incident  had  occurred  late  in  the  evening  which 
made  a  vivid  impression  upon  all  who  witnessed  it. 
A  fire  broke  out  in  the  town,  and  a  burning  building 
lighted  up  the  sky.  Against  this  lurid  background 
every  man  stood  out  a  black  figure  more  easily  seen 
than  in  broad  daylight.  There  could  be  no  thought 
of  moving  till  the  fire  should  be  put  out.  General 
Wood  sent  some  of  his  staff  from  the  north  side  of 

1  In  my  account  of  this  movement  given  in  "Franklin  and  Nash 
ville,"  p.  94,  I  stated  that  the  whole  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  crossed 
at  the  railway  bridge.     I  was  led  to  hclieve,  hy  evidence  based  on  the 
recollection  of  others,  that  this  was  the  case,  lapse  of  time  having 
dimmed  my  own  memory  of  the  fact,  and  full  access  to  official  reports 
being  then  beyond  my  power.     The  fuller  examination  of  the  official 
records  has  corrected  this  error. 

2  O.  11.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  355.     See  also  Appendix  B. 

a  Ante,  p.  49.  4  See  Map,  p.  45,  ante. 


192  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

the  river  to  superintend  the  efforts  of  the  towns 
people,  and  some  detachments  of  soldiers.  On  the 
line  the  officers  were  busy  keeping  the  men  from 
exposing  themselves  and  showing  that  we  were  on 
the  alert,  and  it  was  a  great  relief  when  the  dying 
light  proved  that  the  fire  was  not  spreading,  and 
that  our  movement  would  not  be  long  delayed. 

The  fact  that  the  enemy  did  not  in  any  way  dis 
turb  our  withdrawal  is  sufficient  evidence  that  none 
but  the  disabled  and  the  dead  remained  near  our 
works.  Direct  testimony,  however,  is  not  lacking. 
Major  Dow  tells  of  what  he  himself  saw  after  the 
troops  had  marched  off.  He  says :  "  When  the  com 
mand  moved  out  of  the  works  near  midnight,  I  was 
left  in  charge  of  the  skirmish  line  which  \vas 
detailed  to  occupy  them  for  another  hour.  1  went 
over  the  works  and  walked  some  distance  out  in 
front.  No  enemies  were  there  but  those  disabled 
or  dead,  and  the  cries  of  the  wounded  for  help  were 
very  distressing.  At  that  time  I  heard  no  signs  of 
any  force  on  cither  side  of  the  pike.  There  had  been 
occasional  sharp  volleys  all  the  evening,  but  these 
had  ceased,  and  there  was  no  shot  fired  while  our 
troops  were  withdrawn,  nor  during  the  time  I  stayed, 
or  while  I  withdrew  the  skirmishers.  We  moved  off 
entirely  undisturbed,  and  overtook  the  command 
after  daylight."1 

General  Schofield  halted  the  troops  as  they  crossed 
the  river,  and  kept  the  whole  in  hand  until  all  but 
the  skirmish  line  were  over.  He  then  ordered  me 
to  take  the  advance  with  my  division  and  march  to 
Brentwood,  the  half  way  station  to  Nashville.2  The 
orders  of  General  Thomas  implied  that  we  should  be 

1  See  Appendix  E. 

2  O.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  355,  and  Appendix  B. 


Our   Withdrawal  193 

joined  there  by  the  reinforcements  under  General 
A.  J.  Smith.1  We  halted  accordingly,  and  prepared 
to  take  position  on  the  hills  facing  southward;  but 
Smith's  troops,  disembarking  from  steamboats,  were 
not  supplied  with  wagon  trains,  and  Steedinan's, 
coming  from  Chattanooga,  were  delayed,  so  that 
General  Thomas  decided  to  make  the  rendezvous  for 
the  whole  army  within  the  lines  of  Nashville,  and 
give  some  time  to  the  increase  of  his  cavalry.2  The 
inarch  was  therefore  resumed,  and  Nashville  was 
reached  by  our  advanced  guard  before  noon.  The 
rest  of  the  troops  arrived  in  good  condition  during 
the  course  of  the  day. 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1171.  2  Id.,  part  ii.  p.  17. 

13 


CHAPTER  XV 

FRANKLIN  AFTER  THE  BATTLE 

Hood's  Midnight  Order  —  Condition  of  his  Army  —  Discussion  of 
Probabilities  —  Confederates  move  by  the  Flank  —  Experiences  of 
the  Carter  Family  —  Colonel  Carter's  Story  —  Defensive  Armor  — 
Refnge  in  the  Cellar  — The  terrible  Night—  Captain  Carter's  Fate 
—  Private  Gist's  Adventures  —  General  Cooper's  Retreat. 

HOOD'S  stubborn  purpose  had  not  yielded  to  the  ter 
rible  lesson  of  the  day,  and  at  midnight  he  issued 
orders  for  the  renewal  of  the  fight  in  the  morning. 
He  directed  that  his  artillery  be  massed  and  open  a 
concentrated  cannonade  upon  our  lines,  and  that  his 
infantry  be  arrayed  and  ready  at  the  signal  to  assault 
again  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.1 

It  is  not  at  all  probable  that  his  troops  could  have 
been  led  to  a  new  assault  if  we  had  remained  in 
our  lines.  The  slaughter  of  the  battle  had  pro 
duced  a  depression  which  is  seen  in  every  reference 
to  it  by  those  who  were  present.  The  itinerary  of 
Cheatham's  corps  has  a  brief  but  very  significant 
entry  for  the  1st  of  December:  "To-day  spent  in 
burying  the  dead,  caring  for  the  wounded,  and  reor 
ganizing  the  remains  of  our  corps."2  Brigadier 
General  James  A.  Smith,  who  joined  the  army  after 
the  battle  and  succeeded  to  Cleburne's  command, 

1  Hood's  Report,  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  654.     Hood's  Tennessee  Cam 
paign,  by  Major  D.  W.  Sanders,  Adjutant  General,  French's  division, 
in  Southern  Bivouac  for  June,  1885,  p.  13. 

2  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  731. 


Franklin  after  the  Battle  195 

reported  its  great  depletion  in  numbers,  especially  in 
officers,  and  added,  "Nor  was  the  tone  and  morale 
such  as  was  desirable,  owing  to  the  fearful  loss  sus 
tained  in  that  battle."1  Major-General  Clayton's 
mention  of  "the  terrible  scourge  which  our  brave 
companions  had  suffered  "  has  already  been  referred 
to,2  and  is  especially  significant  as  coming  from  one 
whose  own  command  had  not  been  engaged.  It  indi 
cates  also  his  conviction  of  its  uselcssness,  since  he 
speaks  of  the  merciful  interposition  of  night  which 
saved  his  men  from  a  similar  fate.  Reading  these 
things,  one  is  convinced  that  Hood  would  have  found 
his  subordinates  protesting  against  the  renewal  of 
what  they  plainly  saw  was  a  hopeless  effort,  and  even 
if  he  persisted  we  should  have  repulsed  him  far 
more  easily  than  on  the  previous  day. 

It  must  be  remembered,  too,  that  had  we  remained 
in  our  lines  we  should  not  have  been  idle.  Our 
earthworks  would  have  been  strengthened.  Rein 
forcements  from  Nashville  would  have  been  an  essen 
tial  part  of  our  plan.  A.  J.  Smith's  corps,  coming 
forward  during  the  night,  would  have  taken  position 
on  Hood's  right  flank,  holding  the  cast  bank  of  the 
Harpeth,  and  enfilading  with  artillery  the  Confed 
erate  lines  as  they  attempted  to  advance.  At  the 
first  evidence  of  weakness  or  hesitation  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy,  these  fresh  troops  would  have  been 
ready  for  a  decisive  flank  attack,  and  we  who  were 
in  the  lines  could  have  joined  them  in  what  might 
well  have  proved  an  anticipation  of  the  crowning 
victory  which  was  gained  at  Nashville  a  fortnight 
later. 

Hood  had  no  great  reason  to  think  he  could  have 
shelled  us  out  of  our  position  by  a  superior  artillery 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  739.  2  Ante,  p.  154. 


196  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

fire  in  the  early  morning.  He  could  not  have  had  a 
more  favorable  opportunity  than  at  Columbia  a  few 
days  before,  where  my  division  had  held  him  at  bay, 
although  his  guns  encircled  the  tongue  of  land  which 
we  held,  and  looked  down  upon  us  from  the  com 
manding  ground  around  the  bend  of  Duck  River. 
Nerved  by  the  knowledge  that  aggressive  tactics  on 
our  side  were  being  executed  by  strong  reinforce 
ments,  we  should  not  have  been  less  tenacious  of  our 
position  than  we  had  been  at  Duck  River.  But  the 
conclusion  was  not  to  be  tried  there,  and  we  now 
know  that  the  Confederate  officers  and  men  drew  a 
breath  of  deep  relief  when  the  dawn  of  day  showed 
that  our  trenches  were  empty. 

Rendered  prudent  by  his  experience,  Hood  did  not 
follow  us  by  the  direct  turnpike  to  Nashville,  think 
ing  it  quite  probable  that  Schofield  might  turn  and 
deliver  a  dangerous  blow  when  part  of  the  Confeder 
ate  forces  were  across  the  Harpeth.  He  sent  Forrest 
forward  with  the  cavalry  upon  the  Brentwood  or  Wil 
son  Turnpike,  and  followed  with  Lee's  and  Stewart's 
corps,  till  the  convergence  of  the  roads  made  both 
available.  One  of  his  division  commanders  sarcas 
tically  reminded  him  that  the  same  flank  movement 
made  on  the  day  before  would  have  saved  the  fearful 
losses  which  had  crippled  the  army.1  A  skirmish 
between  Forrest  and  Wilson  was  the  only  incident 
which  enlivened  the  march  to  Nashville,  and  in  a 
day  or  two  Hood  closed  in  upon  the  capital  of  Ten 
nessee,  impelled,  we  must  believe,  far  more  by  a 
wish  to  give  an  air  of  victory  to  the  engagement  at 
Franklin  than  by  any  sound  principles  of  military 
strategy.  The  heart  of  his  army  was  broken,  and 

1  The  author  was  told  this  fact  by  a  Confederate  officer  who  heard 
the  conversation. 


Franklin  after  the  Battle  197 

Beauregard  was  unquestionably  right  (as  was  proved 
by  the  event)  in  saying,  "It  is  clear  to  my  mind  that, 
after  the  great  loss  and  waste  of  life  at  Franklin,  the 
army  was  in  no  condition  to  make  a  successful  attack 
on  Nashville."1  It  was  a  sacrifice  of  military  prin 
ciple  to  the  pride  of  the  commander,  and  was  nat 
urally  followed  by  a  still  greater  disaster,  which 
marked  the  beginning  of  the  rapid  downfall  of  the 
Confederacy. 

The  personal  experience  of  the  Carter  family  was 
a  singular  one,  and  illustrates  so  well  the  terrible 
straits  into  which  private  persons  are  thrust  in  time 
of  war,  that  the  narrative  would  hardly  be  complete 
without  their  story.2 

I  have  already  said  that  the  head  of  the  family  was 
Mr.  F.  B.  Carter,  an  aged  gentleman,3  with  whom 
were  living  four  grown  daughters  (one  of  them  mar 
ried)  and  a  daughter  in  law.  Of  two  sons,  one, 
Captain  Theodoric  Carter,  was  on  the  staff  of  General 
Thomas  B.  Smith  in  Hood's  army,  and  was  in  the 
centre  of  Bate's  division  as  it  advanced  over  his 
father's  farm  to  attack  our  lines  a  little  west  of  the 
homestead.  The  other  son,  Colonel  M.  B.  Carter, 
was  at  home,  a  Confederate  officer  on  parole,  hav 
ing  been  made  prisoner  in  an  earlier  engagement. 
Three  families  of  young  grandchildren  were  also  in 
the  house,  and  a  couple  of  female  servants,  making 

1  O.  Tf.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  051. 

2  Besides  my  own  very  vivid  remembrance  of  the  anxiety  of  the 
family  in  the  early  part  of  the  day  of  battle,  and  of  their  statements 
when  we  saw  them  again  on  our  southward  march  a  month  later, 
Colonel  M.  B.  Carter,  the  present  proprietor  of  the  place,  has  given 
me,  at  my  request,  a  written  narrative  of  what  occurred  in  and  about 
the  house. 

3  Ante,  p.  43. 


198  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

a  household  of  seventeen  souls.  To  these  were  added 
a  family  of  five,  near  neighbors,  who  sought  the  pro 
tection  of  the  stout  brick  walls  of  the  Carter  house 
just  before  the  combat  opened.  When  the  storm 
broke,  therefore,  there  were  three  men  and  nine 
teen  women  and  children,  non-combatants,  in  the 
mansion. 

Early  in  the  day  Mr.  F.  B.  Carter  had  asked  me, 
with  some  anxiety,  whether  he  had  better  remove  his 
family  from  the  house  and  abandon  it.  Without 
knowing  how  large  the  family  in  fact  was,  I  advised 
him  not  to  leave  the  house  unless  it  should  become 
certain  that  a  battle  was  imminent;  for  whilst  my 
headquarters  tents  were  in  his  door-yard,  there  was 
no  danger  of  annoyance  from  the  men  of  my  com 
mand.  If  the  house  were  abandoned,  it  would  be 
impossible  to  answer  for  the  safety  of  its  contents. 
But  if  there  were  to  be  a  battle,  the  very  focus  of  it 
would  certainly  be  there,  and  it  would  be  no  place 
for  women  and  children.  I  thought  it  most  probable 
at  that  time  that  Hood  would  not  attack  in  front. 
The  very  thoroughness  of  our  preparation  to  meet  an 
assault  was  a  reason  why  he  should  not  make  it.  It 
seemed  wise  for  the  family  to  remain  as  they  were 
till  they  saw  that  a  battle  was  about  to  open,  and 
then  to  hasten  into  the  village. 

Soon  after  our  noon  meal,  my  headquarters  tents 
were  struck  and  loaded  on  the  wagon,  which  was  sent 
to  the  rear.  From  this  time  I  was  in  the  saddle 
and  saw  nothing  of  Mr.  Carter's  household.  His 
son,  the  prisoner  on  parole,  naturally  kept  somewhat 
secluded,  and  avoided  inquiries  as  to  his  own  status; 
but  when  the  peril  was  actually  upon  them,  he  be 
came  the  leader  of  the  terrified  and  helpless  group. 
I  shall  let  him  tell  the  talc  himself. 


Franklin  after  the  Battle  199 

"  While  the  preparations  for  the  impending  battle 
were  going  on,"  he  says,  "the  Carter  family  were 
not  inattentive  observers.  They  had  witnessed  on 
other  occasions  sharp  skirmishes  between  Rebel  cav 
alry  raiders  and  the  Federal  pickets  stationed  about 
the  premises,  in  which  men  were  killed  and  wounded, 
some  in  the  yard,  and  even  in  the  house  itself.  They 
felt  themselves  somewhat  inured  to  the  casualties  of 
war;  but  the  great  number  of  men  now  so  hurriedly 
and  so  intently  engaged  in  demolishing  houses  and 
constructing  works  of  defence,  looked  to  them  pain 
fully  ominous.  The  scene  presented  was  on  a  bigger 
scale  than  anything  they  had  ever  seen  before.  It 
created  feelings  of  profound  anxiety.  Whether  to 
abandon  home  and  the  little  that  was  left  to  them 
after  three  years  and  more  of  devastation,  and  to 
seek  personal  safety  by  flight,  was  the  all-absorbing 
thought.  In  either  aspect  the  prospect  was  discour 
aging.  To  leave  home,  pillage  was  almost  certain, 
and  blackened  ruins  might  be  all  that  would  be  left 
to  greet  their  return.  With  one  accord  it  was  deter 
mined  to  remain:  perhaps  their  presence  would  be 
respected  and  the  house  spared.  They  would  trust 
to  God  to  shield  themselves  from  harm.  .  .  . 

"Although  Hood  was  said  to  be  a  rash  fighter,  it 
was  hardly  thought  he  would  be  reckless  enough  to 
make  a  determined  assault  on  the  formidable  works 
in  front  of  him;  but  to  be  prepared  for  any  emer 
gency,  it  was  directed  that  a  bundle  of  clothing  pro 
portioned  to  the  strength  of  each  one  be  prepared, 
for  the  twofold  purpose  of  having  that  much  saved 
in  case  all  else  was  lost,  and  for  partial  protection 
should  they  be  forced  to  leave  the  house.  If  the 
latter  became  necessary,  all  were  instructed  to  throw 


200  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

their  respective  bundles  over  their  backs,  and  follow 
the  leader  whithersoever  he  led.1 

"In  a  little  while  all  doubts  were  solved  as  to 
Hood's  intentions.  His  solid  lines,  to  the  right,  to 
the  left,  and  in  front,  advancing  at  a  rapid  pace, 
showed  plainly  enough  that  the  crash  was  at  hand. 
Although  the  house  had  withstood  the  shock  of 
former  conflicts,  they  seemed  as  child's  play  to  the 
approaching  storm.  The  cellar  afforded  the  securest 
retreat,  and  hardly  was  it  reached  before  the  din  of 
battle  grew  appalling.  In  the  gloom  of  the  cellar 
the  children  cowered  at  the  feet  of  their  parents, 
and  while  the  bullets  rained  against  the  house,  and 
a  cannon  ball  went  crashing  through,2  all  seemed  in 
a  state  of  acute  expectancy,  but  gave  no  audible 
sound  of  fear. 

"  The  first  onset  having  passed,  and  no  one  harmed, 
reassurance  returned,  and  hope  revived  with  some: 
with  others,  the  comparative  lull  increased  the  ten 
sion  and  awakened  fears  of  unknown  dangers  yet  to 
come.  In  this  state  of  alternating  hope  and  fear, 
they  dragged  through  the  weary  hours  until  the  last 
shot  was  fired  and  deliverance  assured.  Mutual 
congratulations  were  scarcely  exchanged  when  a 
Confederate  soldier  brought  the  sad  tidings  that 
Captain  Theodoric  Carter,  a  son  and  brother,  lay 
wounded  on  the  field.  An  elder  brother,  who  had 
thus  far  directed  affairs,  went  immediately  in  search, 
but  by  misdirection  went  to  another  part  of  the  field. 

1  It  was  a  shrewd  device  to  provide  such  defensive  armor  if  they 
had  to  run  toward  town  with  the  hail  of  Confederate  bullets  coming 
from  behind.     Nothing  would  stop  a  bullet  better  than  a  well  rolled 
bundle  of  clothing. 

2  The  ball  went  through  the  wing  or  ell  of  the  house,  and  the  holes 
made  by  its  entrance  from  the  south  and  exit  on  the  north  are  still  there 
(1896). 


Franklin  after  the  Battle  201 

In  the  mean  time,  General  Thomas  B.  Smith,  of 
whose  staff  young  Carter  was  a  member,  reported 
the  casualty  and  led  the  way,  followed  by  the  father, 
three  sisters,  and  sister  in  law,  to  where  the  young 
officer  lay,  mortally  wounded.  They  lifted  him  gen 
tly  and  bore  him  back  to  die  in  the  home  he  had 
not  seen  for  two  years  and  more.  He  had  fallen 
when  his  heart's  wish  was  almost  attained,  only  a 
few  rods  distant  from  the  home  of  a  lifetime." 

When  daylight  came  it  was  found  that  wounded 
men  and  some  skulkers  had  possession  of  the  prin 
cipal  floors  of  the  house.  Some  of  the  wounded  had 
crawled  away  from  the  lines  in  the  darkness,  and 
getting  into  the  house  lay  down  there  and  were  over 
looked  by  the  stretcher  bearers  who  were  carrying 
the  injured  men  to  the  rear.  Others  had  been  laid 
in  order  upon  the  ground  to  await  the  ambulances, 
already  overloaded.  These,  of  course,  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Confederates.  The  movement  in  retir 
ing  from  the  position  at  midnight  was  conducted  so 
quietly  that  even  some  soldiers  who  were  at  the 
breastworks,  overpowered  by  sleep  after  exhausting 
fatigue,  did  not  get  sufficiently  awake  to  fall  into 
line  with  their  comrades.  These  were  aroused  and 
sent  after  the  column  by  the  pickets  left  to  cover 
the  movement. 

Among  the  men  of  Lane's  brigade,  who  turned  and 
fought  at  our  breastworks,  was  an  intelligent  young 
soldier,  a  private  in  the  ranks  of  the  26th  Ohio,  who 
lived  to  become  a  college  professor  after  the  war, 
and  to  write  a  very  clear  and  modest  account  of  his 
personal  recollections  of  the  fight.1  Mr.  Gist  was 

1  Professor  W.  W.  Gist's  paper,  "  The  Battle  of  Franklin  as  seen 
by  a  Private,"  was  published  in  the  Cedar  Rapids  (Iowa)  Weekly 
Republican,  September  6,  1883.  If  all  personal  accounts  of  stirring 


202  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

one  of  those  weary  ones  who  were  overpowered  by 
sleep,  and  we  may  accept  his  well  told  story  of 
his  experience  as  a  lesson  in  the  condition  of  an 
army  which  had  been  fighting  and  marching  day 
and  night. 

"After  the  firing  ceased,"  he  says,  "we  waited  for 
a  long  time  in  terrible  suspense,  expecting  that  the 
battle  would  be  renewed  at  any  moment.  At  last, 
wearied  by  the  marching  and  the  terrible  scenes  of 
the  two  days,  and  stupefied  by  the  gunpowder,  1  fell 
asleep  with  my  head  resting  against  the  works,  I 
think.  It  must  have  been  nearly  midnight  when  I 
awoke.  1  was  amazed  to  find  that  the  line  of  battle 
was  gone,  and  that  only  a  skirmish  line  remained. 
I  think  that  one  of  the  skirmishers  aroused  me.  At 
all  events,  he  told  me  to  hasten  across  the  river,  as 
the  army  was  nearly  all  gone.  I  started  without 
debating  the  question  a  moment.  As  I  passed  back 
of  the  line  a  horrible  sight  met  my  view.  Here  was 
along  line  of  wounded,  lying  as  they  had  been  placed, 
and  moaning  most  piteously.  They  did  not  seem  to 
understand  that  the  army  had  gone,  and  that  soon 
they  would  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  Reach 
ing  the  pike,  I  started  on  the  double-quick  and  soon 
crossed  the  river.  The  road  was  filled  with  soldiers 
moving  toward  Nashville,  but  there  did  not  seem  to 
be  any  organization.  Almost  as  soon  as  I  crossed 
the  river,  I  met  a  man  of  my  company,  and  to  him 
I  owe  my  escape.  I  was  weary  beyond  anything  that 
I  had  ever  experienced,  and  hungry,  and  I  could  not 
walk  a  quarter  of  a  mile  without  resting.  As  soon 
as  I  would  sit  down  I  would  fall  asleep,  and  in  a  few 

events  were  equally  candid  and  careful,  the  work  of  the  historian  would 
be  a  comparatively  easy  one.  I  shall  have  further  occasion  to  refer  to 
this  valuable  paper. 


Franklin  after  the  Battle  203 

minutes  he  would  wake  me.     This  was   repeated,  I 
should  think,  a  hundred  times." 

The  physical  powers  of  the  soldier  place  a  limit  to 
the  work  which  may  be  required  of  him.  Excessive 
weariness  is  as  absolute  a  barrier  to  vigorous  exer 
tion  as  would  be  mutilation  by  wounds  or  collapse 
from  disease.  It  reaches,  at  last,  a  point  where  both 
mind  and  body  become  physically  unreliable.  Ordi 
nary  motives  lose  their  power.  The  stimulus  of 
ambition,  of  hope,  even  of  duty,  loses  its  power,  and 
the  body  and  mind  imperatively  demand  rest  at 
whatever  cost.  The  weaker  men  and  those  upon 
whom  some  extra  stress  of  exertion  has  fallen  will 
show  first  the  failure  of  powers,  and  straggl ing- 
begins.  Discipline  will  postpone  mischievous  re 
sults  for  a  time,  but  not  for  long.  It  is  hard  to  state 
any  definite  criterion  of  the  endurance  of  men  or 
horses,  and  historians  sometimes  fall  into  the  error 
of  assuming  that  marching  and  fighting  may  be  kept 
up  indefinitely.  Mr.  Gist's  description  of  his  own 
suffering  is  equally  true  of  many  more.  Men  have 
told  me  that  on  that  night  march  they  fell  asleep  as 
they  walked,  and  found  themselves  stumbling  or  fall 
ing  when  a  hollow  in  the  road  threw  them  out  of 
poise.  Continuous  exertions  for  several  successive 
days  and  nights  in  part  of  the  command  had  brought 
them  too  near  the  limit  of  their  strength,  and  this 
was  a  legitimate  reason  in  favor  of  giving  the  troops 
a  night's  rest  in  the  lines,  even  with  the  risk  of 
further  fighting  on  the  morrow.  It  should  be  fully 
weighed  in  deciding  whether  it  would  have  been 
wiser  to  push  reinforcements  forward  to  Franklin, 
rather  than  put  upon  exhausted  men  the  additional 
strain  of  another  night  march  in  retreat. 


204  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

The  narrative  of  Schofield's  army  would  riot  be 
complete  without  some  further  mention  of  the  brig 
ade  under  General  Cooper,  which  we  left  in  the 
vicinity  of  Centerville  on  the  Duck  River,  some 
thirty  miles  west  of  Columbia,  on  the  29th.1  Doubt 
ful  whether  the  messenger  could  get  through  who 
was  sent  by  General  Ruger  to  order  Cooper  to  march 
to  Franklin,  Schofield  requested  General  Thomas  to 
send  orders  directly  from  Nashville  to  Cooper  to  the 
same  effect.  In  the  early  afternoon  of  the  29th, 
therefore,  Thomas  sent  a  despatch  by  telegraph  to 
Colonel  C.  R.  Thompson,  commanding  the  post  at 
Johnsonville,  on  the  Tennessee  River,2  ordering  him 
to  send  a  mounted  messenger  to  Cooper  at  Center 
ville  with  an  accompanying  order  to  the  latter  to 
march  by  the  Nashville  road  till  he  should  cross  the 
Harpeth  at  the  farm  of  the  Widow  Demos,  and  from 
there  report  to  Schotield  at  Franklin.3 

Ruger 's  messenger  reached  Cooper  at  Beard's 
Ferry  in  the  morning  of  the  30th,  when  Schofield's 
army  was  already  assembling  at  Franklin,  and  Cooper 
marched  the  portion  of  his  brigade  with  him  to 
Killough's,  five  miles  north  of  Duck  River,  sending 
orders  to  the  rest  of  the  command,  which  was  at 
Centerville,  to  join  him  at  once.  The  map  seemed 
to  make  the  distance  between  Centerville  and  Beard's 

1  Chap,  ii.,  ante,  pp.  24,  29. 

2  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1163. 

3  In  the  official  records  the  "  Widow  Dean  "  is  the  name  given,  but 
Cooper's  report  (Id.,  p.  370)  has  the  name  "Demoss,"  which  agrees 
with  the  name  "  Demos  "  on  the  map  then  used  by  the  army,  which 
had  been  compiled  in  1862  by  the  Engineer  Corps  at  Army  of  the  Ohio 
and  Cumberland  headquarters.     The  crossing  was  where  the  Nashville 
and  Hardin  Turnpike  reached  the  Harpeth.     South  of  that  river  the 
road  was  a  common  country  road  to  Centerville.     The  distance  from 
Nashville  to  Centerville  was  supposed  to  be  fifty-five  miles,  of  which 
fifteen  were  north  of  the  Harpeth. 


Franklin  after  the  Battle  205 

Ferry  some  four  or  five  miles;  but  Cooper  found  it 
fifteen  by  the  shortest  route,1  and  as  the  ferry  was 
nearer  to  Columbia  he  had  rightly  established  his 
headquarters  there  to  shorten  the  time  in  communi 
cating  with  Ruger  and  Schoiield.  The  concentration 
of  his  whole  command  was  not  effected  till  noon  of 
December  1st,  when  our  little  army  was  already  at 
Nashville.  At  two  o'clock  Cooper  received  Thomas's 
message,  which  had  been  two  days  in  reaching  him. 
He  immediately  marched  toward  Nashville,  and 
crossed  the  Harpeth  at  the  place  assigned  on  the 
evening  of  December  2d.  During  this  day  he  learned 
from  Rebel  deserters  that  our  army  had  fallen  back 
from  Franklin,  and  that  his  own  route  to  Nashville 
was  probably  intercepted  by  Hood's  army.2 

At  Franklin,  on  the  30th,  Schofield  learned  from 
Thomas  what  orders  had  been  sent  to  Cooper,  and 
he  sent  a  messenger  down  the  Harpeth  to  order  the 
latter  to  march  at  once  to  Nashville.  But  Cooper, 
of  course,  was  still  near  Centerville,  and  the  mes 
senger  was  chased  by  Confederate  patrols  into  Nash 
ville.3  Upon  this,  Thomas  telegraphed  to  Lieut. 
Colonel  Sellon,  commanding  the  post  at  Kingston 
Springs  on  the  railway  leading  to  Johnsonville,  to 
send  a  mounted  party  to  Centerville  at  once,  to 
direct  Cooper  to  make  for  Clarksville  on  the  Cumber 
land  River  forty  miles  west  of  Nashville,  which  was 
made  the  rendezvous  for  the  posts  along  the  Ten 
nessee  which  might  be  cut  off  from  Nashville  by 
Hood's  advance.4  This  message  did  not  reach 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  370.  2  Id.,  p.  371. 

3  Id.,  pp.  1171,   1175.      In  the   dispatches   between   Thomas   and 
Schofield  the  name  of  the  crossing   is  again  given  as  the  "  Widow 
Dean's,"  and  Schofield  says  he  can  find  no  such  place  on  the  map.     It 
was  probably  misspelled  in  telegraphing. 

4  Id.,  pp.  1194,  1195. 


206  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Cooper,  who  continued  his  march,  as  we  have  seen, 
reaching  the  Harpeth  in  the  evening  of  December  2d. 
He  now  marched  cautiously  toward  Nashville  on  the 
Hardin  Turnpike,  until  he  reached  a  high  hill  eight 
miles  from  the  city,  from  the  top  of  which  he  saw 
the  numerous  camp  tires  on  both  sides  of  the  road  in 
front  of  him.  He  then  moved  across  country  to  his 
left  and  rear  till  he  reached  the  Charlotte  Turnpike, 
which  follows  the  general  westerly  course  of  the 
Cumberland  River,  and,  marching  hard  upon  it  all 
night,  he  recrossed  the  Harpeth  at  daybreak  of  the 
3d.  His  own  good  judgment  now  indicated  Clarks- 
ville  as  his  objective  point,  and  he  continued  his 
movement  in  that  direction.  He  arrived  there  on 
the  evening  of  the  5th,  joining  Colonel  Thompson's 
Johnsonville  garrison,  which  had  just  preceded  him 
under  orders  from  General  Thomas.  Resting  two 
days,  Cooper  resumed  his  march  to  Nashville,  where 
he  rejoined  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  and  reported  to 
General  Schofield  on  the  evening  of  the  8th.  Instead 
of  fifty-five  miles,  his  devious  march  from  Center- 
ville  had  stretched  to  two  hundred  and  ten,  and 
might  easily  have  ended  in  captivity;  but  his  cool 
ness  and  good  judgment  had  made  a  successful  escape 
from  the  perils  and  difficulties  of  his  situation,  and 
good  discipline,  with  the  good  marching  qualities  of 
his  veterans,  had  brought  the  command  in  without 
loss.1 

1  Cooper's  Eeport,  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  370,  371. 


CHAPTER   XVI 

RESULTS  AND  LESSONS 

Sources  of  Statistical  Knowledge  —  Hood's  Forces  before  the  Battle  — 
Schofield's  —  Numbers  actually  engaged  —  Hood's  Casualties  — 
Loss  of  Officers  —  Schofield's  Losses — Analysis  of  them  —  The 
Problem  of  Attack  and  Defence  —  Fire  Discipline. 

IT  is  not  easy  to  be  very  exact  in  stating  the  num 
bers  of  men  engaged  at  Franklin  in  the  two  armies 
under  Hood  and  Schoficld,  or  the  numbers  of  casual 
ties  in  the  battle.  On  the  side  of  the  Confederates 
there  was  a  natural  disposition  to  avoid  too  great 
explicitness ;  for  the  results  of  the  battle  produced  a 
sensible  shock  throughout  the  Southern  States,  and 
it  was  generally  looked  upon  as  a  fatal  blow  to  their 
hopes  of  independence.  On  the  national  side  the 
army  under  Schofield  did  not  have  a  permanent 
organization,  but  was,  in  some  sense,  an  accidental 
assemblage  of  such  portions  of  the  troops  under 
Thomas  in  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi 
as  were  at  the  time  in  hand  for  operations  against 
Hood's  invading  army.  By  carefully  comparing  the 
reports  of  strength  now  published  in  the  Official 
Records,  we  can,  however,  eliminate  most  of  the 
sources  of  error,  and  make  approximations  that  are 
very  close  to  accuracy. 

The  tabulated  reports  of  Hood's  army  on  which 
we  must  chiefly  rely  are  those  of  November  6th  and 


208  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

December  10th.1  No  intermediate  reports  seem  to 
1  have  been  preserved.  There  had  been  a  little  desul 
tory  fighting  on  the  way  northward  from  the  Tennessee 
River  to  Columbia,  and  sharp  affairs  at  the  crossing 
of  Duck  River  and  at  Spring  Hill.  It  is  probable, 
however,  that  the  casualties  prior  to  the  battle  of 
Franklin  were  more  than  offset  by  recruiting;  for 
one  of  the  avowed  advantages  which  Hood  expected 
to  gain  in  Tennessee  was  the  increase  of  his  army 
both  by  voluntary  enlistments  and  by  the  enforce 
ment  of  the  Confederate  conscription  laws.2  There 
is  evidence  that  up  to  the  battle  of  Franklin,  at  least, 
there  was  considerable  success  in  gathering  up  men 
who  had  straggled  homeward  from  the  Tennessee 
regiments,  and  in  bringing  in  fresh  men  who  were 
liable  under  their  laws  to  military  duty.3  We  shall 
therefore  be  probably  within  the  mark  if  we  assume 
that  the  difference  between  Hood's  morning  reports 
of  the  dates  above  given  is  due  to  the  casualties  of 
the  battle  of  Franklin,  and  check  this  by  the  reports 
of  Generals  Thomas  and  Schoficld  of  the  direct 
information  obtained  at  Franklin  on  our  return  there 
after  the  battle  of  Nashville. 

On  the  6th  of  November  Hood  reported  his  infantry 
and  artillery  present  for  duty  to  be  32, 861. 4  Jack 
son's  division  of  cavalry  was  2,801.  But  Forrest's 
cavalry  corps  consisted  of  three  divisions,  the  com 
manders  being  Jackson,  Buford,  and  Chalmers ;  and 
there  is  no  doubt  that  Buford's  division  was  a  larger 
one  than  Jackson's.  It  is  most  probable  that  the 
average  strength  of  Forrest's  divisions  was  3,000, 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  678,  679. 

2  Hood's  "  Advance  and  Retreat,"  p.  305. 

3  Dispatch  of  Colonel  Blake  to  General  Rousseau,  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i. 
p.  896. 

4  Id.,  pp.  678,  679. 


Results  and  Lessons  209 

making  the  strength  of  his  corps  9,000.  Notes  upon 
Hood's  original  returns  show  that  Forrest  made  no 
tabulated  reports  of  his  corps  through  the  whole 
campaign,  and  we  have  to  rely  on  approximate  calcu 
lations.  Gathering  the  best  information  that  could 
be  got  from  prisoners  and  deserters,  and  comparing 
it  with  other  evidence.  General  Schofield  stated  in 
his  own  official  report  that  the  smallest  estimate  of 
Forrest's  corps  was  10,000,  and  this  he  thought  was 
nearly  accurate.1  The  total  strength  of  Hood's  army, 
then,  was  from  42,000  to  43,000  of  ail  arms. 

The  data  for  determining  the  strength  of  General 
Schofield's  army  are  more  complete,  since  we  have 
the  regular  tri -monthly  morning  reports.  As  to 
infantry  and  artillery,  these  would  be  all  we  could 
wish  if  the  published  tables  gave  in  detail  the 
strength  of  detachments,  such  as  that  under  General 
Cooper,  who  marched  from  Centerville  on  the  30th 
of  November,  with  his  brigade  and  two  additional 
regiments  belonging  to  the  Twenty-third  Corps.2 
As  Cooper  c&d  not  rejoin  the  corps  until  it  had 
reached  Nashville,  his  command  must  not  be  counted 
as  among  the  combatants  at  Franklin.  No  return 
of  the  Union  cavalry  with  General  Schofield  was 
separately  made  till  the  morning  of  the  30th  Novem 
ber,  and  even  then  it  was  only  provisionally  organ 
ized,  so  that  it  is  difficult  to  separate  it  from  other 
parts  of  the  cavalry  corps  at  Nashville  and  elsewhere. 
The  discrepancies  as  to  the  cavalry  on  either  side 
are,  however,  of  minor  importance,  as  the  strongly 
dominant  feature  of  the  battle  of  Franklin  was  the 
infantry  engagement. 

On  the  morning  of  November  20th,  the  infantry 
and  artillery  of  the  Fourth  Army  Corps,  present  for 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  341.     See  Appendix  A.  2  Id.,  p.  367. 

14 


210  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

duty  equipped,  numbered  13,119;  of  the  Twenty-third 
)  Army  Corps,  9,823:  total,  22,942.  On  the  morning 
of  the  battle,  November  30th,  the  numbers  were,  of 
the  Fourth  Corps  15,207,  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps 
10,527,  besides  two  regiments  of  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee  (44th  Missouri  and  72d  Illinois),  detached 
and  temporarily  assigned  to  the  latter  corps.1  These 
two  regiments  were  more  full  than  most  of  the  old 
organizations,  and  numbered,  perhaps,  a  thousand 
men.2  The  gain  of  2,792  in  the  aggregate  of  the 
two  corps  consisted  of  new  regiments  and  recruits 
which  joined  Schofield  at  Columbia.  But  the  absence 
of  Cooper's  command  reduces  the  number  present  at 
Franklin  in  the  Twenty-third  Corps  by  about  3,000 
men,  and  makes  the  aggregate  of  Schofield's  infantry 
and  artillery  at  the  opening  of  the  battle  23,734. 

The  national  cavalry  under  General  Wilson  must 
be  estimated  in  part,  for  reasons  already  given. 
Hatch's  division  is  reported  as  numbering  2,638, 
Johnson's  2,286,  and  Hammond's  brigade  is  not 
reported.3  The  aggregate  was  about  5,500,  and  the 
total  strength  in  all  arms  of  Schofield's  army  29,234. 

For  the  purposes  of  military  criticism  and  infor 
mation  it  will  be  profitable  to  consider  also  the 
forces  on  both  sides  actually  employed  in  attack  and 
defence.  Of  Hood's  army  two  divisions  of  Lee's 
corps  were  held  in  reserve  and  not  engaged,  and 
one  brigade  of  Stewart's  corps  (Ector's)  was  absent, 
escorting  the  pontoon  train.  Only  two  batteries  of 
his  artillery  appear  to  have  been  under  fire.  The 
numbers  of  Hood's  infantry  and  artillery  actually 

1  See  ante,  p.  54,  and  Rnger's  "Report,  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  367. 

2  On  the  concentration  of  the  army  at  Nashville,  these  two  regi 
ments  were  transferred  to  General  A.  J.  Smith's  "  Detachment  of  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee." 

3  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  54. 


Results  and  Lessons  211 

delivering  the  assault  on  our  lines  were,  therefore, 
two  or  three  hundred  less  than  24,000. 

The  assault  was  received  upon  the  continuous 
intrenched  line  between  the  Harpeth  River  above 
the  town  on  the  left,  and  the  Carter's  Creek  Turn 
pike  on  the  right.  As  we  have  seen,1  Kimball's 
division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  was  rather  a  guard  or 
cover  for  the  right  flank  than  a  part  of  the  continu 
ously  intrenched  front,  and,  except  part  of  its  left 
brigade,  it  was  only  slightly  engaged  with  Chalmers's 
division  of  the  enemy's  cavalry.  It,  as  well  as  our 
cavalry  engagement  across  the  river  on  the  east, 
might  properly  be  dropped  from  the  consideration 
of  the  conditions  and  results  of  the  infantry  assault 
by  the  Confederates,  though  both  must  of  course  be 
considered  in  the  statistical  results  of  the  whole 
engagement.  I  shall  analyze  the  latter  first. 

Upon  our  reoccupation  of  Franklin,  December  18th, 
unusually  full  opportunities  for  knowledge  of  the 
enemy's  losses  were  made  available.  Their  hos 
pitals  fell  into  our  hands,  and  we  recovered  our  own, 
with  our  medical  officers  and  attendants  who  had 
been  left  in  charge  of  them.  General  Schofield  was 
thus  enabled  to  report  definitely  that  Hood's  losses 
were  "1,750  buried  upon  the  field,  3,800  disabled 
and  placed  in  hospitals  in  Franklin,  and  702  pris 
oners,  making  6,252  of  the  enemy  placed  Jiors  de 
combat,  besides  the  slightly  wounded.  The  enemy's 
loss  in  general  officers  was  very  great,  being  six 
killed,  six  wounded,  and  one  captured."2  As  to 

1  Ante,  p.  GO. 

2  0.  R.;  xlv.  pairt  i.-  p.  344,  and  Appendix  A.     General  Thomas's 
report  gives  the  same  figures.    Id.,  p.  35.    My  own  investigation  on  the 
field  at  the  time  made  the  killed  1,800,  the  wounded  in  hospital,  3,800, 
and  the  number  of  prisoners  captured  by  the  Twenty-third   Corps, 


212  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

the  slightly  wounded,  Hood's  own  dispatches  to  the 
Confederate  War  Department  are  conclusive.  On 
the  5th  of  December,  trying  to  remove  the  stunning 
effect  of  the  terrible  loss  in  general  officers,  he  tele 
graphed  to  the  Secretary,  Mr.  Scddon :  "  Our  loss  of 
officers  in  the  battle  of  Franklin  on  the  80th  was 
excessively  large  in  proportion  to  the  loss  of  men. 
The  medical  director  reports  a  very  large  propor 
tion  of  slightly  wounded  men. " l  Any  accepted 
ratio  between  killed  and  wounded  which  military 
experience  has  established,  will  show  that  the  tem 
porarily  disabled  who  had  been  treated  in  their 
quarters  or  who  had  left  the  hospitals  and  returned 
to  the  ranks  before  Hood's  next  return  of  his  force 
was  made  (December  10th)  would  add  about  two 
thousand  to  the  list  of  casualties  and  swell  the 
aggregate  to  eight  thousand  or  more. 

It  is  interesting,  in  confirmation  of  this,  to  com 
pare  the  Confederate  returns  of  December  10th  with 
those  of  November  6th,  which  have  been  analyzed 
above.  The  returns  of  infantry  and  artillery  of  the 
later  date  show  24,074  present  for  duty.2  To  these 
must  be  added  four  absent  brigades,  which  at  the 
proportionate  part  of  the  divisions  to  which  they 

702.  I  added :  "  Thus,  without  estimating  the  prisoners  taken  by  any 
part  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  or  the  stragglers  and  deserters,  who  are 
known  to  have  been  numerous,  the  enemy's  loss  was  not  less  than 
6,300."  Official  Report,  Id,  p.  356,  and  Appendix  K  GeneralWag- 
ner's  Report  (Id.,  p.  232)  says  his  brigade  commanders  claim  753 
prisoners.  In  his  special  report  of  prisoners,  flags,  etc.,  he  adds  the 
postscript :  "  The  above  is  the  report  of  brigade  commanders.  Only 
about  400  prisoners  (officers  and  men)  passed  through  the  hands  of 
my  provost  marshal."  Id.,  p.  234.  The  reports  of  Generals  Schofield 
and  Thomas  include  only  the  prisoners  reported  by  me  for  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps.  See  also  chap,  xix.,  post. 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  ii.  p.  650. 

2  Id.,  part  i.  p.  679. 


Results  and  Lessons  213 

belong  would  amount  to  2, 387, J  making  the  aggregate 
26,461. 2  The  difference  between  this  and  32,861, 
the  similar  aggregate  for  November  6th,  is  6,400, 
which  would  show  the  losses  in  infantry  and  artil 
lery.  To  these  must  of  course  be  added  those  of  the 
cavalry,  which  are  reported  as  being  269  for  the 
month  of  November.  The  total  is  thus  raised  to 
6,669,  which  excludes  all  cases  of  slight  wounds 
where  the  men  had  returned  to  duty  within  ten  days 
after  the  battle.3  The  resemblance  of  these  figures 
to  those  of  General  Schofield's  report  made  at  the 
time  is  very  striking. 

It  would,  of  course,  be  very  desirable  to  have  full 
official  returns  of  the  Confederate  losses,  and  thus 
be  saved  the  need  of  comparison  and  calculation; 
but  no  reports  are  preserved,  if  ever  made,  of  Cheat- 
ham's  divisions  (Cleburne's  and  Brown's),  which 
suffered  most  heavily,  and  we  are  therefore  obliged 
to  have  recourse  to  the  kind  of  evidence  which  has 
been  presented. 

The  thing  which  most  impressed  the  world  at  the 
time  was  the  unusual  number  of  general  officers  who 
appeared  in  the  casualty  lists.  Hood  gave  the  list 
with  laconic  brevity  in  his  dispatch  to  the  Confed 
erate  War  Department  on  December  3d.  "  We  have 
to  lament, "  he  said,  "  the  loss  of  many  gallant  officers 
and  brave  men.  Major  General  Cleburne,  Brigadier 

1  A  striking  example  of  the  destruction  of  some  of  the  brigades  is 
that  of  Cockrell's  of  French's  division,  one  of  those  included  in  the  ab 
sentees  on  December  10.     It  went  into  the  fight  with  G96  officers  and 
men,  and  suffered  419  casualties.     0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  71G. 

2  Ante,  p.  211. 

3  There  are  discrepancies  in  the  reports  of  the  cavalry  which  can 
not  easily  be  reconciled.      The  report  quoted  gives  the  losses  of  Chal 
mers's  division  for  the  month  of  November  as  35  (Td.,  p.  762)  ;  but 
Chalmers's  report  makes  them  116  killed  and  wounded  in  the  battle  of 
Franklin.     Id.,  p.  764. 


214  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Generals  John  Adams,  Gist,  Stralil,  and  Granbury 
were  killed :  Major  General  John  C.  Brown,  Briga 
dier  Generals  Carter,  Manigault,  Quarlcs,  Cockrell, 
and  Scott  were  wounded;  Brigadier  General  Gordon 
was  captured.1 

But  this  was  only  a  part  of  the  response  to  his 
order  immediately  after  the  battle,  that  "  Corps  com 
manders  will  send  in  at  once  a  list  of  the  divis 
ion,  brigade,  and  regimental  commanders  by  name 
and  rank,  who  were  killed  or  wounded  so  as  to  be 
unfit  for  service,  in  the  engagement  of  yesterday 
evening."  2 

The  complete  return  is  a  roll  of  honor  which  fills 
nearly  three  pages  of  the  published  official  records, 
and  of  which  the  summary  is  live  general  officers 
killed,  six  wounded,  and  one  captured;  six  colonels 
killed,  fifteen  wounded,  and  two  missing;  two  lieu 
tenant  colonels  killed  and  nine  wounded ;  three 
majors  killed,  five  wounded,  and  two  missing;  two 
captains  killed,  three  wounded,  and  four  missing:  a 
total  of  sixty-five.3  Remember  that  none  of  these 
were  exercising  a  less  command  than  that  of  a  regi 
ment.  Every  captain  on  the  list  was  serving  three 
grades  above  his  rank  when  he  fell,  stepping  forward 
to  fill  vacancies  as  they  had  been  made  by  the  for 
tunes  of  war.  The  other  field  and  line  officers  who 
fell  are  mingled  in  the  long  list  of  the  thousands  in 
which  the  sacrifices  of  war  are  summed  up.  When 
silence  fell  upon  the  field,  there  was  more  than  one 
brigade  in  which  a  captain  was  the  ranking  officer 
in  command.4 


1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  ii.  pp.  643,  C44. 

2  Id.,  p.  629.  3  Id.,  part  i.  pp.  684-686. 

4  This  was  the  case  in  Quarles's  brigade  of  Walthall's  division,  and 
in  Gist's  brigade  of  Cheatham's  division.     Id.,  pp.  721,  738. 


Results  and  Lessons 


215 


The  losses  on  the  national  side  are  more  readily 
ascertained  from  the  official  reports,  for  the  complete 
aggregate  by  divisions  in  the  Fourth  and  Twenty- 
third  Corps  was  reported  by  General  Schofield.1 
Those  of  the  cavalry  are  returned  for  the  whole 
campaign,  including  the  battle  of  Nashville,  so  that 
the  losses  of  General  Wilson's  command  at  Franklin 
cannot  he  separately  stated.2  It  was  understood  that 
they  were  not  large.  General  Schotield's  tabulated 
statement  is  as  follows  :  — 


Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

Aggregate. 

Fourth  Army  Corps  : 
First  Division  (Kimball)    . 
Second  Division  (Wagner) 
Artillery      .                    .     . 

5 
52 
10 

37 
519 
51 

18 
670 
6 

60 
1,241 
67 

Twenty-third  Army  Corps  : 
Second  Division  (Ruger)  . 
Third  Division  (Reilly)      . 

74 

48 

241 
185 

313 

97 

628 
330 

Total    

189 

1,033 

1,104 

2,326 

The  analysis  of_this  total  of  2,32(3  casualties  shows 
several  important  and  instructive  facts. 

First,  nearly  half  of  the  whole  are  in  the  list  of 
"missing."  Whilst  it  is  true  that  among  the  miss 
ing  would  be  some  of  the  dead  who  fell  outside  the 
works,  and  a  few  stragglers  and  fugitives  from  the 
battle-field  who  did  not  rejoin  their  colors,  the 
greater  part  would  be  men,  wounded  or  unwoundcd, 
who  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands.  In  his  dispatch 
of  December  3d,  Hood  claims  that  he  captured  about 
a  thousand  prisoners.  His  claim  is  corroborated  by 
this  list  of  1,104  missing.3 

Second,  nearly  the  whole  of  the  missing  are  in 
Wagner's  and  Ruger's  divisions,  and  nearly  two 


1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  343. 
3  Id.,  part  ii.  p.  643. 


2  Id.,  pp.  47,  568. 


216  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

thirds  of  the  whole  are  in  Wagner's  alone.  Analyz 
ing  still  further  by  brigades,  the  number  of  missing 
in  Moore's  brigade  of  Ruger's  division  is  trifling; 
so  is  it  in  Casement's  and  Stiles's  brigades  of 
Reilly's  division.1  As  to  the  Twenty -third  Corps, 
therefore,  the  missing  are  nearly  all  from  Reilly's 
and  Strickland's  brigades,  the  two  which  were  re 
spectively  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  Columbia 
Turnpike,  and  there  were  three  times  as  many  in 
Strickland's  as  in  Reilly's  brigade.  In  Wagner's 
division  Opdycke's  brigade  returns  70  missing,2  and 
the  600  remaining  are  from  Lane's  and  Conrad's 
brigades.  Those  in  Opdycke's  brigade  are  almost 
exactly  the  same  as  in  Reilly's  brigade.  These 
figures  demonstrate  that  where  the  line  was  un- 
.)  shaken  and  the  troops  held  firmly  to  the  works,  the 
:  loss  was  small ;  where  the  break  was  momentary  and 
\  the  line  quickly  restored  (as  by  Reilly  and  Opdycke), 
the  prisoners  lost  were  still  moderate  in  number; 
where  the  break  was  more  complete  and  the  enemy 
held  the  works  for  a  longer  time  (as  in  Strickland's 
line),  the  losses  were  large;  but  where  the  enemy 
came  in  pell-mell  with  our  men  who  were  driven  in 
from  the  position  nearly  half  a  mile  in  front,  both 
wounded  and  missing  were  multiplied,  as  one  would 
naturally  expect. 

Third,  the  lists  of  the  killed  tell  a  similar  story. 
They  are  trifling  everywhere  but  near  the  centre,  on 
the  national  side,  though  the  Confederates  lost  nearly 
as  heavily  in  front  of  Stiles  and  Casement  as  any 
where  on  the  field.3  It  helps  to  show  the  character 
of  the  fighting  in  Strickland's  brigade  when  we  find 
that  the  number  of  the  killed  in  it  was  53,  whilst 

1  O.  R.,  part  i.  pp.  381,  409.  2  Id.,  p.  241. 

8  See  ante,  pp.  124,  126. 


Results  and  Lessons  217 

the  number  killed  in  Lane's  and  Conrad's  brigades 
together  was  36. l  In  Opdyeke's  brigade  16  were 
killed,  making  52  in  the  three  brigades  of  Wagner's 
division  to  74  in  the  two  brigades  of  Ruger's.  This 
shows  not  only  that  Strickland's  regiments  rallied 
stoutly  and  fought  stubbornly,  but  that  the  second 
hastily  constructed  breastworks  were  poorer  cover 
for  them  than  the  original  works  in  the  main  line. 
Thus  every  column  of  the  tables  corroborates  the 
narrative  of  the  battle  as  we  have  read  it  in  the 
preceding  pages. 

The  improvements  in  repeating  arms  made  since 
our  civil  war,  and  the  current  discussion  of  the 
practical  range  and  rapidity  of  lire  from  a  line  of 
battle,  receive  light  from  our  experience  at  Franklin. 
We  found  that  the  slight  undulations  of  the  field 
were  scarcely  noticeable  from  our  parapet,  and  yet 
they  were  sufficient  to  cover  flood's  advancing  lines 
of  infantry  so  well  that  it  was  not  till  they  had 
passed  the  position  first  occupied  by  Wagner's  two 
brigades  that  they  came  under  infantry  fire.  They 
thus  got  within  five  or  six  hundred  yards  of  our  lines 
practically  unharmed  from  musketry.  We  rarely 
found  a  field,  during  the  war,  so  open  or  so  level 
as  this,  and  one  might  fairly  be  sceptical  as  to  the 
practical  value  of  much  greater  range  in  small 
arms. 

As  to  rapidity  of  fire,  however,  the  proof  seems 
strongly  in  its  favor.  /The  few  repeating  rifles  we 
had  bore  no  important  ratio  to  the  number  of  men 
in  line,  though  the  enemy,  exaggerating  the  number 
of  such  weapons,  credited  them  with  much  of  the 
terrible  destruction  of  the  field.  The  truth  was  that 
the  crowding  of  our  second  line  and  reserves  into  the 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  381,  and  table,  ante,  p.  215. 


218  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

works  practically  made  all  our  weapons  repeaters. 
i'  For  as  the  men  were  three  or  four  deep  in  most 
/  places,  they  supplied  the  front  rank  so  rapidly  with 
loaded  pieces  that  I  doubt  if  any  ordinary  line  armed 
with  the  latest  magazine  gun  could  have  delivered 
so  continuous  a  fire  as  we  witnessed.  As  darkness 
came  on,  the  appeanuice  was  so  exactly  that  of  a 
sheet  of  lire  lying  stationary  and  uninterrupted  at 
the  level  of  the  parapet,  that  the  engagement  is 
rarely  mentioned  by  one  who  was  there  without 
speaking  of  this,  a  striking  phenomenon  of  the 
battle.  With  the  weapons  of  to-day  a  similar  result 
would  be  produced  by  a  line  in  two  ranks. 

The  engagement  also  sheds  instructive  light  on 
the  question,  much  mooted  in  recent  military  discus- 
(  sions,  of  the  limit  of  endurance  of  loss  by  well  dis 
ciplined  troops,  beyond  which  they  cannot  go.  No 
one  competent  to  judge  denies  that  for  a  union  of 
personal  courage  with  intelligence,  the  material  of 
the  Union  and  Confederate  armies  in  1864  cannot 
be  excelled.  Their  fire  discipline  was  also  of  a  very 
high  order.  Something  less  than  24,000  of  such 
men l  actually  delivered  the  Confederate  assault  upon 
the  line  of  breastworks  between  the  Harpeth  River 
and  the  Carter's  Creek  Turnpike,  say  a  mile  long, 
held  by  about  10,000  national  troops,  made  up  of 
Reilly's  and  Ruger's  divisions  and  the  artillery.2 
About  5,000  more  (Wagner's  division)  were  in  the 
fight;  but  the  preceding  narrative  makes  it  clear 
that,  under  the  circumstances,  their  participation 
was  a  misfortune  and  not  a  benefit  to  the  national 
army.  The  incidents  at  the  opening  of  the  battle 
greatly  increased  the  confidence  of  the  Confederates, 
and  stimulated  their  hopeful  courage  far  beyond 

1  Ante,  p.  211.  2  Ante,  p.  210. 


Results  and  Lessons  219 

the  ordinary.  Their  total  casualties,  including  the 
slighter  but  temporarily  disabling  wounds,  were  about 
one  third  of  their  whole  number  before  they  yielded 
to  the  inevitable  and  ceased  their  efforts.  It  would 
be  hard  to  Find  a  better  test  of  what  courage,  nerve, 
and  discipline  are  capable  of.1  It  helps  to  establish 
a  practical  limit  where  the  sense  of  hopelessness  and 
impossibility  quenches  will.  Beyond  that  point 
continued  struggle  is  not  heroism,  it  is  insanity,, 
The  men  who  held  the  works  and  restored  the  line 
when  broken,  may  also  fairly  claim  that  they  too 
showed  what  nerve  and  will  may  do  to  retrieve  an 
error  and  turn  a  threatened  disaster  into  victory. 

Among  the  trophies  of  the  battle  General  Schofield 
was  able  to  report  thirty-three  flags.  Twenty  of  these 
were  captured  along  Reilly's  parapet,  ten  at  Opdycke's, 
and  three  at  other  points.  Many  of  these  were  taken 
in  hand  to  hand  conflict,  but  some  were  dropped  upon 
the  field,  where  the  fearful  destruction  left  no  one  to 
lift  them  again.  Hood  also  claimed  several,  taken  in 
the  rout  of  Wagner's  outpost  before  the  rally  at  the 
main  line  renewed  the  continuous  front  of  fire  and 
steel.2 

1  An  interesting  discussion  of  the  general  subject  is  found  in  the 
papers  of  Captain  F.  N.  Maude,  R.  E.,  republished  by  Captain  Arthur 
L.  Wagner,  II.  S.  A.,  in  the  "  International  Series,"  vol.  i. 

2  See  Schofield's  Report,  Appendix  A,  pp.  306,  307.     Opdycke's 
Report,  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  242.     Hood's  Report,  id.,  p.  G58. 


CHAPTER   XVII 

DISCUSSION  OF   WAGNER'S  CONDUCT 

Natural  Rise  of  Controversies  —  Corps  Feeling  —  Good  Comradeship 

—  Wagner's  Personal   Situation  —  Disposition  to  befriend  him  — 
Criticisms  by  his   Subordinates  —  Efforts   to   allay  the  Irritation 

—  Correspondence  —  Preliminary    Reports  —  Conrad's   Report  — 
Wagner  retired  from  the  Division  —  Leaves  the  Army. 

I  HAVE  now  completed  the  connected  narrative  of  the 
battle  of  Franklin  with  what  may  seem  abundant 
fulness  of  detail;  but,  as  I  have  had  to  note  on 
several  occasions,  controversies  have  arisen  in  regard 
to  various  points  in  the  history  which  may  be  con 
clusively  settled,  as  it  seems  to  me,  by  a  careful 
weighing  of  the  evidence,  official  and  private,  which 
we  noAV  have  access  to.  One  of  the  most  interesting 
features  of  a  civil  war  waged  by  a  people  of  so  gen 
eral  intelligence  and  mental  alertness  as  ours  is  the 
great  activity  of  discussion  which  follows  it.  Our 
old  soldiers  were  keen  critics  of  what  they  saw,  and 
in  the  long  delay  in  publishing  the  official  records 
of  the  war  debated  its  issues  and  fought  its  battles 
over  with  none  the  less  zest  because  their  informa 
tion  was  limited  and  their  memory  imperfect. 

As  it  fell  to  my  lot  to  publish  in  1882  1  a  compar 
atively  brief  history  of  the  campaign  of  which  the 
battle  of  Franklin  was  a  part,  it  was  an  altogether 
natural  result  that  I  should  find  some  of  my  state- 

1  Ante,  p.  2,  note. 


Discussion  of  Wagners  Conduct  221 

ments  and  conclusions  challenged.  The  brevity  of 
my  narrative  made  it  impossible  to  give  the  evidence 
which  supported  it.  I  was  obliged  to  state  facts  and 
conclusions  succinctly,  trusting  to  a  confident  belief 
that  candid  investigation  would  show  that  1  had 
asserted  nothing  without  strong  proof.  My  personal 
familiarity  with  the  events  of  which  1  wrote  gave 
me  some  advantage  in  following  the  clues  which 
lead  to  the  truth.  On  many  points  i  was  also  an 
eyewitness  \vho  owed  it  to  himself  to  be  explicit  in 
telling  what  he  knew,  leaving  it  to  the  reader  to  give 
proper  weight  to  his  testimony. 

1  have  little  reason  to  complain  of  my  treatment 
as  an  author.  The  most  competent  judges  have 
accepted  the  authority  of  my  volumes,  and  the  pub 
lication  of  the  government  records  has  practically 
quieted  discussion.  There  are,  however,  several  sub 
jects  still  debated  which  should  be  settled,  if  pos 
sible;  and  those  who  are  interested  in  historical 
investigation  will,  I  hope,  be  glad  of  the  additional 
light  I  may  be  able  to  give. 

A  very  natural  esprit  de  corps  led  some  worthy 
men  who  served  in  Wagner's  division  to  question 
the  justice  of  the  criticism  upon  his  handling  of  the 
division  in  the  battle.  The  quotation  from  the 
official  records  of  the  written  orders  given  him  and 
his  own  report  of  his  understanding  of  them  fully 
disposes  of  the  contention  that  the  responsibility  for 
his  giving  battle  in  front  of  our  lines  of  works  should 
rest  upon  his  superiors.  There  have,  however,  been 
occasional  allegations  of  a  disposition  on  the  part  of 
General  Schofield  and  other  officers  of  the  Twenty- 
third  corps  to  be  unfriendly  to  him  in  the  examina 
tion  which  General  Thomas  instituted  on  the  arrival 
of  the  army  at  Nashville.  The  fact  was  quite  the 


222  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

opposite.  General  Schofield  was  well  aware  of  jeal 
ousies  which  grew  out  of  his  assignment  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  army  in  the  Held,  and  had  sought  by 
every  means  in  his  power  to  allay  them.  In  this  he 
was  heartily  seconded  by  his  principal  subordinates 
in  his  own  corps.  General  Rugcr  had  just  been 
transferred  from  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to 
the  Twenty-third  Corps,  and  could  not  be  otherwise 
than  warm  in  his  relations  to  his  old  comrades.  My 
own  had  been  scarcely  less  so  from  the  day  we  had 
welcomed  Wood's  and  Sheridan's  divisions  as  rein 
forcements  near  Knoxville  in  the  winter  campaign 
of  1863-64.  How  we  proved  this  cordiality  will  be 
shown  in  the  events  of  the  week  following  the 
battle. 

It  was  past  noon  on  the  1st  of  December  when  we 
reached  Nashville,  and  the  troops  were  hardly  put 
in  position  about  the  town  when  General  Wagner 
called  upon  me.  He  was  in  distress  over  the  results 
of  the  engagement  to  his  division,  and  wras  most 
anxious  to  soften  the  judgment  of  his  superiors  as 
to  his  action  under  his  orders.  His  statement  regard 
ing  the  orders  he  gave  to  his  own  subordinates  was 
that  which  he  embodied  in  his  official  report  the 
next  day.1  It  was,  in  brief,  that  they  were  directed 
"  to  develop  the  enemy,  but  not  to  attempt  to  fight 
if  threatened  by  the  enemy  in  too  strong  a  force." 
But  the  enemy's  "onset  was  so  sudden  that  Colonel 
Conrad  found  his  brigade  heavily  engaged  and  about 
to  be  flanked  before  he  could  withdraw  his  line. 
His  men  fought  gallantly,  refusing  to  retire  till 
completely  flanked  and  driven  out  of  their  hastily 
thrown-up  barricades,  when  they  retired  on  the  main 

1  See  quotations  in  chap,  iv.,  ante,  and  the  whole  report,  O.  R.,  xlv. 
part  i.  p.  231. 


Discussion  of  Wagner  s  Conduct  223 

line. "  1  There  was  no  room  for  disagreement  between 
us,  and  there  was  none,  as  to  the  rallying  and  reor 
ganization  of  Conrad's  and  Lane's  brigades  near  the 
river,  or  as  to  Opdyckc's  charging  to  restore  the  lines 
at  the  centre.  General  Wagner's  anxiety  was  to 
get  me  to  accept  the  view  that  his  two  brigades 
made  a  retreat,  in  accordance,  substantially,  with 
his  orders,  and  took  a  position  within  the  lines  where 
they  would  be  in  reserve  supporting  my  line  in  the 
works. 

Wagner  had  seen  a  good  deal  of  active  field  ser 
vice,  and  under  a  rough  exterior  had  a  generous  and 
genial  character.  If  his  account  of  the  matter  were 
accurate,  it  was  rather  the  excess  of  courage  in  the 
two  brigades  which  had  compromised  them,  and 
there  was  no  occasion  for  blaming  him.  To  one 
who  was  friendly,  it  was  easy  to  yield  to  his  appeal 
for  help  in  setting  his  conduct  in  a  favorable  light. 
There  had  been  no  time  to  investigate.  We  had  not 
even  rested  from  the  fatigue  and  the  excitement  of 
the  past  three  days.  I  had  seen  the  first  break  of 
his  men  from  the  outer  line,  but  I  had  not  seen  and 
had  not  yet  learned  the  particulars  of  what  occurred 
whilst  I  was  riding  from  the  left  to  the  centre.  I 
felt  at  liberty,  therefore,  to  accept  his  view,  and  to 
promise  him  the  assistance  of  a  friendly  report, 
made  provisionally  and  expressly  preliminary  to  an 
official  one  which  should  come  later,  when  subordi 
nate  reports  should  be  received  and  investigation  be 
completed.  General  Schofield  accepted  the  same 
favorable  views ;  and  the  preliminary  reports  which 
went  to  General  Thomas  immediately,  attributed  the 
momentary  break  at  the  centre  to  the  cover  afforded 
the  enemy  by  our  retreating  outpost,  and  the  mis- 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  231. 


224  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

understanding  of  orders  by  the  troops  in  the  breast 
works  near  the  turnpike,  in  the  confusion  when 
Wagner's  two  brigades  passed  over  them. 

I  should  hesitate  to  state  what  occurred  at  this 
visit  of  an  officer  now  dead,  were  there  not  contem 
poraneous  written  evidence  of  it,  so  that  it  does  not 
depend  on  my  recollection.1  The  substance  of  his 
conversational  statement  I  have  been  content  to  put 
in  the  language  of  his  own  official  report ;  though  it 
was  more  earnestly  emphatic  in  the  freedom  of  such 
an  oral  interview,  and  claimed  that  his  two  brigades 
made  a  leisurely  retreat.  He  was  well  aware  of 
severe  criticism  among  his  subordinates,  and  that 
it  was  likely  to  lead  to  official  inquiry  if  not  to  a 
court-martial.  This  was  in  fact  the  motive  for  his 
so  great  haste  in  seeking  to  remove  unfavorable 
impressions  from  the  minds  of  those  immediately 
above  him.  Feeling  that  the  glorious  result  of  the 
engagement  made  it  easy  to  take  the  favorable  view 
of  his  action,  as  he  stated  it,  and  to  treat  it  rather 
as  an  accidental  mishap  than  as  a  disobedience  of 
orders,  I  was  entirely  cordial  in  giving  him  prompt 
friendly  assistance  and  counsel. 

The  tart  exchange  of  opinions  between  himself 
and  Colonel  Opdycke  at  the  time  the  brigade  was 
marched  within  the  lines,2  I  advised  him  to  ignore; 
and  as  I  was  personally  witness  to  Opdycke's  hero 
ism  in  the  magnificent  charge  of  his  brigade,  I  urged 
him  to  do  full  justice  to  it,  and  to  recommend  the 
colonel's  promotion.  As  he  had  been  busy  with  the 
reorganization  of  the  other  brigades,  and  had  not 
personally  seen  Opdycke's  conduct,  I  agreed  to  take 
the  initiative  and  write  the  recommendation  for  pro 
motion  which  he  would  sustain  in  his  report.  With 

1  Post,  p.  226.  '2  Ante,  p.  73,  note. 


Discussion  of  Wagners  Conduct  225 

regard  to  the  irritation  in  Conrad's  and  Lane's 
brigades,  I  comforted  him  with  saying  that,  the  facts 
being  as  he  stated  them,  a  full  recognition  of  the 
courage  which  had  been  only  too  persistent  would 
be  likely  to  allay  the  irritation  and  bring  the  whole 
into  harmony  again.  I  did  not  then  know  the  inci 
dent  which  my  Adjutant  General  had  witnessed  at 
Franklin,  when  General  Wagner,  haranguing  his 
partially  reorganized  troops  near  the  river,  had  said, 
"Stand  by  me,  boys,  and  I'll  stand  by  youv"  The 
effort  to  overcome  the  insubordinate  feeling  began 
there. l 

The  contemporaneous  documents  to  which  I  have 
referred  are  so  necessary  a  part  of  the  narrative  that 
I  give  them  in  full.  First  is  my  official  recommen 
dation  of  the  promotion  of  Colonel  Opdycke. 

"  HEADQUARTERS  THIRD  DIVISION,  TWENTY-THIRD  ARMY 
CORPS,  NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  Dec.  3d,  1864. 

"  MAJOR  GENERAL  THOMAS, 

Commanding  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 
"  GENERAL,  — 

"  I  have  the  honor  of  calling  to  your  notice  the  con 
spicuous  gallantry  and  meritorious  conduct  of  Colonel 
Emerson  Opdycke,  commanding  a  brigade  in  General 
Wagner's  division,  Fourth  Corps,  in  the  battle  of  the 
30th  ultimo. 

"  In  the  early  part  of  the  engagement  a  portion  of  the 
Second  Division,  Twenty-third  Corps,  was  somewhat 
disordered  by  misunderstanding  the  purpose  of  retiring 
through  the  lines  of  the  two  brigades  of  Wagner's  divis 
ion  which  had  been  engaged  in  advance.  It  was  at  this 
time  that  Opdycke's  brigade  was  lying  in  reserve  on  the 
Columbia  pike,  and,  being  called  upon,  he  led  them  for 
ward  in  the  most  brilliant  manner,  charging  the  ad- 

1  Ante,  p.  146,  and  Appendix  F. 
15 


226  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

vancing  rebels  and  restoring  the  continuity  of  our  lines, 
which  were  not  again  disordered  in  the  slightest  degree. 
Colonel  Opdycke's  promptness  and  courage  deserve  of 
ficial  notice,  and,  as  I  was  commanding  the  line  at  that 
time,  I  deem  it  my  duty  to  bring  the  facts  to  your  atten 
tion,  the  more  especially  as  he  does  not  belong  to  my 
division. 

"  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"J.  D.  Cox, 
Brigadier  General  Commanding" 

This  letter  was  sent,  by  the  usual  military  rule, 
through  the  headquarters  of  General  Schofield,  and 
is  still  on  the  files  of  the  War  Department.1  The 
recommendation  was  adopted  and  indorsed  by  General 
Schofield  in  his  own  report,  dated  December  7th.2 

I  caused  a  copy  of  this  to  be  made  and  sent  it  to 
General  Wagner  with  the  following  letter  of  my 
own:  — 

"HEADQUARTERS  THIRD  DIVISION,  TWENTY-THIRD  ARMY 
CORPS,  NASHVILLE,  TENN-,  Dec.  3d,  1864. 

"  GENERAL, — 

"I  have  the  honor  of  handing  you  herewith  a  copy 
of  a  paper  forwarded  by  me  to  General  Thomas's  head 
quarters,  concerning  the  subject  matter  of  which  I  had  a 
conversation  with  you  a  couple  of  days  since.  I  think 
this  would  be  a  proper  time  to  press  the  subject  of 
Colonel  Opdycke's  promotion,  and  if  this  can  be  made 
the  means  of  doing  so,  I  shall  be  most  happy.  Please 
inform  me  what  steps  you  think  can  be  advantageously 
taken,  and  it  will  give  me  great  pleasure  to  co-operate 
further. 

"  I  desire  also  to  express  my  admiration  of  the  gal 
lantry  of  your  whole  command.  Indeed  an  excess  of 
bravery  kept  the  two  brigades  a  little  too  long  in  front, 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  409. 

2  Td.,  p.  ."43,  and  see  Appendix  A. 


Discussion  of  Wagner  s  Conduct  227 

so  that  the  troops  at  the  main  line  could  not  get  to  firing 
upon  the  advancing  enemy  till  they  were  uncomfortably 
near. 

"  Very  truly  and  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

"J.  D.  Cox, 
Brigadier  General  Commanding" 

"To  BRIGADIER  GENERAL  G.  D.  WAGNER, 

Commanding  2d  Division,  Fourth  Army  Corps." 


This  letter,  which  by  its  tenor  General  Wagner 
was  permitted  to  use  for  the  friendly  purposes  already 
stated,  wras  not  strictly  official,  and  docs  not  ap 
pear  to  have  been  preserved  in  the  Official  Army 
Records  or  in  my  private  letter-book.  Finding  an 
extract  from  it  quoted  in  one  of  the  many  newspaper 
articles  upon  the  battle,  Major  E.  C.  Dawcs  (the  well 
known  military  statistician  and  writer)  procured 
a  copy  attested  by  an  officer  of  General  Wagner's 
staff.  It  fixes  tho  date  of  the  interview  between 
General  Wagner  and  myself  on  the  1st  of  December, 
the  day  after  the  battle,  when,  after  our  twenty-mile 
march  begun  at  midnight,  we  went  into  position  in 
the  fortifications  about  Nashville  in  the  afternoon. 

In  connecting  the  two  papers  now  given,  I  have 
outrun  the  order  of  events  and  must  return  to  the 
2d  of  December.  On  the  morning  of  tha,t  day  General 
Schofield  informed  me  that  General  Thomas  desired 
a  preliminary  sketch  of  the  battle  for  immediate  use, 
and,  although  it  was  quite  impossible  to  get  subordi 
nates'  reports,  asked  me  to  write  it  at  once,  ns  the 
officer  who  had  fullest  and  most  direct  personal 
knowledge  of  what  occurred  upon  the  line.  I  did 
so  without  a  moment's  delay,  and  it  was  forwarded 
to  General  Thomas,  bearing  that  date.1  General 

1  O.  "R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  348.     See  also  Appendix  A. 


228  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Scliofield  made  a  report  for  the  army,  also  prelimi 
nary,  on  the  7th  of  December;  but  neither  of  the 
regular  official  reports  from  the  corps  headquarters 
was  made  for  more  than  a  month  afterward.1 

In  this  preliminary  report,  thus  made  without 
time  for  investigation  or  official  data,  and  both 
expressly  and  impliedly  subject  to  full  correction  in 
the  official  one  which  was  to  follow,  I  felt  not  only 
at  liberty  to  follow  my  friendly  feeling  toward 
General  Wagner,  but,  with  only  his  statements  of 
the  preceding  evening  before  me,  I  felt  it  due  to 
him  to  accept  them  in  regard  to  the  retreat  of  his 
two  brigades.  In  this  clause  of  the  report,  there 
fore,  I  used  his  freshly  uttered  words,  and  said,  "At 
three  o'clock  the  enemy  engaged  the  two  brigades  of 
Wagner's  division,  which,  in  accordance  with  orders, 
fell  leisurely  back  within  our  lines,  and  the  action 
became  general  along  the  entire  front. " 2 

Everything,  therefore,  which  kindly  personal  feel 
ing  or  sympathetic  comradeship  could  do  to  assist 
General  Wagner  had  been  done  in  the  Twenty-third 
Corps.  How  did  it  happen  that  it  did  not  avail? 

On  the  evening  of  the  1st  of  December,8  before 
resting  from  the  fatigues  of  the  battle  and  the  march, 
Colonel  Conrad  made  his  report  for  the  Third  Brigade 
of  Wagner's  division.  He  had  not  waited  for  the 
reports  of  his  regimental  commanders,  the  earliest 
of  which  are  dated  on  the  5th.4  Of  the  other  brigade 
reports,  Opdycke's  was  dated  on  the  5th  and  Lane's 
on  the  7th.5  As  I  have  already  said,  this  haste  was 

1  The  regular  official  report  of  the  Fourth  Corps  was  made  by 
General  Thomas  J.  Wood,  from  Huntsville,  Ala.,  on  the  10th  of  Jan 
uary,  1865,  and  mine  for  the  Twenty-third  Corps  was  made  from  Clif 
ton,  Tenn.,  on  the  same  date.     O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  119  and  349. 

2  0.  R,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  349.  4  Td.,  p.  275,  etc. 

3  Id.,  p.  269.  5  Id.,  pp.  239,  255. 


Discussion  of  Wagner  s  Conduct  229 

not  only  unusual,  but  it  was  equivalent  to  preferring 
charges  against  the  division  commander 1  when  the 
character  of  the  report  is  considered.  It  anticipated 
and  contradicted  General  Wagner's  theory  that  the 
two  brigades  had  been  compromised  by  the  persist 
ence  of  its  officers  and  men  in  lighting  when  their 
orders  directed  their  withdrawal,  and  asserted  that 
the  general's  orders  had  been  explicit,  even  to  direct 
ing  the  file-closers  to  hold  the  men  to  the  line  with 
fixed  bayonets.2  That  this  was  intended  to  be  fol 
lowed  up  by  personal  complaints  at  General  Thomas's 
headquarters  needs  no  argument.  General  Wagner 
evidently  so  understood  it,  for  he  hastened  his  own 
report  and  presented  it  on  the  next  day,  three  days 
before  any  other  report  from  his  subordinates  was 
received.  There  is  internal  evidence  that  he  sought 
in  it  to  soften  the  collision  between  his  own  and 
Colonel  Conrad's  statements,  but  the  consequences 
speak  for  themselves. 

In  Colonel  Fullerton's  Itinerary  of  the  Fourth 
Corps,  under  date  of  3d  December,  this  entry  is 
found  :  "  Brigadier  General  Elliott  has  been  assigned 
to  the  Second  Division  of  this  corps,  and  he  takes 
command  of  it  to-day.  General  Wagner,  who  has 
been  commanding  it,  resumes  command  of  his  bri 
gade, —  Second  Brigade  of  the  same  division."3  This 
was  the  brigade  of  which  Colonel  Lane  had  recently 
been  in  command.  The  chagrin  caused  by  this  order 
of  General  Thomas  was  of  course  hard  for  General 
Wagner  to  bear,  and  one  is  not  surprised  to  find  it 
followed  by  his  request  to  be  allowed  to  retire  from 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  On  the  9th  of  Decem 
ber,  in  one  of  Thomas's  Special  Field  Orders,  a  para 
graph  reads  as  follows:  "Brigadier  General  George 

1  Ante,  p.  79,  note.         2  0.  II.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  270.         3  /</.,  p.  152. 


230  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

D.  Wagner  is  at  his  own  request  relieved  from  further 
duty  with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  and  will  pro 
ceed  to  Indianapolis,  Indiana,  and  report  by  letter 
to  the  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army  for  orders. " l 

As  soon  as  there  was  time  for  investigation,  the 
evidence  became  conclusive  that  General  Wagner's 
version  of  his  orders  to  his  subordinates  and  the 
character  of  the  retreat  from  the  outer  line  could  not 
be  sustained,  and  that  the  truth  as  to  the  facts  was 
that  which  I  have  narrated  in  a  preceding  chapter.2 
When  my  official  report  was  written,  a  month  later, 
it  had  necessarily  to  be  in  accord  with  the  facts  as 
we  had  then  learned  them.  The  inconsistency  be 
tween  this  and  the  preliminary  report  in  regard  to 
the  points  on  which  I  had  at  first  accepted  General 
Wagner's  statement  is  not  a  matter  of  regret,  because 
it  makes  record  evidence  of  my  desire  to  take  the 
most  friendly  and  favorable  view  of  a  comrade's 
conduct  while  it  was  possible  to  do  so. 

It  is  right  that  we  should  even  now  recollect  that 
Wagner  recovered  his  balance  before  the  two  brigades 
had  come  to  blows  with  the  enemy,  and  that  he  then 
gave  orders  consistent  with  those  he  had  received.3 
The  period  of  over-excitement,  however,  had  lasted 
long  enough  to  prevent  the  correction  of  the  error. 
His  report  was  not  wholly  erroneous  as  to  his  com 
mands.  It  omitted,  as  he  would  have  been  glad  to 
have  his  subordinates  omit,  the  contradictory  orders 
which  in  his  excitement  he  had  issued.  General 
Thomas  was  forced  to  conclude  that  this  loss  of  self- 
possession  showed  that  he  was  overweighted  with  the 
command  of  the  division,  especially  ns  the  brigade 
commanders  had  evidently  lost  confidence  in  his 
capacity. 

1  0.  "R.,  xlv.  part  ii.  p.  117.         2  Ante,  chap.  vii.         3  Ante, p.  107. 


Discussion  of  Wagners  Conduct  231 

General  L.  P.  Bradley  had  been  the  permanent 
commander  of  the  brigade  which  was  under  Colonel 
Conrad  at  Franklin,  the  latter  having  taken  com 
mand  by  seniority  after  Bradley  was  severely  wounded 
at  Spring  Hill,  the  day  before.  At  Ihc  close  of  the 
war  General  Bradley  was  commissioned  in  the  regu 
lar  army  in  recognition  of  his  services  in  the  volun 
teers.  In  a  letter  to  me,  dated  November  18,  1889, 
he  says:  "I  was  not  in  the  fight  at  Franklin,  as  you 
will  remember,  but  was  in  the  town  when  the  battle 
was  being  fought,  and  soon  after  saw  and  talked 
with  officers  who  were  wounded  there.  There  has 
never  been  any  doubt  in  my  mind  since  then  as  to 
the  responsibility  for  the  exposed  position  of  the  two 
brigades  of  the  Fourth  Corps  in  front  of  the  lines. 
It  was  one  of  the  vagaries  of  Wagner's  mind  that  an 
assault  in  force  should  be  resisted  by  the  pickets  in 
front  of  a  fortified  line,  and  I  remember  a  difference 
I  had  with  him  at  Columbia,  where  it  was  thought 
we  might  be  attacked  when  I  was  in  charge  of  the 
picket  lines.  I  felt  justified  then  in  saying  to  him 
that  if  Hood's  army  attacked,  I  should  retire  the 
pickets  after  giving  information  of  the  enemy's  move 
ment.  Wagner  distinctly  ordered  the  brigades  to 
remain  outside  the  line  and  fight,  after  he  was 
informed  of  the  approach  of  Hood's  columns  by  one 
of  Conrad's  staff  officers.  His  orders  and  conduct 
at  Franklin  justified  his  removal  from  command  of 
the  division." 

It  will  at  once  be  seen  that  this  also  throws  strong 
light  on  the  difference  between  Colonel  Opdycke  and 
General  Wagner  in  regard  to  this  very  point  of  risk 
ing  a  serious  engagement  in  front  of  our  main  lines.1 
Opdycke  practically  took  the  responsibility  of  dis- 

1  Ante,  pp.  73,  226. 


232  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

obedience  by  marching  his  brigade  to  the  position  in 
reserve,  which  proved  so  important  to  us.  He  did 
in  fact  what  Bradley  had  notified  Wagner  he  would 
do  in  a  similar  juncture.  That  Colonel  Conrad, 
Bradley 's  successor,  shared  this  judgment  of  the 
two  senior  brigade  commanders,  his  report  leaves  no 
room  for  doubt.  Lane's  report,  though  made  after 
Wagner's  removal  from  the  command  of  the  divis 
ion,  is  in  accord  with  Conrad's  as  to  the  principal 
facts.  It  is  thus  made  plain  where  were  the  dissatis- 
action  and  want  of  confidence  which  General  Thomas 
judged  to  be  well  founded. 


CHAPTER    XVIII 

DOUBLE  BREASTWORKS  ON  CARTER  HILL 

The  Two  Lines  at  our  Right  Centre  —  Conflicting  Memory  of  Eye 
witnesses —  Confederate  Testimony  —  Solution  of  the  Matter  — 
Bullet  Marks  on  Brick  Smoke-house  —  Summary  of  the  Evidence. 

AMONG  the  questions  at  one  time  warmly  discussed 
was  the  construction  of  the  second  line  of  earthworks 
and  barricade  near  the  Carter  house,  continuous  with 
the  retrenchment  across  the  Columbia  Turnpike,  and 
the  office  and  smoke-house  of  the  Carter  place.1  This 
was  the  line  held  by  Opdycke's  and  Strickland's  bri 
gades,  after  the  break  at  the  centre  was  restored,  as 
we  have  seen ;  and  it  was  through  this  second  line 
that  Colonel  Bond  passed  with  the  112th  Illinois  in 
the  effort  to  regain  the  original  front  line  at  the 
locust  grove.2 

In  my  official  report,  I  spoke  of  this  matter  in  these 
terms :  "  The  condition  of  the  atmosphere  was  such 
that  the  smoke  settled  upon  the  field  without  drifting 
off,  and  after  the  first  half  hour's  fighting  it  became 
almost  impossible  to  discern  any  object  along  the  line 
at  a  few  yards'  distance.  This  state  of  things  ap 
peared  to  have  deceived  Colonel  Strickland  in  regard 
to  his  line,  as  he  reported  the  first  line  completely 
reoccupied  along  his  entire  front  after  the  repulse 
of  the  enemy's  first  assault,  whilst  in  fact  a  portion 

1  Ante,  pp.  56,  117.  2  Ante,  p.  161. 


234  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

of  it  at  his  left  was  not  filled  by  our  troops,  and 
Colonel  Opdycke,  not  being  personally  acquainted  with 
the  lines,  was  not  aware  for  some  time  that  he  had 
not  reached  the  first  line  in  Colonel  Strickland's  front, 
where  the  outbuildings  of  Carter's  house  prevented  the 
line  from  being  distinctly  seen  from  the  turnpike,  even 
if  the  smoke  had  not  formed  so  dark  a  covcrino- " 1 

O  * 

The  only  inaccuracy  in  this  report  was  that  in  the 
smoky  air  and  the  quickly  advancing  twilight,  I  un 
derestimated  the  length  of  this  second  line  of  Strick 
land's,  and  thought  his  confidence  that  he  held  his 
original  front  was  justified  as  to  his  right,  where  the 
72d  Illinois  was  placed.  The  curve  of  the  lines 
toward  the  rear  made  them  appear  to  unite.2  But  we 
have  seen  that  the  right  wing  of  that  regiment,  which 
had  not  been  involved  in  the  rush  of  Lane's  brigade 
from  the  front,  was  ordered  back  to  the  second  line, 
and  the  left  flank  of  Moore's  brigade  was  covered  by 
the  companies  of  the  101st  Ohio,  which  were  sent  by 
General  Kimball  in  obedience  to  my  order.3  At  this 
point,  however,  the  distance  between  the  lines  was 
very  small. 

When  the  opportunity  came  to  examine  the  field 
again  in  December,  on  our  advance  after  the  victory 
at  Nashville,  the  exact  extent  of  the  break  from  the 
first  line  was  still  uncertain,  for  the  loose  barricade 
of  rails  and  logs  in  front  of  Strickland's  right  had 
been  scattered,  or  used  as  fuel  by  encamping  troops 
that  had  twice  traversed  the  ground.  The  solidcr 
parapet,  which  had  been  occupied  by  the  44th  Mis 
souri,  was  there,  and  its  length  was  that  which  T  took 
to  be  the  extent  of  the  whole  second  line,  or  nearly 
so.  All  this  has  since  been  satisfactorily  settled  by 

1  O.  "R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  354,  and  Appendix  B. 

2  See  sketch,  p.  43,  ante.  3  Ante,  pp.  131,  134. 


Double  Breastworks  on  Carter  Hill          235 

the  comparison  of  Confederate  reports  and  accounts 
with  our  own,  and  by  the  statements  of  Mr.  Carter, 
the  proprietor  of  the  farm,  who  subsequently  levelled 
the  earthworks  themselves. 

Yet  some  of  the  most  able  and  intelligent  of  the 
officers  and  men  who  fought  there  continued  to  be 
lieve  that  the  charge  of  the  reserves  at  the  centre  had 
carried  our  line  up  to  the  original  front  line  of  earth 
works  on  the  right  of  the  turnpike,  as  it  certainly 
had  done  on  the  left.  Colonel  Opdycke  strenuously 
insisted  upon  this  as  long  as  he  lived,  and  in  a  very 
interesting  correspondence  with  me  on  the  subject  in 
1880,  maintained  the  same  view.  Major  A.  G.  Hatry 
of  the  183d  Ohio,  which  was  part  of  Strickland's 
reserve,  is  one  of  the  officers  to  whom  I  am  indebted 
for  valuable  reminiscences  of  the  campaign ;  yet  he 
also,  in  reply  to  inquiries  on  this  point,  had  no  recol 
lection  of  the  second  line,  and  believed  that  the  line 
first  constructed  along  Strickland's  brigade  front  was 
that  on  which  the  brigade  rallied  and  fought  until  it 
was  withdrawn  at  midnight.  More  reputable  witnesses 
it  would  be  impossible  to  find ;  and  yet  the  fact  that 
the  Confederates  continued  to  hold  the  outside  of  the 
parapet  near  the  locust  grove  is  so  thoroughly  estab 
lished  that  one  feels  impelled  to  seek  a  solution  of 
this  problem  of  varying  memory  among  men  of  perfect 
honesty  of  character  with  full  opportunity,  apparently, 
of  knowing  the  facts. 

In  the  case  of  Colonel  Opdycke,  it  seems  to  me 
that  the  explanation  is  found  in  his  position  as  com 
mandant  of  a  reserve  which  lay  on  the  slope  of  the 
knoll  some  two  hundred  yards  or  more  in  rear  of  the 
Carter  house,  the  houses  and  trees  as  well  as  the  roll 
of  the  ground  hiding  the  breastworks  at  which  our 
men  stood.  As  his  brigade  deployed  and  advanced 


236  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

driving  the  enemy  before  them,  he  found  the  Confed 
erates  holding  the  outside  of  the  retrenchment  which 
we  had  built  across  the  turnpike  in  rear  of  the 
opening  where  the  main  line  crossed  the  road.  This 
retrenchment,  it  must  not  be  forgotten,  was  abreast 
of  and  in  line  with  the  wooden  office  building  and 
brick  smoke-house  in  the  yard  of  the  Carter  house.1 
West  of  these  was  the  e'paulement  for  the  20th  Ohio 
Light  Artillery,  and  still  farther  to  the  right  the 
breastwork  of  the  44th  Missouri  Regiment  in  the 
second  line.  This  line  of  buildings  and  works  was 
ablaze  with  the  enemy's  musketry  fire,  and  was  the 
objective  for  Opdycke's  men  as  they  charged  forward 
on  both  sides  of  the  Carter  house. 

From  the  turnpike,  where  Opdycke  was  in  person, 
nothing  could  be  seen  of  our  works  beyond,  even  if 
the  air  had  been  clear ;  but  in  the  smoke  of  battle, 
the  line  of  retrenchment  connecting  with  the  build 
ings  and  the  Ohio  battery  seemed  so  naturally  the 
original  main  line  that  he  assumed  it  to  be  such  with 
undoubting  confidence.  His  mention  of  the  recap 
tured  battery  shows  that  he  thought  it  was  in  the 
original  front  line.2  The  successive  lines  of  the  enemy 
coming  forward  in  headlong  assault  allowed  no  time 
for  investigation,  even  if  there  had  been  anything  to 
suggest  it,  and  the  desperate  fight  to  hold  the  works 
thus  gained  continued  on  late  into  the  night.  West 
of  the  turnpike  the  ground  fell  away  more  rapidly, 
and  the  main  line  was  on  a  level  so  much  lower  than 
the  house  and  outbuildings,  that  it  could  not  be  seen 
at  all  from  the  turnpike  in  rear  of  the  retrenchment 
crossing  the  road,  where  the  brigade  headquarters 
were  during  the  fight. 

1  See  sketch,  ante,  p.  43. 

2  0.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  240. 


Double  Breastworks  on  Carter  Hill          237 

Besides  the  overwhelming  personal  evidence  which 
fixes  this  second  line,  there  are  to  be  seen  to  this  day 
the  bullet  marks  on  the  east  side  of  the  brick  smoke 
house.  The  wooden  office  building  was  nearest  the 
turnpike,  and  the  men  who  stood  in  the  space  between 
the  two  buildings  fired  obliquely  to  the  right,  in  the 
evening,  to  reach  the  Confederates  who  still  held  the 
outside  of  the  main  parapet  at  the  locust  grove.  In 
the  darkness  they  sometimes  obliqued  too  much,  and 
their  bullets  struck  the  brick  wall.  The  leaden  mis 
siles  left  a  glaze  upon  the  brick  surface  before  pene 
trating  enough  to  be  stopped  or  to  rebound.  The  wall 
is  dotted  with  these  peculiar  comet-shaped  marks,  the 
groove  deepest  toward  the  enemy,  with  the  film  of 
lead  adhering  where  the  bullet  first  touched.  There 
is  thus  a  demonstration  that  the  firing  was  outward 
from  the  line  of  these  buildings. 

Major  Hatry's  experience  in  the  battle  was  such  as 
to  account  easily  for  his  being  misled  on  this  point. 
He  had  been  field  officer  of  the  day  in  command  of 
General  Ruger's  skirmishers,  and  they  had  only  come 
in  with  Wagners  two  brigades  when  these  were  driven 
back.  He  came  through  our  lines  at  the  Columbia 
Turnpike,  and,  separating  himself  from  the  crowd  of 
Wagner's  men  that  were  surging  along  toward  the 
village,  he  rejoined  his  regiment  on  foot,  and  found 
them  in  the  rifle  pits,  fighting  the  Confederates  hand 
to  hand.  Lieut.  Colonel  Clark  of  the  regiment  and 
a  number  of  other  officers  had  been  killed,  and  he 
found  his  own  work  fully  cut  out  for  him.  He  states 
explicitly  that  the  regiment  remained  where  he  found 
it  till  it  was  ordered  out  at  midnight.1  As  the  line 

1  From  a  written  statement,  made  by  Colonel  Hatry  in  January, 
1894,  in  which  he  kindly  answered  specific  inquiries  made  by  me.  He 
is  a  retired  business  man  of  Pittsburgh,  Pa.,  of  high  standing  in  that 
city. 


238  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

had  been  re-formed  before  Major  Hatry  joined  the 
regiment  in  the  turmoil  of  that  furious  combat,  we 
can  easily  comprehend  the  impression  on  his  memory, 
when  at  a  later  time  the  subject  of  the  two  lines  was 
broached,  that  this  was  "  news  to  him." 

There  is  scarcely  an  engagement  recorded  in  which 
there  are  not  similar  discrepancies  of  recollection ;  for 
in  the  midst  of  fierce  excitement  the  thing  one  is 
specially  occupied  about  is  so  absorbing  that  it  fre 
quently  occurs  that  no  mental  note  is  made  of  other 
things  happening  under  one's  eyes.  Remoter  events, 
outside  the  range  of  immediate  duty,  are  as  if  they 
had  never  been.  It  is  the  concurrence  of  positive 
testimony  from  different  and  independent  sources 
which  establishes  beyond  dispute  such  a  fact  as  the 
construction  of  the  second  line.  The  lack  of  knowl 
edge  or  of  memory  can  hardly  compare  in  weight 
with  the  distinct  and  affirmative  statement  of  an  act 
by  one  who  took  part  in  it.  Such  a  statement  as  that 
of  Captain  Bates1  of  the  125th  Ohio  (in  Opdycke's 
brigade),  that  his  men  constructed  "new  barricades," 
greatly  overweighs,  even  when  standing  alone,  the 
absence  of  recollection  by  another.  But  when  we 
find  the  same  fact  reiterated  by  numerous  eyewit 
nesses  whose  reports  are  unknown  to  each  other 
and  are  sent  up  through  different  channels,  —  when 
both  National  and  Confederate  reports  agree  in  re 
gard  to  the  matter,  —  when  the  official  map  of  the 
field  made  by  General  Schofielcl's  chief  engineer 
shows  the  artillery  epaulement  in  the  second  line 
which  was  extended  to  the  right  by  the  breastworks 
of  the  44th  Missouri,  the  question  of  fact  must  be 
regarded  as  settled,  and  the  only  problem  remaining 
is  the  interesting  but  much  less  important  one  touch- 

1  Ante,  p.  116. 


Double  Breastworks  on  Carter  Hill          239 

ing  the  lack  of  memory  in  the  case  of  those  whom  we 
should  expect  to  know. 

A  brief  summary  of  the  affirmative  and  independ 
ent  statements  from  Union  officers  who  knew  of  the 
existence  of  the  two  lines  will  show  how  surprisingly 
strong  is  the  support  for  the  narrative  of  my  official 
report  and  of  my  historical  volume,  for  which,  of 
course,  my  personal  knowledge  was  the  original 
basis. 

General  Ruger's  official  report  states  that  "  at  the 
first  onset  of  the  enemy,  the  left  of  the  line,  held  by 
the  50th  Ohio  Volunteers  and  the  72d  Illinois  Volun 
teers,  fell  back  some  fifty  yards  from  the  breastworks, 
at  which  position  they  were  rallied  and  maintained  a 
firm  stand,  holding  this  new  position,  which  was  has 
tily  intrenched  during  the  intervals  of  the  fighting."  1 

Beginning  at  the  right  of  Strickland's  brigade,  the 
official  report  of  the  72d  Illinois,  made  by  Captain 
Sexton,  describes  the  disorderly  retreat  of  the  outpost 
brigades  with  the  enemy  upon  their  heels.  "  At  the 
same  time,"  it  adds,  "  the  support  on  our  left  gave 
way,  and  the  flank  of  our  regiment  being  turned,  the 
four  left  companies  fell  back,  and  as  our  right  flank 
also  became  exposed  to  the  enemy  the  remaining  com 
panies  were  also  ordered  to  retire  to  the  second  line 
of  works,  which  was  done."2  All  the  field  officers 
being  wounded,  Captain  Sexton  took  command.  He 
ordered  an  effort  to  regain  the  first  line,  which  was 
unsuccessful,  the  whole  color  guard  being  shot  down 
in  the  charge  across  a  space  of  some  twenty  yards. 

The  44th  Missouri  built  its  breastworks  in  the  sec 
ond  line  and  held  them  throughout  the  battle,3  being 
the  nucleus  on  which  the  first  line  rallied.  Its  official 
report  to  the  Adjutant  General  of  Missouri  also  de- 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  365.  2  Id.,  p.  393.  3  Ante,  p.  117. 


240  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

scribes  the  rout  of  Wagner's  men,  saving  they  "  re 
treated  in  great  disorder  and  confusion,  literally 
running  over  the  44th,  who,  notwithstanding  the 
shock,  stood  firm.  .  .  .  Ahout  sunset  we  received 
orders  to  charge  over  the  works  and  retake  the  lower 
ditch,  out  of  which  the  enemy  had  driven  several  of 
our  regiments  in  the  first  charge.  .  .  .  Here  Colonel 
Bradshaw  fell,  pierced  with  seven  balls,  but  fortu 
nately  not  killed.  .  .  .  We  were  forced  back  to  our 
old  position  without  being  able  to  carry  off  our  dead 
and  wounded."  l  Lieut.  Colonel  Barr  then  assumed 
the  command  and  made  the  report. 

My  inspector,  Major  Dow,  accompanied  the  112th 
Illinois,  which  I  sent  to  assist  in  regaining  the  first 
line  after  dark.  His  description  has  already  been 
quoted,  and  is  explicit  as  to  the  relation  of  the  two 
lines.2 

Lieut.  Colonel  Bond,  who  led  the  112th  Illinois,  is 
equally  clear  in  his  statement  of  the  position  of  the 
two  lines.3 

General  J.  S.  Casement,  in  a  letter  of  December 
26th,  1881,  giving  recollections  for  which  I  had  in 
quired,  and  replying  to  my  question  whether  he  knew 
anything  of  the  second  line  or  barricade  on  the  right 
of  the  Columbia  road,  said  :  "  I  was  at  that  barricade 
with  you  that  night,  and  recollect  how  anxious  you 
were  to  have  the  first  line  regained  so  that  the  rebels 
might  not  be  so  near  to  us  when  we  withdrew."  In 
that  connection  he  mentions  the  combination  of  a  sally 
from  the  left  of  the  turnpike  with  the  direct  advance 
from  the  second  line. 

Captain  L.  T.  Scoficld,4  topographer,  in  a  letter  of 
December  23d,  1870,  giving  his  personal  memories  of 

1  Report  of  Adjutant  General  of  Missouri,  1865,  p.  276. 

2  Appendix  E.  3  Ante,  p.  162.  *  See  ante,  pp.  103,  et  seq. 


Double  Breastworks  on  Carter  Hill         241 

the  field,  said  :  "  The  first  brigade  on  the  right  of  the 
pike  did  not  stand  so  well  [as  the  line  on  the  left],  for 
they  were  partly  made  up  of  new  troops,  and  the  forti 
fications  were  not  as  strong,  which  resulted  in  their 
being  compelled  to  fall  back  to  the  second  line,  where 
they  were  reinforced  by  Opdycke's  brigade  of  Wag 
ner's  division." 

The  36th  Illinois  Regiment  (of  Opdycke's  brigade) 
published  a  regimental  history,  in  which  it  is  said 
that  "the  charge  of  the  first  brigade  [in  which  they 
were]  was  not  entirely  successful  in  regaining  the 
whole  line  at  the  first  onset,"  but  that  "  a  small 
salient  to  the  right  of  the  Columbia  pike  for  a  short 
time  was  held  by  the  enemy,  who  determined  to  use 
it  as  an  entering  wedge  through  which  to  break  the 
Federal  line  and  recover  the  works."  1 

The  report  of  Captain  Bates  for  the  125th  Ohio, 
also  of  Opdycke's  brigade,  that  they  constructed  new 
barricades,  with  the  36th  Illinois  on  their  right  and 
the  24th  Wisconsin  on  the  left,  need  not  be  repeated 
in  full.2 

The  24th  Wisconsin,  of  the  same  brigade,  in  report 
ing  to  the  Adjutant  General  of  that  State,  says  that 
the  charge  succeeded  in  "  retaking  a  part  of  the  line 
which  had  been  momentarily  held  by  the  enemy."3 

Colonel  Sherwood,  whose  regiment  (the  lllth  Ohio) 
was  at  the  left  of  Moore's  brigade,  and  Captain  Dow- 
ling,  the  brigade  inspector,  are  explicit  in  stating  that 
Strickland's  men  occupied  the  second  line  during  the 
hottest  of  the  fight.4 

1  History  of  the  36th  Regiment  Illinois  Volunteers,  by  Bennett  and 
Haigh,  Aurora,  111.,  1876. 

2  O.  R,,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  251. 

3  Report  Adjutant  General  of  Wisconsin,  1865,  p.  372. 
*  Ante,  p.  131. 

16 


242  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Mr.  Carter,  the  present  proprietor  of  the  Carter 
place,  levelled  the  "  new  barricades,"  and  pointed  out 
to  Captain  Speed  and  others  the  site  of  this  second 
line  as  he  found  it  when  the  battle  ended.1 

Captain  Twining's  official  map  shows  the  artillery 
epaulement  in  rear  of  the  Carter  house,  which  was  in 
the  44th  Missouri  line,  as  a  second  line  in  rear  of  the 
main  intrenchment  on  the  right  of  the  turnpike. 
Major  Foster's  Confederate  map,  made  for  Stewart's 
corps,  also  shows  the  double  line  at  that  point.2 

Thus  from  more  than  a  dozen  independent  sources 
comes  the  multiplied  confirmation  of  the  statements 
of  my  official  report,  without  mentioning  the  reports 
of  the  Confederates,  which  are  to  the  same  effect. 

1  Ohio  Loyal  Legiou  papers,  vol.  iii.  p.  61. 

2  Ante,  pp.  45,  83. 


CHAPTER    XIX 

THE   RALLYING  OF  THE   OUTPOST  BRIGADES       . 

Value  of  Detailed  Reports  —  Landmarks  —  Lines  of  Retreat  from  the 
Outpost —  Crowding  toward  the  Centre  —  Significant  Omissions  — 
Lists  of  Missing  —  What  they  Teach  — Reports  Compared  —  Inci 
dents  relating  to  Captured  Flags  —  Statements  of  various  Officers 
—  Conclusions  from  the  Facts. 

ANOTHER  subject  of  debate  has  been  the  question,  What 
became  of  Wagner's  two  brigades  which  were  driven 
in  from  the  front  ?  I  have  already  given  the  story  of 
their  break  from  their  outer  position,  the  rush  of  the 
main  body  along  the  turnpike,  and  into  the  town  of 
Franklin,  the  effort  at  reorganization  near  the  river, 
and  their  final  collection  near  the  wagon  bridge  and 
withdrawal  in  the  night  under  the  orders  to  march  to 
Nashville.  I  have  also  noted  the  fact  that  numbers 
of  men  from  these  two  brigades  turned  and  fought  at 
our  main  lines  with  the  brigades  of  Rcilly,  Opdycke, 
and  Strickland  which  were  the  organized  troops 
holding  the  centre  on  both  sides  of  the  Columbia 
Turnpike. 

The  reports  of  the  commandants  of  Wagner's  two 
brigades  in  question  ignore  the  fact  that  the  division 
and  brigade  commanders  made  their  official  rallying 
place  in  the  town,  and  confine  their  statements  to 
those  disorganized  portions  of  their  commands  which 
halted  and  fought  at  the  main  line.  These  are  spoken 
of  as  if  they  were  "  the  command."  Nothing  is  more 


244  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

notorious  in  regard  to  military  reports  than  that  they 
arc  apologetic  in  cases  of  mishap,  and  no  form  of  gloss 
ing  the  facts  is  more  common  than  the  omission  of 
unpleasant  features  whilst  more  creditable  ones  are 
amplified. 

The  task  of  the  historian  will  be  to  reach  the  truth 
by  running  down  and  fixing  the  facts  which  arc 
omitted,  and  constructing  an  authentic  narrative 
based  upon  everything  which  is  satisfactorily  and 
affirmatively  established.  The  greatest  help  in  this 
work  is  found  in  detailed  subordinate  reports,  and  the 
help  is  increased  just  in  proportion  as  these  are  full  in 
incidents,  with  time,  place,  and  circumstance  which 
may  be  compared  with  evidence  derived  from  other 
sources.  With  general  and  rather  vague  statements 
that  a  command  rallied  at  the  line  and  fought  bravely 
for  hours,  we  can  do  little  except  to  show  opposing 
statements  that  are  inconsistent  with  these  ;  but  when 
details  are  given,  as  of  the  other  troops  on  right  and 
left  with  whom  they  were  in  contact,  commands  re 
ceived  and  given,  by  whom  and  to  whom,  the  general 
picture  begins  to  assume  shape  that  can  be  tested,  and 
apparently  insignificant  incidents  often  become  of  great 
significance. 

It  would  have  overburdened  my  narrative  to  have 
analyzed  the  evidence  to  which  I  am  now  referring, 
and  I  have  preferred  to  give  a  connected  story  from 
my  own  standpoint,  as  I  knew  it  and  had  to  act  upon 
it  at  the  time.  I  trust  that  now,  however,  it  will  not 
be  unprofitable  to  consider  some  of  the  statements 
which  may  at  first  appear  conflicting,  and  to  weigh 
more  fully  the  evidence  as  to  the  rallying  of  the  out 
post  brigades. 

First,  as  to  the  place  in  the  main  line  where  Lane's 
and  Conrad's  brigades  must  have  crossed  our  works. 


The  Rallying  of  the  Outpost  Brigades       245 

In  their  outpost  position  they  had  been  in  a  wedge- 
shaped  formation  on  both  sides  of  the  Columbia  Turn 
pike,  the  road  being  in  the  apex  of  the  wedge.  Conrad 
was  on  the  left  and  Lane  on  the  right.1  In  our  main 
works  nearly  half  a  mile  in  rear,  Rcilly's  brigade 
was  behind  Conrad,  and  Strickland's  was  behind  Lane. 
Opdycke's  brigade  was  some  two  hundred  yards  still 
farther  in  rear,  lying  in  column  of  regiments  in  re 
serve  on  the  west  side  (right)  of  the  turnpike  behind 
Strickland.  As  to  all  this  there  is  no  controversy, 
and  the  places  are  distinctly  marked  in  the  official 
map  of  General  Schofield's  chief  engineer,  Captain 
Twining.  The  same  map  marks  the  place  of  the 
locust  grove  near  the  right  of  Strickland's  brigade, 
which  was  partly  cut  down  to  form  an  abattis  in  that 
part  of  the  line,  and  which  is  so  often  mentioned  in 
the  official  reports  that  it  becomes  a  fixed  and  impor 
tant  landmark. 

These  positions  indicate  so  plainly  what  must  occur 
when  Wagner's  two  brigades  should  be  overwhelmed 
and  driven  in  by  the  enemy,  that  every  narrative  must 
be  interpreted  with  reference  to  them.  Conrad's  and 
Lane's  men  would  naturally  converge  toward  the  turn 
pike  which  was  the  unobstructed  way  to  safety,  the 
abattis  in  front  of  the  works  being  a  most  inconven 
ient  thing  to  cross.  All  the  details  in  the  reports 
and  in  authentic  personal  narratives  that  have  been 
published  show  that  such  was  in  fact  the  line  of  re 
treat  of  Wagner's  men.  The  mass  crowded  the  turn 
pike  on  the  way  into  the  town,  whilst  thinner  portions 
of  the  line  threaded  the  abattis  and  climbed  the  breast 
works  on  either  side  of  the  turnpike.2  Lane's  report 
mentions  the  "  heavy  line  of  abattis  of  locust  boughs, 
placed  there  for  some  purpose,  through  which  my  line 

1  See  map,  p.  45,  ante.  2  Ante,  pp.  104,  109,  118. 


246  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

had  to  pass."1  Not  only  do  all  the  official  reports 
show  that  Moore's  brigade,  on  the  right  of  Strickland, 
firmly  held  its  place,  but  the  statement  of  Mr.  Gist 
(to  which  reference  has  already  been  made),  who  be 
longed  to  the  right  regiment  of  Lane's  brigade,  is 
explicit,  that  "  Moore's  brigade  repulsed  the  attacks 
made  on  their  part  of  the  line,"  and  "  had  not  been 
disorganized  in  the  least."2  He  also  says  that  his 
part  of  Lane's  line  "reached  the  works  just  at  the 
right  of  the  Columbia  pike,  near  a  grove  of  small 
locust  trees." 

On  the  left  of  the  turnpike  there  is  a  similar  concur 
rence  of  testimony  that  Casement's  brigade  remained 
unmoved,  and  that  those  of  Conrad's  men  who  did  not 
come  in  upon  the  road  "  were  mixed  from  the  cotton 
gin  on  to  the  pike."3  It  is  thus  put  beyond  dispute  that 
whatever  these  two  brigades  of  Wagner's  did  or  suf 
fered  in  the  main  line  was  between  the  cotton  gin  on 
the  left  and  the  locust  grove  on  the  right,  comprising 
not  quite  the  whole  of  the  original  front  of  Reilly's 
and  Strickland's  brigades,  in  the  centre  of  which  was 
the  Carter  house  where  Opdycke's  brigade  (also  of 
Wagner's  division)  was,  after  its  rush  forward  from 
its  place  in  reserve,  and  where  my  personal  head 
quarters  had  been  since  daybreak  in  the  morning  and 
remained  till  we  withdrew  at  midnight. 

If  Conrad's  and  Lane's  brigades  were  in  the  main 
line,  as  nobody  doubts  that  Opdycke's  was,  then  the 
whole  of  Wagner's  division,  except  stragglers,  was 
there.  Wagner's  place  should  have  been  close  to  my 
own,  Conrad  should  have  been  close  to  Reilly,  Lane 

1  O.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  256. 

2  Professor  Cist's  Narrative,  referred  to,  ante,  p.  201. 

3  Tleport  of  Colonel  Buckner,  99th  Illinois  (of  Conrad's  brigade), 
O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  280. 


The  Rallying  of  the  Outpost  Brigades       247 

close  to  Strickland  and  Opdyckc.  Each  of  them  should 
have  been  cognizant  of  what  occurred  there,  have  been 
necessarily  in  communication  with  General  Stanley 
during  the  short  time  he  was  with  Opdyckc's  brigade 
before  he  was  wounded,  and  with  myself  afterward. 
My  efforts  completely  to  restore  the  line  in  Strick 
land's  front,  in  which  I  called  for  assistance  from 
Kimball's  division  on  the  extreme  right  and  brought 
a  regiment  from  Stiles' s  brigade  on  the  extreme  left, 
must  have  involved  co-operation  with  Wagner  and  his 
brigade  commanders.  Of  Opdycke's  presence  and  the 
place  of  his  regiments,  myself  and  his  neighbors  on 
right  and  left  were  well  aware,  as  both  official  and  un 
official  reports  show  ;  but  none  of  us  had  any  knowl 
edge  of  the  others  or  communication  with  them,  nor 
do  their  reports  show  any  relations  to  us.  It  cannot 
be  necessary  to  point  out  the  significance  of  this  as 
bearing  upon  the  question  of  their  actual  whereabouts, 
and  the  place  of  the  formal  reorganization  of  the  two 
brigades. 

Before  passing  to  the  examination  of  the  reports  of 
General  Wagner  and  his  subordinates,  it  may  be  in 
structive  to  notice  that  the  reports  of  the  "  missing," 
in  the  case  of  such  a  melee  as  occurred  at  our  centre, 
fix  the  extent  to  which  the  enemy  were  temporarily 
within  our  works,  in  a  manner  which  strikingly  cor 
roborates  the  other  evidence.  On  reaching  Casement's 
brigade  on  the  left  and  Moore's  on  the  right,  the  list 
of  missing  becomes  merely  nominal,  amounting  only 
to  a  few  who  would  straggle  in  the  darkness.  In 
Reilly's,  Opdycke's,  and  Strickland's  brigades,  how 
ever,  they  are  numerous  enough  to  indicate  a  consid 
erable  number  of  wounded  and  other  prisoners  who 
fell  into  the  enemy's  hands  within  our  breastworks, 
and  were  carried  back  with  them  into  captivity  when 


248  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

they  were  driven  out  of  our  lines.  The  statistical 
tables  thus  mark  the  extent  of  the  hand  to  hand 
fight  at  the  works  as  accurately  as  an  eyewitness 
could  do. 

Second,  I  shall  bring  together  some  of  the  evidence 
from  the  reports  and  documents  corroborating  the 
account  which  I  have  given  of  the  reorganization  of 
Wagner's  two  brigades  at  the  river.1 

Wagner's  own  report,  written  on  December  2d,  and 
in  advance  of  the  receipt  of  his  subordinates'  reports 
(except  Conrad's),  is  very  vague  and  partly  unintelli 
gible  in  its  reference  to  the  rallying  of  his  command. 
The  language  as  found  in  the  Official  Records  is  this : 
"  On  reaching  the  main  line  of  works  the  officers 
rallied  their  men  as  best  they  could,  and  placed  them 
in  position  to  support  the  works  which  were  give  up 
\8ic\  their  position  at  the  approach  of  the  enemy  who 
followed  close  on  the  steps  of  our  retiring  lines."2 
The  latter  part  of  this  sentence  (which  is  the  only 
attempt  in  the  report  to  describe  the  rallying)  is 
without  meaning,  and  shows  that  the  writer  had 
found  difficulty  in  casting  his  statement  into  any 
form  which  should  harmonize  his  own  knowledge  of 
what  occurred  with  the  report  of  Colonel  Conrad, 
which  alone  was  then  before  him.8  It  is  significant, 
however,  in  this,  that  the  troops  are  said  to  have  been 
"  placed  in  position  to  support  the  works."  This 
implies  that  they  were  as  a  body  at  some  distance  in 

i  Ante,  chap.  x.  2  0.  "R,,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  232. 

3  The  original  manuscript  of  Wagner's  report  in  the  War  Records 
Office  is  literally  as  given  above.  It  was  apparently  copied  from  some 
previous  draught  in  preparation  for  his  signature,  as  there  are  no  eras 
ures  or  interlineations  in  the  passage  quoted.  Its  lack  of  connection 
suggests  that  possibly  something  had  been  erased  in  the  draught 
with  a  purpose  to  change  the  form  of  expression,  and  that  haste  had 
caused  this  to  be  forgotten. 


The  Rallying  of  the  Outpost  Brigades       249 

rear,  for  thus  only  would  they  be  in  "  support "  of  the 
fighting  line.  The  report  makes  no  mention  of  the 
troops  of  other  commands,  or  his  contact  with  them ; 
and  the  omission  is  in  harmony  with  the  facts  as  to 
the  general  rallying  place  of  the  two  brigades,  which 
have  been  already  narrated.  He  had  no  personal 
knowledge  of  the  situation  on  the  line,  and  could 
not  speak  of  what  occurred  after  he  had  passed  to 
the  rear. 

Colonel  Opdycke's  official  report  necessarily  implies 
the  total  severance  of  communication  between  the 
brigade  and  his  division  commander  from  the  time  it 
was  placed  in  position  as  a  reserve  until  the  with 
drawal  at  midnight.  As  to  this  period,  it  makes  no 
allusion  whatever  to  General  Wagner  (to  whom  the 
report  was  addressed),  but  states  that  the  order  to  be 
ready  to  charge  up  to  the  line  and  the  directions  to 
withdraw  at  midnight  came  from  myself.  In  his 
narrative  of  the  battle,  published  after  the  close  of 
the  war,1  he  explicitly  states  what  is  thus  impliedly 
contained  in  his  report,  saying  that  "  General  Wagner 
was  carried  to  the  rear  in  the  rush  of  disordered 
troops,  and  did  not  again  find  his  way  to  the  front." 
My  own  opinion  that  he  was  properly  engaged  in  the 
reorganization  of  the  broken  brigades,  and  that  this 
was  his  first  duty,  has  already  been  given.2 

Colonel  Allen  Buckner,  of  the  79th  Illinois,  seems 
to  have  been  the  officer  next  in  seniority  to  Colonel 
Conrad  in  that  brigade.  He  thus  describes  the  rally 
at  our  works  in  his  report :  "  We  fell  back  to  the 
works  to  the  left  of  the  pike,  and  I  was  enabled  to 
rally,  and  afterward  fought  in  connection  with  troops 
of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  and  others  of  our  brigade 
and  corps  (for  here  we  were  mixed  from  the  cotton 

1  New  York  Times,  September  10,  1882.  2  Ante,  p.  145. 


250  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

gin  on  to  the  pike)  until  some  time  in  the  night. 
The  troops  being  thick  and  we  not  needed  longer,  I 
told  General  Reilly  that  I  would  get  my  regiment 
back,  and  try  to  get  off  our  wounded.  In  a  short 
time  orders  came,  and  we  got  the  brigade  together, 
and  came  out  of  the  town  about  midnight."  l 

This  shows  very  clearly  that  Reilly's  brigade  of 
the  Twenty -third  Corps  was  in  position  at  the  cotton 
gin,  with  General  Reilly  personally  in  command  ;  that 
Colonel  Buckncr  and  the  men  with  him  fought  in  that 
line  after  rallying ;  that  Rcilly's  men  were  enough  to 
hold  the  line  after  the  first  repulse  of  the  enemy, 
and  that  because  the  troops  were  so  "  thick  "  Colonel 
Buckner  very  rightly  gathered  his  men  for  reorgani 
zation  ;  that  his  brigade  and  division  commanders  of 
the  Fourth  Corps  were  not  present,  so  that  it  was 
to  General  Reilly  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  that  he 
communicated  his  wish  to  get  his  men  back  from  the 
line ;  that  it  was  after  this  that  "  orders  came " 
(from  his  own  superiors),  and  they  "  got  the  brigade 
together."  Stronger  corroboration  of  my  general 
narrative  could  hardly  be  given. 

No  regimental  reports  of  the  battle  were  made  by 
the  regiments  of  Lane's  brigade,  except  the  97th  Ohio 
(Colonel  Lane's  own),  in  command  of  which  was  Lieut. 
Colonel  Barnes.  His  vivid  description  of  the  retreat 
of  his  regiment  through  the  abattis  in  front  of  the 
locust  grove  on  the  right  of  the  Columbia  Turnpike 
has  already  been  quoted,  as  well  as  his  statement 
of  the  utter  confusion  and  disorganization  of  the  bri 
gade.  In  concluding  it  he  says  that  about  ten  o'clock 
the  firing  gradually  ceased,  and  he  "  received  an  order 
from  Colonel  Lane  in  person  to  draw  off  the  regiment 
and  reorganize  the  line."  "  In  gathering  them  to- 

1  0.  B.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  280. 


The  Rallying  of  the  Outpost  Brigades        251 

gether,"  he  adds,  "they  came  from  the  front."  1  This 
implies  that  the  order  was  given  at  some  place  in 
the  rear,  and  to  it,  as  the  place  of  reorganization,  the 
group  of  Lane's  men,  who  had  been  stubbornly  lighting 
with  Strickland's  brigade,  "  came  from  the  front "  as 
word  reached  them  that  a  rallying  place  had  been 
established. 

In  response  to  a  call  for  flags  and  trophies  captured, 
several  regiments  of  Wagner's  division,  two  or  three 
months  later,  made  claim  to  the  capture  of  flags, 
which,  as  was  said,  had  been  turned  over  to  officers  of 
the  Twenty-third  Corps.  The  alleged  circumstances 
throw  light  on  the  situation. 

Such  a  claim  was  made  for  Sergeant  Ransbottom 
of  the  97th  Ohio,  Colonel  Lane's  regiment,  a  rem 
nant  of  which  we  have  just  seen  was  fighting  at  the 
locust  grove  in  Strickland's  brigade  line.  Lieut. 
Colonel  Barnes  says  that  after  nightfall  "  volun 
teers  were  called  for  to  pass  through  a  gap  in  our 
works  on  the  Columbia  pike  that  they  might  enfilade 
the  enemy,  and  capture  a  portion  of  the  storming 
party."  2  Sergeant  Ransbottom  is  said  to  have  volun 
teered  among  others,  and  to  have  captured  a  flag. 
The  only  order  of  the  kind  given  that  evening  was 
my  own  order  to  General  Reilly  already  mentioned,3  to 
be  executed  by  the  troops  of  his  command  on  the  east 
of  the  turnpike.  There  was  no  attempt  to  pass  out 
at  the  gap  on  the  Columbia  Turnpike.  That  was  in 
Opdycke's  brigade  line,  and  was  quite  too  near  the 
enemy,  who  were  holding  the  outside  of  the  original 
line  in  Strickland's  front.  The  party  made  the  move 
ment  from  the  salient  at  the  cotton  gin.  If  the  ser 
geant  volunteered  for  that  sally,  he  was  in  the  left 
wing  of  Reilly's  brigade,  with  two  full  brigades  inter- 

1  O.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  265.  2  Id.,  p.  2G7.  a  Ante,  p.  14G. 


252  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

veiling  between  it  and  the  locust  grove,  where  Colonels 
Lane  and  Barnes  locate  the  group  of  the  regiment  to 
which  he  belonged.  He  acted,  if  at  all,  as  an  indi 
vidual  temporarily  attached  to  another  command,  and 
far  separated  from  his  own  comrades.  No  call  was 
made  upon  any  troops  on  the  right  of  the  turnpike  to 
participate  in  the  sally  mentioned.  Yet  the  incident 
is  referred  to  in  the  brigade  report  as  an  item  in  the 
creditable  conduct  of  that  command.1 

In  a  similar  report  as  to  flags,  under  date  of  Jan 
uary  5,  1865,  Major  At  water  of  the  42d  Illinois  (Con 
rad's  brigade)  states  that  different  men  of  his  regiment 
captured  flags  (three  or  four)  or  went  over  the  works 
in  the  evening  and  picked  them  up  where  the  enemy 
had  let  them  fall,  but  that  on  their  coming  in  they 
were  ordered  by  officers  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  to 
give  them  up,  and  they  obeyed.2  These  officers  are 
said  in  his  communication  to  have  been  of  the  104th 
Ohio,  which  was  in  Reilly's  brigade,  and  stationed  at 
the  cotton  gin.  If  the  incident  is  correctly  reported, 
it  shows  that  no  officers  of  Conrad's  command  were 
present,  for  had  they  been,  their  men  would  have 
appealed  to  them  and  they  would  have  asserted  the 
claims  of  that  command.  The  controversy  would  then 
have  been  between  commissioned  officers,  and  would 
not  have  rested  on  the  statement  of  private  soldiers 
alone.  It  shows  also  that  the  officers  and  men  of 
Reilly's  brigade  were  in  orderly  line  attending  to  their 
duties,  and  that  the  scattered  individuals  of  Conrad's 
command  were  acting  with  Reilly's  regiments  and 
under  the  orders  of  his  officers.  Thus  from  unex 
pected  sources  we  get  aid  in  establishing  the  true 
condition  of  things  upon  the  line. 

The  narrative  of  Mr.  Gist,  from  which  I  have  already 

1  0.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  256.  2  Id.,  p.  276. 


The  Rallying  of  the  Outpost  Brigades       253 

quoted,1  says :  u  Long  after  night  there  was  a  lull  in  the 
battle,  and  we  began  to  hope  that  there  would  be  no 
other  charge.  I  moved  around  to  the  right  a  little,  on 
the  works,  and  met  a  member  of  my  company,  the 
only  one  of  the  regiment  that  I  had  seen  since  the 
opening  of  the  fight."  As  his  regiment  was  one  of 
Lane's  brigade,  and  his  own  position  was  at  the  locust 
grove  where  was  the  only  considerable  group  of  the 
men  of  that  brigade,  the  fact  is  more  significant  of 
the  thin  scattering  of  his  comrades  than  any  general 
estimate  of  their  numbers  could  be.  He  tells  another 
incident  also  which  corroborates  my  statement  that 
this  part  of  the  line  was  held  by  the  72d  Illinois  of 
Strickland's  brigade.2  "  A  colonel  of  some  regiment 
tried  hard  in  the  thickest  of  the  fight  to  get  the  line 
to  charge.  ...  He  mounted  the  works  himself  and 
called  upon  the  disorganized  portions  of  a  dozen  com 
mands  to  follow.  He  was  pierced  by  a  ball  and  fell  a 
few  feet  to  my  left."  This  officer  was  Lieut.  Colonel 
Stockton  of  the  72d  Illinois,  who  with  Major  James  of 
the  same  regiment  was  wounded  and  fell.  Captain 
Sexton,3  upon  whom  the  command  devolved,  has 
permitted  me  to  read  a  letter  from  Lieutenant  Mohr- 
mann  of  the  same  regiment  describing  the  scene  when 
Colonel  Stockton  mounted  the  breastwork,  which 
Captain  Sexton  also  confirms. 

Captain  Sexton  estimates  higher  than  any  other 
oificer  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  the  number  of  men 
from  Conrad's  and  Lane's  brigades  who  rallied  on  the 
line,  placing  them  at  "  about  five  hundred  men."  No 
doubt  a  larger  body  of  them  took  temporary  place  in 
his  regiment  than  in  any  other  on  the  line.  He  says 
of  them,  "  There  were  a  few  line,  but  no  field  officers 
with  them."  He  saw  nothing  of  their  division  or 

1  Ante,  p.  246.         2  See  ante,  p.  118.         3  See  ante,  p.  118,  note. 


254  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

brigade  commanders.  As  to  the  place  where  the  bulk 
of  the  two  brigades  were  rallied,  he  says :  "  I  was  in 
formed  that  part  of  them  were  stopped  by  Wood's 
command  near  the  river,  and  the  rest  at  Nashville."  i 
His  narrative  is  full  of  admiration  for  the  soldierly 
conduct  and  courage  of  those  who  rallied  in  his  line, 
and  for  the  cool  discipline  they  showed  in  maintaining 
the  fire  along  with  his  own  men. 

Major  Hatry,  of  the  183d  Ohio  (also  of  Strickland's 
brigade),  we  have  seen'2  in  command  of  the  skirmish 
line  of  Ruger's  division  which  came  in  with  Wagner's 
broken  brigades.  These,  he  says,  in  his  written  reply 
to  questions  from  me,  "  crowded  the  Columbia  pike  at 
the  Carter  house."  Leaving  them  he  went  to  his  own 
regiment  which  he  found  in  line  with  the  44th  Mis 
souri  and  72d  Illinois,  the  centre  and  right  of  Strick 
land's  brigade,  holding  breastworks  which,  as  he  says, 
they  did  not  move  out  of  "  until  we  evacuated  them  at 
midnight."  As  to  the  men  of  Conrad's  and  Lane's 
brigades,  his  statement  is  :  "I  don't  think  many  stayed 
with  us  in  the  front  line.  They  proceeded  down  the 
village,  and  were  rallied  down  there  by  some  officer 
whom  I  saw  come  up  with  reinforcements.  How  many 
came  back,  and  where  they  went,  I  could  not  say,  but 
think  that  some  of  them  went  to  both  sides  of  the  pike 
or  very  close  to  it  in  the  rifle-pits  there."  To  the  dis 
tinct  question  whether  he  saw  Wagner,  Lane,  Conrad, 
or  any  of  their  regimental  commanders  there,  he  re 
plies,  "  I  did  not."  He  clearly  identifies  his  position 
on  the  field.  "  The  line  we  fought  in  was  in  front  of 
the  locust  grove  and  to  the  right  and  front  of  the  Car 
ter  house,  I  mean  as  the  ground  descends  from  the 

1  From  Captain  Sexton's  written  statement  referred  to  at  p.  163, 
ante. 

2  Ante,  p.  237. 


The  Rallying  of  the  Outpost  Brigades        255 

bouse.  Our  regiment  and  the  part  of  the  line  in 
which  they  were  was  near  the  rear  of  the  Carter  house 
and  to  the  right  of  the  locust  grove."  1 

The  graphic  description  by  Captain  Scofield  of  the 
retreat  of  the  two  brigades  has  already  been  given,2 
but  in  the  same  correspondence  he  adds  what  is  di 
rectly  in  point  touching  the  organization  of  the  line 
when  it  was  restored.  "  I  did  not  sec,"  he  says,  "  any 
superior  officers  commanding  a  brigade,  except  Reilly, 
Opdycke,  and  Strickland,  between  Casement's  right 
and  Moore's  left,  and  I  am  sure  there  were  none  there, 
for  I  should  have  seen  them,  as  I  was  not  out  of  sight 
of  Columbia  pike  from  the  time  the  battle  commenced 
till  10  o'clock  P.  M."  Again,  he  says:  "There  were 
no  detachments  from  the  retreating  brigades,  in  com 
mand  of  officers,  brought  to  our  line  during  the  action. 
There  may  have  been  stragglers  from  the  rear  that 
returned  to  our  position  singly  or  in  squads  that  would 
escape  my  notice,  but  anything  like  a  regiment  or  com 
pany  I  could  not  have  missed  seeing." 

Major  Dow,  my  division  inspector,  in  his  written 
statement  says,  "  I  don't  remember  seeing  Wagner 
during  the  battle."  3  The  visit  of  my  Adjutant  Gen 
eral  to  General  Wagner  at  the  place  near  the  river 
where  he  was  reorganizing  the  two  brigades  need 
not  be  repeated.4  In  a  correspondence  with  General 
Stanley  to  which  I  shall  have  occasion  by  and  by  to 
refer,5  he  recognized  the  fact  that  Opdycke's  brigade 
remained  under  my  command  till  the  midnight  with 
drawal,  separate  communication  being  had  by  him  and 
Wagner  with  the  other  two  brigades  of  that  division 

1  See  map  at  p.  45,  ante.    The  slope  from  the  Carter  house  is  here 
toward  the  southwest,  and  the  line  followed  the  curve. 

2  Ante,  p.  104.  4  See  Appendix  F. 

3  See  Appendix  E.  5  Post,  chap.  xx. 


256  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

of  his  corps.  To  any  one  having  the  slightest  knowl 
edge  of  military  organization  this  is  completely  de 
structive  of  any  theory  that  Conrad's  brigade  was  on 
one  side  of  Opdycke  and  Lane  on  the  other,  the  whole 
under  the  usual  division  organization.  In  such  a  case 
the  withdrawal  of  Conrad  and  Lane  in  the  night  leav 
ing  Opdycke  without  orders  or  communication  with 
his  superiors  would  be  a  military  absurdity.  It  could 
only  have  been  done  by  full  communication  between 
such  superior  officers  and  myself,  with  careful  precau 
tions  to  prevent  mischievous  results  on  the  line. 
Nobody  has  ever  pretended  that  this  was  the  case. 
The  fact  that  Opdycke  alone  remained  under  my 
orders  and  was  withdrawn  by  me,  as  he  officially  re 
ported,  would  of  itself  prove  that  the  other  brigades 
were  not  there. 

Thus  from  every  source,  affirmative  and  negative, 
the  mass  of  evidence  establishes  the  historical  facts 
as  I  narrated  them  from  my  personal  knowledge. 
Various  motives  of  pride  and  anger  led  the  superior 
officers  of  that  division  to  omit  the  report  of  the  two 
brigades  reassembling  and  reorganizing  at  the  Har- 
peth  River,  and  to  treat  the  groups  which  rallied  with 
the  organized  brigades  upon  the  line  as  if  they  were 
the  whole  command.  I  think  the  candid  reader  will 
see  how  futile  such  a  treatment  of  the  subject  is,  when 
once  the  mass  of  evidence  official  and  unofficial,  direct 
and  circumstantial,  is  considered.  But  I  again  repeat 
that  after  the  two  brigades  had  been  compromised 
and  broken  in  front,  it  was  no  fault  of  Wagner  or  his 
subordinates  to  rally  for  reorganization  wherever  the 
crowd  surging  along  the  Columbia  Turnpike  into  the 
town  could  be  stopped.  To  get  them  into  form  so  that 
they  could  be  handled  was  their  first  duty  as  officers. 
Those  who  stopped  at  the  line  obeyed  a  noble  impulse 


The  Rallying  of  the  Outpost  Brigades       257 

in  doing  so,  but  it  was  their  manifest  duty  also  to  find 
the  cadres  of  their  regiments  and  brigades  at  the  ear 
liest  moment  when  it  was  evident  that  the  organized 
brigades  of  Rcilly,  Opdycke,  and  Strickland  were  hold 
ing  the  position. 

With  the  facts  before  us  there  is  little  use  in  trying 
to  estimate  the  numbers  of  Lane's  and  Conrad's  dis 
organized  men  who  halted  at  our  breastworks  and 
fought.  General  Reilly  was  prompt  to  give  credit  to 
the  175th  Ohio1  (a  new  and  unassigned  regiment), 
and  to  the  44th  Illinois  (the  left  wing  of  Opdycke's 
brigade),  which  gave  him  organized  help  in  regaining 
and  holding  his  breastworks.  There  is  not  the  slight 
est  ground  to  doubt  the  equal  candor  of  his  report 
that  "  with  this  exception  the  brigade  received  no 
assistance  during  the  fight,  unless  perhaps  some  of 
the  men  coming  in  over  the  works  may  have  rallied 
in  or  behind  the  lines."  Colonel  Opdycke  assured  me 
that  only  detached  individuals  or  small  groups  rallied 
with  his  men.  In  Strickland's  line  it  appears  that 
considerably  larger  numbers  rallied  at  the  locust 
grove,  but,  like  the  rest,  completely  disorganized.  At 
this  point  alone  does  my  own  memory  recall  anything 
like  a  collection  of  Wagner's  men  going  to  join  their 
brigades  in  town.  Seeing  in  the  evening  what  I  took 
to  be  about  a  company  dimly  outlined  in  the  darkness 
passing,  at  a  little  distance,  my  own  position  on  the 
turnpike  near  the  Carter  house,  I  directed  a  staff 
officer  to  inquire  where  they  were  going,  and  was 
informed  that  they  were  some  of  Wagner's  men  who 
had  been  collected  and  were  going  to  join  the  com 
mand  in  the  village.  Others  had  doubtless  done  the 
same,  but  in  groups  too  small  to  attract  attention. 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  412. 


CHAPTER  XX 

AN  UNEXPECTED  CONTROVERSY 

Colonel  Stone's  Paper  in  Century  War  Book  — General  Stanley's 
Criticism  —  A  Violent  Attack  —  Earlier  Correspondence  —  Nine 
Points  —  Two  Corrections  —  Basis  of  a  Historical  Narrative. 

THE  matters  of  more  or  less  debate  which  I  have 
discussed  were  such  as  involved  no  special  interest  on 
my  part,  beyond  that  which  is  felt  by  every  actor  in 
important  events,  and  by  every  student  of  history  who 
desires  to  solve  correctly  the  problems  of  a  great  war. 
I  must  now,  however,  give  some  attention  to  a  con 
troversy  which  more  nearly  concerns  myself.  I  would 
gladly  be  excused  from  this ;  but  historical  truth  is 
involved,  and  the  discussion  of  the  battle  of  Franklin 
would  be  incomplete  without  it. 

In  the  series  of  important  papers  upon  the  Civil 
War  published  in  the  Century  Magazine,  and  after 
ward  collected  into  the  Century  War  Book,1  was  one 
upon  the  campaigns  of  Franklin  and  Nashville  by 
Colonel  Henry  Stone,  formerly  upon  the  staff  of  Gen 
eral  George  H.  Thomas.  In  this  paper  Colonel  Stone 
had  said  of  the  main  line  in  front  of  the  village  of 
Franklin,  that  "all  the  troops  in  the  works  were 
ordered  to  report  to  General  Cox,  to  whom  was  as 
signed  the  command  of  the  defences."  To  this 
statement  of  Colonel  Stone,  made  entirely  upon  his 

1  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  Century  Co.,  1884-88. 


An  Unexpected  Controversy  259 

independent  investigation,  General  Stanley  took  ex 
ception,  in  a  letter  which  was  published  in  the  Cen 
tury  Magazine  for  February,  1889.  He  asserted  that 
the  statement  of  Colonel  Stone  was  not  made  "  from 
the  standpoint  of  an  officer  well  informed  as  to  the 
rights  of  command,"  for  "  all  the  troops  in  the  works 
could  not  have  been  ordered  to  report  to  General  Cox 
without  removing  me  [Stanley]  from  the  command  of 
the  Fourth  Corps,  and  no  one  will  claim  that  the 
latter  idea  was  ever  thought  of  by  any  one."  Cer 
tainly  no  one  has  been  more  explicit  than  myself  in 
saying  that  General  Stanley  was  in  command  of  the 
Fourth  Corps,  and  continued  so. 

This,  as  a  criticism  of  Colonel  Stone's  paper,  whether 
well  or  ill  made,  would  have  involved  me  in  no  way, 
had  General  Stanley  not  added  an  ostensible  excuse 
for  Colonel  Stone,  "  as  lie  could  easily  have  been  led 
into  making  this  misstatement  by  General  Cox  him 
self  ;  for  the  latter,  in  the  book  written  by  him,  enti 
tled  <  The  March  to  the  Sea,  Franklin  and  Nashville,' 
on  page  86  complacently  styles  himself  '  Commandant 
upon  the  line.' ':  General  Stanley  then  proceeded  to 
controvert  this  assumption. 

By  the  courtesy  of  the  editors  of  the  Century,  an 
opportunity  was  given  to  Colonel  Stone  and  myself  to 
reply  in  the  same  number  of  the  magazine,  and  I  was 
quite  content  to  leave  the  matter  where  it  was  thus 
placed.  In  the  following  autumn,  however,  a  new 
attack  appeared  in  a  daily  newspaper,  which  did  not 
come  to  my  notice  till  a  fortnight  after  its  publication. 
Fgiled  in  an  effort  to  put  a  reply  before  the  readers 
of  the  sarne  journal,  I  allowed  the  subject  to  await 
that  clearing  up  of  controversies  which  I  have  had  an 
abiding  confidence  would  follow  the  completed  publi 
cation  of  the  Official  War  Records.  I  was  the  more 


260  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

easily  led  to  do  thus  because  the  matter,  tone,  and 
style  of  the  last  publication  mentioned  were  not  such 
as  one  ordinarily  feels  the  need  of  replying  to. 

In  an  attempt  at  a  somewhat  full  historical  investi 
gation,  however,  it  would  manifestly  leave  the  discus 
sion  incomplete  if  the  question  of  command  on  the 
line  did  not  receive  the  same  attention  as  other  ques 
tions.  I  shall  try  to  treat  it  as  a  simple  historical 
inquiry,  in  which  the  evidence,  both  official  and  other, 
seems  to  me  pretty  complete  and  clear.  To  let  it  fall 
below  this  level  would  be  to  forfeit  the  respect  of 
intelligent  readers. 

When  I  was  preparing,  in  the  summer  of  1881,  to 
write  the  volume  in  the  Scribner  War  Series  of  His 
tories,  entitled  "  The  March  to  the  Sea,  Franklin  and 
Nashville,"  General  Stanley  opened  a  correspondence 
with  me,  offering  to  assist  me  by  the  loan  of  pa 
pers,  etc.  In  my  reply,  dated  August  24th,  accepting 
the  offer,  I  took  the  opportunity  to  compare  our 
recollections  of  the  principal  facts.  I  wrote  :  — 

"  Let  me  state  a  few  consecutive  points  within  my 
own  memory,  and  ask  you  to  compare  it  with  yours, 
premising  that  I  have  not  yet  begun  the  systematic 
review  of  the  documents  in  my  possession. 

"  1.  Two  divisions  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  were 
present,  and  acting  under  my  command,  Ruger's  on 
the  right  of  the  Columbia  pike,  and  my  own  (Reilly 
commanding)  on  the  left. 

"  2.  Schofield  had  only  intended  to  cover  the  cross 
ing  of  trains,  and  had  not  meant  to  fight  south  of  the 
Harpeth.  He  had  therefore  ordered  me  to  send  my 
own  artillery  and  wagons  over  the  river  early,  and 
had  arranged  that  Major  Goodspeed,1  your  chief  of 

1  This  should  be  Captain  Bridges:  Major  Goodspeed  was  Chief  of 
Artillery  of  the  Fourth  Corps  a  little  later. 


An  Unexpected  Controversy  261 

artillery,  should  detail  some  batteries  as  your  troops 
came  in,  and  they  reported  to  me. 

"  3.  After  putting  my  own  command  in  position,  I 
reported  to  General  Schofield  that  my  troops  were  not 
sufficient  to  reach  the  river  on  the  right,  and  that 
flank  was  consequently  exposed.  Kimball's  division 
reported  to  me,  and  was  assigned  that  place. 

"  4.  I  received  a  written  dispatch  from  General 
Schoficld  saying  that  two  brigades  of  Wagner's  were 
out  as  rear  guard,  and  one  (Opdycke's)  would  report 
within  the  lines  to  act  as  my  reserve ;  that  Wagner 
was  ordered  to  bring  the  other  two  brigades  in  when 
ever  Hood  showed  a  purpose  of  serious  attack.  I 
showed  this  note  to  Wagner,  and  found  he  had  such 
orders. 

"  5.  When  Hood  formed  and  advanced,  Wagner 
did  not  order  in  the  two  brigades,  but  ordered  them 
to  fight.  One  of  my  staff,  still  living,  heard  him  send 
the  order  from  the  Carter  house.  In  his  excitement, 
he  had  forgotten  his  orders,  apparently,  and  did  not 
change  though  reminded  of  them. 

"  6.  Being  at  the  left  of  the  line  on  the  parapet, 
watching  the  enemy's  advance,  I  was  amazed  to  see 
Wagner's  two  brigades  open  fire.  They  were  quickly 
run  over  by  the  enemy,  and  came  back  in  confusion. 

"  7.  I  immediately  sent  an  aid  to  Opdyckc  to  warn 
him  to  be  ready  to  advance  in  case  of  a  break  at  the 
centre,  and  to  order  the  commandants  of  brigades, 
etc.,  to  withhold  their  fire  till  Wagner's  men  should 
get  in.  The  two  aids  who  were  with  me  are  both 
dead,  one  being  killed  while  performing  part  of  the 
above  duty.  Opdycke  afterward  told  me  that  he  got 
no  order,  and  acted  on  his  own  judgment,  and  I  have 
accepted  that  as  the  fact. 

"  8.    I  almost  immediately  followed  my  order,  and 


262  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

rode  to  the  pike.  There  I  met  Opdycke  advancing, 
and  met  you  also.  We  all  went  forward  together. 
When  Opdycke  reached  the  parapet,  you  and  I  were 
trying  to  rally  the  fugitives  immediately  in  rear  of  the 
line.  While  thus  employed  you  were  wounded,  and 
your  horse  was  also  hit.  You  asked  me  to  look  at 
the  hurt,  and  I  urged  you  to  go  and  have  surgical 
attention  to  it.  I  dismounted  Captain  Tracy,  one  of 
my  aids,  and  gave  you  my  horse  which  he  was  riding. 
To  say  anything  here  of  the  impression  your  conduct 
made  on  me  would  violate  the  old  maxim  about 
6  praise  to  face,'  etc. 

"  9.  Opdycke  and  the  artillery  continued  to  act 
under  my  orders  till  we  left  the  lines  at  midnight. 
Orders  to  the  rest  of  Wagner's  division  and  to  Kim- 
hall  went  from  your  headquarters,  you  continuing  in 
command  of  the  Fourth  Corps  till  we  got  back  to 
Nashville,  notwithstanding  your  hurt. 

"  As  I  have  said  above,  I  have  not  yet  begun  the 
collation  of  documents ;  but  I  have  taken  advan 
tage  of  your  kind  letter  to  give  the  above  outline,  and 
to  ask  for  any  illustration,  correction,  or  addition  which 
may  occur  to  you,  so  that  I  may  give  careful  attention 
to  any  point  on  which  my  memory  should  differ  from 
yours." 

To  this  General  Stanley  replied  from  Fort  Clarke, 
Texas,  under  date  of  October  17,  1881,  saying,  among 
other  things  :  — 

"  The  nine  points  submitted  in  your  letter  are,  to 
the  best  of  my  memory,  exactly  correct.  I  think  it 
may  be  true  that  Opdycke  did  not  receive  your  order. 
When  I  arrived  at  the  left  of  his  brigade,  the  men 
were  just  getting  to  their  feet,  as  they  had  been  lying 
down,  I  presume  to  avoid  the  enemy's  bullets." 

Replying   on   the    81st  of  October  to   this    letter, 


An  Unexpected  Controversy  263 

I  said :  "  It  gives  me  sincere  pleasure  to  know  that 
we  agree  in  memory  as  to  the  outline  of  the  battle 
-of  Franklin.  It  increases  my  confidence  in  my  rec 
ollection,  and  will  give  me  more  assurance  in  going 
forward." 

This  outline,  so  explicitly  agreed  upon,  needs  cor 
rection  in  but  two  points,  in  both  of  which  the  official 
reports  show  that  I  understated  my  own  command 
upon  the  line.  First,  Opdycke's  official  report1  shows 
that  he  received  my  order  mentioned  in  the  seventh  of 
the  points  stated  "to  be  ready  to  advance  in  case  of  a 
break  at  the  centre,"  and  that  it  was  the  second  order 
mentioned  in  my  official  report,2  calling  on  him  to 
charge  at  once,  which  he  anticipated.  Finding  my  aid, 
Captain  Tracy,  with  him  when  I  joined  him  on  the 
turnpike,  I  of  course  assumed  that  the  order  had  been 
delivered,  and  did  not  know  till  Opdycke  afterward 
told  me  of  it,  that  the  beginning  of  the  actual  charge 
was  spontaneous  on  his  part,  and  made  it  unnecessary 
for  Tracy  to  deliver  the  order  when  he  reached  the 
brigade.  The  evidence  that  Opdycke  recognized  my 
authority  was  thus  officially  complete.  In  a  corre 
spondence  with  him  at  about  the  same  time  as  that 
with  General  Stanley,  he  very  frankly  and  clearly  put 
the  matter  on  this  footing,  as  he  did  in  his  published 
narrative  of  the  battle.3  General  Stanley's  assent  to 
the  points  recognizes  also  my  right  to  exercise  the 
command  over  that  brigade  and  the  artillery,  and  to 
continue  it  till  the  midnight  withdrawal. 

Second,  in  the  ninth  point  I  understated  my  exer 
cise  of  authority  as  to  KimbalPs  division,  for  that 
officer's  official  report4  shows  that  I  called  upon  him 
to  detach  a  regiment  to  reinforce  the  left  of  Moore's 

1  O.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  240.  3  See  ante,  p.  9G. 

2  See  Appendix  B.  4  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  178. 


264  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

brigade,  and  that  Colonel  McDanald's  was  sent  in 
response  to  the  order.1 

In  my  history  of  the  campaign,  I  had  followed  the 
outline  thus  explicitly  assented  to  by  General  Stanley. 
When  it  is  remembered  that  this  was  the  result  of  his 
own  offer  to  help  me  fix  the  more  important  facts  of 
the  campaign  for  the  expressed  purpose  of  a  historical 
narrative,  their  conclusiveness  upon  him  is  indispu 
table.  If  there  were  anything  which  lie  should  after 
ward  wisli  to  modify  or  question,  a  courteous  and 
temperate  tone  was  certainly  demanded  as  well  as  a 
recollection  of  the  points  which  he  had  so  emphati 
cally  indorsed. 

So  far  as  my  use  of  the  phrase  "  commandant  upon 
the  line  "  was  concerned,  I  said,  in  my  reply  in  the 
Century,  that  it  was  used  chiefly  to  avoid  the  repeti 
tion  of  my  own  name  in  a  narrative  written  by  myself, 
and  that  I  should  be  quite  content  to  have  the  reader 
substitute  my  name  for  the  phrase.  I  might  have 
added  that  in  my  desire  to  keep  upon  ground  where  I 
supposed  we  were  agreed,  I  had  spoken  of  myself  as 
"  commandant  upon  the  line"  only  in  the  events  prior 
to  General  Stanley's  appearance  at  the  front,  and  my 
language  after  that  was,  "  the  commandants  of  the 
two  corps  met  on  the  turnpike  just  as  Opdyckc  and 
his  men  were  rushing  to  the  front." 2  Controversy 

1  When  the  correspondence  printed  in  the  Century  Magazine  for 
February,  1889,  appeared,  I  had  not  seen  General  Kimball's  official 
report  and  had  forgotten  the  fact  that  I  had  sent  the  order.     Colonel 
Stone,  however,  referred  to  it  in  his  reply  to  General  Stanley,  and  I 
then  procured  a  copy  of  the  official  report.    I  discovered,  a  little  later,  in 
my  files  of  preserved  letters,  one  from  Mr.  Edward  C.  Russell,  a  hard 
ware  merchant  at  Corning,  Iowa,  dated  January  4,  1876,  in  which  he 
recalled  himself  to  my  memory  as  one  of  my  orderlies  at  the  battle  of 
Franklin,  and  the  messenger  who  carried  my  order  to  Kimball  for  the 
reinforcement  at  the  centre. 

2  Franklin  and  Nashville,  etc.,  pp.  80,  89. 


An  Unexpected  Controversy  265 

on  that  point  was  therefore  wholly  gratuitous.  But 
the  challenge  of  my  accuracy  went  the  whole  length 
of  our  relations  to  the  line  engaged  in  the  defences  of 
Franklin  at  all  times  during  the  oOth  of  November. 

MY  well  meant  purpose  to  keep  within  the  lines  of 
uncontroverted  facts  in  my  history  was  thus,  some 
seven  years  after  its  publication,  disappointed.  I  had 
in  fact  accorded  to  General  Stanley  more  than  he  had 
any  claim  to,  and  the  outcome  was  that  I  found  my 
own  candor  and  accuracy  assailed. 

In  writing  to  me  after  the  appearance  of  the  little 
volume  referred  to,  General  Schofield,  in  November, 
1882,  spoke  strongly  of  my  manifest  effort,  in  treat 
ing  the  whole  campaign,  to  avoid  unnecessary  criti 
cism  and  to  deal  liberally  with  all  who  had  a 
responsible  part  in  it.  He  even  suggested  that  I 
might  "  feel  estopped "  from  a  more  rigid  analysis 
"  by  the  generous  treatment  you  have  already  given  " 
to  others.  If  the  word  "  generous  "  be  properly  used 
in  regard  to  anything  I  have  said  of  that  campaign,  I 
am  very  sure  it  would  nowhere  be  more  appropriate 
than  to  my  references  to  General  Stanley,  from  my 
preliminary  report  in  the  field  to  niy  last  printed 
word.  Whether  well  or  ill  requited,  I  should  not 
have  modified  the  creditable  picture  which  I  had 
helped  to  draw.  He  lias  himself  made  it  seem  ne 
cessary  to  examine  more  critically  the  relative  parts 
we  bore  in  that  day's  work.  The  fulness  of  the  nar 
rative  in  the  preceding  pages  will  enable  me  to  make 
the  summary  comparatively  brief. 


CHAPTER   XXI 

CONTROVERTED  POINTS 

Work  assigned  the  Twenty -third  Corps  —  Detachment  of  Fourth 
Corps  Batteries  —  Orders  to  Ruger  and  Kimball  —  Detachments' 
often  Necessary — Articles  of  War  and  Regulations  —  Questions 
of  Command —  Stanley  on  North  Side  of  River —  liis  Ride  to  the 
Front  —  Soon  Wounded  —  He  Retires — Statements  of  Officers  — 
At  the  Field  Hospital  —  At  Schofield's  Headquarters  —  Summary 
—  Official  Reports  —  Analysis  of  Stanley's  —  Contemporaneous 
Records  —  Conclusion. 

IN  an  early  chapter1  I  have  told  how,  before  the  break 
of  day,  General  Schofield  came  to  the  Carter  house, 
upon  the  Columbia  Turnpike,  and  gave  to  me  in 
person  the  direction  to  put  the  Twenty -third  Corps 
in  position,  make  defensive  works,  and  hold  back 
Hood  at  all  hazards.  With  the  Columbia  road  as 
a  centre,  the  line  as  first  laid  out  extended  about 
equal  distances  to  right  and  left,  say  half  a  mile 
each  way,  reaching  from  the  Harpeth  River  on  the 
left  to  the  Carter's  Creek  Turnpike  on  the  right. 
This  line  was  occupied  and  intrenched  wholly  by 
the  two  divisions  of  the  corps.  This  was  "the  line  " 
in  front  of  Franklin  during  the  forenoon.  Even  the 
artillery  in  it  would  have  been  the  batteries  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps,  except  that  General  Schofield 
as  a  wise  economy  of  time  ordered  me  to  send  my 
artillery  at  once  over  the  Harpeth,  promising  to 
detail  batteries  from  Stanley's  Fourth  Corps,  and 

1  Ante,  chap.  iii. 


Controverted  Points  267 

give  them  to  me  to  supply  the  place  of  mine.  About 
this  there  has  never  been  any  question :  every  report, 
official  and  private,  is  in  accord,  and  General  Stanley 
has  said  that  it  is  "exactly  correct." 

The  work  of  holding  back  the  Confederates  in 
front  of  Franklin  was  thus  definitely  committed  to 
me,  and  Hood  was  advancing  from  Columbia  by  the 
road  which  cut  the  centre  of  the  line  thus  estab 
lished.  As  to  the  artillery,  General  Schofield,  in 
accordance  with  his  promise,  made  a  detachment  of 
certain  batteries  from  the  Fourth  Corps  to  fight  in 
such  positions  in  my  line  as  I  should  direct.  To 
say  that  they  did  not  come  under  my  general  com 
mand  would  be  a  military  absurdity.  There  neither 
is  nor  for  the  past  century  has  there  been  an  army 
in  Christendom  in  which  a  corps  commander  has  not 
control  of  the  batteries  assigned  to  him.  A  reserve 
is  often  separately  massed  for  a  special  purpose,  but 
the  batteries  detailed  to  a  corps  are  always  part  of 
"the  command,"  for  the  time  at  least.  The  Twenty- 
third  Corps  had  no  reserve  artillery,  but  the  batteries 
were  integral  parts  of  the  divisions;  and  when  their 
place  was  supplied  by  others,  as  in  this  case,  the 
substitutes  came,  by  the  fixed  rule  of  the  service, 
under  the  orders  of  the  general  officer  to  whom  they 
were  ordered  to  report.  Any  other  rule  would  make 
utter  confusion. 

General  Stanley  recognized  this  in  its  full  effect, 
since,  for  the  very  purpose  of  settling  points  as  to 
the  battle  for  a  published  narrative,  he  admitted  the 
exact  correctness  of  my  statement  that  the  batteries 
were  "  detailed  "  to  report  to  me  generally,  and  that 
they  "continued  to  act  under  my  orders  till  we  left 
the  lines  at  midnight."1  General  Schofield's  pur- 

1  Ante,  p.  262. 


268  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

pose  that  they  should  so  report  to  me  and  act  under 
my  orders  is  too  plain  for  discussion.  He  had  said 
so  to  me  orally,  and  the  written  order  from  his  head 
quarters  was  meant  to  do  this,  neither  more  nor  less. 
Now  what  was  the  language  in  which  he  expressed 
the  purpose?  It  ordered  Captain  Bridges  to  "report 
four  (4)  batteries  from  your  command  to  Brig.  Gen. 
J.  D.  Cox  for  position  on  the  line."  It  is  thus  con 
clusively  proved  that  he  and  his  adjutant  general 
regarded  that  language  as  aptly  expressive  of  the 
purpose. 

But  the  officer  to  whom  it  was  addressed  also 
understood  it  so.  Captain  Bridges  states  in  his 
official  report  that  he  placed  the  Fourth  Corps  bat 
teries  in  the  positions  in  the  Twenty-third  Corps 
line  "by  direction  of  Brigadier-General  Cox,"  and 
describes  them  in  detail.  Then,  after  describing 
the  opening  of  the  battle  and  the  fighting  of  the 
artillery,  he  adds :  "  Receiving  orders  from  Briga 
dier  General  Cox,  commanding  the  Twenty-third 
Army  Corps,  and  Lieut.  Colonel  Schoficld,  Chief  of 
Artillery  Department  of  the  Ohio,  to  remain  upon 
the  line  with  the  batteries,  I  remained  near  the 
Columbia  pike,  which  seemed  to  be  the  place  upon 
the  line  where  the  enemy  made  the  most  effort  to 
obtain  a  lodgment,  and  which  was  a  position  from 
which  I  could  see  the  entire  line. "  1  From  the  first 
of  these  quotations  to  the  last,  including  the  whole 
action  of  the  artillery  upon  the  line,  he  makes  no 
mention  of  General  Stanley  whatever,  although,  as 
chief  of  artillery  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  he  was  attached 
to  that  officer's  staff.  It  should  be  noted  also  that 
his  position  was  close  to  my  headquarters  on  the 
turnpike  near  the  Carter  house,  where  Stanley  was 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  320,  321. 


Controverted  Points  269 

for  a  few  minutes  in  the  first  mele'e,  and  where  he 
would  have  been  likely  to  be  had  he  remained  at  the 
front.  When  Captain  Bridges  in  the  succeeding  sen 
tence  speaks  of  the  order  to  withdraw  the  batteries, 
he  correctly  says  l  that  it  came  from  General  Stanley. 
The  withdrawal  orders  we  have  already  examined.2 
The  report  of  Captain  Bridges  thus  becomes  proof 
not  only  of  his  recognition  of  my  own  command 
upon  the  line,  but  that  Gene  nil  Stanley  was  not 
there  long  enough  even  to  raise  a  question  as  to 
subordination  or  command  there.3 

General  Ruger  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  was  also 
ordered  to  report  to  me,  and  in  this  case  also  there 
is  no  possible  dispute  as  to  the  fact  or  as  to  General 
Schofield's  purpose  to  do  it.  It  was  part  of  the 
authority  and  instruction  he  gave  me  orally  in  the 
early  morning,  and,  like  that  in  regard  to  the  bat 
teries,  was  a  little  later  put  in  form  as  an  order. 
In  this,  as  in  the  other  case,  General  Stanley  admits 
the  exact  accuracy  of  my  statement,4  that  Ruger 's 
division  was  thus  put  under  my  command  for  the 
day,  and  General  Schofield's  official  report  declares 
that  I  was  temporarily  in  command  of  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps.5  Again  we  have  to  ask  in  what  lan 
guage  was  this  purpose  expressed  in  the  order,  and 
General  Ruger  answers  the  question.  In  his  official 
report  of  the  battle  he  says  he  was  ordered  to  report 
to  me  "for  assignment  to  position."6  This  not  only 
shows  that  the  same  language  was  used  as  in  the  case 
of  the  batteries,  but,  by  his  unquestioning  recogni 
tion  of  my  authority,  General  Ruger  shows  that  he 

1  0.  TC.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  320,  321. 

2  Ante,  p.  169.  a  Ante,  p.  100. 

4  Ante,  p.  260.  5  gee  Appendix  A. 

6  0.  K.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  364. 


270  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

regarded   the  words  as   appropriate   to   convey   the 
meaning  intended.1 

When,  later  in  the  day,  as  we  have  seen,2  the 
appearance  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  my  right  Hank 
showed  the  need  of  strengthening  that  part  of  the 
position,  I  reported  the  fact  to  General  Schoficld. 
He  ordered  General  Nathan  Kimball,  commanding 
a  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  to  report  to  me,  and 
I  placed  him  on  the  recurved  extension  of  my  right. 
For  the  third  time  that  day  the  language  of  the  order 
was,  "The  Commanding  General  directs  that  you 
report  with  your  command  to  Brig.  Gen.  J.  D.  Cox 
for  position  on  the  line  to-day."  General  Kimball 
not  only  took  the  position  assigned  him,  but  in  the 
first  hour  of  the  battle,  while  it  was  yet  broad  day 
light,3  he  obeyed  my  order  to  send  a  regiment  to 
the  centre,  where,  between  Strickland's  right  and 
Moore's  left,  help  was  sorely  needed. 

Of  these  orders,  thus  successively  sent  and  thus 
successively  obeyed,  General  Stanley  argues  that 
they  conveyed  no  authority  except  such  as  an  "  aid- 
de-camp  "  or  "  an  orderly  or  guide  "  might  have  had, 
"to  show  General  Kimball  where  he  was  to  go"!4 
Such  interpretation  would  discredit  a  freshly  com 
missioned  subaltern.  He  goes  further,  and  in  igno 
rance  of  the  fact  that  General  Kimball' s  official 
report  contradicts  him,  completes  the  absurdity  by 
saying  that,  if  I  "had  attempted  to  assume  the 
authority  to  give  orders,"  his  division  commanders 
"would  have  paid  no  attention  to  them." 

The  truth  is  that  no  rule  is  more  rigidly  enforced 
in  our  army  than  that  an  officer  is  never  ordered  to 

1  General  Thomas  II.  Ruger  is  now  (1896)  a  Major  General  U.  S.  A. 

2  Ante,  p.  60.  4  Century  Magazine,  loc.  cit. 
8  Ante,  p.  134.  5  Ibid. 


Controverted  Points  271 

report  to  one  of  lower  rank.  To  talk  of  a  general 
officer  being  ordered  to  report  to  a  captain  or  a  guide 
"for  position,"  or  for  any  purpose  whatever,  is  a 
glaring  solecism  which  exposes  any  one  who  uses  it. 
A  little  pains  to  recall  the  circumstances  under  which 
the  orders  were  given  would  make  their  form  appear 
very  natural.  Their  purpose  and  substance  could 
never  have  been  doubtful  till  the  remembrance  of 
events  a  quarter  of  a  century  old  had  become  dim. 

The  line  of  defences  in  front  of  Franklin  had,  quite 
early  in  the  morning,  taken  the  form  of  a  fortified 
enceinte,  the  batteries  with  embrasures  being  con 
nected  by  an  infantry  parapet.  Both  the  enemy's 
and  our  own  officers  and  men  spoke  of  them  as  forti 
fications.  An  order  to  report  to  the  commandant  of 
a  fortification  "for  position  in  the  redan,"  for  in 
stance,  carries  with  it  the  duty  of  serving  there  also, 
and  not  merely  of  finding  a  place.  This  usage  was 
common  at  headquarters  on  the  day  in  question,  as 
is  shown  by  the  diary  of  Colonel  Fullerton,  Stanley's 
chief  of  staff.  He  notes  at  1  P.  M.,  that  General 
Wagner  is  supposed  to  be  moving  his  division  "  within 
the  bridge-head  constructed  by  General  Cox  around 
the  town  of  Franklin."  1  With  this  somewhat  formal 
idea  of  "the  works,"  there  was  no  danger  that  any 
officer  ordered  to  report  to  me  for  position  there 
would  doubt  his  subordination.  No  one,  in  fact,  did 
doubt  it.  It  required  twenty -five  years  to  create  that 
illusion. 

The  matter,  then,  is  a  very  simple  one.  To  meet 
a  temporary  exigency,  General  Schofield  ordered  cer 
tain  detachments  from  the  Fourth  Corps  to  report  to 
the  commandant  of  the  Twenty-third.  When  the 
exigency  was  past,  the  same  power  would  order  them 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  149. 


272  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

back.  It  could,  of  course,  do  so  at  any  moment. 
To  speak  of  this  as  removing  Stanley  from  the  com 
mand  of  his  corps  is  nonsense.  It  is  not  pleasant 
to  find  the  units  of  one's  command  scattered,  but  it 
often  happens,  and  the  loyal  subordinate  submits 
without  a  murmur.  At  the  battle  of  Chickamauga 
one  of  the  incidents  was  that  the  divisions  of 
McCook's  corps  were  sent  to  reinforce  Thomas,  till 
he  was  left  with  only  Sheridan's.  At  the  battle  of 
Atlanta  my  division  of  five  brigades  (including  one 
of  dismounted  cavalry)  was  scattered  by  Sherman's 
order,  until  I  was  left  with  only  one,  covering  the 
extreme  left  of  the  army  on  the  Decatur  road. 
Nobody  has  any  right  to  complain  of  such  things. 

Had  Hood  concluded  to  tumour  position  at  Frank 
lin  instead  of  attacking  in  front,  General  Schoficld 
would  no  doubt  have  withdrawn  KimbalPs  and 
Wagner's  divisions  from  the  south  side  of  the 
Harpeth,  possibly  sending  Ruger  also  to  report  to 
Stanley,  and  leaving  me  alone  with  one  division  in 
my  works.  In  the  forenoon  this  seemed  most  prob 
able.  It  \vas  the  fortune  of  war  that  it  turned  out 
otherwise. 

A  brief  reference  to  the  orders  given  to  General 
Wagner  will  complete  all  that  it  is  necessary  to  say 
of  the  troops  on  the  line.  The  tenor  of  those  orders 
need  not  be  repeated.1  If  he  had  withdrawn  from 
the  front  and  come  within  my  "bridge-head"  in 
accordance  with  them,  his  whole  division  would  have 
been,  where  Opdycke's  brigade  was,  in  reserve  be 
hind  the  line  and  in  close  support.  General  Scho- 
ficld's  official  report  tells  us  that  such  was  his 
intention.2  There  is  also  no  dispute  that  an  order 
placing  troops  thus  in  reserve  gives  to  the  com- 

1  Ante,  pp.  66,  71.  2  See  Appendix  A. 


Controverted  Points  273 

mandant  of  the  principal  line  the  power  to  call  upon 
them  when  needed.  Opdycke's  brigade  was  thus 
called  upon,1  and  in  the  "nine  points"  approved  by 
General  Stanley  the  rightful  subordination  of  that 
command  to  my  orders  is  unquestioned.  The  dis 
organization  of  the  other  two  brigades  made  it 
impracticable  for  them  to  act  as  reserves,  and  the 
scattered  groups  which  rallied  at  the  works  fell 
under  the  command  of  the  organized  brigades  in 
which  they  happened  to  be. 

With  this  understanding  of  the  situation,  and  of 
the  application  of  military  rules,  what  might  hap 
pen  on  the  line  was  provided  for.  General  Schofield 
could  leave  the  south  side  of  the  river  and  the  vil 
lage,  and  go  to  any  central  position  north  of  it,  from 
which  he  could  be  equally  near  to  the  cavalry  corps, 
to  Wood's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  and  to  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  artillery,  all  of  which  were  on 
the  north  bank  of  the  Ilarpeth.  He  would  thus  be 
prepared  for  most  efficient  control  of  all  his  forces, 
whatever  might  turn  out  to  be  the  plan  adopted  by 
his  adversary,  General  Hood.  General  Stanley  could 
properly  accompany  his  superior  to  be  ready  promptly 
to  take  the  immediate  command  of  troops  used  to 
checkmate  Hood  in  any  other  move  than  that  of  a 
direct  and  rash  attack  upon  my  works. 

If  I  were  not  in  the  relation  to  the  line  in  front  of 
the  town  which  I  have  described,  the  arrangement 
would  have  been  radically  faulty.  General  Stanley 
should  in  that  case  have  remained  in  as  close  touch 
with  the  troops  he  claimed  to  command  as  I  was  with 
the  Twenty-third  Corps.  We  all  knew  beforehand 
what  the  event  proved,  that  if  anything  went  wrong 
on  any  part  of  that  line,  there  would  be  no  time  to 

1  Ante,  p.  95. 
18 


274  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

correct  it  by  reporting  it  to  the  Truett  house  or  even 
to  Fort  Granger,  north  of  the  river.  It  must  be  cor 
rected  instantly  and  on  the  spot.  The  fact,  there 
fore,  that  General  Schofield  and  General  Stanley  both 
moved  their  headquarters  from  the  village  over  the 
river  soon  after  noon  helps  to  prove  the  complete 
understanding  that  the  whole  "bridge-head  around 
the  town  of  Franklin  "  was  under  my  command.  On 
this  view,  contingencies  were  provided  for,  and  a 
responsible  head  was  left  on  the  line.  On  any  other, 
they  were  not. 

In  the  letters  in  the  Century  Magazine,1  the  sug 
gestion  appears  that  under  the  Articles  of  War  a 
momentary  authority  might  have  devolved  upon  me 
by  reason  of  portions  of  the  Fourth  Corps  troops 
happening  to  do  duty  with  mine,  upon  the  line, 
whilst  I  was  senior  there,  and  that  my  right  to  com 
mand  would  thus  be  dependent  upon  military  law, 
and  not  on  the  tenor  of  the  written  orders.  I  then 
replied  that  I  should  be  entirely  indifferent  as  to  the 
source  of  power,  were  it  not  that  the  facts  proved 
that  everybody,  at  the  time,  recognized  it  as  depend 
ent  upon  the  orders,  as  General  Stanley  himself  had 
most  explicitly  done  in  the  "nine  points." 

It  may  be  interesting,  however,  to  inquire  briefly 
as  to  the  application  of  the  military  rule.  The  62d 
of  the  Articles  of  War2  is  this:  "If  upon  marches, 
guards,  or  in  quarters,  different  corps  of  the  army 
shall  happen  to  join  or  do  duty  together,  the  officer 
highest  in  rank  of  the  line  of  the  army,  marine  corps, 
or  militia  by  commission,  there  on  duty  or  in  quar 
ters,  shall  command  the  whole  and  give  orders  for 
what  is  needful  to  the  service,  unless  otherwise 
specially  directed  by  the  President  of  the  United 

1  Ante,  p.  259.  2  Army  Regulations  (1861),  p.  508. 


Controverted  Points  275 

States,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  case."  Very 
good  authority  could  be  quoted  for  holding  that  this 
law  meant  by  "different  corps,"  those  differing  in 
function,  as  the  engineers,  ordnance  corps,  marine 
corps,  or  medical  corps,  and  that  it  does  not  apply 
to  different  bodies  of  troops,  like  companies,  regi 
ments,  brigades,  divisions,  etc.  The  "army  corps," 
as  everybody  knows,  was  created  long  after  the 
article  quoted  was  enacted.  The  right  to  command 
in  general  is  much  more  fundamental,  and  is  found 
in  the  very  first  paragraph  of  the  Regulations,  which 
says  that  "all  inferiors  are  required  to  obey  strictly 
and  to  execute  with  alacrity  and  good  faith  the  law 
ful  orders  of  the  superiors  appointed  over  them."1 
As  is  usual  in  such  matters,  the  difficulty  arises 
when  it  becomes  necessary  to  decide  who  is  the 
"superior,"  has  he  been  "appointed  over"  another, 
and  what  are  "  lawful  orders. " 

Waiving  all  technical  discussion  of  the  meaning 
of  the  phrase  "  different  corps  "  in  the  Article  of 
War,  it  is  very  clear  that  its  principle  could  only 
apply  in  the  case  of  the  absence  of  a  common  supe 
rior.  The  captain  of  Company  A  in  a  regiment 
does  not  acquire  any  command  over  the  captain  of 
Company  F,  who  follows  him  on  the  march,  or  is 
next  to  him  in  line,  by  mere  virtue  of  contiguity. 
If  the  regiment  is  under  the  command  of  a  field 
officer,  the  captains  are  independent  of  each  other, 
and  strictly  subordinate  to  the  common  superior 
present.  If  no  field  officer  were  present,  the  com 
mand  of  the  whole  regiment  would  devolve  on  the 
captain  of  Company  A.  The  elementary  principle 
applies  to  divisions  or  army  corps  as  well  as  to 
companies. 

1  Army  Regulations  (1861),  p.  9. 


276  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

But  if  Companies  A  and  F  were  separated  from 
the  regiment  so  that  no  field  officer  could  exercise 
practical  control,  then,  undoubtedly,  in  matters  not 
explicitly  provided  for  in  previous  orders,  the  two 
companies  would  become,  by  necessary  implication, 
a  new  temporary  organization  for  the  common  pur 
pose,  and  by  virtue  of  his  seniority  the  captain  of 
Company  A  would  become  the  commander.  Here, 
too,  the  rule  for  divisions  or  army  corps  is  identi 
cally  the  same.  In  the  larger  organizations,  how 
ever,  it  is  more  difficult  to  say  when  a  common 
superior  is  present,  and  it  is  correspondingly  diffi 
cult  to  say,  as  between  two  of  his  subordinates,  when 
a  case  arises  in  which  one  could  assume  command 
over  the  other.  As  the  grades  of  rank  and  command 
increase,  the  discretion  of  the  subordinate  increases 
in  the  mode  of  executing  his  own  orders;  but  it  does 
not  increase  in  the  matter  of  assuming  authority 
over  other  equal  organizations.  On  a  field  of  battle, 
above  all  other  places,  it  would  be  intolerable  and 
disastrous  for  one  corps  or  division  commander  to 
assume  authority  over  another,  by  reason  of  con 
tiguity,  when  there  is  a  general  in  chief  present  in 
actual  command.  From  top  to  bottom  of  the  army 
organization  this  is  a  fundamental  principle,  under 
which  Article  62  is  only  a  grouping  of  particular 
cases.  It  applies  to  two  corporal's  guards  as  well 
as  to  two  army  corps. 

In  the  battle  of  Franklin  General  Schofield  was 
present,  commanding  three  corps,  two  of  infantry 
and  one  of  cavalry.  He  had  issued  no  orders  put 
ting  either  of  his  three  principal  subordinates  under 
the  command  of  another,  and  no  one  of  them  has 
ever  pretended  to  have  had  such  authority.  General 
Stanley,  in  express  terms,  disclaimed  it.1  They 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  118.     See  Appendix  D. 


Controverted  Points  277 

each  looked  to  General  Schofield,  and  to  him  alone, 
for  orders.  No  case  had  arisen,  therefore,  either 
under  Article  62  or  any  other  clause  of  the  Regula 
tions,  for  looking  to  anything  else  than  the  actual 
orders  for  the  authority  of  his  subordinates. 

Our  experience  in  the  Atlanta  campaign  was  a 
constant  lesson  as  to  the  difficulties  likely  to  arise 
from  disputed  authority  when  different  bodies  of 
troops  came  into  casual  connection.  General  Scho 
field  found  such  a  question  arise  between  him  and 
General  Stanley,  in  the  movement  turning  Atlanta, 
on  the  thirty-first  day  of  August,  and  the  authorita 
tive  decision  of  it  was  not  announced  till  the  7th 
of  November,  after  the  opening  of  the  new  cam 
paign.1  It  gave  rise  to  a  somewhat  voluminous  cor 
respondence  which  was  referred  to  Washington. 
Schofield  himself  was  far  too  prudent  an  officer  to 
leave  such  questions  open  among  his  own  subordi 
nates.  From  first  to  last  in  the  campaigns  of  the 
year,  he  provided  against  dispute  by  explicit  direc 
tions  embodied  in  his  orders. 

As  the  Atlanta  campaign  opened,  on  the  1st  of 
May,  1864,  the  Twenty-third  Corps  was  at  Charles 
ton,  Tenn.,  a  little  north  of  the  Georgia  line.  The 
corps  was  ordered  to  march  to  Cleveland,  Tenn., 
on  the  3d,  "in  order  of  rank  of  division  command 
ers."  General  Schofield  intended  to  precede  the 
troops  to  Chattanooga  for  consultation  with  General 
Sherman,  and  to  rejoin  the  corps  when  it  should 
reach  Cleveland.  Here  was  (if  ever  there  was)  a 
plain  case  under  the  principle  of  the  62d  Article, 
and  without  special  order  I  should  have  had,  by  vir 
tue  of  my  seniority,  the  command  of  the  corps  on 
the  inarch.  But  General  Schofield  did  not  trust  to 

1  O.  R.,  xxxviii.  part  v.  p.  734;  xxxix.  part  iii.  p.  685. 


278  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

such  implied  authority.  In  the  order  itself,  addressed 
to  me,  "  he  directs  that  you  assume  command  of  the 
whole,  and  conduct  the  inarch,  and  place  the  troops 
in  position  at  or  near  Cleveland."  1 

Again,  on  the  3d  of  May,  two  divisions  of  the 
corps  were  ordered  to  advance  to  Red  Clay  in  Georgia 
(now  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy) ;  and  "  he  directs 
you  to  take  command  of  the  two  divisions  and  place 
them  in  position  at  Red  Clay,  and  retain  command 
until  the  arrival  of  the  commanding  general  or  till 
further  orders. " 2 

Passing  to  one  of  the  latest  incidents  of  the 
Franklin  campaign,  on  the  march  from  Pulaski  to 
Columbia,  General  Schofield  directed  me  to  take  the 
advance,  and  on  November  21st  wrote :  "  I  desire  you 
to  move  to  Lynnville  to-morrow  morning.  General 
Wagner  will  follow  you.  I  will  probably  join  you 
there  before  night.  Reports  indicate  that  Forrest  is 
moving  with  Hood.  He  may,  however,  push  out  and 
strike  the  railroad  to-morrow;  if  so,  try  to  prevent 
him.  In  my  absence  take  command  of  Wagner's 
division."  3 

In  the  face  of  such  evidence  of  the  custom  not  to 
trust  to  the  understanding  of  the  Regulations,  can 
we  be  asked  to  helieve  that  in  preparing  for  the 
battle  of  Franklin,  when  Hood's  formidable  array 
showed  the  imminence  of  one  of  the  deadliest  and 
most  persistent  combats  of  the  war,  General  Scho 
field  intended  to  leave  the  question  of  command  and 
responsibility  on  the  line  to  the  interpretation  of 
the  officers  involved,  and  to  their  decision,  without 
direction,  in  the  excitement  of  the  battle  itself?  He 
did  no  such  thing.  He  gave  written  orders,  which 

1  O.  R.,  xxxviii.  part  iv.  pp.  5,  6.  2  Id.,  p.  23. 

3  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  974. 


Controverted  Points  279 

were  unhesitatingly  interpreted,  both  by  myself  and 
by  every  one  of  the  officers  ordered  to  report  to  me, 
as  clearly  fixing  their  subordination  and  my  authority, 
as  we  have  seen.  In  each  case  the  ofiicial  reports 
have  demonstrated  it,  and  the  whole  was  in  perfect 
accord  with  the  purpose  he  had  orally  expressed  at 
daybreak. 

Having  seen  the  organization  of  the  line  to  meet 

O  o 

the  contingencies  of  battle  or  of  withdrawal,  and  the 
transfer  of  headquarters  of  the  army  and  of  the 
Fourth  Corps  to  the  north  side  of  the  river,  it  will 
be  natural  to  inquire  whether  the  orders  given  and 
arrangements  made  were  changed  or  affected  by 
General  Stanley's  appearance  at  the  front  when  the 
battle  opened.  To  understand  the  matter  clearly 
we  need  to  learn  just  what  General  Stanley  did. 
There  has  never  been  any  pretence  that  General 
Schofield  issued  any  new  orders  changing  the  com 
mand  upon  the  line.  Both  in  his  letter  to  the  Cen 
tury,  and  elsewhere,  General  Stanley  has  contended 
only  that  the  orders  which  have  been  already  dis 
cussed  had  another  meaning  from  that  which  I  attrib 
uted  to  them.  He  was  not  ordered  to  come  to  the 
front  or  to  assume  any  command.  He  contends  that 
he  had  sufficient  authority  at  all  times  during  the 
day.  The  error  of  this  having  been  shown,  I  shall 
inquire  as  to  the  military  effect  of  his  volunteered 
appearance  on  the  line  after  settling  as  distinctly  as 
possible  what  the  facts  actually  were. 

In  his  so  called  official  report1  General  Stanley 
said:  "From  one  o'clock  until  four  in  the  evening 
the  enemy's  entire  force  was  in  sight,  and  forming 
for  attack;  yet  in  view  of  the  strong  position  we 

1  The  irregular  paper,  styled  an  official  report,  by  General  Stanley, 
Appendix  D,  will  be  examined  presently. 


280  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

held,  and  reasoning  from  the  former  course  of  the 
rebels  during  this  campaign,  nothing  appeared  so 
improbable  as  that  they  would  assault.  I  felt  so 
confident  in  this  belief  that  I  did  not  leave  Gen 
eral  Schofield's  headquarters  until  the  firing  com 
menced.  " 1 

Colonel  Wherry,  General  Schofield's  senior  aid 
and  chief  of  staff,  had  been  with  me  upon  the  line 
but  a  few  minutes  before,  bringing  final  directions 
from  the  general  in  view  of  the  expected  engagement, 
and  on  his  way  back  to  headquarters  at  the  Truett 
house  on  the  Nashville  road,  was  overtaken  by  one 
of  my  orderlies  bearing  the  message  that  the  enemy 
was  about  to  attack.  Hastening  on  across  the  bridge, 
within  half  a  mile,  he  met  Generals  Schofield  and 
Stanley  riding  toward  the  river.  Schofield  went  into 
Fort  Granger,  and  Stanley  came  to  the  front,  where 
he  and  myself  met  on  the  Columbia  Turnpike,  near 
the  Carter  house.2 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  115.     Appendix  D. 

2  Ante,  pp.  98,  100.     Colonel  Wherry's  letter  to  me,  dated  October 
7,   1895,  describing   this   incident,  is   worthy  of   fuller   quotation,  as 
giving  interesting  circumstances  attending  the  opening  of  the  battle, 
and  showing  the  exigencies  of  staff  service  at  such  a  time.   In  his  state 
ment  his  memory  was  assisted  by  original  memoranda  made  at  the  time. 
Speaking  of  General  Schofield's  movements  on  that  day,  he  proceeds :  — 

"  Our  first  stop  was  early  in  the  morning  at  the  Carter  house ; 
then  down  at  the  river  by  the  bridges.  From  there  the  General  and 
his  staff  went  to  Dr.  Cliffs  house  with  General  Stanley  about  10  or 
10  30  A.  M.  We  remained  there,  the  staff  going  and  coming  as  re 
quired  by  duty,  until  after  dinner.  About  2  P.M.  Generals  Schofield 
and  Stanley  removed  their  headquarters  to  the  north  bank  of  the  river ; 
to  a  house  some  distance  out  on  the  Nashville  road.  They  gave  per 
sonal  attention  to  some  details  in  respect  to  the  placing  of  Wood's 
division  as  a  reserve  to  cover  the  crossings  of  the  Harpeth. 

"About  3  p.  M.  I  was  sent  with  an  order  to  the  south  bank,  which 
having  delivered,  as  I  was  suffering  with  a  severe  toothache  from  a 
tooth  prepared  for  filling  but  not  filled,  I  repaired  to  Dr.  Cliffs  house 
again  to  get  the  doctor  to  draw  the  tooth.  lie  was  absent,  and  I 


Controverted  Points  281 

This  meeting  with  General  Stanley  on  the  Columbia 
Turnpike,  near  the  Carter  house  (our  first  and  only 
meeting  that  day),  has  already  been  described,1  and 
is  one  of  the  points  on  which  he  declared  that  we 
were  exactly  agreed.  In  my  investigation  in  1881 
I  found  that  General  Opdycke  took  exception  to  the 
statement  of  General  Stanley  that  his  men  were  lying 
down  when  the  latter  reached  them.  He  wrote  to 
me  (December  6th) :  "  Before  he  [Stanley]  came,  I 
had  received  your  request  to  have  my  brigade  ready. 
It  was  then  lying  down  by  the  stacks  of  muskets, 
having  just  got  something  to  eat.  The  whole  com 
mand  must  have  been  in  order  in  a  minute  after  your 
request  came.  I  did  not  see  Stanley  nor  know  any 
thing  of  his  whereabouts  till  after  the  line  was 

waited  for  his  return,  leaving  my  horse  in  charge  of  my  orderlies  at 
the  gate.  Very  shortly  after  3.30  a  messenger  from  you  to  Gen- 
ral  Schofield,  with  your  information  that  the  enemy  was  forming  up 
and  about  to  attack,  came  by  the  house  which  had  been  our  headquar 
ters  up  to  2  o'clock,  and,  recognizing  my  horse  and  orderlies,  delivered 
his  message  to  me.  I  mounted,  and,  taking  the  man  along,  rode  across 
the  bridge,  and  within  half  a  mile  —  a  few  hundred  yards  my  memo 
randum  has  it  —  I  met  Generals  Schofield  and  Stanley  riding  toward 
the  river.  They  had  received  from  some  other  source  the  information 
I  was  conveying.  I  turned  and  rode  with  them.  At  the  bridge  Gen 
eral  Stanley  crossed  and  went  to  his  troops  at  the  Carter  house,  and 
General  Schofield  rode  into  Fort  Granger,  which,  as  you  know,  was 
very  close  to  the  railroad  bridge  and  was  the  prolongation  of  our  left, 
only  separated  from  the  line  of  battle  on  that  flank  by  the  narrow 
stream.  It  overlooked  the  front  nearly  to  the  Columbia  pike  at  the 
Carter  house,  and  was  where  communication  with  the  reserves  and 
line  of  battle  could  best  be  had.  General  Scliofield's  headquarters  were 
there  until  after  the  battle,  when  we  went  to  the  same  house  out  on 
the  Nashville  pike  about  a  mile,  where  was  General  Stanley,  who  had 
been  wounded,  and  his  staff.  There  we  remained  until  after  mid 
night,  when  the  head  of  column  came  along  from  the  river  and  we 
rode  to  Brentwood  hills." 

Colonel  Wherry  was  Brevet  Brigadier  General  at  the  close  of  the 
war,  and  is  now  (1896)  Lieut.  Colonel  Second  Infantry,  U.  S.  A.,  and 
Brevet  Colonel. 

1  Ante,  pp.  98,  100. 


282  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

restored,  when  he  rode  up  to  me  and  showed  me 
that  he  was  wounded.  lie  immediately  rode  away. " 

The  omission  to  notice  General  Stanley  at  the 
instant  of  his  arrival  is  not  remarkable  in  the  in 
tense  preoccupation  in  his  own  work  at  such  a 
moment.  The  order  of  events  is  important  as  show 
ing  that  under  my  direction  he  had  already  begun 
preparation  for  the  movement  forward. 

The  same  letter  bears  directly  upon  the  question 
next  in  order,  How  long  did  General  Stanley  remain 
upon  the  line  ?  Immediately  after  the  quotation  last 
made,  it  says :  "  I  have  always  insisted  that  his  report 
did  you  a  grave  injustice.  It  simply  represents  you 
as  gallantly  assisting  liim,  when  the  fact  was  that 
you  were  commanding  the  whole  line  of  battle,  and 
he  aided  you,  I  suppose  about  live  minutes,  and  then 
left,  wounded."  In  his  published  account  of  the 
battle,  Opdycke  stated  with  equal  distinctness  that, 
"soon  after  coming  under  fire,  Stanley's  horse  was 
shot  under  him,  and  he  himself  wounded  and  so 
compelled  to  leave  the  field."1 

There  is  no  room  for  dispute  as  to  the  time  and 
circumstances  of  General  Stanley's  receiving  his 
wound.  In  the  "report"  he  himself  says  it  was 
"  just  after  the  retaking  of  the  line  by  our  troops. "  2 
In  the  eighth  of  the  nine  points  to  which  he  agreed 
it  was  said  to  be  "when  Opdycke  reached  the  para 
pet,"  and  we  "were  trying  to  rally  the  fugitives 
immediately  in  rear  of  the  line."3  All  who  were 
personally  witnesses  of  what  occurred  corroborate 
Opdyckc's  statement  as  to  the  wounding  in  that  first 
melee,  and  Stanley's  immediate  retirement  for  surgi 
cal  treatment,  as  I  urged  upon  him. 

1  New  York  Times,  September  10,  1882. 

2  Appendix  D.  3  Ante,  p.  262. 


Controverted  Points  283 

Major  Dow,  my  Inspector  General,  was  himself  in 
the  group  at  the  turnpike,  rallying  the  men  as  the 
reserves  went  forward.  He  says  :  u  Generals  Stanley 
and  Cox  were  on  the  pike  with  them  "  (Opdy eke' s 
troops).  "  General  Stanley  was  wounded  in  the  first 
melee,  and  his  horse  shot  also.  I  saw  his  wound  in 
the  neck,  and  saw  him  remounted  on  one  of  General 
Cox's  horses.  .  .  .  Stanley  exercised  no  command 
while  there,  but  rallied  the  men."1 

Captain  Cox,  Adjutant  General,  says:  "General 
Stanley  rode  up  to  the  front  at  this  point;  but  he 
had  scarcely  done  so  (and  before  he  had  time  to  view 
the  field,  or  give  or  suggest  an  order)  when  he  was 
wounded  and  his  horse  shot.  Captain  Tracy  then 
dismounted  from  your  dun  horse,  which  he  had  been 
riding,  and  gave  it  to  General  Stanley,  who  imme 
diately  mounted,  and  rode  off  through  the  village. 
This  was  the  only  time  I  saw  General  Stanley  that 
day,  until  I  went  over  the  river  in  the  evening  to  see 
General  Schoiield  at  his  headquarters."2 

Captain  L.  T.  Scofield,  Topographical  Engineer, 
also  speaking  as  an  eyewitness,  says  in  his  paper 
on  the  campaign  already  quoted :  "  General  Stanley 
was  also  there,  showing  great  gallantry  in  encourag 
ing  the  troops,  but  was  wounded  before  he  had  been 
on  the  field  ten  minutes,  and  retired."3 

General  Reilly,  under  date  of  February  21,  1876, 
wrote  me:  "I  did  not  receive  orders  that  day,  as  you 
are  aware,  from  any  other  than  yourself,  and  sup 
posed,  as  I  do  yet,  that  you  were  in  chief  command 
on  south  side  of  river.  General  Stanley,  although 
wounded  in  rear  of  line  of  Third  Division  (Twenty- 
third  Army  Corps),  did  not  give  or  assume  any 
command." 

1  Appendix  E.  2  Appendix  F 

3  Ohio  Loyal  Legion  papers,  vol.  ii.  p.  137. 


284  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

The  earliest  formal  history  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  was  that  by  Van  Home,  who,  though 
not  present  at  this  battle,  had  long  been  connected 
with  General  Thomas's  staff,  and  had  full  access  to 
all  his  papers  at  the  time  he  wrote.  He  may  there 
fore  be  considered  as  giving  the  general  understand 
ing  at  Thomas's  headquarters  when  he  said  that 
Stanley  "  was  pierced  in  the  neck  by  a  bullet  and 
was  compelled  to  leave  the  field."1 

There  are  also  statements  of  officers  whose  posi 
tions  at  and  near  the  centre  gave  them  the  oppor 
tunity  of  knowing  what  general  officers  were  or  were 
not  there  after  the  first  restoration  of  the  line ;  and 
though  negative  in  form,  they  are  hardly  less  con 
clusive  in  fact  than  the  testimony  of  those  who  saw 
General  Stanley  go  to  the  rear  at  that  early  stage  of 
the  battle. 

General  Casement,  whose  brigade  was  next  east 
of  the  cotton-gin,  in  a  letter  to  me  of  October  21, 
1889,  (from  which  I  have  already  quoted,2)  after  tell 
ing  of  his  being  "along  the  line  several  times  to  the 
Carter  house  "  during  the  battle,  says  of  General 
Stanley  that  he  did  not  see  him,  and  that  "  he  was 
never  on  my  portion  of  the  line,  either  while  in 
course  of  construction,  after  it  was  finished,  or  dur 
ing  the  progress  of  the  battle."  He  mentions  also 
coming  to  me,  near  the  Carter  house,  just  about 
dark,  and  adds :  "  I  know  that  there  was  no  officer 
of  superior  rank  to  yourself  on  the  field  ...  I 
never  heard  of  such  an  officer  till  lono;  after  the  war 
was  over."  I  had  put  to  him  the  direct  question, 

1  Van  Home,  "Army  of  the  Cumberland"  (1875),  vol.  ii.  p.  201. 
This  hook  had  been  published  seven  years  when  my  volume,  "  Frank 
lin  and  Nashville,"  appeared. 

2  Ante,  p.  146,  note. 


Controverted  Points  285 

"From  all  you  saw  of  my  position  and  action  at  the 
time,  and  the  conduct  of  others  in  recognizing  my 
orders,  what  did  you  as  an  officer  understand  my 
relations  to  the  line  to  be?"  His  answer  was,  "I 
understood  you  to  be  in  command  of  the  line,  and 
so  understand  now  ;  and  it  is  too  late  to  change  the 
facts." 

The  73d  Illinois  was  one  of  the  regiments  of 
Opdycke's  brigade  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  and  its 
officers  were  therefore  General  Stanley's  subordi 
nates.  The  regiment  published  its  own  history,  and 
Captain  E.  J.  Ingersoll  was  one  of  the  contributors 
to  it.  He  says  of  his  own  movements  immediately 
after  the  restoration  of  the  line:  "I  passed  from  the 
Carter  house  to  the  cotton-gin,  then  returned  to  first 
piece  of  artillery  in  rear  of  Carter  house.  .  .  .  Met 
General  Cox  on  the  pike  in  front  of  the  Carter  house 
about  5  P.M.,  and  again  about  10  P.M.  — the  only 
general  officer  I  saw  on  the  ground. "  l 

Captain  Sexton,  in  command  of  the  72d  Illinois, 
in  Strickland's  brigade,  in  his  communication  from 
which  I  have  already  quoted,2  says:  "The  only  supe 
rior  officer  I  saw  after  the  battle  opened  was  General 
Cox." 

When  it  is  remembered  that  the  gist  of  General 
Stanley's  contention  is  that  he  remained  throughout 
the  battle  on  the  line,  and  at  the  centre,  which  was 
the  critical  point,  the  appositeness  of  these  quota 
tions  is  plain. 

Our  next  step  is  to  find  where  General  Stanley 
received  the  surgical  attention  which  he  went  to  seek 
when  he  left  me  on  the  line  at  the  Carter  house.3 
I  have  already  quoted  from  a  letter  of  Surgeon  Hill 4 

1  History  of  the  73d  Illinois  Regiment,  p.  642. 

2  Ante,  p.  254.  3  Ante,  p.  101.  *  Ante,  p.  95. 


286  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

(of  Kimball's  division),  who  stood  near  General 
Schoficld  on  the  parapet  of  Fort  Granger,  and  saw 
the  opening  of  the  fight.  He  then  wont  to  his  field 
hospital,  which  he  says  was  "some  distance  to  the 
right  of  the  fort  (looking  toward  the  south),  a  little 
to  its  rear,  and  north  of  the  river  —  also  a  little  west 
of  the  Nashville  pike."  This  description  accurately 
locates  the  field  hospital  a  short  distance  northwest 
of  the  place  where  the  temporary  road  from  the 
wagon  bridge  over  the  Harpeth  joins  the  Nashville 
Turnpike  on  the  north  side  of  the  river.1 

To  this  hospital  General  Stanley  went,  still  in 
wrathful  excitement  from  traversing  the  crowds  of 
disorganized  men  and  stragglers  in  the  village, 
aggravated  by  the  painful  smarting  of  his  wound. 
He  at  first  mistook  the  group  at  the  hospital  for  a 
crowd  of  skulkers,  and  it  took,  Dr.  Hill  says,  a  little 
time  to  get  him  to  dismount.  "An  examination 
revealed  a  flesh  wound  running  transversely  across 
the  nape  of  the  neck,  probably  three  inches  long 
and  equal  in  depth  to  half  the  diameter  of  the  ball. 
The  wound  stung  furiously.  .  .  .  After  quieting 
down,  the  wound  was  dressed,  an  opiate  adminis 
tered,  and  he  was  put  in  an  ambulance,  which  moved 
off  up  the  Nashville  road.  ...  He  must  have  met 
me,"  the  surgeon  concludes,  "within  half  an  hour  of 
the  receipt  of  his  injury,  and  was  not  to  exceed  a 
half  hour  in  my  hands. " 

As  soon  as  the  repulse  of  the  enemy's  first  assaults 
gave  assurance  that  we  should  be  able  to  hold  our 
lines  against  him,  and  probably  immediately  upon 
the  receipt  of  the  order  to  withdraw  at  midnight,2 

1  Surgeon  Hill  was  also  kind  enough  to  locate  the  place  upon  a 
sketch  traced  from  one  of  the  published  maps. 
a  Ante,  p.  169. 


Controverted  Points  287 

I  sent  my  Adjutant  General  to  General  Schoficld's 
headquarters  to  express  my  strong  confidence  that 
we  could  await  the  expected  reinforcements  where 
we  were.  This  was  very  soon  after  dark.  lie  says 
of  it:  "At  General  Schoficld's  headquarters,  besides 
his  usual  staff,  I  saw  General  Stanley  and  several 
officers."1  A  little  later,  on  a  call  to  consult  Gen 
eral  Schofield's  Inspector  General  in  reference  to 
the  placing  of  pickets  and  skirmish  line  when  we 
should  retire,  1  sent  Major  Dow  to  the  same  head 
quarters.  He,  too,  found  Generals  Schofield  and 
Stanley  together  at  the  Tructt  house.2 

General  James  II.  Wilson,  the  cavalry  commander, 
in  a  paper  upon  the  campaign  published  in  the 
Century  War  Book,3  also  mentions  meeting  Stanley 
at  General  Schofield's  headquarters.  He  says  that 
"immediately  after  the  close  of  the  cavalry  battle 
.  .  .  I  rode  to  General  Schoficld's  headquarters. 
.  .  .  Schofield  and  Stanley,  the  latter  severely 
wounded,  were  together,  discussing  the  events  of  the 
day."4  The  dispatches  which  passed  help  to  fix 
the  time  pretty  accurately.  At  five  o'clock  (just  as 
the  sun  was  setting)  General  Wilson  had  been  able 
to  announce  the  Confederate  cavalry  defeated  and 
driven  back  across  the  Harpcth.  It  was  a  half 
hour's  ride  from  his  headquarters  to  General  Scho 
ficld's,  and  the  latter  acknowledged  the  receipt  of 
the  welcome  dispatch  at  half  past  five.5  Waiting 

1  Appendix  F.  2  Ante,  p.  170,  and  Appendix  E. 

3  Battles  and  Leaders,  vol.  iv.  p.  466. 

4  In  the  paper  referred  to,  General  Wilson  speaks  of  the  headquar 
ters  as  being  in  Fort  Granger.    It  is  agreed  on  all  hands  that  they 
were  moved  from  the  fort  to  the  Truett  house  when  it  became  too  dark 
to  see  the  lines  from  that  point.     The  slip  of  memory  as  to  the  place 
is  corrected  by  Colonel  Fullerton's  diary. 

5  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1179. 


288  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

only  to  make  sure  that  his  front  was  really  quiet, 
General  Wilson  tells  us  he  "immediately"  rode  in 
person  to  see  Schofield,  as  he  had  been  asked  to  do 
in  an  earlier  message.1  In  the  first  darkness  of  the 
evening  (for  it  was  dark  within  half  an  hour  after 
sunset),2  General  Wilson  found  Generals  Schofield 
and  Stanley  together,  the  wound  of  the  latter  having 
been  already  dressed,  and  he  sufficiently  comfortable 
to  join  in  the  discussion  of  the  events  of  the  da}7. 
After  this  visit  General  Wilson  returned  to  his 
headquarters  at  the  cross-roads  two  miles  and  a  half 
east  of  Franklin,  where  he  was  again  established  in 
time  to  write  instructions  to  General  Hammond,  his 
subordinate,  dated  at  8.45  P.M.3  The  mention  by 
Colonel  Wherry  of  General  Stanley's  presence  at 
headquarters  when  General  Schofield  reached  the 
Truett  house,  has  already  been  noted.4 

After  General  Stanley's  arrival  at  the  Truett 
house,  before  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening,  Colonel 
Fullerton,  his  chief  of  staff,  was  prepared  to  resume 
the  annotation  of  events  in  his  diary,  and  had  entered 
an  outline  of  what  had  occurred  between  four  and 
seven  o'clock.5  A  series  of  entries  runs  through  the 
evening.  At  seven  it  is  noted  that  "  the  enemy  has 
been  steadily  fighting  up  to  this  hour  since  4  P.M." 
At  half  past  seven  the  visit  of  General  Wilson  is 
mentioned.  At  eight  the  preparations  for  with 
drawing  from  the  lines  are  spoken  of,  but  it  is  said 
to  be  "very  doubtful  whether  these  troops  can  be 
withdrawn,  as  they  are  very  close  to  the  enemy, 

1  O.  R,,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1178.  3  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  1184. 

2  Ante,  p.  147,  note.  4  Ante,  p.  281,  note. 

5  The  hours  at  which  entries  are  made  in  such  diaries  must  be 
taken  with  due  allowance.  The  outline  referred  to  is  dated  4  p.  M.,  but 
its  contents  show  that  it  must  have  been  written  after  Colonel  Fuller- 
ton's  return  with  General  Stanley  to  the  headquarters. 


Controverted  Points  289 

with  whom  they  are  keeping  up  a  continual  skirmish 
fire,"  and  the  Confederates  still  making  frequent 
though  feeble  assaults.  At  nine  the  reports  are  that 
"the  enemy  is  relieving  his  troops,  which  have  been 
engaged,  and  is  substituting  others  for  them."  At 
ten  the  fire  in  the  town  is  noted,  supposed  to  be 
started  "by  the  enemy  in  order  to  show  them  any 
attempt  we  might  make  to  retreat,"  and  which  "with 
difficulty  was  put  out  by  midnight."  The  retirement 
of  the  troops  then  began.1 

It  is  not  often  that  the  movements  of  a  single 
officer  can  be  so  consecutively  accounted  for  as  in 
this  instance :  the  circumstances  also  become  vividly 
clear.  Through  the  long  evening  it  is  very  plain 
that  everybody  at  General  Schofield's  headquarters 
appreciated  the  fighting  going  on  upon  the  line,  and 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  parti,  pp.  150,  151.  If  further  evidence  of  the  pro 
longed  night  engagement  were  needed,  one  cannot  go  amiss  in  refer 
ring  to  any  of  the  official  reports  on  either  side. 

General  Hood,  in  his  official  report,  said  that  "  the  struggle  lasted 
till  near  midnight."  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  653.  In  another  place  that 
"  the  struggle  continued  with  more  or  less  violence  till  nine  o'clock  in 
the  evening,  and  then  much  desultory  fighting  through  most  of  the 
night."  Advance  and  Retreat,  p.  295. 

General  Schofield  reports  that  "  the  enemy  assaulted  persistently 
and  continuously  with  his  whole  force  from  about  3.30  p.  M.  until  after 
dark,  and  made  numerous  intermittent  attacks  at  a  few  points  until 
about  10  P.  M."  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  342,  and  Appendix  A  of  this 
volume. 

My  own  report  states  that  the  assaults  on  Ruger's  division  and 
Opdycke's  brigade  "  were  obstinately  repeated  till  nightfall,  and  even 
as  late  as  nine  o'clock  attacks  were  made,  which  were,  however,  easily 
repulsed,  and  the  enemy  withdrew  the  remnants  of  his  shattered  lines 
to  the  position  occupied  at  the  opening  of  the  battle  by  Wagner's  divis 
ion,  in  advance  of  our  lines  about  eight  hundred  yards.  Alarms  oc 
curred  frequently  until  eleven  o'clock,  and  frequently  caused  a  general 
musketry  fire  on  both  sides  from  our  centre  toward  the  right,  but  I 
found  no  evidence  that  any  real  attack  was  made  at  so  late  an  hour." 
O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  354,  and  Appendix  B  of  this  volume;  also  chap, 
xii.,  ante. 

19 


290  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

the  danger  that  at  any  moment  Hood's  efforts  would 
resume  the  desperate  character  of  the  earlier  assaults. 
The  delicacy  of  the  operation  of  withdrawing  was 
also  evidently  discussed  and  commented  upon.  If 
the  Fourth  Corps  troops  in  the  line  were  not  with 
the  men  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  under  a  common 
head,  empowered  to  meet  such  emergencies  as  might 
momently  arise,  it  is  too  plain  for  argument  that  a 
commander  for  the  Fourth  Corps  ought  to  have  been 
by  my  side  near  the  Carter  house,  mutually  to  assist 
in  instant  decision  and  in  action.  The  Fourth  Corps 
staff  diary,  like  every  other  contemporaneous  report, 
emphatically  contradicts  the  assumption  that  the 
battle  was  over  when  General  Stanley  left  the  front, 
and  the  distance  between  the  Carter  house  and  the 
Truett  house  was  altogether  too  great  for  communi 
cation  by  messenger  before  acting  in  emergencies 
that  might  arise. 

The  simple  sequence  of  facts  destroys  all  such 
fictitious  theories  of  the  situation.  General  Stanley 
left  the  lines,  wounded  in  the  first  mel^e.  My  task 
of  inspection  immediately  followed.1  Orders  were 
sent  to  Kimball's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps 
for  the  reinforcement  at  the  centre,  and  Colonel 
McDanald  marched  his  regiment  to  its  assigned  posi 
tion  in  Ruger's  line  before  the  setting  sun  marked 
that  five  o'clock  was  reached,  and  two  hours  before 
the  hour  at  which  Colonel  Fullerton  entered  in  his 
diary,  "The  enemy  has  been  steadily  fighting  since 
four  o'clock." 

The  Twenty-third  Corps  headquarters  on  the 
Columbia  Turnpike,  near  the  Carter  house,  was  the 
only  place  with  which  communication  was  kept  up 
with  reference  to  the  conduct  of  the  battle  at  the 

1  Ante,  p.  144. 


Controverted  Points  291 

works ;  and  the  messages  sent  and  received  through 
both  General  Schofield's  staff  officers  and  my  own 
fully  implied  my  complete  reponsibility  for  affairs 
there.  On  this  point  the  statement  of  Colonel 
Opdyeke,  which  I  have  quoted,1  is  supported  by  that 
of  Captain  Scoficld,  who  says :  "  I  knew  early  in 
the  day  that  you  had  been  placed  in  command  of  the 
troops  in  the  fortifications  south  of  the  Harpeth 
River.  I  did  not  see  the  written  order  assigning 

o          o 

you  to  command,  but  during  the  day  and  night  I  was 
present  when  officers  from  General  Schofield's  head 
quarters  brought  such  instructions  and  received  such 
information  as  would  only  come  to  and  from  one  in 
active  command."2 

Among  the  staff  officers  who  were  indefatigable 
in  duty  that  day  and  night,  none  was  more  active 
than  Colonel  Wherry,  General  Schofield's  chief  of 
staff,  and  none  knew  better  the  relations  of  officers 
on  that  field.  It  has  more  than  ordinary  conclusive- 
ness,  then,  when  he,  before  the  publication  of  my 
volume  on  that  campaign,  wrote :  "  Not  only  has  it 
been  attempted  to  withhold  from  General  Schofield 
the  measure  of  honor  due  him  as  commander  of  the 
combined  forces  in  the  field,  including  Franklin,  but 
your  part  as  commanding  the  line  at  Franklin  has 
been  usurped  by  others. "  3 

General  Stanley  himself  becomes  a  witness  to  the 
truth  of  the  situation  thus  described,  when,  remem 
bering  that  Wagner  was  reorganizing  two  of  his 

1  Ante,  p.  282. 

2  Letter   of   November   3,  1889.     See  also  statement  of   Surgeou 
Frink,  ante,  p.  40,  note. 

3  Letter  of  June    21,   1881.     T   do   not   understand   that    General 
Wherry  intended  to   express  a  judgment  as   to  any  theoretic    right 
to  command  during  the  time   General  Stanley  was  actually  present 
on  the  line. 


292  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

brigades  in  the  town,  we  find  him  in  the  last  of  the 
"  nine  points  "  assenting  unequivocally  to  the  fact 
that  "Opdycke  and  the  artillery  continued  to  act 
under  my  orders  till  we  left  the  lines  at  midnight."  1 
What  Kimball,  his  other  division  commander,  did, 
is  told  by  the  official  report  of  that  division.2 

The  inquiry  propounded  at  the  beginning  of  this 
chapter  as  to  the  military  effect  of  Stanley's  brief 
appearance  at  the  front  may  be  answered  by  saying 
that  the  orders  under  which  troops  are  detached 
continue  in  force  until  they  are  revoked  by  the 
authority  which  issued  them,  or  the  duty  is  com 
pletely  performed.  "On  the  return  of  a  detachment 
the  commander  reports  to  the  headquarters  from 
which  he  received  his  orders,"  and  no  officer  can 
put  himself  on  duty  without  orders  from  competent 
authority.3 

Portions  of  the  Fourth  Corps  having  been  tem 
porarily  detached,  and  ordered  to  report  to  another 
officer,  General  Stanley  could  not,  at  his  own  will, 
resume  command  of  them.  However  gallant  the 
motive,  he  appeared  at  the  lines  simply  as  a  volun 
teer.  He  did  not  in  fact  issue  any  orders,  and  as  he 
soon  retired,  wounded,  no  question  arose  as  to  his 
status  or  his  authority. 

How  then  can  we  account  for  his  intemperate 
assaults  upon  the  veracity  of  statements  which  are 
carefully  within  the  limits  of  the  truth  so  abundantly 
sustained  as  we  have  seen?  We  must  look  for  the 
answer  in  the  examination  of  the  document  which 
he  calls  his  "  official  report. " 

1  Ante,  p.  262. 

2  Ante,  p.  263. 

3  Army  Regulations  of  1861,  §§  8,  655. 


Controverted  Points  293 

After  the  battle  of  Nashville  (December  15,  1C, 
1864),  General  Thomas  called  upon  his  subordinates 
for  official  reports  of  the  preceding  campaign.  These 
were  naturally  divided  into  two  parts:  first,  the 
campaign  in  the  field,  including  the  battle  of  Frank 
lin,  when  General  Schofield  was  in  command  of  the 
active  army,  consisting  of  the  Fourth  and  Twenty- 
third  Corps  and  the  Cavalry  Corps;  and  second,  the 
subsequent  period,  including  the  battle  of  Nashville, 
when  General  Thomas  was  personally  in  command. 
For  the  former  period  the  reports  should  all  pass 
through  General  Schoiield's  hands,  his  own  report 
being  a  general  one  for  the  whole  army  in  the  field. 
For  the  latter  period  the  corps  commanders  would 
collect  their  subordinates'  reports  and  forward  them 
with  their  own  to  General  Thomas  direct. 

In  the  regular  report  of  the  Fourth  Corps  for  the 
latter  period,  General  Wood,  the  senior  division 
commander,1  says:  "Maj.  Gen.  D.  S.  Stanley,  hav 
ing  been  wounded  in  the  conflict  at  Franklin,  on  the 
30th  of  November,  and  having  received  a  leave  of 
absence  on  account  of  his  wound,  relinquished,  and 
I  assumed  command  of  the  corps  on  the  2d  of 
December. " 2  Being  thus  in  command,  General 
Wood,  on  the  10th  of  January,  1865,  made  the  reg 
ular  official  report  of  the  Fourth  Corps  for  the  first 
period  of  the  campaign.  He  says  that  he  did  it  "in 
pursuance  with  orders  received  from  the  headquarters 
Department  of  the  Cumberland,"  and  that  "the 
duty  devolved  upon "  him,  in  consequence  of  the 
relinquishment  of  command  by  General  Stanley.3 
The  report  was  a  full  and  detailed  one,  and  no  one 

1  General  Thomas  J.  Wood,  now  Brevet  Major  General,  U.  S.  A., 
retired. 

2  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  126.          3  Id.,  pp.  119,  126.     Appendix  C. 


294  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

will  question  General  Wood's  title  to  equal  ability 
and  experience  with  General  Stanley.  With  this 
regular  official  report  of  the  Fourth  Corps  went  up 
the  subordinate  reports.  On  the  same  date  I  made 
the  report  for  the  Twenty-third  Corps.1  General 
Schofieid's  report  for  the  active  army  in  the  field 
was  made  on  December  31st.2  Upon  the  receipt  of 
these  reports,  General  Thomas  prepared  his  own, 
which  is  dated  January  20th,  and  the  whole,  with 
the  accompanying  papers,  went  to  Washington.3 

General  Stanley's  absence  from  the  army  continued 
through  the  crisis  of  the  campaign,  the  battle  of 
Nashville,  the  pursuit  of  Hood,  and  until  the  latter 
part  of  February,  when  he  resumed  command  of 
the  Fourth  Corps  at  Huntsville,  Ala.  In  January, 
General  Schofield  and  the  Twenty-third  Corps  were 
transferred  to  the  Atlantic  coast,  and  our  connection 
with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  finally  severed. 
After  all  this,  on  the  25th  of  February,  1865,  Gen 
eral  Stanley  writes  what  he  styles  a  "  Report  of  the 
services  of  the  Fourth  Army  Corps  from  the  time  of 
separating  from  General  Sherman's  Army  at  Gayles- 
ville,  Ala,,  to  and  including  the  Battle  of  Franklin, 
Term. " 4 

This  paper  wholly  ignores  the  regular  official 
report  of  the  corps  made  in  ordinary  course  of  duty 
by  General  Wood,  and  traverses  the  identical  ground, 
as  if  no  such  report  had  been  made.  General  Wood's 
report  is  in  the  usual  impersonal  style  of  military 
reports,  stating  what  was  done  by  the  corps  and  its 
parts.  General  Stanley's  is  throughout  much  more 

1  O.  "R.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  349.     Appendix  B. 

2  Id.,  pp.  339-347.     Appendix  A. 

3  Id.,  pp.  ,32-46. 

4  Id.,  xxxix.  part  i.  p.  907,  and  xlv.  part  i.  p.  112.     Appendix  D. 


Controverted  Points  295 

in  the  form  of  a  personal  narrative,  emphasizing  his 
personal  part  and  his  opinions.  The  matter,  how 
ever,  is  in  substance  the  same  until  the  affair  at 
Spring  Hill  (November  29)  and  the  battle  of  Franklin 
(November  30)  are  reached.  Here  the  raison  d'etre  of 
the  new  paper  becomes  plain.  The  personal  relations 
of  the  author  of  it  to  the  battle  is  the  theme.  It  is 
not,  however,  with  the  style  or  taste  of  the  docu 
ment  that  we  have  now  to  do,  but  with  its  official 
character  and  its  value  as  a  narrative. 

It  was  wholly  irregular.  The  official  report  of  the 
corps  had  been  regularly  made  in  accordance  with 
the  rules  of  the  service.  If  anything  in  General 
Wood's  report  had  been  unjust  or  erroneous,  or  if 
anything  really  important  was  omitted,  it  was  Gen 
eral  Stanley's  privilege,  on  its  coming  to  his  knowl 
edge  (as  it  would  have  been  of  any  other  officer  in 
the  service),  to  address  a  letter  to  the  Adjutant 
General  pointing  out  the  errors.  This  would  lead 
to  official  inquiry  in  an  established  method.  The 
character  of  the  new  matter  in  the  so  called  report 
could  in  no  way  be  so  well  shown  as  by  culling  out 
all  that  is  additional  to  General  Wood's  report,  and 
embodying  it  in  the  form  of  such  a  letter  to  head 
quarters.  It  consists,  in  the  main,  of  the  personal 
experience  of  General  Stanley  on  the  field.  The 
description  of  the  battle  would  give  the  reader  no 
suspicion  of  the  actual  relations  of  the  troops  of  the 
two  corps.  One  would  not  guess  that  Opdycke's 
brigade  and  the  batteries  were  the  only  organized 
bodies  of  the  Fourth  Corps  in  the  lines  near  the 
centre ;  that  Ruger's  whole  division  of  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps  was  in  line  between  Opdycke's  brigade 
and  Kimball's  division;  and  that  Reilly's  division 
of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  extended  on  the  left  from 


296  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

Opdycke's  brigade  to  the  river.  We  get  no  assist 
ance  in  learning  why  General  Wagner  and  his  two 
brigade  commanders  were  not  on  the  line,  or  where 
and  how  the  two  brigades  were  reorganized.  The 
things  which  would  enable  the  commander  of  the 
army  to  get  definite  knowledge  of  the  battle  through 
the  relations  of  the  several  bodies  of  troops  to  each 
other  and  to  the  whole  are  conspicuously  absent. 

General  Stanley's  appearance  on  the  field  and 
what  the  soldiers  said  are  dramatically  told,  but  no 
mention  is  made  of  his  visit  to  Surgeon  Hill's  field- 
hospital  north  of  the  river,  or  his  spending  the  rest 
of  the  evening  at  the  Truett  house.  On  the  other 
hand,  after  saying  that  his  wound  "  did  not  prevent 
his  keeping  the  field,"  the  continuous  narrative  pre 
sents  him  in  undiminished  closeness  of  contact  with 
the  fighting  lines  in  each  successive  incident  until 
"  at  midnight  the  withdrawal  was  made  successfully." 
That  we  may  have  no  doubt  of  his  meaning,  he 
quoted  the  passage,  in  his  newspaper  letter,  as  proof 
of  the  falsity  of  the  assertion  that  he  "was  reluc 
tantly  persuaded  to  return  to  his  quarters  for  surgical 
help."1 

But  two  or  three  sentences  in  the  document  are 
worthy  of  more  careful  examination.  He  says  :  "'Just 
after  the  retaking  of  the  line  by  our  troops,  as  I  was 
passing  toward  the  left  to  General  Cox's  position, 
my  horse  was  killed,  and  no  sooner  had  I  regained 
my  feet  than  I  received  a  musket  ball  through  the 
back  of  my  neck.  My  wound,  however,  did  not  pre 
vent  my  keeping  the  field,  and  General  Cox  kindly 
furnished  me  a  remount."2  A  couple  of  pages  far 
ther  on,  at  the  end  of  the  lively  narration,  he  adds: 
"Although  Brig.  Gen.  J.  D.  Cox  was  not  in  my 

1  March  to  the  Sea,  p.  90.  -  ().  M.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  116. 


Controverted  Points  297 

command,  he  was  my  close  neighbor  in  the  battle  of 
Franklin,  and  1  take  this  opportunity  to  express  to 
him  my  thanks  for  his  gallant  help  at  that  time."  l 

I  have  already  referred  to  the  first  of  these  quota 
tions  as  fixing  the  time  at  which  he  was  hurt,  in  sub 
stantial  accord  with  my  own  recollection  submitted 
to  him  in  1881, 2  and  said  by  him  to  be  exactly  cor 
rect.  The  next  statement,  however,  demands  notice. 
What  can  be  meant  by  "  passing  to  the  left  to  General 
Cox's  position"?  We  were  in  the  highway  of  the 
Columbia  Turnpike,  in  front  of  the  Carter  house, 
where  my  headquarters  had  been  since  daybreak, 
where  they  remained  till  midnight,  and  where  they 
are  marked  on  Captain  Twining's  official  map. 
That  we  went  forward  together,  were  together  rally 
ing  the  troops,  when  he  was  hit,  that  he  asked  me 
to  examine  his  wound,  and  that  I  urged  him  to  go 
for  surgical  attention,  General  Stanley  perfectly  re 
membered  in  1881. 3  As  to  position,  we  were  not 
only  at  my  headquarters,  but  were  at  the  centre  of 
the  Twenty-third  Corps  line;  he  could  not  possibly 
be  more  exactly  at  my  military  position  or  my  bodily 
station.  Yet  the  reader  of  this  "  report "  would  cer 
tainly  understand  that  here  was  something  like  a 
passing  from  one  corps  position  to  another,  off  at 
the  left! 

As  to  his  "keeping  the  field,"  I  need  not  repeat 
the  statements  of  the  eyewitnesses  (including  my 
self),  who  saw  him  ride  away  toward  the  village, 
and  who  know  that  he  did  not  return,4  or  of  those 
by  whom  his  whereabouts,  from  half  an  hour  after 
he  was  hurt  till  midnight,  are  consecutively  given. 
The  facts  were  known  to  such  a  cloud  of  witnesses, 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  I.  p.  118.         3  See  map,  ante,  p.  45;  also  p.  262. 

2  Ante,  p.  262.  4  Ante,  p.  282,  et  seq. 


298  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

including  nearly  every  general  and  staff  officer  in 
the  army,  that  one  wonders  at  the  rashness  which 
could  raise  any  question  about  it,  until  the  so  called 
report  is  read,  when  the  assumption  of  heat  in  sus 
taining  its  assertions  becomes  intelligible.  With 
the  final  artistic  touch,  thanking  me  for  the  aid  I 
had  incidentally  given  him  in  his  arduous  and  con 
tinuous  labors,  the  sketch  is  complete.  Anything 
inconsistent  with  it  must  be  stormed  down  as  falsi 
fication.  As  he  had  probably  forgotten  the  sweeping 
assertions  of  this  report  when,  in  1881,  appealing 
to  his  actual  recollection,1  he  pronounced  the  "nine 
points  "  exactly  correct,  so  in  1889  we  may  assume 
that  the  emphatic  indorsement  of  the  "nine  points" 
was  forgotten,  and  the  thick-and-thin  reiteration  of 
the  "  report "  was  in  order. 

Except  for  such  forgetfulness,  the  remembrance 
that  he  had  distinctly  agreed,  as  the  basis  for  a  his 
torical  publication,  upon  the  fact  that  Opdycke's 
brigade  and  the  batteries  "continued  to  act  under 
my  orders  till  we  left  the  lines  at  midnight," 2  would 
have  suggested  the  inquiry  what  need  there  was  of 
his  remaining  at  the  lines  or  returning  to  them  after 
the  first  repulse  of  the  enemy  at  the  centre.  Those 
organizations  were  the  only  Fourth  Corps  troops  in 
line  there.  The  disorganized  groups  or  individuals 
scattered  among  the  rest  were  not  in  need  of  his 
presence.  Wagner's  two  other  brigades  were  reor 
ganizing  near  the  river,  as  we  have  seen.3  Kimball's 
division  was  three  quarters  of  a  mile  away  on  the 
extreme  right,  had  easily  repulsed  the  rebel  cavalry, 
and  was  not  again  attacked.  It  is  not  alleged  that 
General  Stanley  went  there.  What  then  was  he 
in  active  command  of,  at  the  front,  after  he  was 

1  Ante,  p.  260,  et  seq.  2  Ante,  p.  262.  3  Ante,  p.  146. 


Controverted  Points  299 

wounded,  that  he  so  hotly  treats  as  calumny  the 
statement  that  he  did  the  sensible  thing  of  going  to 
have  his  hurt  attended  to  ?  He  himself  being  the 
witness,  the  answer  must  be,  of  nobody  and  of  noth 
ing.  Opdycke  and  the  batteries  being  under  my 
orders,  the  line  of  my  command  is  continuous  and 
complete  from  the  Harpeth  on  the  left  to  Carter's 
Creek  Turnpike  on  the  right.  Kimball  neither 
needed  nor  had  any  orders  as  to  the  right  flank 
beyond  Ruger,  except  to  send  the  reinforcement  to 
the  centre,  and  that  order  went  from  me,  as  he 
officially  reported.1  We  search  the  Official  Records 
in  vain  for  evidence  of  any  order  issued  by  General 
Stanley  in  the  conduct  of  the  battle,  or  any  recog 
nition  of  his  presence  on  the  line  after  he  was 
wounded.  It  was,  then,  the  fatal  necessity  of  sus 
taining  that  extraordinary  "report"  that  led  to 
General  Stanley's  persistent  and  violent  attacks 
upon  other  people's  veracity. 

To  complete  the  consideration  of  the  subject,  it 
is  only  necessary  to  examine  the  contemporaneous 
records  of  the  engagement  which  I  myself  made,  so 
that  the  view  I  took  of  it  at  the  time  may  be  com 
pared  with  the  historical  account  written  in  1882. 
As  a  memorandum  of  official  action,  I  kept  a  brief 
journal,  which,  like  similar  headquarters  diaries, 
has  been  published  with  the  Official  Records.2  In 
this,  under  date  of.  November  30th,  the  day  of  the 
battle,  1  entered  the  following:  "Reached  Franklin 
before  day,  having  marched  twenty  miles  during  the 
night,  passing  the  rest  of  the  army  on  the  way.  No 
means  for  crossing  Harpeth  River,  and  I  am  ordered 
to  take  both  divisions  Twenty-third  Corps,  and  hold 
a  line  above  the  town  till  the  trains  and  the  rest  of 

1  Ante,  pp.  263,  264.  2  0.  II.,  xlv.  part  i.  p.  356,  et  seq. 


300  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

the  army  are  over.  Enemy  follows  close,  and  two 
divisions  of  Fourth  Corps  —  KimbalPs  and  Wagner's 
—  are  ordered  to  report  to  me.  Enemy  assault  at 
3.30  P.M.  Gain  some  temporary  advantage  in  the 
centre  at  first,  but  are  soon  repulsed  with  terrible 
slaughter.  We  held  the  lines  till  midnight." 

On  the  next  day,  December  1st,  I  noted  in  the 
journal  the  march  to  Nashville,  and  a  brief  outline 
of  the  results  of  the  battle,  concluding  with  this: 
"Whole  loss  of  the  army  about  2,000,  of  which  most 
was  in  Wagner's  division,  which  was  driven  in  from 
the  front  in  confusion. "  l 

In  my  preliminary  report,2  dated  December  2d,  I 
stated  the  duty  intrusted  to  me  in  substantially  the 
same  form  as  in  my  journal,  and  that  KimbalPs  and 
Wagner's  divisions  of  the  Fourth  Corps  reported  to 
me  by  order  of  General  Scholield. 

On  December  3d  I  recommended  Colonel  Opdycke 
for  promotion,  giving  as  a  reason  for  doing  so  that 
his  heroic  service  was  whilst  under  my  orders,  "  as 
I  was  commanding  the  line  at  that  time."3 

It  is  thus  clearly  shown  that  my  view  of  my  rela 
tions  to  the  troops  and  to  the  line  is  not  one  that 
has  been  born  of  long  brooding  over  the  stirring 
affairs  of  that  campaign,  but  was  that  which  I  held 
at  the  time,  and  which  is  sustained  by  the  mass  of 
evidence  both  official  and  private.  But  in  my  re 
ports,  sincerely  sympathizing  with  an  officer  who 
was  wounded  in  the  performance  of  a  gallant  act  in 
circumstances  that  gave  him  no  official  position,  I 
understated  my  own  authority,  and  attributed  to 
him  a  command  which  he  did  not  exercise.  The 
reassertion  of  the  truth  in  regard  to  this  matter  has 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  358,  359.  "  Id.,  p.  348. 

8  Id.,  p.  409,  and  ante,  p.  228. 


Controverted  Points  301 

not  been  of  my  seeking.  My  historical  account  of 
the  battle  was  entirely  consistent  with  the  "  nine 
points"  which  General  Stanley  had  unqualifiedly 
assented  to  for  the  express  purpose  of  such  a  publi 
cation.1  He  has  himself  forced  the  comparison  be 
tween  the  facts  and  his  so-called  report  of  February 
25,  1865.  He  has  also  brought  out  the  truth  that 
in  my  official  report  I  claimed  much  less  than  the 
reports  of  the  officers  of  his  own  corps  show  that  I 
was  entitled  to. 

After  I  had  thus  voluntarily  diminished  the  state 
ment  of  the  extent  of  my  authority  on  the  actual 
line,  I  was  of  course  estopped  (to  use  General  Scho- 
ficld's  word)  from  calling  public  attention  to  the 
truth  until  General  Stanley's  so  called  report  came 
to  light.  It  was  a  number  of  years  after  the  war, 
when  I  first  heard  of  that  document.  It  completely 
removed  any  cause  for  delicacy  in  thoroughly  review 
ing  the  facts,  and,  in  the  preparation  to  write  the 
history  of  the  campaign,  I  was  considering  this 
matter,  when  General  Stanley  himself  took  the  initi 
ative  by  addressing  me  the  letter  already  mentioned.2 
If  he  had  then  challenged  the  accuracy  of  the  "  nine 
points  "  I  submitted  to  him  in  reply,  the  discussion 
of  the  subject  would  have  been  fully  opened.  As, 
however,  he  unqualifiedly  assented  to  their  exact 
correctness,  I  was  glad  to  find  an  accepted  outline  of 
a  narrative  in  which  controversy  could  be  avoided. 
I  informed  General  Schofield,  General  Wherry,  his 
chief  of  staff,  and  General  Opdycke,  and  they  all 
expressed  their  satisfaction  that  such  an  outline  had 
been  agreed  upon.3  The  volume  was  published,  and 

1  Ante,  p.  262,  and  March  to  the  Sea,  chap.  v.  2  Ante,  p.  262. 

3  All  this  correspondence  took  place  in  1881,  and  the  letters  are  in 
my  private  files.  General  Schofield's  was  dated  December  5,  and  said: 


302  The  Battle  of  Franklin 

nearly  seven  years  passed,  when  the  literary  peace 
was  wantonly  broken  in  the  manner  which  has  been 
sufficiently  stated. 

In  the  light  of  the  evidence  which  has  been  given, 
the  candid  reader  can  judge  who,  if  anybody,  has 
grasped  at  honors  which  were  unearned.  The  means 
are  offered  of  testing  by  the  Official  Records  the 
vanity  or  the  modesty,  the  selfish  or  the  generous 
motives,  of  the  reports  of  the  campaign.  The  lesson 
is  one  which  I  even  think  may  be  useful  to  the  care 
ful  student  of  our  war  history  as  showing  how  the 
abundance  of  the  official  documents  and  private 
material  gives  unexpected  clues  to  the  truth,  and 
helps  in  the  exposure  of  false  assumptions. 

A  reference  to  my  method  in  preparing  both  my 
little  volumes  of  war  history,  the  "  Atlanta  "  as  well 
as  the  "March  to  the  Sea,"  will  close  what  I  have 
to  say.  Both  General  Sherman  and  General  Scho- 
field  scrupulously  refrained  from  pressing  upon  me 
their  own  views  of  their  campaigns,  and  strictly 
limited  their  assistance  to  furnishing  me  copies  of 
papers,  maps,  and  documents.  They  concurred  with 
me  that  it  was  not  best  that  they  should  see  any  part 
of  my  work  till  it  should  appear  in  print.  I  was 
happy  to  find,  when  it  was  published,  that  they  both 
regarded  the  narrative  as  authentic  and  authoritative. 
After  the  volume  on  Franklin  and  Nashville  appeared, 
General  Schofield  kindly  gave  it  a  careful  reading, 
and  noted  even  minute  errors  for  my  assistance  in 
revising  for  a  new  edition.  In  the  account  of  the 
battle  of  Franklin  he  noted  none,  and  suggested  no 

"  It  is  very  gratifying  to  me  that  you  and  Stanley  have,  upon  a  com 
parison  of  views,  found  yourselves  in  substantial  accord  in  respect  to 
the  relations  of  your  two  commands  at  Franklin.  I  believe  your  way 
is  now  clear  to  a  just  and  impartial  account  of  that  battle." 


Controverted  Points  303 

changes.  It  was  with  a  satisfaction  which  was  not 
unnatural  that  I  had  found  him  saying  of  that  cam 
paign  in  general :  "  No  doubt  you  must  be  prepared 
to  meet  unjust  assaults  upon  your  history ;  but  you 
are  fully  fortified  by  the  evidence  and  by  sound  mili 
tary  principles.  You  may  well  stand  fast  on  the 
record,  as  you  have  stated  it,  and  I  shall  take  great 
pleasure,  if  there  be  any  need,  in  defending  the 
truth  as  you  have  written  it."  l  In  his  letter  written 
after  the  more  careful  reading,2  the  tone  is  the  same, 
and  it  is  in  it  that  he  spoke  of  my  being  possibly 
"  estopped  "  from  a  more  critical  treatment  of  these 
events 3  by  " the  generous  treatment  already  given" 
to  others.  Such  commendation  seemed  to  me  to  set 
the  seal  of  candor  and  fairness  upon  my  work. 

1  Letter  of  September  13,  1882. 

2  November  29,  1882. 

3  See  ante,  p.  265. 


APPENDIX    A 

GENERAL    SCIIOFIELD'S   REPORT 

DATED  DECEMBER  7,  1864 
(Part  relating  to  the  Battle  of  franklin *) 

I  ARRIVED  at  Franklin  with  the  head  of  column  a  little 
before  daylight  on  the  30th,  and  found  no  wagon  bridge 
for  crossing  the  river,  and  the  fords  in  very  bad  condition. 
I  caused  the  railroad  bridge  to  be  prepared  for  crossing 
wagons,  and  had  a  foot  bridge  built  for  infantry,  which 
fortunately  also  proved  available  for  wagons,  and  used 
the  fords  as  much  as  possible.  I  hoped,  in  spite  of  the 
difficulties,  to  get  all  my  material,  including  the  public 
property,  and  a  large  wagon  train  at  Franklin,  across  the 
river,  and  move  the  army  over  before  the  enemy  could 
get  up  force  enough  to  attack  me.  But  I  put  the  troops 
in  position  as  they  arrived  on  the  south  side,  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps  on  the  left  and  centre,  covering  the  Colum 
bia  and  Lewisburg  pikes,  and  General  KimbalPs  division 
of  the  Fourth  Corps  on  the  right,  both  flanks  resting  on 
the  river.  Two  brigades  of  General  Wagner's  division! 
were  left  in  front  to  retard  the  enemy's  advance,  and  ; 
G^Jie.rjilJNVqpd's  division,  with  some  artillery,  was  moved 
to  the  north  bank  of  the  river  to  cover  the  flanks  should 
the  enemy  attempt  to  cross  above  or  below. 

The  enemy  followed  close  after  our  rear  guard,  brought 
up  and  deployed  two  full  corps  with  astonishing  celerity, 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  342-344. 
20 


306  Appendix  A 


moved  rapidly  forward  to  the  attack.  Our  outposts, 
)  imprudently  brave,  held  their  ground  too  long,  and  hence 
•  were  compelled  to  come  in  at  a  run.  In  passing  over  the 
parapet  they  carried  with  them  the  troops  of  the  line  for 
a  short  space,  and  thus  permitted  a  few  hundred  of  the 
enemy  to  get  in.  "But  the  reserves  near  by  instantly 
sprang  forward,  regaining  the  parapet,  and  captured 
those  of  the  enemy  who  had  passed  it.  The  enemy 
assaulted  persistently  and  continuously  with  his  whole 
force  from  about  3.30  p.  M.  until  after  dark,  and  made 
numerous  intermittent  attacks  at  a  few  points  until  about 
10  P.  M.N  He  was  splendidly  repulsed  along  the  whole  line 
of  .attack.  The  enemy  attacked  on  a  front  of  about  two 
miles,  extending  from  our  left  to  our  right  centre,  Gen 
eral  Kimball's  left  brigade.  Our  two  right  brigades 
were  only  slightly  engaged.  I  believe  the  enemy's  loss 
in  killed  and  wounded  cannot  have  been  less  than  5,000, 
and  may  have  been  much  greater.  We  captured  702 
prisoners  and  33  stand  of  colors. 

Our  loss,  as  officially  reported,  is  as  follows.1 
I  am  not  able  at  this  time  to  give  fully  the  names  of 
the  killed  and  wounded  officers.  Among  the  latter  is 
Major  General  Stanley,  commanding  the  Fourth  Corps, 
who  was  severely  wounded  in  the  neck  while  gallantly 
urging  forward  his  troops  to  regain  the  portion  of  our 
line  which  had  been  lost.  General  Stanley  is  deserving 
of  special  commendation,  and  has  my  hearty  thanks  for 
his  cordial  support  and  wise  counsel  throughout  the  short 
but  eventful  campaign.  Brigadier  General  J.  D.  Cox, 
commanding  temporarily  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  de 
serves  a  very  large  share  of  credit  for  the  brilliant  vic 
tory  at  Franklin.  The  troops  were  placed  in  position 
and  intrenched  under  his  immediate  direction,  and  the 
greater  portion  of  the  line  engaged  was  under  his  com 
mand  during  the  battle.  I  recommend  General  Cox  to 

1  Tabular  statement  omitted.  It  will  be  found  in  chap,  xvi.,  ante. 
For  the  final  statement  of  the  enemey's  losses,  see  the  closing  para 
graph  of  this  report. 


Appendix  A  307 

the  special  consideration  of  the  Government.  Brigadier 
General  Ruger,  commanding  Second  Division,  Twenty- 
third  Corps,  held  the  weakest  portion  of  our  line,  and 
that  upon  which  the  enemy's  assaults  were  most  persist 
ent.  He  is  entitled  to  very  great  credit.  Brigadier 
Gejiaral.Eeilly,  commanding  (temporarily)  the  Third  Di 
vision,  Twenty-third  Corps,  maintained  his  lines  with 
perfect  firmness,  and  captured  twenty  battle  flags  along 
his  parapet.  I  am  also  under  great  obligations  to  the  di 
vision  commanders  of  the  Fourth  Army  Corps,  Brigadier 
Generals  Wood,  Wagner,  and  Kimball,  for  the  admirable 
manner  in  which  they  discharged  every  duty,  and  cannot 
refrain  from  expressing  my  high  commendation,  though 
in  advance  of  the  official  report  of  their  immediate  com 
mander.  Colonel  Emerson  Opdycke,  commanding  First 
Brigade,  Second  Division,  Fourth  Army  Corps,  the  re 
serve  which  recaptured  the  lost  portion  of  our  line,  is 
spoken  of  by  Generals  Stanley  and  Cox  as  having  dis 
played  on  that  occasion  the  highest  qualities  of  a  com 
mander.  I  cordially  indorse  their  recommendation.  For 
other  special  instances  of  gallantry  and  good  conduct  1 
must  refer  to  subordinate  reports. 

On  my  arrival  at  Franklin  I  gained  the  first  informa 
tion  from  General  Wilson  since  the  enemy  commenced 
his  advance  from  Duck  River.  I  learned  that  he  had 
been  driven  back  and  had  crossed  the  Harpeth  above 
Franklin  on  the  preceding  day,  leaving  my  left  and  rear 
entirely  open  to  the  enemy's  cavalry.  By  my  direction 
he  sent  General  Hatch's  division  forward  again,  on  the 
Lewisburg  pike,  to  hold  Forrest  in  check  until  my  trains 
and  troops  could  reach  Franklin.  This  was  successfully 
done,  and  General  Hatch  then  retired  before  a  superior 
force,  and  recrossed  the  river,  connecting  with  my  infan 
try  pickets  on  the  north  bank  early  in  the  afternoon.  A 
short  time  before  the  infantry  attack  commenced,  the 
enemy's  cavalry  forced  a  crossing  about  three  miles  above 
Franklin,  and  drove  back  our  cavalry,  for  a  time  seriously 
threatening  our  trains,  which  were  accumulating  on  the 


308  Appendix  A 

north  bank,  and  moving  toward  Nashville.  I  sent  Gen 
eral  Wilson  orders,  which  he  had,  however,  anticipated, 
to  drive  the  enemy  back  at  all  hazards,  and  moved  a  bri 
gade  of  General  Wood's  division  to  support  him  if  neces 
sary.  At  the  moment  of  the  first  decisive  repulse  of  the 
enemy's  infantry  I  received  the  most  gratifying  intelli 
gence  that  General  Wilson  had  driven  the  rebel  cavalry 
back  across  the  river.  This  rendered  my  immediate  left 
and  rear  secure  for  the  time  being.  Previous  to  the 
battle  of  the  30th  I  had  ordered  all  trains  except  ammu 
nition  and  hospital  wagons  to  Nashville,  preparatory  to 
falling  back  from  Franklin  when  it  should  become  neces 
sary,  which  I  expected  on  the  following  day.  The  enemy, 
having  nearly  double  my  force  of  infantry  and  quite 
double  my  cavalry,  could  easily  turn  any  position  I  might 
take  and  seriously  endanger  my  rear. 

Only  one  division  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  had  been 
engaged  with  General  Wilson  during  the  30th.  The  re 
maining  three  divisions  were  free  to  strike  my  line  of 
communications,  which  they  could  easily  do  about  Brent- 
wood  by  daylight  the  next  morning.  My  experience  on 
the  29th  had  shown  how  utterly  inferior  in  force  my 
cavalry  was  to  that  of  the  enemy,  and  that  even  my  im 
mediate  flank  and  rear  were  insecure,  while  my  commu 
nication  with  Nashville  was  entirely  without  protection. 
I  could  not  even  rely  upon  getting  up  the  ammunition 
necessary  for  another  battle.  To  remain  longer  at  Frank 
lin  was  to  seriously  hazard  the  loss  of  my  army,  by  giving 
the  enemy  another  chance  to  cut  me  off  from  reinforce 
ments,  which  he  had  made  three  desperate  though  futile 
attempts  to  accomplish.  I  had  detained  the  enemy  long 
enough  to  enable  you  to  concentrate  your  scattered  troops 
at  Nashville,  and  had  succeeded  in  inflicting  upon  him 
very  heavy  losses,  which  was  the  primary  object.  I 
had  found  it  impossible  to  detain  him  long  enough  to 
get  reinforcements  at  Franklin.  Only  a  small  portion  of 
the  infantry  and  none  of  the  cavalry  could  reach  me  in 
time  to  be  of  any  use  in  the  battle,  which  must  have  been 


Appendix  A  309 

fought  on  the  1st  of  December.  For  these  reasons,  after 
consulting  with  the  corps  and  division  commanders,  and 
obtaining  your  approval,  I  determined  to  retire  during 
the  night  of  the  30th  toward  Nashville.  The  artillery 
was  withdrawn  to  the  north  bank  during  the  early  part 
of  the  night,  and  at  twelve  o'clock  the  army  withdrew 
from  its  trenches  and  crossed  the  river  without  loss. 
During  the  next  day,  December  1,  the  whole  army  was 
placed  in  position  in  front  of  Nashville. 


Information  obtained  since  the  above  report 
written,1  and  principally  since  the  inoccupation.  of 
Franklin  by  our  troops,  makes  the  enemy's  loss  1,750 
buried  upon  the  field,  3,800  disabled  and  placed  in  hos 
pitals  in  Franklin,  and  702  prisoners,  making  6,252  of 
the  enemy  placed  hors  de  combat,  besides  the  slightly 
wounded.  The  enemy's  loss  in  general  officers  was  very 
great,  being  6  killed,  6  wounded,  and  1  captured,  (it  is 
to  be_gbservecl  j;Jiat  more  than  half  of  our  loss  occurred 
iajGreneral  Wagner's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  which 
did  not  form  part  of  the  main  line  of  defence!)  This  loss 
arose  In  two  brigades  of  that  division  from  their  remain 
ing  in  front  of  the  line  after  their  proper  duty  as  out 
posts  had  been  accomplished,  and  after  they  should  have 
taken  their  positions  in  reserve,  and  in  the  other  brigade 
(Colonel  Opdycke's)  in  its  hand  to  hand  encounter  with 
the  enemy  over  the  portion  of  the  parapet  which  had 
been  temporarily  lost  by  the  precipitate  retreat  of  the 
other  two  brigades.  When  it  became  apparent  that  we 
should  have  to  fall  back  from  Columbia,  orders  to  rejoin 
the  army  were  sent  to  General  Cooper,  commanding  the 
troops  guarding  the  crossings  of  Duck  River  below  Co 
lumbia  at  Centerville,  both  by  myself  and  the  Major  Gen 
eral  commanding,  which  were  obeyed  as  soon  as  received, 
and  General  Cooper  marched  for  Franklin.  Owing  to 
delays  in  receiving  his  orders  and  the  time  necessary  to 

1  The  final  report  was  dated  December  31,  1864,  incorporating  and 
adopting  the  preliminary  report  of  December  7,  preceding. 


310  Appendix  A 

concentrate  his  troops,  General  Cooper  could  not  reach 
Franklin  before  its  occupation  by  the  enemy,  and  turned 
his  column  direct  for  Nashville.  Arrived  at  the  Brent- 
wood  Hills  by  the  Charlotte  pike  on  the  night  of  Decem 
ber  2,  and  again  found  the  enemy  between  him  and  the 
army.  He  then  marched  to  Clarksville,  where  he  arrived 
in  safety  on  the  5th  and  rejoined  my  command  on  the 
8th  of  December.  General  Cooper  deserves  great  credit 
for  the  skill  and  judgment  displayed  in  conducting  his 
retreat. 


Appendix  B  311 


APPENDIX  B 

GENERAL  COX'S  REPORT 

DATED  JANUARY  10,  1805 
(Battle  of  Franklin  l) 

I  HAVE  the  honor  to  make  the  following  report  of  the 
operations  of  the  Twenty-third  Army  Corps  in  the  battle 
between  the  U.  S.  forces,  under  Major  General  Schofield, 
and  the  rebel  army,  under  General  Hood,  at  Franklin, 
Term.,  on  the  30th  day  of  November,  1864. 

My  own  division  (Third  Division,  Twenty-third  Army 
Corps)  reached  Franklin  about  an  hour  before  daybreak 
on  the  morning  of  the  30th,  having  marched  from  Co 
lumbia,  twenty-two  miles,  during  the  night.  The  division 
was  halted  and  massed  on  the  ground  upon  which  the 
battle  was  fought,  and  the  men  were  allowed  to  cook  their 
breakfast  whilst  the  trains  which  were  following  filed 
past  into  the  town.  General  Schofield,  being  with  the 
bead  of  the  column,  after  an  examination  of  the  means 
of  crossing  the  army  to  the  north  side  of  the  Harpeth 
River,  informed  me  that  the  means  were  so  inadequate  as 
to  demand  his  immediate  personal  attention,  and  ordered 
that  I  assume  command  of  the  corps  and  put  it  in  posi 
tion  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the  remainder  of  the  army 
to  the  north  bank  of  the  river.  The  whole  command 
was  moving  in  from  Columbia  and  Spring  Hill  by  the 
turnpike  leading  from  those  places  to  Franklin,  and  the 
enemy  was  knoAvn  to  be  following  witli  his  infantry  by 

1  O.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  349-356. 


312  Appendix  B 

the  same  route,  his  cavalry  being  chiefly  upon  the  turn 
pike  leading  from  Lewisburg  to  Franklin.  A  reconnois- 
sance  of  the  position  as  soon  as  it  was  light  showed  that 
the  ground  immediately  south  of  the  village  was  almost 
level,  and  without  any  cover  from  wroods  or  orchards  for 
a  distance  of  nearly  a  mile  from  the  outskirts  of  the 
village,  and  even  for  a  considerably  longer  distance  on 
the  Columbia  pike. 

/"  A  brick  dwelling,  belonging  to  a  Mr.  Carter,  the  south- 
I  ernmost  one  of  the  town,  stands  on  the  west  side  of  the 
turnpike  upon  a  slight  knoll  over  which  the  road  runs 
as  it  leaves  the  village.  This  knoll  has  an  elevation  of 
about  ten  feet  above  the  lower  ground  around  it,  and 
even  less  above  that  directly  south,  the  slope  there  being 
so  slight  as  to  be  scarcely  perceptible  to  one  approaching 
from  that  direction.  The  crest  of  this  elevation  is  about 
two  hundred  yards  in  length  from  right  to  left,  and  is 
divided  nearly  equally  by  the  Columbia  pike.  Two  other 
turnpikes  diverge  from  the  village  going  southward,  the 
Lewisburg  pike  on  the  left  (east)  and  the  Carter's  Creek 
pike  on  the  right  (west).  A  curved  line,  intersecting 
these  two  last-mentioned  roads  at  the  edge  of  the  village, 
crossed  each  of  them  upon  slight  elevations  of  ground, 
similar  to  that  at  Carter's  house  on  the  Columbia  pike. 
This  being  the  only  line  apparently  tenable  near  the  out 
skirts  of  the  town,  and  sufficiently  short  to  be  occupied 
in  reasonable  strength  by  the  two  divisions  of  the  corps 
(the  Second  being  weakened  by  the  absence  of  the  strong 
est  brigade),  and  it  being  also  substantially  the  line 
indicated  by  the  major  general  commanding  upon  our 
approach  to  the  town,  I  ordered  the  troops  into  position 
upon  it,  and  directed  that  they  throw  up  breastworks 
immediately.  To  completely  understand  the  nature  of 
the  field  it  is,  however,  necessary  to  notice  that  the  rail 
road  also  passes  out  of  the  town  toward  the  southeast, 
and  a  little  to  the  left  of  the  Lewisburg  pike,  and  that 
the  Itarpeth  Eiver,  running  northwestwardly,  is  nearly 
parallel  to  the  railroad  and  quite  near  to  it  for  some  dis- 


Appendix  B  313 

tance,  whilst  on  our  right  it  opens  a  considerable  space 
between  it  and  the  Carter's  Creek  pike.     Upon  the  north 
bank  of  the  Harpeth  and  near  the  left  of  our  line,  as 
indicated,  is  a  fort,  erected  some  two  years  since  (Fort 
Granger),  which  commands  a  stretch  of  the  river  to  the 
left,  and  also  a  cut  of  the  railroad,  through  which  troops 
might  advance  under  cover  toward  the  left  of  our  line. 
lleilly's  brigade  (First),  of  my  own  division,  was  placecK 
with  it's  right  resting  upon  the  Columbia  pike,  its  front  I 
line  consisting  of  the  100th  Ohio  and  104th  Ohio  Volun 
teers,  its  second  line  of  the  12th  and  16th  Kentucky,  and  . 
the  8th  Tennessee  Volunteers.     Its  left  extended  some-    . 
what  beyond  a  cotton  gin,  which  stood  in  a  slight  angle  / 
of  the  line  about  one  hundred  yards  from  the  Columbia  / 
Turnpike.     The  Second  Brigade  (Colonel  J.  S.  Casement, 
103d  Ohio,  commanding)  extended  the  line  from  Reilly's  j 
left  to  the  Lewisburg  pike,  the  65th  Indiana,  65th  Illi-  \ 
nois,  and  124th  Indiana  Volunteers  forming  his  first  line, 
and   the  5th  Tennessee  Volunteers  in  the  second  line. 
TheJThird  Brigade  (Colonel  I.  N.  Stiles,  63d  Indiana,  tem 
porarily  commanding)  continued  the  line  from  Casement's 
left  to  the  Harpeth  River,  the  128th  Indiana,  63d  Indi 
ana,  and  120th  Indiana  Volunteers  in  the  first  line,  and 
112th  Illinois  Volunteers  in  the  second  line. 

Upon  the  right  of  the  pike  I  directed  Brigadier  Gen 
eral  RugerT  commanding  Second  Division,  TVejnty^hird 
Army  Corps,  to  put  his  division  upon  the  line  indicated, 
reaching  as  far  to  the  right  as  he  could  firmly  hold  the 
line.     He_accprdingly  placed  Strickland's  brigade  (Third) 
upon  his  left,  being  immediately  on  the  right  of  the  Co- 
Imnbia^pike,  the  50th  Ohio  and  72d  Illinois  Volunteers 
in  the  first  line,  and  the  183d  Ohio  and  44th  Missouri 
Volunteers  in  the  second  line.     Moore's  brigade  j(Sj;cjpjKl)-j 
was  placed  on  the  right  of  Strickland's,  and  in  order  to  I 
cover  the  Carter's  Creek  pike  was  deployed  in  one  line  / 
in_thejollowing  order :  80th  Indiana,  23d  Michigan.  129th  \ 
Indiana,   and  lllth   Ohio  Volunteers,  numbering   from  i 
right  to  loft,  as  in  the  cases  of  all  the  other  brigades 


314  Appendix  B 

mentioned  above.  Moore's  line  being  still  weak  on  ac 
count  of  its  extent,  General  Ruger  ordered  fifty  men  of 
the  183d  Ohio  (Strickland's  second  line)  to  report  to  him, 
and  they  were  placed  by  Colonel  Moore  between  the 
J_29fch  Indiana  and  23d  Michigan.1  By  noon  a  tolerably 
\  good  line  of  breastworks  had  been  erected  along  the 
''  front  described,  and  in  a  portion  of  the  line  a  slight 
\  abattis  had  been  constructed.  A  small  locust  grove  and 
some  fruit  trees  in  front  of  Kuger's  division  had  been 
used  for  this  purpose,  and  some  Osage  orange  hedges 
about  a  small  enclosure  in  front  of  Stiles's  brigade  on 
/'the  left  had  also  been  made  good  use  of.  One  line  of  this 
I  hedge  parallel  to  Stiles's  left  front  was  slightly  thinned 
out  and  left  standing,  and  in  the  end  proved  most  useful. 
The  remainder  of  the  hedge  was  used  along  the  front  of 
the  Third  Division,  but  there  was  not  sufficient  material 
near  at  hand  to  make  the  line  continuous,  nor  was  there 
time  to  stake  it  down,  so  that  it  amounted  simply  to  a 
slight  obstruction  of  small  branches  and  twigs  that  could 
offer  no  serious  obstacle  to  an  advancing  enemy,  except 
as  the  thorny  nature  of  the  Osage  orange  made  it  an  un 
expectedly  troublesome  thing  to  handle  or  remove  under 
/fire.  The  artillery  of  the  corps  had  been  moved  to  the 
north  side  of  the  river  early  in  the  morning,  under  the 
direction  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Schofield,  Chief  of  Artil 
lery,  and  a  portion  of  it  placed  in  the  fort. 

As  the  troops  of  the  Fourth  Corps  came  in,  later  in 
the  forenoon,  four  batteries  from  that  corps  were  ordered 
to  report  to  me,  and  I  assigned  them  positions  as  follows  : 
1st  Kentucky  Light  Artillery,  four  guns,  on  the  left  of 
the  Columbia  pike,  in  the  line  of  the  100th  Ohio  Infantry; 
6th  Ohio  Light  Artillery,  two  guns  at  the  left  of  the 
cotton  gin,  and  two  guns  on  the  left  of  the  Lewisburg 
pike ;  20th  Ohio  Light  Artillery,  four  guns,  on  the  right 
of  the  Columbia  pike,  just  west  of  Carter's  house ;  and 
Battery  B,  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  at  the  Carter's  Creek 

1  For  a  corrected  statement  of  the  array  of  Moore's  troops,  see 
p.  55,  ante. 


Appendix  B  315 


pike.1J  Although  not  strictly  in  the  order  of  occurrence, 
it  will  tend  to  greater  clearness  to  add  that  about  three 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  when  an  attack  by  the  enemy  • 
in  force  had  become  more  immediate,  other  batteries  of 
the  Fourth  Corps  were  placed  in  position  by  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Schofield  and  Captain  Bridges,  Chiefs  of  Artillery  ^ 
of  the  Twenty-third  and  Fourth  Corps,  respectively,  viz. : 
Battery  M,  4th  U.  S.  Artillery,  and  Battery  G,  1st  Ohio 
Light  Artillery,  were  thus  placed  near  the  left  of  Stiles's 
brigade,  Third  Division,  Twenty-third  Army  Corps;  Bat 
tery  A,  1st  Ohio  Light  Artillery,  was  placed  in  reserve 
near    the  Columbia   pike ;    and  Bridges's   Battery,  Illi 
nois   Light    Artillery,   was   placed   near   the   centre    of 
Strickland's    brigade,    Second    Division,    Twenty-third 
Corps.     About  noon,  some   appearance  of  the   enemy's 
cavalry  being    reported  on    the   Carter's  Creek    pike,  I 
called  the  attention  of  the  commanding  general  to  the 
fact  that  Kuger's  division  could  not  reach  any  secure  I 
point  at  which  to  rest  on  the  right,  and  shortly  after 
Brigadier  General  Kimball,  commanding  First  Division, 
Fourth  Corps,  reported  to  me  by  order,  and  I  directed  • 
him  to  go  into  position  on  General   "Ruler's  right,  filling 
the  space  between  the  Carter's  Creek  pike  and  the  river. 
At  two  o'clock  I  received  orders  to  withdraw  the  com 
mand  to  the  north  bank  of  the  river  at  six  o'clock,  in 
case  there  should  be  no  attack  by  the  enemy.   (At  this  \ 
time  nearly  the  whole  of  the  trains  and  Wood's  (Third) 
division  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  had  crossed  the  Harpeth!} 
Sfiortly  after,  Brigadier  General  Wagner,   commanding 
Second  Division,  Fourth  Corps,  presented  in  person  his 
orders  to  report  to  me  and  act  under  my  orders.     He 
informed  me  that  one  brigade   (Opdycke's)  of  his  divis 
ion  was    already   within  the   lines,  and   that   the  other 
two,  with  a  section  of  artillery,  had  been  acting  as  rear 
guard  for  the  army  and  were  then  some  two  miles  at  the 

1  Two  lines  in  the  description  of  the  positions  of  artillery  were,  by 
.1  clerical  error,  omitted  in  the  report  forwarded  to  Washington,  and 
are  inserted  from  my  retained  copy  of  the  original. 


316  Appendix  B 

rear,  where  the  Columbia  pike  passes  through  a  high 
range  of  hills  before  reaching  the  plateau  on  which  the 
.  village  stands  ;  that  his  orders  then  were  to  hold  the 
(  enemy  back  until  they  developed  a  heavy  force  mani- 
<  festly  superior  to  his  own,  and  then  slowly  retire  within 
I  my  lines.  I  directed  Opdycke's  brigade  to  be  placed  on 
thejightof  the  Columbia  pike,  about  two  hundred  yards 
inj;g_ar  of  our  centre,  as  a  general  reserve;  that  the  or 
ders  under  which  General  Wagner  was  then  acting  as  to 
the  two  brigades  serving  as  rear  guard  should  be  carried 
out,  and  that  when  the  troops  were  withdrawn  within  the 
lines  they  should  be  placed  in  position  near  Opdycke's 
brigade  and  held  in  reserve  awaiting  further  orders  and 
jn  readiness  to  support  any  part  of  the  line.  At  three 
o'clock  the  two  brigades  of  Wagner's  division  in  front 
1  fallen  back  to  a  position  about  half  a  mile  in  front 
of  the  lines,  and  reported  the  enemy  developing  in  force 
in  their  front,  whilst  they  opened  upon  the  rebels  with 
the  section  of  artillery  which  was  with  them.  {The  order 
was  then  reiterated  to  General  Wagner  to  withdraw  the 
brigades  whenever  the  enemy  appeared  to  be  advancing 
in  decidedly  superior  force,  without  allowing  his  troops 
to  become  seriously  engage^  General  Wagner  was  at 
that  time  in  person  upon  the  Columbia  pike  near  the 
Carter  house,  where  niy  headquarters  had  been  during 
the  day. 

£A  slight  depression  beyond  the  lines  held  by  Wagner's 
advanced  brigades  prevented  the  enemy  from  being  seen 
from  our  lines  till  about  four  o'clock,  when  the  officers 
on  the  skirmish  line  reported  him  advancing  in  several 
lines  and  in  very  great  force.)  Almost  simultaneously 
with  this  report  the  two  brigades  of  Wagner's  division 
in  front  opened  a  brisk  musketry  fire,  and  part  of  them 
were  seen  making  a  barricade  of  rails,  etc.,  apparently 
with  a  view  of  endeavoring  to  make  a  stand  there,  though 
the  section  of  artillery  retired  leisurely  within  our  lines. 
Before  an  order  could  reach  them  they  were  so  hotly  en 
gaged  that  they  could  not  be  withdrawn  in  order.  The 


Appendix  B  317 

enemy  wasted  no  time  in  firing,  but  charged  them,  and, 
being  enveloped  on  the  flanks,  the  two  brigades,  after  a 
short  and  brave  though  useless  struggle,  broke  to  the 
rear  in  confusion.  The  momentary  check  at  the  centre  \ 
brought  the  right  wing  of  the  enemy  farther  forward,  / 
and  they  came  on  at  a  double-quick  with  trailed  arms, 
some  pieces  of  artillery  advancing  and  firing  between 
brigade  intervals.  As  soon  as  they  were  seen  the  bat 
teries  on  our  left  opened  upon  them,  as  well  as  the  guns 
in  Fort  Granger,  and  as  they  advanced  into  rifle  range 
of  our  infantry,  Stiles's  and  Casement's  brigades  opened 
fire  also.  The  rebel  lines  could  now  be  plainly  seen,  as 
well  as  the  general  disposition  and  apparent  purpose  of 
their  movement.  Their  heaviest  masses .  were  advancing 
on  the  line  of  the  Columbia  pike,  reaching  quite  to  the 
river  oiToiff'left,  the  two  points  of  assault  at  that  time  I 
being  apparently  our  centre  and  our  extreme  left ;  the 
latter  being  the  point  nearest  to  our  bridges,  which  were 
necessarily  much  nearer  that  flank  (one  of  them  being 
the  railroad  bridge),  and  that  being  the  line  of  move 
ment  by  which  they  would  most  rapidly  have  cut  us  off 
from  crossing  the  river  had  our  lines  been  broken.  The 
extreme  left  was  the  portion  of  our  main  line  first  warmly 
engaged.  The  enemy  endeavored  to  pass  up  the  railroad  S 
cut  above  mentioned,  but  were  enfiladed  not  only  by  the 
guns  in  Fort  Granger  but  by  Battery  M,  Fourth  U.  S. 
Artillery,  and  driven  from  that  shelter.  Their  lines  on 
either  side,  however,  advanced  steadily.  On  reaching 
the  Osage  orange  hedge  in  front  of  Stiles's  left,  they  first 
endeavored  to  force  their  way  through  it  and  pull  it 
aside.  ^The  tough  and  thorny  nature  of  the  shrub  foiled 
them  in  this,  and  they  attempted  to  file  around  the  hedge 
by  the  flank,  and  under  a  terrible,  withering  fire  from 
Stiles's  and  Casement's  brigades  and  the  batteries  on  that 
flank.1  They  soon  abandoned  this  effort,  and  most  of 
those  remaining  unhurt  lay  down  behind  the  hedge,  and  [ 
after  keeping  up  a  desultory  fire  for  a  time,  straggled  to 
the  rear,  singly  and  in  small  squads. 


318  Appendix  D 

In  front  of  Stiles's  right  and  Casement's  left,  the  ob- 
/  structions  being  fewer  and  more  insignificant,  the  enemy 
\  advanced  rapidly  and  in  good  order,  though  suffering 
very  severely,  up  to  the  breastworks,  and  made  desper 
ate  efforts  to  carry  them.  Their  officers  showed  the  most 
heroic  example  and  self-sacrifice,  riding  up  to  our  lines 
in  advance  of  the  men,  cheering  them  on.  One  general 
officer  (Adams)  was  shot  down  upon  the  parapet  itself, 
his  horse  falling  across  the  breastwork.  [In  all  this  part 
of  the  line  our  men  stood  steadily  without  flinching,  and 
repulsed  the  enemy,  inflicting  terrible  loss  upon  him  and 
suffering  but  little  in  return.  Meanwhile,  in  the  centre, 
the  enemy  gained  some  temporary  advantage.  When 
the  two  brigades  of  Wagner's  division,  Fourth  Corps, 
broke,  the  enemy  were  close  upon  them  and  followed 
them  in,  overtaking  and  capturing  considerable  numbers 
of  the  fugitives.  [Our  own  men  in  the  lines  along  the 
centre  were  restrained  from  firing,  in  order  not  to  injure 
those  who  were  retreating,  and  the  enemy  were  thus 
^enabled  to  come  up  to  the  breastworks  pell-mell  with 
Wagner's  men,  without  suffering  loss  or  being  seriously 
exposed  to  fire.  'Immediately  upon  the  pike  the  crowd 
of  the  retreating  troops  and  the  advancing  enemy  over 
whelmed  the  men  at  the  breastworks  there,  and  a  portion 
of  the  right  of  Reilly's  brigade  (Third  Division)  and 
most  of  Strickland's  brigade  (Second  Division)  broke 
from  the  first  line.""  This  was  not  due  altogether  to 
the  pressure  upon  their  immediate  front,  but  partly 
also  to  the  fact  that  the  orders  given  by  their  officers 
to  the  rear  of  Wagner's  division  coming  in  from  the 
front  to  rally  at  the  rear  were  supposed  by  many  of 
the  men  in  the  lines  to  apply  to  them  also.  When 
the  two  brigades  of  Wagner's  were  first  seen  to  be 
compromised  by  getting  seriously  engaged,  as  a  pro 
vision  against  danger  in  the  centre  I  had  ordered 
Opdycke's  brigade  to  be  ready  to  charge  up  to  the 
lines  instantly,  if  there  should  be  any  confusion  there. 
This  brigade  was  now  ordered  up,  and  came  up  the 


Appendix  B  319 

turnpike  in  the  most  gallant  manner ;  Rally's  rushed 
forward  at  the  same  moment. 

Major  General  Stanley,  commanding  Fourth  Corps, 
wlioTiacTt^e'en  ill  during  the  prior  part  of  the  day,  came, 
on  the  field  on  hearing  the  sound  of  battle,  and  arrived 
in  time  to  take  an  active  part  in  the  effort  to  rally  Wag 
ner's  men,  but  was  soon  wounded  and  his  horse  shot 
under  him.  The  most  strenuous  efforts  were  made  by 
all  officers  along  that  part  of  the  line  to  rally  the  men, 
and  were  so  far_  successful  that  the  line  was  quickly 
restored  on  the  left  of  the  turnpike,  and  after  a  sharp' 7 
struggle  on  the  right  of  Strickland's  brigade  also,  though 
the  enemy  continued  to  occupy  in  some  force  a  portion 
of  the  outside  of  the  parapet  on  Strickland's  left  for  a  dis 
tance  of  about  one  regimental  front.  [Opdycke's  brigade 
occupied  the  sec^odjine,  which  at  that  point  was  not 
over_jt wenty-five  yards  in  rear  of  the  first,  and  under 
cover  of  the  smoke  strengthened  a  barricade  and  breast 
work  which  had  been  before  there.;  The  175th  Ohio 
Volunteers,  a  new  regiment,  unassigned  to  a  brigade, 
had  reported  early  in  the  afternoon  by  direction  of  the 
commanding  general,  and  was  by  me  temporarily  as 
signed  to  lleilly's  brigade  and  placed  in  reserve.  It 
also  advanced  with  the  rest  of  the  supporting  troops 
and  did  good  service,  behaving  with  great  steadiness 
and  courage.  The  attack  extended  toward  our  right  to 
the  Carter's  Creek  pike.  The  enemy,  being  apparently  , 
satisjRecl  of  the  impracticability  of  advancing  again  upon/ 
o_ur_left  for  the  reason  before  stated,  pressed  farther  to  \ 
our  right,  and  especially  after  they  had  seemed  to  have 
gained  some  advantage  in  the  centre,  their  efforts  there 
and. upon  their  own  left  were  redoubled.  Colonel  Moore's 
brigade  held  its  ground  firmly,  and  although  it  was  in 
imminent  danger  at  the  moment  when  the  centre  wavered,  ,'•• 
repulsed  a  determined  assault,  and  preserved  its  line  in 
tact  throughout  the  battle.  The  condition  of  the  atmos-  ) 
phere  was  such  that  the  smoke  settled  upon  the  field 
without  drifting  off,  and  after  the  first  half  hour's  fighting 


.320  Appendix  B 

fit  became  almost  impossible  to  discern  any  object  along 
)the  line  at  a  few  yards'  distance.  jJThis  state  of  things 
appeared  to  have  deceived  Colonel  Strickland  in  regard 
to  his  line,  as  he  reported  the  first  line  completely  re- 
occupied  along  his  entire  front  after  the  repulse  of  the 
enemy's  first  assault,  whilst  in  fact  a  portion  of  it  at  his 
left  was  not  filled  by  our  troops,  and  Colonel  Opdycke, 
not  being  personally  acquainted  with  the  lines,  was  not 
aware  for  some  time  that  he  had  not  reached  the  first 
line  in  Colonel  Strickland's  front,  where  the  outbuild 
ings  of  Carter's  house  prevented  the  line  from  being  dis 
tinctly  seen  from  the  turnpike  even  if  the  smoke  had 
not  formed  so  dark  a  covering-j 

r   After   a   short   lull   the   attack  was   resumed  by  the 
';  enemy  with    the    same    audacity  and   determination   as 
/   before,  and,  Strickland's  brigade  suffering  considerably, 
and ...  being   reported   by  him   a  good  deal  weakened,  I 
withdre-W.  the  112th  Illinois  Volunteers  from  the  second 
line_of  Stiles's  brigade  on  the  extreme  left,  and  ordered 
it  to  report  to  Colonel  Strickland  and  to  aid  in  re-estab 
lishing  the  line  in  his  front.     It  was  led  forward  very 
gallantly  by  Lieut.  Colonel  Bond  commanding,  who  was 
wounded  in  the  advance.     The  smoke  and  errowins:  dark- 

o  O 

-'''ness  deceived  also  the  enemy,  who  apparently  supposed 
f  they  had  gained  full  possession  of  our  lines  in  the 
centre,  and  continued  to  push  in  fresh  masses  of  troops, 
only  to  be  destroyed  or  captured,  for  very  few  went  back, 
insomuch  that  prisoners  captured  continually  expressed 
the  utmost  surprise,  declaring  that  they  supposed  and 
had  been  informed  that  our  lines  were  occupied  by  their 
troops  which  had  assaulted  before,  and  of  whom  nothing 
since  had  been  seen.  /The  ditches  in  front  of  the  whole 
line  of  the  corps,  and  particularly  in  the  centre,  contained 
many  of  the  enemy  who  were  unable  to  get  back,  and 
who  at  the  first  opportunity  surrendered  and  came  over 
the  breastworks  as  prisoners.'  _The  assaults  on  the  ceu- 
-tre,  extending  considerably  to  the  right  of  the  'Columbia, 
pike  and  involving  Moore's  brigade  more  or  less,  were 


Appendix  B  321 

obstinately  repeated  until  nightfall,  and  even  as  late  as 
nine  o5HocK"~attaoks  were  made,  which  were,  however, 
easily  repulsed,  and  the  enemy  withdrew  the  remnants 
of  his  shattered  lines  to  the  position  occupied  at  the 
opening  of  the  battle  by  Wagner's  division,  in  advance 
of  our  lines  about  eight  hundred  yards.  Alarms  occurred 
frequently  until  eleven  o'clock,  and  frequently  caused  a 
general  musketry  fire  on  both  sides  from  our  centre  toward 
the  right;  but  I  found  no  evidence  that  any  real  attack 
was  made  at  so  late  an  hour,  the  demonstrations  being 
manifestly  made  by  the  rebels  to  discover  whether  out 
lines  were  being  abandoned  during  the  evening. 

CA.t  midnight,  all  being  quiet  in  the  front,  in  accordance 
with  orders  from  the  commanding  general,  I  withdrew 
my  command  to  the  north  bank  of  the  river,  leaving  a 
skirmish  line  in  the  earthworks  an  hour  later,  when 
they  also  were  withdrawn.*]  The  whole  movement  was 
made  without  interruption  or  molestation  from  the 
enemy,  the  Third  Division  moving  by  the  left  flank  and 
crossing  the  river  upon  the  railroad  bridge,  which  had 
been  planked,  and  the  Second  Division  (with  Opdycke's 
brigade  of  the  Fourth  Corps)  moving  through  the  town 
and  crossing  by  a  wagon  bridge  a  little  below  the  railroad 
crossing.  Upon  reaching  the  north  bank  I  took  up  the 
line  of  march  with  my  own  division  for  Brentwood  in 
advance  of  the  army,  by  command  of  General  Schofield. 
General  Wagner  rallied  the  two  brigades  of  his  division 
at  the  river,  but  they  were  not  again  brought  into  action. 
Kimball's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  was  to  some 
extent  engaged  upon  its  extreme  left  in  the  late  attacks, 
which  reached  to  and  somewhat  beyond  the  Carter's 
Creek  pike,  and  that  command  also  suffered  somewhat 
from  the  diagonal  fire  of  the  enemy  upon  Ruger's  divis 
ion  of  this  corps.  This,  however,  I  state  from  my  own 
casual  observation  alone,  as  I  took  no  control  of  the 
troops  of  the  Fourth  Corps  (except  Opdycke's  brigade) 
after  General  Stanley  came  upon  the  field,  and  have  no 
official  report  of  their  part  in  the  engagement.  The 

21 


322  Appendix  B 

casualties    of    the    corps    during    the    engagement    are 
reported  to  me  as  follows.1 

These  lists  were  made  up  soon  after  the  engagement, 
and  I  am  convinced  that  corrected  ones,  when  procured, 
will  show  a  considerable  diminution  in  the  list  of  the 
missing.  The  loss  of  the  enemy  we  are  enabled  to  ap 
proximate  with  some  accuracy  from  the  public  admissions 
from  their  commander  as  well  as  from  the  statements  of 
prisoners,  our  own  examination  of  the  field  after  it  again 
came  into  our  possession,  and  the  statements  of  citizens 
and  hospital  attendants  remaining  in  Franklin.  From 
'  all  these  sources  the  testimony  is  abundant  that  the 
rebels  lost  6  general  officers  killed,  6  wounded,  and  1  cap 
tured  ;  that  they  buried  1,800  men  on  the  field,  and  that 
3,800  were  wounded.  The  number  of  prisoners  captured 
by  this  corps  was  702.  Thus,  without  estimating  the 
prisoners  taken  by  any  part  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  or  the 
stragglers  and  deserters,  who  are  known  to  have  been 
numerous,  the  enemy's  loss  was  not  less  than  6,300. 
The  attack  was  made  by  Stewart's  and  Cheatham's  corps 
of  Hood's  army,  Lee's  corps  being  in  reserve,  and  it  is 
only  repeating  what  is  proven  by  the  concurrent  testi 
mony  of  all  officers  and  men  of  the  rebel  army  who  were 
captured,[when  I  assert  that  the  two  assaulting  corps 
''  were  so  weakened  in  numbers  and  broken  in  morale  in 
this  engagement  as  to  lose  for  the  rest  of  the  campaign 
the  formidable  character  as  opponents  which  these  vet 
eran  soldiers  had  before  maintained.,]  Their  remarkable 
loss  in  general  officers  attests  sufficiently  the  desperate 
efforts  to  break  our  lines  and  the  heroic  bravery  of  our 
own  troops,  who  repulsed  their  repeated  assaults. 

The  transmission  of  this  report  has  been  delayed  by 
reason  of  waiting  for  reports  of  subordinate  commanders, 
and  the  whole  are  no\v  submitted. 

1  See  table,  chap,  xvi.,  ante. 


Appendix  C  323 


APPENDIX   C 

GENERAL   WOOD'S   REPORT 

DATED  JANUARY  10,  1805 
(Part  relating  to  Battle  of  Franklin1) 

HEADQUARTERS  FOURTH  ARMY  CORPS, 

HuNTSVlLLE,  ALA.,  January  10,  1865. 

IN  pursuance  with  orders  received  from  the  headquarters 
Department  of  the  Cumberland  to  report  the  operations 
of  the  corps  from  the  time  it  was  detached  from  the 
main  army  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi, 
in  the  latter  part  of  October,  to  its  arrival  at  Nashville, 
on  the  1st  of  December  ultimo,  I  have  the  honor  to  sub 
mit  the  following.  .  .  . 

On  arriving  at  Franklin  the  Twenty-third  Corps  had 
taken  position  in  the  suburbs  of  the  village,  with  its  left 
resting  on  the  river  above  the  town  and  its  right  extend 
ing  across  and  west  of  the  turnpike  road.  The  First  Di 
vision  of  the  Fourth  Corps  (Kimball's)  was  posted  on 
the  right  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  with  its  right  flank 
resting  on  the  river  below  the  town.  Intrenchments 
were  at  once  thrown  up  by  the  Twenty-third  Corps  and 
Kimball's  division,  of  the  Fourth  Corps.  The  Third 
Division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  arrived  next,  and  was 
ordered  to  cross  the  river  and  take  post  on  the  north 
side.  This  was  done.  Wagner's  (the  Second  Division), 
which  was  marching  in  rear,  was  ordered  to  halt  on  a 
range  of  hills  nearly  two  miles  south  of  the  town  and 
deploy  his  command  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check  should 
he  attempt  to  press  us.  In  the  mean  time  the  transpor- 

1  O.  11.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  119-126. 


324  Appendix  C 

tation  was  being  passed  rapidly  across  the  river.  At 
12  M.  General  Wagner  reported  the  appearance  of  the 
enemy  in  heavy  force  in  his  front,  and  later  he  reported 
that  the  enemy  was  evidently  making  preparations  to  at 
tack  him  in  force.  The  position  General  Wagner  then 
held  was  entirely  too  extensive  to  be  covered  by  one 
division,  and  as  the  country  was  open  on  both  flanks  and 
favorable  to  the  movement  of  troops,  the  position  could 
be  readily  flanked  ;  hence  General  Wagner  very  judi 
ciously  determined  to  retire  his  command  nearer  to  the 
town.  He  posted  two  brigades,  Conrad's  and  Lane's, 
across  the  pike,  with  their  flanks  slightly  refused,  about 
a  third  of  a  mile  south  of  the  intrenched  position  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps.  The  other  brigade,  Opdycke's,  was 
sent  inside  of  our  main  works,  —  a  most  fortunate  dispo 
sition  of  this  brigade,  as  the  sequel  of  this  narrative  will 
show.  Conrad's  and  Lane's  brigades  hastily  threw  up  rude 
barricades  to  protect  themselves  from  the  coming  storm. 
Their  orders  were  to  maintain  their  position  as  long  as 
it  could  be  done  without  becoming  too  severely  engaged, 
and  then  retire  on  the  main  line.  At  4  p.  M.  the  enemy 
made  a  vigorous  attack  on  the  front  of  these  two  ad 
vanced  brigades,  threatening  at  the  same  time  their 
flanks  with  strong  columns.  Unwilling  to  abandon  their 
position  so  long  as  there  was  any  probability  of  main 
taining  it,  unfortunately  the  gallant  commanders  re 
mained  in  front  too  long,  and  as  a  consequence,  when 
they  did  retire,  they  were  followed  so  closely  by  the 
enemy  as  to  enter  the  works  through  the  break  which 
had  been  caused  by  the  burst  over  them  of  the  retiring 
brigades.  The  enemy  had  come  on  with  a  terrific  dash, 
had  entered  our  intrenchment,  and  victory  seemed  almost 
within  his  grasp.  Our  line  had  been  broken  in  the  cen 
tre,  two  four-gun  batteries  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy,  and  it  seemed  that  it  was  only  necessary  for 
him  to  press  the  advantage  he  had  gained  to  complete  his 
success.  But  at  this  critical  moment  the  gallant,  prompt, 
and  ready  Opdycke  was  at  hand,  calling  to  his  men  in  a 


Appendix  C  325 

stentorian  tone,  "  Forward  to  the  lines  ! "  and,  adding 
example  to  command,  he,  with  his  bold  brigade,  with 
lowered  bayonets,  rushed  forward,  bore  the  exultant 
enemy  back  over  our  intrenchments,  recovered  the  lost 
guns,  and  captured  nigh  400  prisoners.  But  this  reverse 
did  not  seem  to  discourage  the  enemy ;  it  seemed  rather 
to  add  to  his  determination  and  increase  the  vigor  of  his 
assaults.  On,  on,  he  came,  till  he  made  four  distinct  as 
saults,  each  time  to  be  hurled  back  witli  heavy  loss.  So 
vigorous  and  fierce  were  these  assaults  that  the  enemy 
reached  the  exterior  slope  of  the  rude  intrenchments,  and 
hand  to  hand  encounters  occurred  between  the  courageous 
combatants  across  the  works  ;  and  between  the  assaults 
the  work  of  death  was  not  stopped.  The  undulations  of 
the  ground  are  such  as  to  afford  good  protection  to  an 
attacking  force.  Under  this  cover  the  enemy  pressed 
sharpshooters  as  near  our  lines  as  possible,  and  kept  up 
a  most  galling  fire.  While  these  vigorous  attacks  were 
being  made  on  our  centre  and  left,  the  right,  held  by 
Kimball's  division,  was  also  fiercely  attacked  three  times, 
all  of  which  assaults  were  handsomely  repulsed,  with 
comparatively  slight  loss  to  us,  but  with  terrific  slaugh 
ter  of  the  enemy.  At  no  time  did  the  enemy  gain  any 
advantage  on  this  part  of  our  lines.  As  night  approached 
the  enemy  desisted  from  his  fierce  assaults,  and  his  offen 
sive  efforts  degenerated  into  a  sharp  skirmish  fire. 

Thus  terminated  one  of  the  fiercest,  best  contested, 
most  vigorously  sustained  passages  at  arms  which  have 
occurred  in  this  war. 

When  the  enemy  had  temporarily  broken  our  centre, 
Major  General  Schofield,  commanding  the  forces  in  the 
vicinity  of  Franklin,  under  the  apprehension  that  our 
forces  engaged  on  the  south  side  of  the  river  might  be 
compelled  to  pass  to  the  north  side,  ordered  the  follow 
ing  disposition,  which  was  made,  of  the  Third  Division 
(then  in  reserve)  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  with  a  view  to 
covering  the  withdrawal  of  our  troops,  should  it  become 


326  Appendix  0 

necessary :  Beatty's  brigade  was  deployed  on  the  north 
bank  of  the  river  above  the  town  ;  Streight's  brigade 
along  the  bank  of  the  river  immediately  opposite  the 
town  ;  and  Post's  brigade  on  the  bank  of  the  river  below 
the  town.  Fortunately  the  exigency  for  which  this  dis 
position  was  made  did  not  occur  in  the  progress  of  the 
contest,  but  the  brigades  retained  their  positions  to  cover 
the  withdrawal  at  night,  which  had  been  ordered  before 
the  occurrence  of  the  attack.  To  prepare  for  the  with 
drawal  and  retirement  toward  Nashville,  the  trains  were 
started  before  nightfall  of  the  30th.  At  midnight  the 
troops  on  the  south  side  of  the  river  began  to  withdraw 
from  the  lines  and  pass  to  the  north  side  of  the  stream  ; 
this  work  was  rapidly  and  successfully  accomplished. 
The  enemy  probably  suspected  what  was  going  on,  but  did 
not  attempt  to  interfere  with  the  movement.  The  Third 
Division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  had  been  designated  to 
move  in  rear  and  cover  the  retrograde  movement.  By 
3  A.  M.  of  the  1st  of  December  all  the  troops  had  been 
withdrawn  from  the  south  side  of  the  river,  and  the 
bridges  were  fired.  So  soon  as  the  conflagration  was  so 
far  advanced  as  to  insure  its  being  complete,  the  Third 
Division  commenced  to  withdraw,  and  by  4  A.  M.  the 
whole  of  it  was  on  the  road.  As  the  flames  rose  from 
the  bridge  and  communicated  fully  to  the  enemy  our 
movements,  he  opened  a  heavy  cannonade,  which  fortu 
nately  did  no  injury,  and  was  soon  suspended;  other 
wise  the  enemy  did  not  attempt  to  molest  us.  The  rear 
of  the  command  reached  Brent  wood,  nine  miles  north  of 
Franklin,  at  9  A.  M. 

In  conclusion  it  is  proper  that  I  should  remark  that 
during  the  operations  briefly  sketched  in  this  report  the 
corps  was  commanded  by  Major  General  Stanley.  He 
was  wounded  in  the  battle  at  Franklin,  and  was  com 
pelled  by  the  casualty  to  relinquish  command  of  the 
corps  before  he  could  submit  a  report  of  its  operations; 
hence  the  duty  has  devolved  on  me. 


Appendix  D  327 


APPENDIX   D 

GENERAL   STANLEY'S   REPORT 

DATED  FEBRUARY  kJ5,  1805 

(Part  relating  to  Battle  of  Franklin1) 

GENERAL  KIMBALL'S  division  reached  Franklin  soon 
after  nine  o'clock  and  took  up  position  on  the  right  of 
the  Twenty-third  Corps,  the  right  flank  of  the  divis 
ion  resting  on  the  Harpeth  below  Franklin,  The  line 
selected  by  General  Schotield  was  about  a  mile  and  a 
half  in  length,  and  enclosed  Franklin,  resting  the  flanks 
upon  the  river  above  and  below  the  town.  The  trains 
were  all  crossed  over  to  the  north  side  of  the  Harpeth; 
Wood's  division  was  also  crossed  and  posted  to  watch 
the  fords  below  the  place.  Colonel  Opdycke  reached 
the  heights  two  miles  south  of  Franklin  at  12  M.  He 
was  directed  to  halt  on  the  hills  to  observe  the  enemy. 
Croxton's  brigade  of  cavalry  was  steadily  pushed  back 
by  the  enemy's  infantry  column  on  the  Lewisburg  pike, 
and  at  one  o'clock  General  Wagner  reported  heavy  col 
umns  of  infantry  approaching  on  the  Columbia  and 
Lewisburg  pikes.  General  Wagner  was  instructed  to 
fall  back  before  the  advance  of  the  enemy,  observing 
them.  About  the  same  time  word  was  received  that 
the  rebels  were  trying  to  force  a  crossing  at  Hughes's 
Ford,  two  miles  above  Franklin. 

From  one  o'clock  until  four  in  the  evening  the  enemy's 
entire  force  was  in  sight  and  forming  for  attack,  yet  in 

1  0.  R.,  xlv.  part  i.  pp.  112-118. 


328  Appendix  D 

view  of  the  strong  position  we  held,  and  reasoning  from 
the  former  course  of  the  rebels  during  tins  campaign, 
nothing  appeared  so  improbable  as  that  they  would  as 
sault.  I  felt  so  confident  in  this  belief  that  I  did  not 
leave  General  Schofield's  headquarters  until  the  firing 
commenced.  About  four  o'clock  the  enemy  advanced 
with  his  whole  force,  at  least  two  corps,  making  a  bold 
and  persistent  assault,  which,  upon  a  part  of  the  line, 
lasted  about  forty  minutes.  When  Wagner's  division 
fell  back  from  the  heights  south  of  Franklin,  Opdycke's 
brigade  was  placed  in  reserve  in  rear  of  our  main  line,  on 
the  Columbia  pike.  Lane's  and  Conrad's  brigades  were 
deployed  —  the  former  on  the  right,  the  other  the  left  of 
the  pike  —  about  three  hundred  yards  in  front  of  the 
main  line.  Here  the  men,  as  our  men  always  do,  threw 
up  a  barricade  of  rails.  By  whose  mistake  I  cannot  tell, 
it  certainly  was  never  a  part  of  my  instructions,  but 
these  brigades  had  orders  from  General. Wagner  not  to 
retire  to  the  main  line  until  forced  to  do  so  by  the  fight 
ing  of  the  enemy.  The  consequence  was  that  the  bri 
gades  stood  their  ground  until  the  charging  rebels  were 
almost  crossing  bayonets  with  them,  but  the  line  then 
broke  —  Conrad's  brigade  first,  then  Lane's  —  and  men 
and  officers  made  the  quickest  time  they  could  to  our 
main  lines.  The  old  soldiers  all  escaped,  but  the  con 
scripts  being  afraid  to  run  under  fire,  many  of  them  were 
captured.  Conrad's  brigade  entered  the  main  line  near 
the  Columbia  pike,  Colonel  Lane's  several  hundred  yards 
to  the  right  of  the  pike.  A  large  proportion  of  Lane's 
men  came  back  with  loaded  muskets,  and,  turning  at  the 
breastworks,  they  fired  a  volley  into  the  pressing  rebels 
now  not  ten  steps  from  them.  The  part  of  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps  stationed  in  the  works  for  a  distance  of  about 
three  [hundred]  or  four  [hundred]  yards  to  the  right 
of  the  Columbia  pike,  and  which  space  took  in  the  1st 
Kentucky  and  6th  Ohio  Batteries,  broke  and  ran  to 
the  rear  with  the  fugitives  from  Conrad's  brigade.  To 
add  to  the  disorder  the  caissons  of  the  two  batteries  gal- 


Appendix  D  329 

loped  rapidly  to  the  rear,  and  the  enemy  appeared  on 
the  breastworks  and  in  possession  of  the  two  batteries, 
which  they  commenced  to  turn  upon  us.  It  was  at  this 
moment  I  arrived  at  the  scene  of  disorder,  coming  from 
the  town  on  the  Columbia  pike  ;  the  moment  was  criti 
cal  beyond  any  I  have  known  in  any  battle  —  could  the 
enemy  hold  that  part  of  the  line,  he  was  nearer  to  our  two 
bridges  than  the  extremities  of  our  line.  Colonel  Op- 
dycke's  brigade  was  lying  down  about  one  hundred  yards 
in  rear  of  the  works.  I  rode  quickly  to  the  left  regi 
ment  and  called  to  them  to  charge ;  at  the  same  time  I 
saw  Colonel  Opdycke  near  the  centre  of  his  line  urging 
his  men  forward.  T  gave  the  colonel  no  order,  as  I  saw 
him  engaged  in  doing  the  very  thing  to  save  us,  viz.,  to 
get  possession  of  our  line  again.  The  retreating  men  of 
Colonel  Conrad's  brigade,  and,  I  believe,  the  men  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps,  seeing  the  line  of  Opdycke's  brigade 
start  for  the  works,  commenced  to  rally.  I  heard  the 
old  soldiers  call  out,  "  Come  on,  men,  we  can  go  wher 
ever  the  general  can,"  and,  making  a  rush,  our  men  im 
mediately  retook  all  the  line,  excepting  a  small  portion 
just  in  front  of  the  brick  house  on  the  pike.  A  force  of 
the  rebels  held  out  at  this  point,  and  for  fifteen  or  twenty 
minutes,  supported  by  a  rebel  line  fifty  yards  to  the  rear, 
poured  in  a  severe  fire  upon  our  men.  So  deadly  was 
this  fire  that  it  was  only  by  the  most  strenuous  exertions 
of  the  officers  that  our  men  could  be  kept  to  the  line  ; 
our  exertions,  however,  succeeded,  and  in  twenty  min 
utes  our  front  was  comparatively  clear  of  rebels,  who 
fell  back  to  the  position  formerly  held  by  the  two  bri 
gades  of  the  Second  Division  in  the  commencement  of 
the  fight,  from  whence  they  kept  up  a  fire  until  mid 
night,  when  we  withdrew.  Just  after  the  retaking  of 
the  line  by  our  troops,  as  I  was  passing  toward  the  left 
to  General  Cox's  position,  my  horse  was  killed ;  and  no 
sooner  had  I  regained  my  feet  than  I  received  a  musket- 
ball  through  the  back  of  my  neck.  My  wound,  however, 
did  not  prevent  my  keeping  the  field,  and  General  Cox 


330  Appendix  D 

kindly  furnished  me  a  remount.  The  rapidity  of  the 
firing  made  it  very  difficult  to  keep  up  the  ammunition, 
the  train  being  some  two  miles  distant  on  the  road  to 
Nashville  when  the  battle  commenced,  and  our  greatest 
danger  at  one  period  of  the  battle  was  that  we  would 
exhaust  our  ammunition.  One  hundred  wagon-loads  of 
ammunition,  artillery  and  musket  cartridges,  were  ex 
pended  in  this  short  battle,  belonging  to  the  ordnance 
train  of  the  Fourth  Army  Corps ;  this  train,  however, 
supplied  in  great  part  the  wants  of  the  Twenty -third 
Corps. 

After  the  first  great  attack  and  repulse  the  enemy 
made  several  feeble  demonstrations,  and  until  nine 
o'clock  in  the  evening  formed  and  advanced  upon  the 
Columbia  pike  three  or  four  times.  I  think  these  move 
ments  were  made  to  keep  us  from  moving,  or  to  ascer 
tain  the  very  moment  we  left.  At  the  commencement 
of  the  engagement  word  came  that  the  enemy's  cavalry 
had  forced  a  crossing  at  Hughes's  Ford,  and  calling  upon 
me  for  support  for  our  cavalry.  General  Wood  was 
directed  to  send  a  brigade,  and  General  Beatty's  brigade 
had  started,  when  information  came  that  our  cavalry 
had  driven  the  rebels  back  and  the  reinforcements  would 
not  be  needed.  General  Kimball's  division,  holding  the 
extreme  right  of  the  line,  had  comparatively  an  easy 
thing  of  this  fight ;  being  well  posted  behind  breast 
works,  their  volleys  soon  cleared  their  front  of  rebels. 
One  brigade,  Colonel  Kirby's,  only  had  the  opportunity 
to  fire  one  volley,  and  this  was  a  very  effective  one,  at  a 
rebel  brigade  which  endeavored  to  move  obliquely  across 
our  front  to  gain  the  right  bank  of  the  river.  It  having 
been  determined  to  withdraw  the  troops  to  Nashville, 
they  were  directed  to  leave  the  line  at  midnight,  the 
flanks  withdrawing  first  and  simultaneously,  the  pickets 
to  be  withdrawn  when  all  the  troops  had  crossed.  Some 
villain  came  very  near  frustrating  this  plan  by  firing  a 
house  in  Franklin ;  the  flames  soon  spread,  and  the  pros 
pect  was  that  a  large  fire  would  occur,  which,  lighting 


Appendix  D  331 

up  objects,  would  make  it  impossible  to  move  the  troops 
without  being  seen.  My  staff  officers  and  General  Wood's 
found  an  old  fire  engine,  and  getting  it  at  work,  the  flames 
were  soon  subdued,  and  the  darkness  was  found  to  be  in 
creased  by  the  smoke.  At  midnight  the  withdrawal  was 
made  successfully,  although  the  enemy  discovered  it  and 
followed  our  pickets  up  closely. 

General  Wood's  division  remained  on  the  north  side 
of  the  Harpeth  until  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  as  rear 
guard,  destroying  the  bridges  before  he  left.  The  enemy 
indulged  in  a  furious  shelling  as  soon  as  they  found  we 
had  left.  In  the  fight  of  the  day  before  their  artillery 
had  not  come  up,  and  but  two  batteries  were  used  upon 
us.  These  two  batteries  threw  shells  into  the  town  dur 
ing  the  entire  fight. 

Although  Brigadier  General  J.  D.  Cox  was  not  in  my 
command,  he  was  my  close  neighbor  in  the  battle  of 
Franklin,  and  I  take  this  opportunity  to  express  to  him 
my  thanks  for  his  gallant  help  at  that  time. 


332  Appendix  E 


APPENDIX   E 
STATEMENT   OP   COLONEL   DOW 

NOVEMBER  29,  1864.  Was  left  as  Inspector,  Third  Divis 
ion,  Twenty-third  Corps,  in  charge  of  pickets  at  Duck 
River,  when  the  division  was  moved  to  Spring  Hill  and 
Franklin.  Had  with  me  the  pickets  actually  on  duty 
and  12th  and  16th  Kentucky  as  supports,  with  two 
ambulances  and  one  wagon  loaded  with  ammunition. 
The  skirmish  line  was  a  long  one,  and  consisted  of  some 
hundreds  of  men  besides  the  supports. 

Remained  till  midnight,  as  ordered,  then  relieved  the 
skirmishers,  and  drew  them  in,  and  started  with  them 
for  Spring  Hill  and  Franklin  to  overtake  the  division. 
Passed  Spring  Hill  just  as  the  sun  was  rising,  and  over 
took  the  rear  of  the  Fourth  Corps  a  mile  or  so  north  of 
Spring  Hill. 

Met  General  T.  J.  Wood,  who  was  at  what  I  supposed 
was  the  rear  of  the  column.  After  informing  him  who 
I  was  and  the  command  with  me,  General  Wood  made  a 
remark  which  I  remember.  He  said,  "  Well,  Major,  do 
you  think  the  Lord  will  be  with  us  to-day  ?  "  I  marched 
in  rear  of  all  the  column  of  which  I  knew  anything, 
some  four  or  five  miles,  when  the  enemy's  cavalry  made 
an  attack  on  our  right,  and  had  evidently  been  trying  to 
reach  the  train.  They  were  occupying  higher  ground  to 
the  east  of  the  pike,  perhaps  a  thousand  yards  away. 
General  Wood  told  me  to  take  my  command  and  go  over 
the  fence,  and  drive  those  fellows  off.  I  obeyed  him, 
and  did  so,  and  we  drove  them  off  easily.  A  section  of 
artillery  took  part  in  this  affair  from  a  position,  say  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  ahead  of  us,  on  the  pike. 


Appendix  E  333 

We  passed  some  wagons  which  had  been  destroyed 
by  the  dash  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  but  whether  then 
or  at  another  time  that  morning,  can't  be  sure.  They 
(the  wagons)  were  already  nearly  burned  up  when  we 
saw  them. 

We  reached  Franklin  about  noon,  when  I  reported  my 
command,  which  was  ordered  into  second  line  of  Reilly's 
brigade  to  which  it  belonged.  I  distinctly  remember 
that  the  16th  Kentucky  lay  with  its  right  at  the  pike  in 
Keilly's  second  line,  and  the  12th  lay  on  its  left.  After 
these  joined  their  command,  I  returned  to  staff  duty. 
Being  greatly  fatigued,  I  threw  myself  down  somewhere 
after  I  got  my  dinner,  and  slept  till  about  the  time  of 
the  enemy's  advance  to  open  the  battle. 

Being  told  they  were  forming,  I  went  to  the  lines  on 
the  pike,  where  the  pike  passed  through  the  breastwork. 
I  saw  the  enemy  advancing.  I  saw  the  battery  that  had 
been  with  Wagner's  two  brigades  trot  leisurely  through 
the  works.  Don't  remember  anything  about  Wagner 
himself.  Saw  the  break  at  the  front,  and  saw  Wagner's 
men  coming  in  in  confusion.  Several  of  the  staff  were 
together,  and  when  we  called  for  our  horses,  the  orderlies 
had  disappeared  with  them.  Some  went  to  bring  them 
up  again  or  to  join  the  General  (Cox),  who  was  at  that 
time  farther  to  the  left. 

The  first  incident  I  distinctly  remember  after  this  was 
seeing  the  16th  Kentucky  go  forward  in  fine  style  along 
the  left  of  the  pike  to  the  works  from  which  the  100th 
Ohio  had  been  driven  with  the  crowd  of  fugitives  that 
came  in.  They  regained  the  line.  Opdycke's  brigade 
came  forward,  and  Generals  Stanley  and  Cox  were  on  the 
pike  with  them.  Captain  Tracy  was  with  General  Cox, 
and  I  joined  in  the  effort  to  rally  the  men  who  had  come 
in  in  confusion  or  who  had  left  the  line.  General  Stan 
ley  was  wounded  in  the  first  melee,  and  his  horse  shot 
also.  I  saw  his  wound  in  the  neck,  and  saw  him  re 
mounted  on  one  of  General  Cox's  horses.  General  Cox's 
headquarters  were  close  to  the  pike  on  its  left,  in  rear  of 


334  Appendix  E 

Keilly's  right,  during  the  remainder  of  the  battle,  and 
from  there  he  and  the  staff  went  to  do  any  duty  that 
called. 

I  don't  remember  seeing  Wagner  during  the  battle. 
Stanley  exercised  no  command  while  there,  but  rallied 
the  men.  I  was  along  the  line  on  duty,  more  or  less, 
during  the  engagement.  I  carried  the  order  to  the  112th 
Illinois  to  go  to  the  right  and  attempt  to  get  Strickland's 
line  up  to  the  original  breastworks.  I  led  the  regiment 
across,  halted  them  near  the  pike,  and  explained  the 
thing  expected  of  them ;  then  took  them  to  Strickland's 
line,  and  we  got  over  his  barricade  and  crawled  forward 
to  the  front  line,  a  distance  of  three  or  four  rods.  It 
was  already  dark  or  dusk,  and  I  can't  be  entirely  certain 
as  to  the  distance  back  of  the  Carter  house  where  we  got 
over  the  works.  It  was  a  short  distance  west  of  the 
pike.  We  crept  forward  to  the  front,  and  as  we  rose 
were  met  with  so  heavy  a  fire  that  we  were  obliged, 
after  a  little,  to  go  back  to  Strickland's  new  (or  second) 
barricade. 

I  knew  at  the  time  that  part  of  the  104th  Ohio  got 
over  the  works  in  their  front  soon  after  our  effort  in 
Strickland's  line,  captured  the  enemy  lying  in  the 
trenches,  and  cleared  the  front  there  if  not  in  front  of 
Strickland.  For  reasons  I  will  state  presently,  I  am 
confident  none  of  the  enemy's  force  stayed  at  the  out 
side  of  our  breastworks  long  after  dark,  and  that  they 
retired  under  cover  of  darkness,  all  who  were  able  to,  to 
positions  near  where  Wagner's  two  brigades  had  been. 

Some  time  in  the  evening  I  was  sent  by  General  Cox 
to  General  Schofield's  headquarters  on  the  north  side  of 
the  river.  I  found  him  and  General  Stanley  together. 
They  were  at  a  house,  say  half  or  three  quarters  of  a 
mile  from  the  river,  where  I  understood  General  Scho- 
field  fixed  his  headquarters  about  dark.  I  had  been  sent 
to  arrange  with  Colonel  Hartsuff,  Inspector  of  the  Corps, 
for  the  skirmish  line  which  was  ordered  to  be  left  when 
the  line  should  be  withdrawn.  When  the  request  had 


Appendix  E  335 

first  been  sent  to  General  Cox  to  have  me  go  to  meet 
Harts uff,  General  Cox  did  not  permit  me  to  go,  as  we 
were  busy  at  the  front,  but  later  in  the  evening  I  went 
over  at  the  General's  direction. 

I  am  confident  a  good  many  of  the  100th  Ohio  went 
back  to  the  line  after  the  second  line  advanced.  The 
works  east  of  the  pike  were  full  of  men,  three  or  four 
deep,  showing  that  the  ranks  were  practically  doubled, 
or  more.  Indeed,  there  was  quite  a  crowd  all  along 
there. 

When  the  command  moved  out  of  the  works,  near 
midnight,  I  was  left  in  charge  of  the  skirmish  line, 
which  was  detailed  to  occupy  them  for  another  hour. 
I  went  over  the  works,  and  walked  some  distance  out 
in  front.  No  enemies  were  there  but  those  disabled  or 
dead,  and  the  cries  of  the  wounded  for  help  were  very 
distressing.  At  that  time  I  heard  no  signs  of  any  force 
on  either  side  of  the  pike.  There  had  been  occasional 
sharp  volleys  all  the  evening,  but  these  had  ceased,  and 
there  was  no  shot  fired  while  our  troops  were  withdrawn, 
nor  during  the  time  I  stayed,  or  while  I  withdrew  the 
skirmishers.  We  moved  off  entirely  undisturbed,  and 
overtook  the  command  after  daylight. 

The  foregoing  is  written  at  my  dictation,  and  is  a 
correct  statement  of  the  facts  which  I  remember  as  to 
the  battle  of  Franklin  and  the  events  of  the  preceding 
night. 

(Signed)  T.  T.  Dow. 


336  Appendix  F 


APPENDIX   F 
STATEMENTS   OF   COLONEL   COX 


CINCINNATI,  OHIO,  June  16,  1881. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL,  —  Perhaps  my  personal  recollec 
tions  of  some  of  the  incidents  connected  with  the  battle 
of  Franklin  may  be  of  service  some  day  in  connection 
with  more  important  testimony,  and  I  jot  them  down  for 
your  use. 

After  we  had  established  our  lines  about  the  town  to 
cover  the  crossing  of  our  army  trains  over  the  Harpeth 
River,  most  of  the  officers  of  your  staff  were  trying  to  get 
a  little  rest  after  our  hard  night  march  from  Columbia 
and  Spring  Hill,  and  were  lolling  around  on  the  porch 
and  grass  in  front  of  the  Carter  house  near  to  the  Frank 
lin  pike.  Two  brigades  of  General  Wagner's  division  of 
the  Fourth  Corps  were  in  line  some  distance  in  advance 
of  the  main  line,  they  having  been  the  rear  guard  in  the 
retreat  from  Columbia.  I  recollect  your  having  a  con 
versation  with  General  Wagner  about  the  position  of  his 
troops  and  the  necessity  of  their  being  retired  within  the 
main  line  should  Hood  attack  us,  and  before  there  should 
be  any  danger  of  their  being  engaged  where  they  were. 
You  then  rode  off  toward  the  left  with  Captain  Tracy, 
and,  I  think,  Lieutenant  Coughlan. 

A  short  time  after  this  Captain  Bradley  and  I  were 
sitting  on  the  steps  of  the  Carter  house,  when  the  first 
premonition  to  us  of  battle  came  in  the  shape  of  a  shell 
tearing  off  a  portion  of  the  cornice  of  the  porch  and  ex- 


Appendix  F  337 

ploding  in  the  yard  near  by.1  We  immediately  ran  to 
our  horses,  preparing  to  take  the  direction  you  had  gone, 
down  the;  line,  and  as  we  crossed  the  road  saw  a  staff 
officer  come  dashing  in  from  the  front,  up  to  where  Gen 
eral  Wagner  was,  near  the  opening  in  the  main  line  on 
the  pike,  and  we  very  naturally  stopped  to  hear  what  he 
had  to  say.  He  reported  that  the  enemy  was  moving 
forward  in  line  of  battle,  evidently  in  force,  and  would 
overlap  the  two  brigades  in  front  on  both  flanks,  and  he 
did  not  think  they  ought  to  remain  there  any  longer.  "  Go 
back,"  said  General  Wagner,  "  and  tell  them  to  fight,  — 
fight  like  hell ! "  Bradley  and  I  at  once  remonstrated 
with  General  Wagner,  saying  that  such  an  order  we  were 
sure  was  not  in  accordance  with  the  understanding  had 
with  you.  But  he  simply  reiterated  it  more  forcibly,  if 
possible,  than  before,  and  the  staff  officer  rode  off  to  the 
front.  Bradley  and  I  then  started  off  to  report  this 
strange  affair  to  you.  Before  it  could  be  corrected,  how 
ever,  the  mischief  was  done,  and  Wagner's  two  brigades 
came  in  only  as  they  came  with  the  enemy  on  their 
heels. 

After  the  break  in  our  line  on  the  pike  (caused  by 
Wagner's  nitn  and  the  enemy  mounting  our  works  at  the 
same  time  and  so  obliging  that  part  of  our  corps  to  with 
hold  its  fire)  was  re-established  by  General  Opdycke's 
brigade,  General  Stanley  rode  up  to  the  front  at  this 
point  ;  but  he  had  scarcely  done  so  (and  before  he  had 
time  to  view  the  field  or  give  or  suggest  an  order)  when 
he  was  wounded  and  his  horse  shot.  Captain  Tracy  then 
dismounted  from  your  dun  horse  which  he  had  been 
riding,  and  gave  it  to  Stanley,  who  immediately  mounted 
and  rode  off  through  the  village.  This  was  the  only  time 
I  saw  General  Stanley  that  day  until  I  went  over  the 
river  in  the  evening  to  see  General  Schofield  at  his  head- 

1  A  veranda  on  the  south  side  of  the  ell  of  the  Carter  house  faced 
toward  our  front.  A  cannon  shot  passed  under  this  veranda,  and 
through  the  ell.  The  holes  of  entrance  and  exit  are  still  to  be 
seen. 

22 


338  Appendix  P 

quarters.     Of  the  great  battle  itself,  it  is  hardly  proper 
for  me  to  say  anything  here. 

When  the  many  desperate  charges  in  column  of  the 
enemy  had  been  repulsed  and  the  firing  along  the  line 
had  so  far  subsided  as  to  indicate  that  Hood  had  given 
up  the  fight  for  the  night,  I  went  by  your  direction  over 
the  river  to  General  SehofiekPs  headquarters  to  report 
the  position  at  the  front,  and  suggest  to  General  Scho- 
field  that  you  were  so  well  satisfied  with  the  punishment 
Hood  had  received,  that  you  urged  the  holding  of  the 
lines  and  the  reinforcement  of  them  from  Nashville  that 
night,  so  that  we  might  take  the  offensive  in  the  morn 
ing,  and  that  you  were  willing  to  guarantee  our  success 
from  that  point,  with  your  head. 

At  General  Schofield's  headquarters,  besides  his  usual 
staff,  I  saw  General  Stanley  and  several  officers.  After 
making  my  report  and  delivering  your  message  to  Gen 
eral  Schotield,  he  said  to  me  in  the  presence  of  all  there, 
"  Go  back  and  tell  General  Cox  that  he  has  won  a  glo 
rious  victory,  and  however  much  his  suggestions  weigh 
with  me,  my  orders  from  General  Thomas  are  to  fall 
back  to  Nashville  as  speedily  as  possible,  and  it  must  be 
done.  Therefore,  so  soon  as  the  enemy  withdraws  suf 
ficiently  and  General  Cox  thinks  it  safe,  tell  him  to  put 
the  whole  command  in  motion  and  cross  the  river." 

We  crossed  the  river  that  night  late,  having  been  kept 
in  position  an  hour  or  so  by  the  burning  of  a  barn  in 
town  that  so  illuminated  our  movements  that  we  were 
obliged  to  wait  and  see  it  out. 

Yours, 

(Signed)  THEO.  Cox. 

GENERAL  J.  D.  Cox. 

II 

CINCINNATI,  October  2,  1889. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL,  —  I  remember  very  distinctly  that 
our  headquarters  at  Franklin,  November  30,  1864,  were 


Appendix  F  339 

fixed  at  the  Carter  house  when  we  first  reached  the  town 
early  in  the  morning.  After  it  was  determined  that  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  must  remain  there  and  defend  the 
position  until  bridges  could  be  made  over  the  Harpeth 
and  all  our  army  trains  crossed  to  the  north  bank,  a  few 
of  our  most  necessary  tents  were  taken  out  of  the  wagons 
and  put  up  on  the  slope  of  the  hill  just  north  of  the 
house.  During  the  day  and  up  to  midnight,  members  of 
your  staff  and  orderlies  were  always  in  that  vicinity. 
The  tents,  however,  were  removed  about  the  time  the 
battle  opened,  and  I  did  not  see  them  again  till  we  got 
settled  down  at  Nashville. 

A  short  time  after  the  line  had  been  restored,  Captain 
Hentig,  A.  Q.  M.,  reported  that  stragglers  had  taken  pos 
session  of  the  old  county  bridge  to  such  an  extent  as  to 
block  his  trains,  and  you  sent  me  down  there  to  help 
right  matters  and  put  a  guard  upon  the  bridge.  While 
in  that  vicinity  I  saw  General  Wagner  making  efforts  to 
rally  what  I  suppose  was  a  part  of  his  broken  and  demor 
alized  command.  He  was  very  excited  and  demonstra 
tive.  In  his  pleading  and  remonstrating  with  his  men, 
I  have  the  most  vivid  recollection  of  his  using  these 
words  :  "  Stand  by  me,  boys,  and  I  '11  stand  by  you  ! " 

Upon  my  stating  to  General  Wagner  my  orders,  he 
volunteered  to  place  a  guard  on  the  bridge,  and  see  that 
no  more  trouble  occurred  between  the  men  and  the  cross 
ing  trains. 

Ever  truly, 
(Signed)  THEO.  Cox. 

GENERAL  J.  D.  Cox,  Cincinnati. 


INDEX 


_Y.  B.  —  The.  rank  of  officers  engaged  at  Franklin  is  that  which  they  bore  at  the  time. 


ADAMS,    JOHN,   Brig.   Gen.    com'g 

Brigade,    88.      His    charge     and 

death,  127,  128. 
AMMUNITION.     Twenty-third   Corps 

trains  sent  over  the  Harpeth,  50. 

Supply  from  Fourth  Corps  trains, 

50,  note. 
ARTICLES  OF  WAR,  Interpretation 

of,  274  et  seq. 
ARTILLERY  positions  at  Franklin,  55- 

59,  75,  84,  108,  175,  note.     With 
drawal,  186  et  seq.     First  orders, 

267. 
ASHBURY,    Capt.   com'g   Schofield's 

cavalry  escort,  34,  note. 
ATVVATER,    FREDERICK    A.,    Capt. 

com'g  51st  Illinois,  79,  note. 
ATWATER,    MERRITT     B.,      Major 

com'g  42d  Illinois,  78.  note,  252. 
AYERS,      STEPHEN      C.,     Surgeon. 

Hospital  work,  Incident,  185,  note. 

BALDWIN,  A.  P.,  Lieut,  com'g  Bat 
tery,  110.  At  the  Cotton-Gin,  ib. 
Withdrawal,  187. 

BALDWIN,  BYRON  C.,  Color  Serg't. 
Leads  a  rally,  109. 

BARNES,  MILTON,  Lieut.  Col.  com'g 
97th  Ohio.  At  outpost,  78,  79, 
note.  Re-organization,  250. 

BARR,  ANDREW  J.,  Lieut.  Col.  44th 
Missouri,  57.  Position  at  Frank 
lin,  ib.  Report,  118,  note.  Breast 
works,  ib.,  240.  Regiment  trans 
ferred,  210,  note. 

BATE,  WILLIAM  B.,  Maj.  Gen. 
com'g  Division,  88.  Formation  for 
attack,  132.  Convergent  advance, 


133.     Casualties,   135.     Line  laps 
Brown,  152. 

BATES,  EDWARD  P.,  Capt.  com'g 
125th  Ohio.  In  Opdycke's  charge 
at  centre,  116.  New  barricades, 
ib.,  238. 

BEATTY,  SAMUEL,  Brig.  Gen.  com'g 
Brigade,  168. 

BEAUREGARD,  G.  T.,  General.  His 
command,  4.  Relations  to  Hood, 
5,  6.  Judgment  on  battle  of 
Franklin,  12,  197. 

BENNETT  AND  HAIGH,  History  36th 
Illinois,  cited,  241. 

BIEGHLE,  ALEXANDER  W.,  Lieut, 
com'g  ambulances,  182. 

BOND,  EMERY  S.,  Lieut.  Col.  com'g 
112th  Illinois.  Reinforces  Strick 
land,  161.  Effort  to  retake  main 
line,  ib.  Wounded,  162.  Later 
career,  162,  note.  Second  line, 
240. 

BOSTICK  PLACE.  Topography,  47. 
Battery  there,  132.  Bate's  line,  ib. 

BRADLEY,  D.  C.,  Lieut.  &  A.  D.  C. 
Wagner's  orders,  106. 

BRADLEY,  LUTHER  P.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Brigade,  wounded  at  Spring 
Hill,  64.  Wagner's  characteris 
tics,  231. 

BRADSHAW,  ROBERT  C.,  Colonel 
44th  Missouri.  Wounded,  57, 
117,  note,  240.  Regiment  trans 
ferred,  210.  note. 

BRANTLY,  WILLIAM  F.,  Brig.  Gen. 

coin's  Brigade,  88.     Attack,  153. 
I  BRIDGES  at   Franklin,    45.     Repair 
of    County   Bridge,  50.     Railway 


342 


Index 


bridge,  51.  Retirement  of  troops, 
188  et  seq. 

BRIDGES,  LYMAN,  Captain  and  Chief 
of  Artillery,  57.  Batteries  re 
ported  to  Cox,  ib.,  58,  82,  260, 
note.  Position  of  batteries,  108, 
117,  note,  132.  Withdrawal,  187. 
Understanding  of  orders,  2G8. 

BROWN,  JOHN  C.,  Maj.  Gen.  com'g 
Division,  88.  His  advance,  93, 
104.  Attacks  Ruger,  132.  Lines 
of  attack,  152,  155.  Wounded, 
165. 

BROWN,  JOHN  H.,  Capt.  12th  Ken 
tucky.  At  the  Cotton-Gin,  111. 

BROWN,  ROBERT  C.,  Lieut.  Col. 
com'g  64th  Ohio,  79,  note. 

BUCKNER,  ALLEN,  Colonel  79th 
Illinois,  79.  note.  At  Franklin, 
249.  Reporting  to  Reilly,  250. 

BUFORD,  ABRAHAM,  Brig.  Gen. 
Cavalry  Division,  83.  At  Frank 
lin,  86,"  174. 

BULLOCK,  ROBERT,  Colonel  com'g 
Brigade,  132,  135. 

BURDICK,  JOHN  S.,  Lieut,  com'g 
Battery,  108-  Wounded,  187. 

BURNSIDE,  AMBROSE  E.,  Maj.  Gen. 
Losses  at  Fredericksburg,  15. 

BURR,  Frank  H.  Article  cited,  17, 
note. 

CAMPBELL,  JOHN  A.,  Major  & 
A.  A.  G.,  39,  57,  60. 

CANBY,  SAMUEL,  Lieut,  com'g 
Battery,  125.  In  action,  ib.  With 
drawal,  187. 

CAPERS,  ELLISON,  Colonel  24th 
South  Carolina,  93.  Description 
of  field,  93,  94,  154.  Wounded, 
155.  Later  career,  155,  note. 

CAPRON,  HORACE,  Brig.-Gen.  Cav 
alry,  172. 

CARTER,  F.  B.,  his  house  the  centre 
of  the  line,  43.  Topography,  44, 
45.  Fighting  around  the  house, 
97,  116,  119,  142.  Experience  of 
his  family,  197. 

CARTER,  JOHN  C.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Brigade.  88.  In  second 
line,  93,  132,  152.  Attack,  155. 


CARTER,  M.  B.  Aids  in  fixing  lo 
calities,  43,  44,  77.  His  narrative, 
199.  Second  line,  242. 

CARTER,  THEODORIC,  Captain. 
Wounded,  197,  200. 

CARTER,  Captain  72cl  Illinois.  Effort 
to  retake  first  line,  161. 

CASEMENT,  JOHN  S.  Colonel  103d 
Ohio,  com'g  Brigade,  52.  Position 
at  Franklin,  z'6.,  112.  Attacked, 
121.  123.  Repulses  the  enemy, 
126^  127.  Slight  loss,  129,  note. 
Incident,  146,  note.  Later  career, 
147,  note.  Second  line,  240.  Cox 
in  command  on  the  line,  284, 
285. 

CASUALTIES  at  Franklin,  compared 
with  other  battles,  15.  Reilly's  bri 
gade,  114.  Loring's  division,  126, 
note.  Moore's  brigade,  134.  Bate's 
division,  135.  Chalmers's  do.,  139, 
213.  Cockrell's  brigade,  213,  note. 
In  general,  211  et  seq. 

CHEATHAM,  BENJAMIN  F.,  Maj. 
Gen.  com'g  Corps,  17,  note.  Field 
headquarters  at  Franklin,  69.  De 
ployment,  88.  Advance,  98,  105. 
His  dead  within  our  works,  118. 
Lines  of  attack,  152.  Condition  of 
troops,  194. 

CHALMERS.  JAMES  R.,  Brig.  Gen. 
Cavalry  Division,  83.  March  to 
Franklin,  84.  At  Franklin,  86, 
89.  Line  of  attack,  133,  135. 
Report,  138..  Casualties,  139. 

CLARK,  MERVIN.  Lieut.  Col.  183d 
Ohio,  57.  Killed,  237. 

CLAYTON,  HENRY  D.,  Maj.  Gen. 
com'g  Division,  84.  Report 
quoted,  154.  In  reserve,  165. 
Condition  of  troops,  195. 

CLEBURNE,  PATRICK  R.,  Maj.  Gen. 
com'g  Division,  87,  88.  His 
charge  at  the  centre,  104,  123,  149, 
156.  Killed,  158.  Place,  159. 
Condition  of  troops,  194. 

CLIFT,  DR.  His  house  Schofield's 
headquarters  in  morning,  67,  280, 
note. 

COCKERILL,  GILES  J.,  Capt.  and 
Chief  of  Artillery,  49.  Guns  in 


Index 


343 


Fort  Granger,  59,  95,  123,  note. 
Guns  parked.  175,  note. 

COCKRELL,  FRANCIS  M.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Brigade.  88.  His  attack, 
150,  152. 

COLLAMORE,  G.  A.,  Major,  Surgeon. 
Field  work,  181. 

COLUMBIA,  TENN.  The  position, 
21,  23. 

CONRAD,  JOSEPH,  Colonel  15tli 
Missouri,  com'g  Brigade.  At 
Winstead  Hill,  U5.  Final  outpost 
position,  73,  76.  Asks  for  direc 
tions,  78.  His  criticism  of  Wng- 
ner,  79,  note.  The  orders,  80. 
Makes  barricade,  92.  Hood's 
centre  checked,  10-3.  Message 
to  Wagner,  104.  Wedge-shaped 
line,  131.  Groups  rallying,  142. 
Reorganization,  171.  Report,  228. 
232.  Discussion  of  rallying  place, 
244  etseq.  Line  of  retreat,  245,  246. 

COON,  DATUS  E.,  Colonel  com'g 
Cavalry  Brigade.  At  Franklin, 
172. 

COOPER,  JOSEPH  A.,  Brig.  Gen. 
Commands  detachment  at  Cen- 
terville,  24.  Ordered  to  Franklin, 
29.  His  troops,  54.  Expected  at 
Franklin,  173.  Devious  march  to 
Nashville,  204. 

COUGHLAN,  JAMES,  Lieut.  &  A.  D.  C. 
Sent  with  order  to  Opdycke,  95. 
Killed  at  the  Cotton-Gin,  114. 

Cox,  JACOB  D.,  Brig.  Gen.  com'g 
Division,  27.  Holds  crossing  of 
Duck  River,  27,  31.  At  Spring 
Hill,  34.  March  to  Franklin,  37. 
At  the  Carter  House,  39.  Ordered 
to  hold  Hood  back,  ib.  Put  in 
command  of  Twenty-third  Corps, 
ib.  Headquarters,  53.  Fourth 
Corps  batteries  report  to  him,  57. 
Schofield's  orders  for  the  evening. 
f>8.  Wagner's  orders,  71.  Inspec 
tion  of  lines,  80,81.  Warning  to 
Wagner,  82.  Ride  to  the  left,  91. 
Order  to  Opdycke,  95.  Visits 
Strickland's  line,  142,  144.  Visits 
Ruger,  144.  Orders  reinforce 
ment  from  Kimball,  144.  Ride 


to  Stiles's  brigade,  146.  Case 
ment  and  Reitly,  ?6.,  163.  Confi 
dence  of  holding  position,  169. 
Withdrawal,  186  et  seq.  Orders 
to  Opdycke,  190.  Burning  build 
ing,  191.  March  to  Nashville, 
192.  Discussion  of  Wagner's 
conduct,  220  et  seq.  His  visit  at 
Nashville,  222.  Friendly  judg 
ment,  223.  Opdycke's  promotion, 
225.  Letter  to  Wagner,  226. 
Preliminary  report,  227.  Official 
report,  230,  311.  Double  breast 
works,  233  ct  seq.  Wagner's 
men,  257.  Command  on  the  line, 
258  tt  seq.  Nine  points,  260. 
Schofield  quoted,  265.  'Gener 
osity,'  ib.  The  'line 'first  estab 
lished,  266.  The  artillery,  267. 
Orders  to  Bridges,  268*.  To 
Ruger,  269.  To  Kimball,  270. 
Relation  to  the  line,  271  et  seq., 
291.  The  Articles  of  War,  274. 
Examples  of  orders,  277,  278. 
Fighting  in  the  night,  289,  note. 
Report  of  Twenty-third  Corps, 
294,  311.  Stanley  quoted,  296, 
297.  Personal  position,  297. 
Contemporaneous  records,  299, 
300.  Schofield  on  the  agreed  out 
line,  301,  note.  Wherry  and 
Opdycke,  301.  Method  in  prepar 
ing  former  histories,  302.  Scho 
field  on  their  accuracy,  303. 

Cox,  THEODORE,  Capt.  &  A.  A.  G. 
At  Carter  House,  53.  Wagner's 
orders,  106.  His  later  career,  107, 
note.  Visits  Wagner  at  river, 
146,  225.  Sent  to  Schofield,  169. 
Stanley  wounded  and  retires,  283. 
At  Schofield's  headquarters,  ib.t 
287.  Written  statements,  336,  338. 

CROXTOX,  JOHN  T.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Cavalry  Brigade,  82.  At 
Franklin,  86,  l"73,  175,  177,  178. 

CUNNINGHAM,  S.  A.,  Sergt.  Major. 
Description  of  fight,  164.  Death 
of  Strahl,  165. 

CUNNINGHAM,  W.  E.,  Capt.  41st 
Tennessee.  Description  of  fight 
at  centre,  164.  Wounded,  ib. 


344 


Index 


DAVIS,  JEFFERSON,  visits  Hood  in 
Georgia,  2.  His  approval  of  Hood's 
plan  of  campaign,  3.  His  speech 
and  its  publication,  ib.  Assigns 
Beau  regard  to  command  in  Gulf 
States,  4.  Judgment  on  battle  of 
Franklin,  12. 

DAVIS,  NEWTON,  N.,  Colonel  com'g 
Brigade.  Wounded,  153. 

DA  WES,  EPHRAIM  C.,  Major,  227. 

DEAS.  ZACHARIAH  C.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Brigade,  88. 

Dow,  TRIS.  T.,  Major  112th  Illinois, 
Inspector  General.  On  picket  at 
Duck  River,  33.  Leads  reinforce 
ment  to  Strickland,  146,  161.  Sent 
to  Schofield,  170.  Covers  with 
drawal,  186.  Scene  on  the  field, 
192.  Second  line,  240.  Wagner, 
255.  Stanley  wounded,  and  re 
tires,  283.  Written  statement,  332. 

DOWLING,  PATRICK  H.,  Capt.  & 
Act'g  Insp.  Gen.  Leads  a  rally, 
119.  Wounded,  131.  Second  line, 
241. 

DUCK  RIVER.     The  position,  23. 

ECTOR,  MATTHEW  D.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Brigade,  88.  Guarding  pon 
toons,  ib.,  122. 

ELLIOTT,  WASHINGTON  L.,  Brig. 
Gen.  assigned  to  Wagner's  divis 
ion,  229. 

FATIGUE    OF    TROOPS.      Limits    of 

physical  endurance,  203. 
FEATHERSTON,  WINFIELD  S.,  Brig. 

Gen.  com'g  Brigade,  88.     His  at 
tack,  125,  127,  150. 
FIELD  FORTIFICATIONS.    Problem  of 

attack  and  defence,  13, 14,  122. 126, 

129,  131. 

FIELD,  H.  M.,  Rev.    Cited,  17,  note. 
FIGUER'S    HILL.      Topography,   45. 

Fort  Granger  ib.     Artillery  there, 

48,  94,  125,  175. 
FINLEY,  JESSE  J.,    Brig.  Gen.,  88, 

132,  note. 
FIRE  DISCIPLINE,   218,  219.     Capt. 

F.  N.  Maude  cited,  219,  note. 


FLAGS  CAPTURED,  110,  note,  219,  251, 
252,  306. 

FORREST,  NATHAN  B.,  Maj.  Gen. 
His  cavalrv  corps  crosses  Duck 
River,  24,  26.  At  Spring  Hill,  31, 
32,  34.  At  Franklin,  82.  The 
march  thither,  83.  Covering  the 
infantrv,  86.  Positions  of  divisions, 
174.  Combat  at  Ilughes's  Ford, 
177.  Evening  orders,  179.  March 
to  Nashville,  196. 

FORT  GRANGER,  45,  48.  94,  125,  175. 

FOSTER,  WILLIAM  F.,  Major  and 
Engineer  Stewart's  Corps,  Map, 
83;  cited,  242. 

FRENCH,  SAMUEL  G.,  Maj.  Gen. 
com'g  Division,  88.  Formation 
and  attack,  122,  149. 

FRINK,  C.  S.,  Major,  Surgeon,  and 
Medical  Inspector,  40.  Schoiield's 
orders,  ib.  Field  work,  180  et  seq. 
Paper  cited,  185,  note. 

FULLERTON,  JOSEPH  S.,  Lieut.  Col. 
&  A.  A.  G-,  66.  His  journal 
quoted,  67,  70,  229,  271,  288.  Wil 
son's  visit  to  the  Truett  house, 
288. 

GENERAL  OFFICERS.  Fatality 
amongst,  213,  214. 

GIST,  W.  W.  Narrative,  17,  note, 
201.  Private  soldier,  afterward 
College  Professor,  ib.  Cited,  246, 
252. 

GIST,  S.  R.,  Brig.  Gen.  com'g  Bri 
gade,  88.  Advance,  93,  132,  152, 
155. 

GOODSPEED,  WILP.UR  F.,  Major  of 
Artillery,  260. 

GORDON,  GEORGE  W.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Brigade,  88.  Advance,  93, 
132.  Captured,  150,  152.  His 
attack,  155.  Quoted,  156.  His 
surrender,  158. 

GOVAN,  DANIEL  C.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Brigade,  88. 

GRANBURY,  HIRAM  B.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Brigade,  88.  Attack,  156. 

GRANT,  ULYSSES  S.,  Lieut.  Gen. 
View  of  the  campaign,  4.  Losses 
at  Shiloh  and  Cold  Harbor,  15. 


Index 


345 


GREGG,  T.  C.  Messenger  from  Con 
rad  to  Wagner,  107. 

GROSE,  WILLIAM,  Brig.  Gen.  com'g 
Brigade,  61.  Position  at  Franklin, 
ib.  Attacked,  133,  13G. 

GUIBOR'S  battery,  84,  8,),  126. 

HAIGH,  Bennett  and,  History  36th 
Illinois  cited,  241. 

HALLECK,  HENRY  W..,  Maj.  Gen., 
Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army,  10. 

HAMMOND,  JOHN  II.,  Bt.  Brig.  Gen. 
coni'g  Cavalry  Brigade.  At  Tri 
une,  172;  at  Wilson's  Mill,  173. 

HAMPTON,  HENUY,  Major  &  act'g 
A.  A.  G.,  165. 

HARRISON,  THOMAS  J.,  Colonel 
coni'g  Cavalry  Brigade  at  Frank 
lin,  172. 

HARTSUFF,  WILLIAM,  Lieut.  Col.  & 
Insp.  Gen.  Details  of  withdrawal, 
170:  186. 

HATCH,  EDWARD.  Brig.  Gen.  com'g 
Cavalry  Division,  32.  At  Franklin, 
86,  172.  Combat,  177. 

HATRY,  AUGUST  G.,  Major  183d 
Ohio,235.  Commands  Ruger's  skir 
mishers,  237.  Later  career,  26., note. 
Wagner's  men,  254. 

HAYES,  EDWIN  L.,  Lieut.  Col.  coni'g 
100th  Ohio.  Position  in  line,  59. 
Fight  at  centre.  100. 

HEARD.  J.  THKODORK.  Major,  Sur 
geon,  &  Medical  Director,  183. 
Report,  185,  note. 

HENDERSON,  THOMAS  J..  Colonel 
112th  Illinois,  commanding  Bri 
gade,  52.  In  the  fight,  124,  note, 
146. 

HENTIG,  FREDERICK  G  .  Capt.  & 
C.  S.,  acting  Q,  M.  Message  as  to 
Wagner's  men.  14"-'. 

HILL,  R.  J.,  Major,  Surgeon.  De 
scription  of  the  Confederate  ad 
vance.  95.  Field  work,  183.  Field 
hospital  north  of  .  ivcr,  286. 
Dresses  Stanley's  wound,  ib. 

HOOD,  JOHN  P>.,  Lieut.  Gen.  Con 
ference  with  President  Davis,  2. 
Plan  of  campaign,  3,  4.  Subordi 
nate  to  Beauregard,  4,  5.  Prelim 


inary  movements,  5.  Delay  at 
Tuscumbia,  6.  His  forces,  9.  Ad 
vances  from  Florence  upon  Colum 
bia,  11.  Criticises  his  subordinates 
at  Spring  Hill,  12.  His  tactics  at 
Franklin,  14.  Turns  the  position 
at  Duck  River,  26.  Moves  on 
Spring  Hill,  31,  o2.  Attack  re 
pulsed,  33.  March  to  Franklin, 
83.  His  artillery,  84.  Determines 
to  attack,  85.  Deployment,  87,  88. 
Field  headquarters,  8d.  Advance 
of  his  line,  1)2.  Orders  to  Cheat- 
ham  and  Stewart,  98.  The  roar  of 
musketry,  99.  His  centre  retarded, 
102.  Hi's  extreme  left,  140.  Many 
lines  of  attack,  148  et  atq.  Fierce 
ness  of  light,  153.  His  reserves, 
165.  Chalmers's  cavalry,  174. 
Forrest's,  ib.  Night  orders,  194. 
Condition  of  troops,  ib.  March  to 
Nashville,  196.  Statistics,  207  et 
seq.  Kecruiting  in  Tennessee,  208. 
The  night  righting,  289,  note. 

HOOKER,  JOSEPH,  Maj. -Gen.  Losses 
at  Chancellorsville,  15. 

HORN,  HENRY,  Sergeant  com'g  Bat 
tery,  187. 

HORNBROOK,  Cnpt.  65th  Indiana, 
128,  note. 

HUNT.  WILLIAM  W.,  Capt.  100th 
Ohio,  Acting  Major,  killed  at  the 
parapet,  109. 

INGERSOLL.  E.  J.,  Capt.  73d  Illinois. 
Quoted,  285. 

JACKSON.    HENRY    R.,     Brig. -Gen. 

com'g   Bricra.de,    88.       Position   in 

attack.  132. 
JACKSON,  WILLIAM  FT.,  Brig.-Gen. 

com'g   C;ivalrv  Division,  83.      At 

Franklin.  86,   175.     Ordered   over 

the  Harppth.  ib.     Combat.  177. 
JAMES,    WILLIAM,  JR..   Major    72d 

Illinois.    Wounded.  118.  note,  953. 
JOHNSON,  EDWARD.  Maj. -Gen.  com'g 

Division.  31.  84.  88.     His  attack, 

152. 
JOHNSON,  RICHARD  W.,  Brig.-Gen. 

com'g  Cavalry  Division,  82,  172. 


346 


Index 


JOHNSTON,  JOSEPH  E.,  General. 
Judgment  on  battle  of  Franklin,  13. 

KIM  BALL,  NATHAN,  Brig.-Gen. 
com'g  Divisisn,  29.  At  Ruther 
ford's  Creek,  z"6.,  32.  March  to 
Franklin,  35.  Coming  into  posi 
tion,  GO.  His  brigades,  61.  Orders 
for  the  evening,  68.  Rein 
forces  Ruger's  division,  131.  Ex 
tent  of  line,  136.  Breastworks  not 
complete,  140.  Position  firmly 
held,  145.  Withdrawal,  188. 
Conflict  of  orders,  189.  Relations 
to  Cox,  261,  263.  Interpretation 
of  orders,  270. 

KINGLAKE'S  Invasion  of  the  Crimea, 
cited,  79,  note. 

KIRBY,  ISAAC  M.,  Brig.-Gen.  com'g 
Brigade.  Position  at  Franklin,  61. 
Reinforces  Moore,  134,  note,  136. 

LANE,  JOHN  Q.,  Colonel  97th  Ohio, 
com'g  Brigade.  At  WinsteadHill, 
65.  At  Privet  Knob,  75.  Final 
outpost  position,  ib.,  76.  Wag 
ner's  orders,  80.  Makes  barricade, 
92.  Hood's  centre  checked,  103. 
Wedge-shaped  formation,  131. 
Groups  rallying,  142.  Reorgani 
zation,  171.  Report,  228,  232. 
Discussion  of  rallying  place,  244 
tt  seq.  Line  of  retreat,  245,  246. 

LEE,  STEPHEN  D.,  Lieut.-Gen.  At 
Columbia,  31,  33.  Follows  Scho- 
field's  retreat,  34.  At  Franklin, 
84,  152.  Report  quoted,  153,  154. 

LOCUST  GROVE.  Its  place,  55,  245, 
246. 

LORING,  WILLIAM  TV.,  Maj.-Gen. 
com'g  Division.  Position  and 
advance.  123,  124.  Casualties,  126, 
note.  His  right,  149. 

MCCLELLAN,  GEORGE  B.,  Maj.-Gen. 

Losses  in  Seven-days'  battle,  15. 
McCov,   DANIEL,  Lieut-Col,  com'g 

175th    Ohio.      Helps  restore    the 

line,  113. 
MCDANALD,  BEDAN  B.,  Lieut. -Col. 


com'g    101st      Ohio.      Reinforces 

Moore,  134,  234,  264. 
McMlLLIN,  C.  W.,  Major,  Surgeon. 

Field  work,  282. 
MCQUAIDE,    JOHN.      Finding    Cle- 

burne's  body,  159.  note. 
MANIGAULT,  Arthur  M.,  Brig.  Gen. 

com'g  Brigade,  88.  His  attack,  153. 
MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.     Development 

of   the    plan,    7,    8-     Number   of 

troops,  8. 
MARSHALL,    ALEXANDER,    Captain 

of  Artillery,  G9.  Section  of  bat 
tery  at  Winstead  Hill,  16.,  95.  At 

Stiles's  left,  battery  in  action.  125. 

Withdrawal,  187. 
MAUDE,    F.  N.,  Capt.  R.  E.,  cited, 

219,  note. 
MAURICE,  J.  F.,  Col.  R.  A.     English 

casualties  at  Waterloo,  15,  note. 
MEDICAL  DEPARTMENT.     Its  work, 

180  et  seq. 

MERRILL'S  HILL.    See  Privet  Knob. 
MISSING,  THE.     Significance  of,  216, 

247. 
MITCHELL,   GEORGE    H.,  Lieut,    of 

Artillery.        Com'g    section    with 

rear  guard,  75,  95. 
MOHRMANN,     Lieut.    ~72d     Illinois. 

Letter  cited,  253. 
MOORE,    ORLANDO    H.,    Col.    25th 

Michigan,  com'g  Brigade,  24,  note. 

Position  at  Franklin,  54.     Repels 

enemy's  attack,  119,  130,  246. 
Reinforced  from  KimbalPs  divis 
ion,  131,  134.  Casualties,  134. 

NEELY  HOUSE,  Hood's  headquarters, 
89. 

OFFICIAL  RECORDS.  Importance  of 
the  publication,  17,  18. 

OPDYCKE,  EMERSON,  Col.  125th 
Ohio,  com'g  Brigade.  His  narra 
tive,  17.  note.  Rear  guard  duty, 
64.  At  Winstead  Hill,  65.  In  re 
serve  near  Carter  house,  71.  Order 
from  Cox,  95  &  note.  His 
charge,  98.  In  the  melee,  99,  106. 
Formation  of  his  troops,  115.  At 
the  retrenchment,  142,  145.  Second 


Index 


347 


line  placed,  170.  Withdrawal, 
190.  Promotion,  225.  Difference 
with  Wagner,  224,  231.  The 
second  line,  233  et  seq.  Separa 
tion  from  Wagner,  249,  256 
Lane's  and  Conrad's  men,  257. 
Cox's  orders,  261,  263.  Command 
on  the  line,  282.  Stanley's  pres 
ence,  ib.  Stanley  wounded  and 
retires,  ib. 

PENNEFATHER,  Gen.,  at  Inkerman, 
79,  note. 

PHISTERER,  FREDERICK,  Capt.  U.  S. 
A.  Cited,  15,  note. 

POLK,  Lucius  E.,  Brig.  Gen.  com'g 
Brigade,  88. 

PONTOONS,  Schofield's  request,  24, 
39.  Arrive  but  not  used,  50,  note. 

PORTER,  PROF.  J.  G.,  computes  sun 
set  time,  147,  note. 

POST,  P.  SIDNEY,  Colonel  com'g 
Brigade,  168. 

PRATHER,  ALLEN  W.,  Colonel  120th 
Indiana,  125. 

PRESSTMAN,  STEPHEN  W.,  Colonel 
of  Artillery,  84.  Position  of  guns, 
89,  132. 

PRISONERS,  211,  215. 

PRIVET  KNOB.  Topography,  46, 
73.  Cheatham's  headquarters,  69, 
89.  Artillery,  ib.  Lane's  skir 
mishers,  75.  Confederate  battery, 
89. 

QUARLES,  WILLIAM  A.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Brigade,  88.  His  attack, 
150.  Wounded,  151. 

RANSBOTTOM,  ALFRED,  Sergeant 
97th  Ohio,  251. 

REILLY,  JAMES  W.,  Brig.  Gen.  In 
command  of  division,  51.  Posi 
tion  at  Franklin,  ib.  His  own 
brigade,  52.  Headquarters,  81. 
Advance  of  his  second  line,  99, 
106.  Fight  at  centre,  113.  His 
later  career,  ib.,  note.  To  whom 
opposed,  150.  Second  line  re 
placed,  171.  Withdrawal,  190. 
Conrad's  men  in  his  line,  250. 


Sally  in  the  evening,  251.  Wag 
ner's  men,  257.  Cox  in  command 
on  the  line,  283. 

REPEATING  RIFLES.  A  few  compa 
nies  armed  with  them,  50,  note, 
111,  126,  127,  217. 

REPORTS,  value  of  subordinate  ones, 
18,  244. 

RETRENCHMENT  on  Carter  Hill,  56, 
117,  161.  The  double  breast 
works  at  centre,  233  et  seq. 

REYNOLDS,  DANIEL  II.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Brigade,  88.  Advance,  123. 
I  RICE,  HORACE,  Colonel  com'g  Bri 
gade  wing,  158.  At  the  works,  ib. 
I  RODGERS,  J.  H.,  Major,  Surgeon. 
Field  work,  182. 

ROSE,  THOMAS  E.,  Colonel  77th 
Pennsylvania.  On  skirmish  line, 
136. 

ROSECRANS,  WILLIAM  S.,  Maj.  Gen. 
Losses  at  Stone's  River,  15. 

Ross,  LAWRENCE  S.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Cavalry  Brigade.  Combat 
at  Hughes' s  Ford,  177,  note. 

ROUSSEAU,  LAURENCE  H.,  Lieut. 
Col.  com'g  12th  Kentucky.  On 
picket  at  Duck  River,  33.  March 
to  Franklin,  35.  Position  in  line, 
52,  59.  Charge,  99,  111. 

RUGER,  THOMAS  H.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Division,  24,  note.  Ordered 
to  Spring  Hill,  27,  32,  33.  At 
Thompson's  Station,  34.  Position 
at  Franklin,  49.  His  arrival,  53, 
54.  Artillery,  58,  116.  Head 
quarters,  80.  His  breastworks, 
81,  note,  86,  87.  Formation  of 
brigades,  118  e t  seq.  The  attack 
on  Strickland's  brigade,  ib.  On 
Moore's,  130.  Reinforced  from 
Kimball's  division,  131,  134.  Po 
sition  firm,  145.  Withdrawal, 
190.  Orders  to  Cooper,  204. 
Service  in  Cumberland  army,  222. 
Second  line  at  centre,  239.  Un 
derstanding  of  orders,  269. 

RUSSELL,  EDWARD  C.,  Orderly, 
carries  order  to  Kimball,  264, 
note. 

RUSSELL,    JOHN,     Lieut.     Colonel, 


348 


Index 


com'g  44th  Illinois.     In  Opdycke's 
charge,  99,  109,  113,  116. 

SANDERS,  D.  W.,  Major  &  A.  A.  G., 
17,  note,  44,  note.  Paper  cited, 
175,  note.  Incident,  179,  note. 

SCHOFIELD,  GEORGE  W.,  Lieut. 
Colonel  &  Chief  of  Artillery,  58. 
Inspects  positions,  82.  With 
drawal  of  artillery,  186. 

SCHOFIELD,  JOHN  M.,  Maj.  Gen. 
Duty  assigned  to  him,  8,  9. 
Commands  in  the  field  under 
Thomas,  10.  Questions  of  rank 
with  Stanley,  ib.  Reasons  for 
fighting  at  Franklin,  11.  Ordered 
to  withdraw  to  Nashville,  ib.  His 
qualities  as  commander,  19,  20. 
Ordered  to  delay  Hood,  21,  25. 
The  position  at  Duck  River,  26, 
27.  Asks  for  pontoon  bridge  at 
Franklin,  24.  Holding  Duck 
River,  28-32.  Thomas's  dis 
patches,  ib.  At  Spring  Hill,  32, 
33.  Reaches  Franklin,  37.  Com 
munications  with  Thomas,  38, 
40-43.  The  pontoons,  39.  Orders 
to  Cox,  39,  40.  Artillery  in  Fort 
Granger,  49.  Pontoons,  50,  note. 
Orders  as  to  artillery  in  line,  58. 
Moves  headquarters,  62,  67,  70. 
Forecast  of  Hood's  action,  68.  At 
Fort  Granger,  82,  95,  167.  Orders 
to  Wood,  ib.  Orders  from  Thomas, 

168.  Orders  midnight  withdrawal, 

169.  Orders  to  cavalry  in  morn 
ing,  172.     Afternoon,  176.     Even 
ing,    178,    188.     March   to   Nash 
ville,    192.     Statistics.  207  et  seq. 
Preliminary  report,  228.     Quoted, 

265.  First  orders  as  to  the  line, 

266.  As  to  artillery,  267.    Present 
in  command,  267.      Examples   of 
orders,  277,  278.     Fighting  in  the 
evening,  289,    note.     The  subject 
in    controversy,    301,     303.      His 
report,  305. 

SCOFIELD,  LEVI  T.,  Capt.  &  Act 
ing  Topographer,  17,  note.  What 
he  saw  at  the  centre,  104.  Wag 
ner's  orders,  ib.  Quoted,  170, 


note.  Second  line,  240.  Wagner's 
men,  255.  Stanley  wounded  and 
retires,  283.  Cox  in  active  com 
mand  on  the  line,  291. 

SCOTT,  THOMAS  M  ,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Brigade,  88.  Attack,  125. 

SCOVILL,  CHARLES  W.,  Lieut, 
com'g  Battery,  108,  187. 

SEARS,  CLAUDIUS  W.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Brigade,  88.  His  attack, 
150. 

SEDDON,  JAMES  A.,  Sec.  of  War, 
212. 

SELLON,  WILLIAM  R.,  Lieut.  Col. 
com'g  Post,  205. 

SEXTON,  .'AMES  A.,  Capt.  com'g 
72d  Illinois,  118,  note.  Effort  to 
retake  first  line,  161,  163,  note. 
Later  career,  ib.  Regiment  trans 
ferred,  210,  note.  Second  line  at 
centre,  239,  253.  Wagner's  men, 
253.  General  officers  on  the  line, 
285. 

SHARP,  JACOB  II.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Brigade,  88.  His  attack, 
153. 

SHAW,  THOMAS  P.,  Colonel  com'g 
Brigade.  Killed  in  attack,  153. 

SHELLEY,  CHARLES  M.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Brigade,  88.  Advance,  123, 
149.  Over  our  works,  150. 

SHERMAN,  WILLIAM  T.,  Maj.  Gen. 
Learns  Hood's  plan,  3.  His 
counter-plan,  4.  Correspondence 
with  Grant,  ib.  His  forces,  8. 
Directions  to  Thomas,  9, 10.  Men 
tioned,  272,  277,  302. 

SHERWOOD,  ISAAC  R.,  Lieut.  Col. 
com'g  lllth  Ohio.  Position  at 
Franklin,  131.  Repels  attack,  ib. 
His  missing,  135,  note.  Second 
line,  241. 

SINCLAIR,  WILLIAM  H.,  Major  & 
A.  A.  G.,  67,  note.  68. 

SMITH,  ANDREW  J.,  Maj.  Gen. 
Ordered  to  reinforce  Thomas,  7. 
Arrives  at  Nashville,  11,  21,  40, 
42,  54,  note.  Name  of  his  com- 
mnnd,  210,  note. 

SMITH,  GEORGE  W.,  Lieut.  Colonel 
com'g  74th  and  88th  Illinois,  con- 


Index 


349 


solidated.     In  Opdycke's  charge, 
115. 

SMITH,  JAMES  A.,  Brig.  Gen.  com'g 
Division,  194.  Condition  of  Cle- 
burne's  troops,  195. 

SMITH,  THOMAS  B.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Brigade,  88.  Position  in 
attack,  132,  197,  201 . 

SPARKS,  JOSEPH  S.,  Major,  Surgeon. 
Field  work,  182. 

SPAULDING,  OLIVER  L.,  Colonel 
23d  Michigan.  Builds  traverses, 
81,  note. 

SPEED,  THOMAS,  Lieut.  &  Adjt. 
12th  Kentucky,  17,  note.  Paper 
by  him,  43,  note,  97,  note.  His 
later  career,  ib.  Description  of 
fight  at  the  Cotton-Gin,  111. 

SPRING  HILL.  Distance  from 
Columbia,  27,  note.  Combat 
there,  33. 

STAFFORD,  FOUNTAIN  E.  P.,  Colo 
nel  31st  Tennessee,  com'g  Brigade, 
165. 

STANLEY,  DAVID  S.,  Maj.  Gen.  In 
command  of  Fourth  Corps  at 
Pulaski,  9.  Question  of  rank 
with  Schofield,  10.  At  Spring 
Hill,  27,  29,  34.  At  Franklin, 
orders  to  Wagner,  64,  66.  At 
Dr.  Cliffs,  67.  At  Tmett  House, 
ib.,  70.  Rides  to  the  front,  98. 
In  the  charge,  99.  Wounded,  ib. 
Retires,  100.  At  S'-hofield's  quar 
ters,  170.  Criticism  of  Col.  Stone's 
paper,  259.  Extent  of  Cox's 
command,  259  et  seq.  Nine  points, 
200,  262.  Gratuitous  controversy, 
265.  Assent  to  essential  facts, 
267.  Misinterpretation  of  orders, 
270.  Effect  of  his  appearaace  at  | 
the  front,  279  et  seq.  Leaving 
Schofield,  280.  Joins  Opdycke, 
281.  Wherry's  statement,  281, 
note.  How  long  at  the  front,  282, 
283.  At  the  hospital,  286.  At 
Schofield's  quarters,  287.  Absence 
from  the  armv  and  return,  294. 
Irregular  Report,  ib.,  327.  Cox's 
help,  297.  Passing  to  the  left,  ib.  j 
Keeping  the  field,  297,  298. 


STATISTICS  of  the  battle,  207  et  seq. 

STERL,  OSCAR  W.,  Colonel  104th 
Ohio.  Report  of  fight  at  centre, 
112. 

STEVENS' s  HILL.  See  Winstead 
Hill. 

STEVENSON,  CARTER  L.,  Maj.  Gen. 
com'g  Division,  84.  In  reserve, 
165. 

STEWART,  ALEXANDER  P.,  Lieut. 
Gen.  com'g  corps,  87.  At  Frank 
lin,  88,  94.  His  orders  from  Hood, 
98.  Advance  of  his  corps,  122  et 
seq.,  150. 

STEWART,  ROBERT  R.,  Colonel 
com'g  Cavalry  Brigade.  At 
Franklin,  172.  " 

STILES,  ISRAEL  N.,  Colonel  63d 
Indiana  com'g  Brigade,  52.  Posi 
tion  at  Franklin,  52,  53,  81,  112. 
Earliest  attacked,  121,  123.  The 
hedge,  124.  The  railway  cut,  125. 
Repulses  the  enemy,  128,  129. 
Sends  help  to  centre,  146. 

STOCKTON,  JOSEPH,  Lieut.  Col. 
com'g  72d  Illinois.  Wounded, 
118,  253. 

STONE,  HENRY,  Capt.  &  A.  A.  G., 
17,  note.  Paper  in  Century  War 
Book,  258.  Extent  of  Cox's  com 
mand,  ib. 

STONE  HILL.     See  Privet  Knob. 

STOVALL,  MARCELLUS  A.,  Brig. 
Gen.  com'g  Brigade.  Report  cited, 
166. 

STRAHL,  OTTO  F.,  Brig.  Gen.  com'g 
Brigade,  88.  In  second  line,  93, 132, 
152."  Attack,  155.  Killed,  165. 

STREIGHT,  ABEL  D .,  Colonel  51st 
Indiana,  com'g  Brigade,  168. 

STRICKLAND,  SILAS  A.,  Col.  50th 
Ohio,  com'g  Brigade,  24,  note. 
Position  at  Franklin,  54.  Fight 
at  the  centre,  106.  Formation  of 
regiments,  118.  Reinforced  from 
Stiles,  146,  152,  161.  His  second 
line,  233. 

SUMAN,  ISAAC  C.  B.,  Colonel  9th 
Indiana.  Extent  of  Bate's  attack, 
137. 

SUNSET.     Time  of,  147,  note. 


350 


Index 


Ol\ 


(TACTICS  OF  ASSAULT.     The  lesson1 
of  Franklin,  14,  218,  219. 
TAYLOR,  RICHAKD,  Lieut.  Gen.   Hisr 
department  and  relations  to  Beau- 
regard,  4. 

TELEGKAPII.  Eccentricities  of  man 
agement,  29,  30. 

THOMAS,  GEORGE  H.,  Maj.  Gen. 
His  command,  5,  6,  7.  His  troops 
scattered,  6.  His  problem,  9. 
Sherman's  suggestions,  ib.  His 
forces,  ib.  Orders  Schofield  to 
assume  command  in  the  field,  ib. 
Intends  to  command  in  person 
when  concentration  is  effectel,  10. 
Urges  Schofield  to  delay  Hood,  21, 
22.  Dispatches  to  Schofield  at 
Duck  River,  21-25.  At  Franklin, 
38,  42,  168.  Withdrawing  army 
to  Nashville,  192.  Orders  to  Coo 
per,  204,  205.  Calls  for  reports, 
227.  Relieves  Wagner,  230. 

THOMASSON,  THEODORE  S.,  Captain 
com'g  Battery,  187. 

THOMPSON,  CHARLES  R.,  Colonel 
com'g  Brigade,  204,  206. 

TRACY,  ED  WARD  E.,  Capt.  &A.D.C. 
Sent  with  orders  to  Opdycke,  96, 
261,  263.  Dismounted,  262. 

TRUETT,  ALPHKUS.  House  Scho- 
field's  headquarters,  67. 

TURNPIKES  at  Franklin,  46. 

TYLER,  ROBERT  C.,  Brig.  Gen.,  132, 
note. 

TWINING,  W.  J.,  Capt.  and  Chief 
Engineer  Army  of  Ohio,  27.  Re- 
connoissance  up  Duck  River,  ib 
His  report,  31.  At  Franklin,  37 
38.  Repairing  the  bridges,  49 
His  map,  45.  Cited,  238,  242,  245 

VAN  HORNE,  THOMAS  B.,  Historv 
of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
16.  Life  of  Gen.  Thomas,  17 
Ammunition  expended  at  Frank 
lin,  50,  note.  Wagner's  orders,  74 
note.  Stanley  wounded  and  leave; 
the  field,  284. 

WAGNER,  ARTHUR  L.,  Captain 
U.  S.  A.,  cited,  219,  note. 


WAGNER,  GEORGE  D.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  Division,  29.  At  Spring 
Hill,  ib.  35.  Rear  guard  to 
Franklin,  35.  Checking  the  ene 
my,  63.  Deployed  at  Winstead 
Hill,  64.  Orders  from  Stanley, 
65,  68.  Withdraws  to  Privet 
Knob,  69,  70.  Places  Opdycke 
in  reserve,  71.  The  division  to 
do  the  same,  71,  72.  Colloquy 
with  Opdycke,  73,  224.  New 
position  for  Conrad  and  Lane,  73, 
74.  Character  of  the  outpost,  77, 
78.  Orders,  80.  At  the  Carter 
house,  82.  Orders  to  Conrad  and 
Lane,  103  et  seq.  Rallying  his 
men,  146.  Reorganization,  171. 
Withdrawal,  188.  Conflict  of  or 
ders,  189.  Discussion  of  his  con 
duct,  220  et  seq.  Visit  to  Cox, 
222.  Opdycke's  promotion,  225. 
His  report,  229.  Relieved,  230. 
Rallying  place  at  Franklin,  243 
et  seq.  Line  of  retreat,  245,  246. 
Report  cited,  248.  The  order  to 
become  the  reserve,  261,  272. 

WALTHALL,  EDWARD  C.,  Maj.  Gen. 
com'g  Division,  88.  Deployment, 
ib.  Advance,  123,  149.  Report, 
151. 

WHEELER,  JOSEPH,  Maj.  Gen.  His 
information  to  Hood,  5. 

WHERRY,  WILLIAM  M.,  Major  & 
A.  D.  C.  82,  169.  Letter  giving 
incidents,  280,  note.  Later  career, 
281,  note.  Stanley  at  Schofield's 
headquarters,  ib.  Cox  command 
ing  on  the  line,  291. 

WHITAKKR,  WALTER  C.,  Brig. 
Gen.  com'g  Brigade.  At  Spring 
Hill,  34.  At  Franklin,  62,  136. 

WHITE,  JOHN  S..  Lieut.  Col.  com'g 
16th  Kentucky.  On  picket  at 
Duck  River,  33,  note.  Position  at 
Franklin,  52,  59.  Charge,  99, 
109.  Wounded,  114. 

WHITE,  LYMAN  A.,  Lieut,  com'g 
Battery,  187. 

WHITKSIDES,  EDWARD  G.,  Capt., 
Act'g  A.  A.  G.  Bearer  of  mes 
sage,  69. 


Index 


351 


WILSON,  JAMES  II.,  Bt.  Maj.  Gen. 
Commands  cavalry  corps,  10. 
Resists  Forrest  at  Duck  River,  24. 
26,  27.  To  keep  touch  with  infan 
try,  32.  Connection  broken,  33. 
Joins  Schofield  at  Franklin,  41. 
Cavalry  dispositions,  82,168,  172  et 
seq.  Head  (quarters,  172.  Ham- 
mohd's  brigade  at  Triune,  ib. 
Advance  at  Hughes's  Ford,  177. 
Engagement  there,  ib.,  et  seq.  At 
Scholield's  quarters,  178.  Orders 
as  to  withdrawal,  178.  March  to 
Nashville,  196.  Stanley  at  Scho- 
field's  quarters,  287.  The  hour, 
288. 


WIXSTEAD  HILL.  Topography,  46. 
Wagner  halts  there,  64,  66,  68,  71. 

WOOD,  THOMAS  J.,  Brig.  Gen. 
com'g  division,  26.  March  to 
Franklin,  35.  Position  north  of 
llarpeth  River,  62.  Ordered  to 
cover  crossing  of  Harpeth,  167. 
To  send  brigade  to  Hughes's  Ford, 
168.  Disposition  of  troops,  ib. 
To  cover  withdrawal,  178.  Re 
port,  228,  note,  323.  Command 
ing  Fourth  Corps,  293. 

ZIEGLER,  JACOB,  Captain  of  Artil 
lery.  Position  at  Franklin.  117, 
note,  131,  133.  Withdrawal,  187. 


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